Adorno, Hegel and the Philosophical Origins of Classical Social Theory by Fuller, Brian Wayne
Adorno, Hegel, and the Philosophical Origins of Classical Social Theory
Brian W. Fuller
A dissertation submitted to 
the Faculty of Graduate Studies 
in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
Graduate Program in Sociology
York University
Toronto, Ontario
December 2013
© Brian W. Fuller, 2013
ii
Abstract
The central claim of my dissertation is that the work of Theodor Adorno offers a valuable
framework for reevaluating the philosophical heritage of classical social theory. In his 
ongoing engagement with the philosophy of German Idealism, and with Hegel in 
particular, Adorno’s philosophical, sociological, and cultural critical writings involve a 
critical rethinking of the relationship between subject and object, and between individual
and society. I make two primary arguments to substantiate my claim. The first is that 
Adorno’s work must be understood within the context of the philosophy of Kant and 
Hegel. In particular, I show that Hegel’s critique of Kantian philosophy structures 
Adorno’s own understanding of the work of philosophy and of critical social theory. In 
the first part of the dissertation, I review the substance of Kantian epistemology, and of 
Hegel’s critique (Chapter 2); I then demonstrate that the Adorno’s critical philosophical 
procedure is grounded in his reading of Kant and Hegel (Chapter 3). My second primary 
argument is that Adorno’s attempt to articulate a critique of classical social theory is 
hampered by his own philosophical commitments. Through a juxtaposition of Marx’s 
critique of Hegel’s practical philosophy with Adorno’s own critique of Hegel (Chapter 4), 
I show that Adorno’s commitment to the negativity of the dialectic entails a conception 
of social theory that has not sufficiently addressed the implications of its materialist 
transformation. Adorno’s work relies upon a reduction of Hegel that remains 
problematic and unacknowledged. Next, I use a reading of Durkheim’s own 
philosophical commitments, through the lens of German Idealism, to show that Adorno’s
immanent critique of Durkheim reproduces the aporiae that it seeks to rescue (Chapter 
 iii
5). In the conclusion to the thesis (Chapter 6), I employ a discussion of the common 
themes and problems of Adorno’s critical-philosophical interpretation of classical social 
theory to suggest a reconsideration and renewal of its Hegelian heritage.
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1Chapter 1 Introduction: Adorno on the philosophical and the
sociological
Sociology as organized Wissenschaft is the outcome of 
objective societal power and its objective spirit — 
anathema to individuals, because that power is not so 
easily determined as the opinions, forms of reaction, and
ways of behaving of the socialized individuals; at best 
these index the word society (NSO 241). 
Dialectic is the self-consciousness of the objective 
context of delusion, not that which has already escaped 
(ND 398/406).
1.  Introduction to the problematic
This thesis uses the philosophical and sociological writings of Theodor W. Adorno as a 
framework for interpreting the philosophical origins and nature of a distinctively 
sociological mode of thought. My conceit is that Adorno’s broad interests and objects of 
critique—spanning philosophy, literary and cultural criticism, musical theory, and 
sociology—provide a unique opportunity to explore and better comprehend the 
conceptual transition between philosophy and sociology.1 While not a “typical” 
sociologist, Adorno was invested in sociological ideas and debates, partly as a result of 
pragmatic considerations, but more importantly because his critical-materialist 
perspective demanded a constant attention to the totality of society. Adorno’s struggles 
to articulate his version of “nonidentity thinking” often included discussions of 
sociological concepts and thinkers; while his more properly sociological efforts relied 
heavily on his interpretation of philosophical notions. As Bernstein (2006, 107) has 
1
 I mean here that the narrative that I have crafted here, partly as a result of its anachronism, is 
better understood as a conceptual history, rather than as a primarily historical account of 
persons, ideas, and texts. In this way, I envision it falling somewhere between a Hegelian 
perspective on the history of concepts, and Adorno’s own configurational approach. On the notion
of conceptual history, the origins of which have been variously attributed to Hegel and to Dilthey, 
see, e.g., Koselleck (2002); on Hegel’s history of philosophical concepts, see Macdonald (2006); 
for more on Adorno’s configurations and constellations, see, in particular, Benzer (2011b); Jarvis 
(1998); Paddison (1993).
2articulated, straightforwardly, “Adorno’s conception of dialectic welds together 
philosophical and sociological elements.”
Rather than claiming that Adorno is uniquely situated to shed light on this topic 
simply by virtue of his professional activity as both a philosopher and a sociologist, I 
believe that his significance stems from his understanding of the essential tasks of a 
contemporary critical thought. Adorno was famously skeptical about the project of 
Enlightenment reason, arguing, in a series of works, that it constituted a form of thought 
which was incapable of achieving the fundamentally new, but rather merely passively 
reproduced existing conditions. This form of “identity thinking,” stemming as it does 
from the foundations of Western culture, broadly permeates the forms of contemporary 
art and science alike. In this  sense, Adorno’s critique of “positivist” modes of sociological
thought and research, and of philosophical trends such as phenomenology and 
“fundamental ontology,” share significant commonalities. 
Adorno looked above all to the philosophy of German Idealism as a source of 
inspiration for his endeavors to articulate a “negative dialectic,” and his work is 
incomprehensible without a grasp of this background and his engagement with it. While 
Adorno’s relationship to German Idealism has been mined significantly in the last 
decades, this has primarily only been with reference to his philosophical and aesthetic 
work. Adorno’s own version of sociological research, as well as his understanding of the 
nature of society and of sociology, has more often been neglected—as least within the 
English language literature. As a result of this neglect, the implications of Adorno’s 
philosophical education for his own sociology and theory of society have yet to be 
seriously investigated.
3Additionally, the relationship between the dominant themes of German idealist 
philosophy and “classical” social theory has been significantly neglected. Despite the 
extraordinary significance of the work of Kant and Hegel to major contemporary 
philosophical positions, there has been very little literature from the perspective of 
sociology. When combined with the fact that philosophical and epistemological concerns 
are central to sociology and social research, this gap becomes even more significant. One 
reason for this neglect may be the difficulty of the relevant texts, along with the rise of 
the analytic philosophical perspective. However, many problems and themes from the 
German idealist era continue to haunt philosophy, as the recent resurgence of interest in 
Hegel has indicated. 
My perspective here focuses largely on the epistemological shift that occurs in 
Hegel’s critique of Kantian theoretical philosophy. After Kant’s “Copernican” turn—
which significantly revised the Cartesian conception of the subject—Hegel’s admiration 
for, and trenchant critique of, Kant’s version of “transcendental idealism” attempted to 
understand both subjectivity and objectivity in relationship to an “absolute.” Although 
Hegel’s doctrine of “absolute idealism” is still being interpreted in diverse ways, its 
influence has been enormous.2 His reinterpretation of the Kantian subject within the 
absolute involves an attention to social-historical dynamics; but the systematic character 
of his work, along with his prose style, make interpretation and appropriation difficult.
The plan for the present work is to tease out the relationships between the critical 
philosophical, the epistemological, and the sociological thought of Adorno, by looking at 
his critique of idealism (idealistic philosophy), of Kant and Hegel in particular, and his 
2 Pippin (1989, 3) begins his first book on Hegel by noting the irony that “Hegel seems to be in the
impossible position of being both extraordinarily influential and almost completely inaccessible.”
4relationship to the epistemological and sociological perspectives of Marx and Durkheim. 
Adorno’s particular understanding of society is indebted to both Marx and Hegel, but 
also shares affinities with Durkheim. More importantly, Adorno’s interpretation of 
German Idealist philosophy structures his engagement with classical social theory in a 
way that sheds light on its philosophical origins. To put this another way, it is not that 
Adorno investigates these origins explicitly, but rather that his own attempts to articulate
critical versions of philosophy and sociology—as Rose (1978) has put it, his “search for a 
style”—illuminate the conceptual issues at play.
The significant conceptual issues here revolve around the conceptualization of the 
subject. Kant introduced the concept of the autonomous or “spontaneous” subject, which
determines itself through its own reason; however, the abstractness of his account was 
roundly criticized. Hegel’s approach sought the autonomy of the subject, somewhat 
paradoxically, not in the abstract transcendental sphere, but rather in its social-historical
context (Pippin 1997, 171). The “idealism” which characterizes both of these positions 
contains this notion of the freedom of the subject at its core; in the critique of idealism 
that often marks a “sociological” turn, this notion is often excised theoretically.
1.1 From philosophy to sociology: the context of German idealism
To briefly situate Adorno’s work in the context of German Idealist philosophy: his efforts 
to situate his own critical intentions within the intellectual disciplines of philosophy and 
sociology can be framed in terms of the modern “problem of knowledge.” If we 
emphasize the origins of this problematic in Descartes’ attempt to come to terms with 
modern science, then Adorno’s own extended critique of the “identity thinking” inherent 
in the modern scientific method contains an engagement with  this central problem of 
5modernity: that the scientific revolution has undermined our philosophical forms of 
knowledge, and they must be set right (though not on a new foundation). The Dialectic 
of  Enlightenment laid out the terms of Adorno’s version of this criticism, but his work 
would continue to probe its contours for the remainder of his career. My intention, in 
situating Adorno’s work within this broad philosophical problematic, is to highlight the 
significance of philosophical heritage for his ultimate understanding and critique of 
modern society and sociology. I agree on the whole with Kilminster’s analysis that the 
“development and character of European sociology cannot be fully understood without 
taking into account the ways in which its practitioners have tried—though not always 
fully successfully—to transform into social scientific research programmes various 
problems and issues they encountered in the writings of philosophers” (1998, 27). Often 
taking the form of a series of critiques of various philosophers, as well as of multiple 
cultural forms, Adorno’s work must be situated within a much larger discourse in order 
to be properly understood.
The question then arises as to the proper scope of such an undertaking. Although 
keenly attuned to the limits of human reason, Adorno’s own critical lens recognized very 
few boundaries. In the following study, I will focus on those figures whose work is most 
important for questions concerning the problem of modern knowledge within the 
disciplinary transition from philosophy to sociology and social theory: Kant and Hegel 
on the philosophical side, Marx and Durkheim on the sociological. The full justification 
of this selection will come out over the course of the dissertation; however, a brief 
account begins with the significance of Hegel’s philosophy for the entirety of Adorno’s 
work (Jarvis 1998; O’Connor 2004). Adorno devoted individual chapters of Negative 
6Dialectics to Kant and Hegel, and his work cannot be understood outside of the German 
Idealist context. This philosophical (epistemological and ethical) context is important 
because it remained so central to Adorno’s own interdisciplinary concerns. 
With regard to sociology and social theory, Adorno cast a similarly wide net in terms
of his critiques, but considered Marx to be of primary importance. A significant question 
here is the extent to which we can say that it is Marx’s explicitly sociological concerns 
which are influential for Adorno. He clearly viewed himself as a critical materialist. My 
emphasis on Marx and Durkheim here is based upon two primary considerations. First, 
each is significant for Adorno’s own work. Marx’s imprint, especially his critique of Hegel
and his theory of value, are all over Adorno’s work, while Durkheim is most often used as
a foil in Adorno’s writings on sociology. However, he did write an introduction to the 
German translation of Durkheim’s book Philosophy and  Sociology, which arguably 
gives the best view of his critique. Second, my selection follows the status and position of 
Marx and Durkheim within the sociological “canon.” Although representing only two of 
the “big three” classical sociologists, Marx and Durkheim are often characterized as 
“structural” or “functional” theorists. This makes them important figures for my analysis 
here, since it will emphasize the significance of the Hegelian concepts of “totality” and 
“objective spirit” for thinking sociologically.3
In isolating the intellectual connections between Adorno and the classical German 
Idealist philosophers, and the “classical” sociologists, my intent is to conduct a kind of 
“dual movement,” with respect to Adorno’s work, which (1) locates Adorno’s 
3
 The original plan for the work included a chapter on Adorno’s reading of Weber, which had to be
omitted due to concerns of time and space. Such a study, which will be completed in the future, is 
important for a full understanding of Adorno’s perspective on the relationship of the individual 
and society, the character of subjectivity in modern society, and the interpretative character of 
social critique. 
7philosophical and sociological work within the philosophy of German Idealism; and (2) 
situates his work within the classical sociological tradition, by looking at his engagement 
with the work of Marx and Durkheim. Although this may be an unorthodox approach, 
through it I hope to provide a means of understanding the continued sociological 
significance of these philosophical origins, and contribute to the meager literature on 
this topic. The broader significance, and the further goal of my study, is (3) to illuminate 
the ways in which philosophical paradigms have been translated into sociological 
concerns, and what has been lost in the process.4 
1.2 Caveats and limitations
Working analytically with Adorno’s writings poses some problems for the researcher. 
Adorno’s intellectual procedure, as a critical method, is based in the concept and practice
of negation; as a result, attempting to draw out a positive theory is typically folly.5 While 
I try to avoid this trap here, the reader can judge the success of my efforts. The problem 
is exacerbated by looking at Adorno’s thought in comparison to Durkheim, a very 
4
 The present work also follows on a recent revival of interest in Hegel’s philosophy among some 
of those who were previously most skeptical of it: analytic philosophers. Andrew Bowie (1994b, 2)
puts it nicely: “The recent revival of interest in German Idealism has been fuelled by the 
widespread rejection of philosophies which entail a subject-object duality and a notion of 
cognition which depends upon assuming a mind separate from the rest of the world. The 
suspicion that the mechanistic, objectifying forms of explanation that came to dominate natural 
science and philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth century are seriously inadequate has 
led to a reconsideration of some of the major philosophical positions of the early nineteenth 
century.” But he also points to a paradox that will be relevant here: “On the one hand, [German 
Idealism] is seen as a form of totalising metaphysics that merely conjured away, rather than 
overcoming, the modern problem of the relationship between thought and being that was 
revealed by Kant’s critique of previous metaphysics. On the other hand, German Idealism is seen 
as that strand of modern philosophy which began to develop a methodologically defensible way of
overcoming the split between consciousness and the world” (1994b, 2). For additional 
commentary on this theme, see Beiser (2008); Redding (2007).
5
 This point was recently acknowledged by Honneth (2005), who corrected his earlier (1993) 
critique of Adorno’s social theory, saying that he now conceives of Adorno’s work as a 
hermeneutic of capitalism.
8different kind of thinker. The differences in their approach to reason is often the explicit 
target of Adorno’s criticisms; however, the significance of the comparison goes beyond 
this. While I do not attempt to uncover an explicit theory of society or theory of 
knowledge in Adorno’s work, I do try to emphasize the ways in which his interpretations 
are partial and/or polemical, and any significant consequences that result therefrom.
My own perspective here has additionally led to some difficulties. While much of the
following will concern Adorno’s interpretation of Kant and Hegel, I then propose to 
examine Adorno’s reading of Marx and Durkheim, in light of his interpretation of 
German Idealist philosophy. While I believe that this is a fruitful approach—for reasons 
briefly mentioned above and which will be clear by the end of the thesis—I have had to 
tread a line through classical social theory, discussing the approaches of Marx and 
Durkheim, but typically not addressing these thinkers directly. The significance of my 
claims I think can be seen best through Adorno’s eyes, and, while I try to give pointers 
about the limitations of his perspective, I do not spend time arguing for its veracity. In 
my opinion, this path would be a dead end. The problematization of Adorno’s 
interpretation of Durkheim, in particular, would be an easy task, but where would it get 
one? For a thinker who was explicitly concerned with the line between truth and falsity, 
who admitted an approach based on exaggeration and fiercely criticized clarity in 
philosophical thought, the significance of any particular critique is often performative. 
Given this, it may be hubristic to approach my questions in this way. I can only hope that
I have, by the end of the work, convinced the reader of its value.
One more caveat regarding Adorno relates the nature of his thought to the sheer 
volume of his writings. While I have read a significant portion of Adorno’s oeuvre, I 
9cannot claim mastery, especially of the works concerning music and aesthetics. 
Acknowledging that one cannot neatly categorize his work into categories of 
“philosophy,” “sociology,” “aesthetics,” etc.—indeed, this point is of central concern to 
my discussion here—I thereby admit some fundamental limitations and potential flaws. I
have necessarily had to limit the discussion to the present themes. This problem relates 
back to the dialectical nature of the work of both Hegel and Adorno,6 as well as 
pragmatic concerns. I have tried to find a balance between analysis and expression here, 
while bracketing some themes and texts. 
While I have drawn from a wide range of Adorno’s texts, I have focused on the 
themes within Negative Dialectics, which are discussed in many other works (e.g., EDi, 
H, KK, LGF, SO, VND), and on his writings about sociologists and sociological themes 
(e.g., EDu, EP, ES, G, PETG, PS). For the former, I believe that it represents the 
“pinnacle” of his philosophical efforts, and is certainly rich enough to sustain my topic. 
With regard to Adorno’s “sociological” thoughts, I have chosen to focus on his writings 
about thinkers and themes, rather than explicitly on the texts which comprise his 
empirical sociological efforts, such as The Authoritarian Personality, Currents of Music, 
the Group Experiment, and The Stars Down to Earth. While my original plan for the 
work included these texts, I soon realized that they would be beyond the scope of my 
concerns here. I hope that the present work on the relationship of philosophy to 
6
 Though the problem is different in each case. In Hegel the issue concerns the systematic nature 
of his thought, which unifies logic, nature, and spirit, leaving nothing untouched. For Adorno, 
despite his stark criticism of Hegel’s totality, and his corresponding “micrological” focus and 
configurational form, everything nevertheless remains related through the inescapable mediation 
of the social. There is the additional issue of his employment of Hegelian terminology, discussed 
below.
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sociology in Adorno’s writings will lead to a more thorough investigation of his empirical 
sociological efforts.7
Adorno’s style of writing stems directly from his theories. Hohendahl has noted, 
with respect to Adorno’s work in the mode of literary critique, that it is impossible to 
understand Adorno’s contributions from a conventional perspective. “To appreciate 
them, one must pay attention to their form and manner of presentation as much as to 
their topics and arguments . . . Their artistic form makes Adorno’s essays incompatible 
with and suspect to the project of academic criticism, which is based on the idea of 
research and scientific argument” (1995, 75-77). Although the “incompatibility” 
mentioned here may be an overstatement, the problem is real enough, and applies to a 
significant number of his works. I hope to have successfully drawn out meanings and 
implications here, without too much reduction. I have quoted liberally from his texts, 
often choosing to let his words “speak for themselves,” rather than relying of excessive 
paraphrase. 
A final, related, note concerns translations. I have generally worked with the original
German texts when available, providing reference to both the original text and the 
English translation; and have indicated when the translations given are my own. The 
translation of Adorno’s texts presents a number of issues, well-discussed by Hullot-
Kentor in his introduction to his translation of Aesthetic Theory. I have chosen here to 
7
 As this project was nearing its latter stages, the first comprehensive work in English on Adorno’s
sociology appeared (Benzer 2011b). While Benzer’s book is rich and well-reasoned, and admirable
in its thoroughness and clarity, I believe that my perspective here complements it. Benzer seeks to
not only describe, but also to evaluate the contemporary significance of Adorno’s sociology (13), 
and he highlights its origins in, and relationships to, Adorno’s theory of language and his critiques
of concepts from various philosophers. However, I believe that his discussion neglects precisely 
what I focus in on here: that Adorno’s work (philosophical or sociological) cannot be understood 
without a thorough reckoning of its engagement with Hegel, the details of which have 
implications for sociological thought. I’ll discuss this critique in more detail in my conclusion.
11
stick rather closely to the German text, reproducing some of the idiosyncrasies of his 
style.
2. The plan of the work
The thrust of my argument in the following is twofold. First, I aim to demonstrate that 
Adorno’s relationship to the classical social theorists cannot be understood outside of his
interpretation and critique of German Idealist philosophy; second, that with this 
philosophical interpretation Adorno commits himself to a reproduction of the aporiae of 
sociological thought. While Adorno would surely not claim that philosophy can or should
be consistent, rooted as it is in a society of contradiction, his attempt to recover a 
“negative” dialectic out of the remains of Hegel’s own contains difficulties that cannot be 
written off to the necessities of the constellation, or to the rejection of enlightenment 
thought’s obsession with clarity. In terms of the broader story of the philosophical 
origins of classical social theory, I hope to demonstrate that the significant break with 
the reflective thought of Kantianism remains with Hegel, rather than Adorno.
My argument obtains its bearings not from a general conception of idealism, but 
from Hegel’s critique of Kant, or more generally the relationship between a Hegelian, 
“objective,” speculative form of idealism and a Kantian transcendental one. In Chapter 
Two I introduce the relevant themes in Kant’s philosophy, and elaborate my 
interpretation of Hegel’s critique and its significance. This chapter sets the stage for a 
discussion of Adorno’s reading of both Kant and Hegel, to which Chapter Three is 
devoted. The result of these chapters will be an understanding of the philosophical 
difficulties involved in Adorno’s project. In an attempt to situate himself somewhere 
12
between Kant and Hegel, Adorno develops an account of experience intended to 
overcome the problems of each.
The discussion then takes a sociological turn, spending the next two chapters on 
Adorno’s relationship with Marx (Chapter Four) and Durkheim (Chapter Five). I frame 
these discussions in terms of the attempt, within classical social theory generally, to 
evolve a methodology in part out of the critique of philosophical reason. Marx and 
Durkheim would have their own versions of what constitutes the “objectivity” of the 
social. Adorno, while taking his cues explicitly from Marx’s critical and dialectical 
perspective rather than Durkheim’s static scientific one, cannot provide a satisfactory 
critique, given his philosophical orientations.
3. Review of the relevant literature
As a means of organizing the previous work which is relevant to my topic here, I have 
broken the discussion down into two categories. The first examines works which have 
discussed sociology, and/or sociological theory, within the context of German Idealist 
philosophy; the second examines the research on Adorno which is related to his social 
theory in particular. 
3.1 From philosophy to sociology
The significance of German idealism on the development of sociological thinking in the 
late 19th century should not be underestimated. Although significantly mediated by such 
important successor movements as left-Hegelianism and neo-Kantianism, it is the 
watershed of Kant’s “Copernican revolution,” and Hegel’s reaction to it, which is 
ultimately foundational for classical social and sociological theory. Adorno’s concern 
13
with the philosophies of Kant and Hegel can be read through this lens, which we can 
then apply to his understanding of the sociological canon, and the tasks of sociology 
itself. More broadly, I believe that these themes represent a hidden heritage of classical 
sociological theory. Most often discussed in terms of its philosophical grounding in neo-
Kantianism (Weber), left-Hegelianism (Marx), and positivism (Durkheim), the “canon” 
of classical sociological theory has a relationship to older philosophical traditions which 
has yet to be investigated in its full complexity. Of course, these later traditions are 
extremely important, but each draws upon, or can be seen profitably in relation to, the 
German idealist tradition. In particular, the twin themes of autonomy and objectivity 
highlight the relationship between practical and theoretical knowledge, and the 
conception of the subject-object relationship which essentially underlies social theory.
There is a familiar story here, which tells of the origins of the attempt to analytically 
separate the Geisteswissenschaften from the Naturwissenschaften, an effort which 
originated in the post-Hegelian era. One of the key figures here is Dilthey, whose own 
hermeneutic approach explicitly attempted to abstract the Hegelian notion of “objective 
spirit” from its philosophical (metaphysical) context, and use it for a new fledgling 
Wissenschaft. “For Dilthey, the need to liberate Hegel’s idea of objectiver [sic] Geist 
from his systematic metaphysics meant extracting it from his tripartite classification of 
spirit into its ‘subjective,’ ‘objective,’ and, crucially, ‘absolute’ forms. It was ‘absolute 
spirit’—often taken simply as a synonym for ‘God’—that showed Hegel’s commitment to 
a pre-Kantian dogmatic, and in particular, spiritualistic, metaphysics” (Redding 2011, 
213; see also Bambach 1995; Rose 1981; Schnädelbach 1984). Dilthey’s attempt was 
14
influential for the two schools of neo-Kantianism, who, as I’ll briefly discuss in my 
commentary on Rose below, sought a more explicit route back to Kant’s critique. 
Rather than focus on these historical themes, here I review more contemporary 
literature, leaving aside the mediating factors of Dilthey’s hermeneutics, neo-Kantian 
epistemology, and left-Hegelianism.8 Within the set of texts which have discussed the 
philosophical origins of classical social theory, there is a small group which explicitly 
examines the German Idealist heritage. Among these, there is no general consensus as to
the significant themes, nor the nature of the influence. Instead, we have a plethora of 
stories with a diverse set of characters. Here I will only review the texts which discuss the
figures that I deal with in this study. First, I’ll briefly evaluate a number of minor papers, 
before turning to a few book-length studies.
3.1.1 Minor texts
John Hund (1998) frames the topic here in perhaps the broadest fashion, arguing 
that Hegel’s critique of Kant marked a transition from an individual, psychological 
(“asociological”) perspective, to an explicitly sociological one. He goes so far as to claim 
that Hegel provides a “paradigm” for sociology. However, while Hund does focus on a 
neglected strain of thought, he goes little further than associating “collective ideas” and 
“social objects” in an attempt at a quasi-Hegelian story of constructionism. “The nucleus 
of Hegel’s idealism is the idea that self and society are synthetic unities that cannot be 
reduced to collections of self-subsistent phenomena out of which they are constructed” 
8
 I also omit discussions within the philosophy of social science literature, which are typically 
situated with an analytic philosophical perspective, discussing the paradigms of social science 
within a framework of positivism, realism, interpretivism, and Marxism/critical theory. Even in 
more recent texts, even ones focusing on “contintental” themes, the discussion does not extend 
back to German Idealism, and rarely discusses Adorno outside of a general “critical theory” 
interpretation, centered on Horkheimer and Habermas (see, e.g., Baert 2005; Sherratt 2006).
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(239). While this may be an appropriately sociological reading of Hegel’s intent, it is 
hardly an accurate statement of Hegel’s idealism. Hund’s account is geared towards 
making a basic analogy between the Hegel-Kant split, and that between sociology and 
psychology, and his article culminates in a table comparing the Kantian (individual, 
psychological) and the Hegelian (collective, sociological) paradigms of philosophy. The 
latter is suggested to have been the source of the sociologies of Durkhiem, Simmel, and 
Dilthey. While Hund’s article is suggestive, it eschews any kind of detailed analysis.
In a couple of articles that seem to have been largely ignored, Knapp (1985; 1986) 
issues a call for a thorough examination of the relationship between Hegel and the 
diverse and divergent paradigms of sociological thought. In Knapp’s analysis of the time, 
“the most commonly accepted family tree of sociology hardly recognizes Hegel even as a 
distant ancestor” (1986, 586). He proceeds to provide a brief discussion of the ways in 
which the complex meaning of Hegel’s concept of the “universal” serves to structure the 
conflict (Marx), functionalist (Durkheim), and organizational (Weber) approaches in 
classical sociological theory. Although this work has some cogency, and would be 
followed up by more detailed work on the Hegel-Durkheim relationship (discussed 
below), Knapp’s approach was limited by his conception of Hegel’s universal. Although 
his intent was to show its complexity, in understanding the universal according to the 
meanings of “general, public, common, universal, and universalistic,” Knapp explicitly 
removed the problematic concept of the absolute. While this may have been a reasonable
strategy, for my purposes here of understanding Adorno’s relationship to both German 
idealism and classical social theory, the speculative portions of Hegel’s philosophy are 
crucial. Although he took his inspiration from Rose (1981), by restricting the “universal” 
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in this way, Knapp fundamentally cuts himself off from a thorough understanding of the 
intellectual tradition that he wants to re-value.9
With a more historical approach, but a roughly similar goal as Knapp, Bubner 
(1984) laments the excision of Hegel from Anglo-American philosophy. Taking his cue 
from Hegel’s assertion that “Philosophy is its own epoch comprehended in thought”, 
Bubner discusses the history of the reception of Hegel by the left-Hegelians and neo-
Marxists, Dilthey, Freyer, and Mannheim, before moving on to his own perspective. 
Rather than the concept of “objective spirit,” or the “critical confrontation of theory and 
reality” addressed in dialectics, Bubner examines the significance of this dictum of 
Hegel’s for philosophy and its historical context. In this interpretation, philosophy must 
come to terms with the relationship between its own essence and its historical 
manifestations. In other words, it can only abstract from its own historical specificity at 
its own peril—every philosophy, no matter how dogmatic, will ultimately, in the long run,
be relativized to its own time period. Philosophy thus faces the paradoxical situation of 
needing to assert its own autonomy, while recognizing its own historicity (1984, 151f.).
Philosophy must therefore conceptually articulate the essence of an era, without the 
removal of its own perspective. To achieve this, it must differentiate itself from an 
everyday or common sense perspective through this mode of reflection.
The result of disinterest in the contingency of the moment over against the genuine 
philosophical interest in reason is that those factors in any given historical situation 
which resist the activity of rational elucidation prove to be the fundamental structures of 
an epoch. What philosophy is unable to relativize to any greater degree, it must 
recognize in the name of reason itself. This is precisely the meaning of Hegel’s 
provocative motto of the actuality of the rational and the rationality of the actual (1984, 
154).
9
 Knapp does make the important recognition that with the rise of new approaches in social 
theory related to literary criticism, phenomenology, existentialism, among others, the intellectual 
background of Hegel has only grown more significant (1986, 607).
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The social sciences, however, as precisely sciences, are more involved in the formation of 
common opinion about our world, rather than with its comprehension. Philosophy 
attempts to uncover the rational “structures;” it “brings to light that which, independent 
of the historical moment, is worth considering on generally valid grounds” (1984, 156).
Despite its relative lack of development, Bubner’s perspective brings up some 
important issues for my discussion here. Most importantly, the issue of Hegel’s 
significance for the social sciences goes beyond a particular concept such as the 
“universal” or even “objective spirit.” In attempting to articulate his own system of 
philosophy, Hegel provides some indication (if not a model) of the relationship between 
philosophy and other forms of thought, including both “common sense” and science. 
Although Bubner’s aim was to move beyond conceptions of this intellectual history which
prioritize “objective spirit” and dialectical critique, my own approach in this work will be 
more to attempt to relate the significance of all three of these approaches. Admittedly, 
this is a large undertaking; however, I believe that it is necessary to discuss the 
relationships among various aspects of the Hegelian influence in order to grasp his 
relevance for Adorno. Taking inspiration from Knapp’s attempt to unify sociological 
paradigms through their common intellectual heritage, I will attempt a broader, if not 
unified, perspective here.
Shalin (1990) argues that German idealist philosophy, or, as he refers to it, 
“transcendental idealism”, was instrumental in providing an alternative model of the 
subject-object relationship, opposed to the dualism of rationalism. He identifies the 
importance of idealism’s “distinctly sociological dimension,” namely that it conceives of 
sociality and rationality as “dialectically intertwined,” and discusses its influence on the 
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“cultural science” tradition in Germany (Dilthey, Weber, Simmel), and the interactionist 
tradition in the United States (Mead, Cooley, Dewey, Pierce) (1990, 4). Although Shalin’s
work provides a useful starting point, it is essentially a very broad overview, and fails to 
differentiate between the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, or between 
the various social theorists that he covers.
There is a small body of literature that focuses more narrowly on Durkheim’s 
relationship to German Idealism in general, and to Kant and Hegel specifically. Collins 
(1985) notes the influence of Hegel on the philosophical work of both Renouvier and, 
through him, Hamelin, both of whom were important intellectual influences on 
Durkheim. Although for Kant the transcendental “I” is perceived as the “ground” of the 
empirical “I,” Renouvier’s “personalism” holds that the grounding of the self, as a moral 
agent (practical reason has priority over theoretical reason here) is not in the 
transcendental sphere, but in the “concrete empirical individual” (Collins 1985, 58). 
Durkheim began with this basis in the empirical individual, and moved to an empirical 
conception of the social.
Knapp (1985; 1986) and Tekiner (2002) have examined Durkheim’s Hegelian 
heritage explicitly. Knapp in particular finds that many of Durkheim’s acknowledged 
intellectual influences were themselves significantly Hegelian, and that the Hegelian 
conception of Geist is reminiscent of Durkheim’s conception of society, the collective 
conscience, collective representations and even the homo duplex. He iterates a list of 
“common elements” of the work of Hegel and Durkheim, including the focus on 
“objective, supra-individual” processes; the conception of a functional system; a focus on
the sphere of culture; and the idea that “[r]eligion expresses the moral reality of the 
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society” (Knapp 1986, 596; 1985, 5). Although his reading suffers from an overly 
simplified account of Hegel (Geist, for instance, is glossed simply as ‘culture’), Knapp 
provides a plausible explanation of the reasons Durkheim might have had for explicitly 
distancing himself from the work of Hegel, and he usefully juxtaposes a properly 
scientific approach from the speculative philosophy of Hegel.  
In a more recent article, Gangas (2007) has provided the most sophisticated 
“rethinking” of the relationship between Hegel and Durkheim. He focuses primarily on 
the similarities between the accounts of Durkheim and Hegel of the reconciliation of 
individual and society. He correctly notes that many of the readings of Durkheim and 
Hegel suffer from a misunderstanding of how each treats the concept of the “individual.” 
According to Gangas, neither thinker subordinated the individual to the social, as is 
commonly believed. Gangas’s reading is interesting in the context of Adorno’s critique of 
Durkheim, because it highlights the notion of organic solidarity as an “organic-
teleological model” of society, against the abstract universal of mechanical solidarity. It 
would certainly appear that Adorno misreads Durkheim in a way that is criticized by 
Gangas; but my goal here is less to fit Adorno into Gangas’s or any other particular 
critique (I believe that Adorno misreads Hegel’s version of “totality,” and the 
corresponding state organism, in a similar way to his misreading of Durkheim), but more
to further refine the delineation of conceptions of the social at work in German idealism, 
Durkheim and Adorno. However, I certainly will not claim that Adorno provides a 
sophisticated reading of Durkheim as a Hegelian—as  elsewhere, Adorno’s focus is on the
productivity of critique, rather than its accuracy. But his account of Durkheim relies 
crucially on his understanding of Hegel, and so with this examination, I hope to map out 
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these relationships more fully. Like both Gangas and Knapp, I believe that the 
significance of the Hegelian Geist is of crucial importance for an understanding of 
Durkheim’s sociology. In addition, it is the conception of coercion and its experiential 
grounding which is important to Adorno. The aporias created through Durkheim’s 
attempt to socially ground the categories of thought are addressed in part through what 
may be considered his “Hegelian” conception of social reality. Adorno picks up on the 
vague Hegelian roots of Durkheim’s thought.
3.1.2 Rose
Gillian Rose (1981) gives by far the most comprehensive account of the relationship 
between sociological thought and the German Idealist heritage. As opposed to traditional
accounts, which tend to dichotomise the perspectives of Durkheim and Weber, Rose 
lumps them both under the heading of neo-Kantianism. Although they are to be 
differentiated within this category, according to the two main schools, of more 
significance is their similarity in refusing to go beyond a merely transcendental 
sociology, which presupposes the existence of its objects. This was the effect of the turn 
away from Hegel and his metaphysical system of philosophy, and the “return to Kant” of 
the neo-Kantian philosophers. Rose’s account emphasizes the neo-Kantian distinction 
between Geltung (validity) and Werte (values), and the shift from a transcendental logic, 
concerned with the conditions of experience, to what Rose calls a “general logic,” which 
discusses the creation of objects. This general logic, a “logic of validity” (Geltungslogik), 
took objectification under its scope, and detached perceptual and empirical reality, a 
move which entailed the independence of the process of cognition from the “logic of 
thought” (HCS 9). She traces this grounding through the Marburg and Heidelberg 
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schools of neo-Kantian philosophy, and into the canon of sociology (and Marxism), 
claiming that the important distinction between the opposing sides of the debate is only 
whether they considered values or validity to be primary.
This heritage is crucial for understanding “the idea of a scientific sociology” for 
Rose, since both Durkheim and Weber adhered to this perspective of an independent 
realm of validity (apart from individual perception).  “It was the ambition of sociology to 
substitute itself for traditional theoretical and practical philosophy, as well as to secure a 
sociological object-domain sui generis” (HCS 14). Rose analyzes the sociologies of 
Durkheim and Weber in terms of Kant’s constitutive versus regulative principles. 
Durkheim, giving priority to validity over values, considers society to be constitutive of 
its objects (moral facts), since it is a transcendental precondition of their possibility. 
Weber, on the other hand, giving values the priority and sui generis status, used his 
notion of “objective possibility,” which grounds the ideal type, as a regulative principle 
with which to make sense of the object. Validity here is constituted by subjective belief. 
This has led to “two logics of the social,” one, identified with Durkheim, that “identifies 
social reality by a critique of consciousness,” and the other modeled on Weber which 
“locates social reality within the realm of consciousness and its oppositions” (HCS 21). 
Only the latter is properly “sociology,” in the sense of a differentiation from the natural 
sciences, while the other has traditionally been accused of positivism.10
10
 In Rose’s analysis, a third variant of Geltungslogik was provided by Simmel, who considered 
the sphere of validity to be a “third realm,” existing beyond both subjective being and objective 
being, which are its modes of realization. Rose considers this to be merely a recasting, in 
Simmelian lebensphilosophische terminology, of the Kantian critique of neo-Kantianism. “His 
critical philosophy of culture examines the relation between the independent realm of validities 
and the soul or life, which dwells partly in harmony with the realm of validities and partly in 
opposition” (HCS 25). This cultural sphere of moral or practical consciousness is comprised of 
forms of life which attain an independent validity (alienation) from their creators. This sphere is 
starkly opposed by Simmel’s analysis of theoretical consciousness, which alone constitutes the 
unity of sociation.
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Taking on Marxist critics of Hegel, Rose categorizes the work of both Lukács and 
Adorno as original but unsuccessful attempts to break out of the “neo-Kantian paradigm 
of validity and values.” “The relation of their work to neo-Kantianism is the source both 
of its sociological power and the peculiarity of its contribution to Marxist theory. They 
turned the neo-Kantian paradigm into a Marxist sociology of cultural forms by 
combining Simmel’s philosophy of form with a selective generalization of Marx’s theory 
of commodity fetishism” (HCS 27).  Lukács made it clear that “reification is the 
specifically capitalist form of objectification” (HCS 28). Social forms only become valid 
when they are viewed from the standpoint of totality, not in isolation from it. In this way,
Lukács shifted Geltungslogik into “a theory of historical mediation.” However, the 
problem with this is that, without the connection to Marx’s theory of value, Lukács’s 
crucial categories of “mediation” and “totality” are really only “a kind of shorthand 
instead of a sustained theory” (HCS 29). By tracing the concept of reification back to 
Kant’s distinction between the rationality of the cognitive synthetic capacity, and the 
irrationality of the sphere of noumena, Lukács set up a Fichtean resolution in the 
standpoint of the proletariat.
Adorno, in Rose’s account, despite his Hegelian-inspired critique of Lukács, could 
not fully incorporate it. “Adorno largely accepted Lukács’ generalization of Marx’s theory
of commodity fetishism. Instead of understanding capitalist social, cultural and artistic 
forms as ‘objectifications’ or ‘facts of consciousness,’ Adorno analysed them as 
determinants of the contradictions of consciousness” (HCS 32). Rose’s critique of 
Adorno places him squarely within the “neo-Fichteanism” which characterizes the 
theoretical dead end leading from the critique of Kant. Adorno’s “morality of method” 
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remained too abstract, and trapped within “a realm of infinite striving or task, a 
morality, in the limited sense which Hegel criticized: a general prescription not located 
in the social relations which underlie it, and hence incapable of providing any sustained 
and rigorous analysis of those relations” (HCS 33). 
The point of Rose’s analysis is that Hegel’s thought has been “mystified” by Marxist 
and non-Marxists sociology alike, the former by postulating an artificial distinction 
between the “conservative system” of Hegel, and his “radical method,” and the latter by 
either remaining explicitly within a neo-Kantian logic (Weber, Durkheim), or by trying to
divorce Hegel’s “objective spirit” from its context of the absolute (HCS 41f.). This 
explains their inability to account for Hegel’s prior critique of Kant. Her goal is then to 
begin the process of recovering the value of Hegel’s thought for social theory. “In their 
very different ways, both the non-Marxist and the Marxist critiques of Hegel attempt to 
drop the notion of the ‘absolute,’, but, at the same time, retain the social import of 
Hegel’s thought . . . Hegel’s philosophy has no social import if the absolute is banished or
suppressed, if the absolute cannot be thought” (HCS 42).
Rose’s critique forms the background and basis of my investigation here. Her 
analysis of Adorno (1993) has him eschewing a properly speculative form of reason in 
favor of a merely dialectical one, a point which my analysis will support. Despite some of 
his claims, Adorno’s work constitutes a “repudiation” of speculation; he “replac[es] 
recollections of the whole with judged oppositions” (Rose 1993, 54).11 Adorno’s critique 
11
 “In passage after passage of Negative Dialectics Adorno represents Hegel in terms of 
oppositions—between individual and ideal, or between particular and universal—which Hegel is 
alleged to have invariably reconciled in favour of the latter term of the opposition against the 
former” (Rose 1993, 61).
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of Hegel relies on the accusation of false reconciliations; while Adorno “remains with the 
dialectical antinomies” (Rose 1993, 61).
The difficulty of Rose’s work has perhaps been the cause of its relative neglect, but I 
hope to demonstrate something of its value here.  Although in Rose’s terms, the entire 
field of sociology as it has been constituted historically is within a neo-Kantian 
framework, I believe that there is something to be gained from further investigation into 
Adorno’s quasi-Hegelian perspective. His struggle to come to terms with Hegel’s 
systematic philosophy, and his struggle to situate sociological perspectives within his 
own work, shed further light upon this debate. The absolute is “the formation process of 
subjects and objects” (Rosen 1974, 42); it is the whole. But in Adorno’s terms, the whole 
means something different, which is why it must be false. Adorno’s claim about the 
falsity of the whole marks his Marxian shift towards the materialization of Hegel. Adorno
tries to understand society itself as spirit, as concept, a move which muddles the issues 
and leads to complexities and confusions in his work. I’ll return to a discussion of her 
interpretation of Hegel and sociological thought in the conclusion.
3.1.3 Kilminster
Outside of Rose’s work, there are been few substantive attempts to come to terms 
with the heritage of German Idealism. Kilminster (1998, 27) reviews the “sociological 
revolution in knowledge” as a “break with philosophy.” Identifying Kant and Hegel as 
the lynchpins, and neo-Kantianism and Marxism as the most significant mediators, 
Kilminster argues that, rather than a transition to an Hegelian “speculative position”, 
advocated by Rose, sociology must differentiate itself explicitly from philosophy through 
“socio-genesis” (1998, 31). By succumbing to the “Hegelian temptation,” sociologists 
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move decisively towards a new metaphysics; the move is, in any case, unnecessary, since 
Hegel’s philosophical perspective has “already been incorporated and reformulated on to
another level as part of the sociological revolution in knowledge” (1998, 40).12 
One of the primary difficulties with Kilminster’s narrative is its reliance on an 
outdated and simplified interpretation of Hegel as first and foremost a metaphysician. 
His call for the “end of philosophy,” while reminiscent of Marx’s own, rejects both the 
system and the method of Hegel. For Kilminster, the empirical analyses of sociology have
made Hegel (and philosophy) redundant.  Kilminster wants to promote a kind of 
reduction of philosophy to the sociology of knowledge, claiming that Hegel 
misunderstood the significance of the social context of his own philosophy (1998, 39). He
criticizes the “Hegelians” —whom he never actually identifies, other than Rose — for 
assuming that “sociological paradigms must possess philosophical underpinnings or 
make philosophical assumptions” (1998, 39).
3.1.4 Abbinnett
In a neglected work exploring the idea of a “speculative social science,” Abbinnett 
(1998) claims “that the historical determination of truth within the ‘substance’ of ethical 
life demands that we acknowledge the relationship of self-consciousness (subjectivity) to 
the ‘objective’ structures in which its activity is situated (economy, state, culture, etc.)” 
(1998, 1). He attempts to “expound the relationship of sociological conceptions of 
12
 Kilminster’s analysis is based upon the type of interpretation of Hegel that others (notably 
Pippin 1989 and Rose 1981) have argued against. He believes that Hegel’s work can be mined for 
theoretical insights, and that one can find its sociological core beneath its metaphysical cover. 
“Expressed in Hegel’s works in a baroque and forbiddingly complex and plastic manner, are, 
nevertheless, important insights. To recover the spirit (no pun intended) rather than the letter of 
Hegel, one needs to break with his archaic metaphysics and appropriate the dynamic, relational 
and synthesizing force of his work in a sociological fashion and go forward. This truly constitutes 
the ‘end of philosophy’” (1998, 36).
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community, identity, subjectivity and totality to Hegel’s speculative conception of 
Sittlichkeit” (1998, 2). The key here is in the nature of this relationship. For, while 
Abbinnett is right that for Hegel, “the autonomy of the subject must be understood in 
terms of the objective/existent conditions of its activity,” the nature of these conditions is
what is precisely at stake (1998, 3). The key Hegelian categories are “nature” and “spirit,”
but we cannot translate this into a dualism of mind and body, individual and society to 
get a form of “sociological” thinking. Abbinnett explicitly poses the question of the 
compatibility between speculative thought and social scientific reason, and seeks to 
explain why Kantian thought has established itself as the philosophical inspiration of 
sociological thought (1998, 10).
Like Rose, Abbinnett agrees with Hegel that if we are going to “re-cognize the ‘idea’ 
of sociality”, we can only do it through the antagonisms of Kantian philosophy (1998, 11).
The key Kantian categories for him are “identity,” “autonomy,” and “synthesis.” He 
undertakes a detailed analysis of the ways in which various strains of sociological 
thought—including the Marxian paradigm of production, the Durkheimian model of 
cohesion and interdependency, and the Weberian “idealist” conception of agency and 
meaning—manage to give only a partial perspective on social reality, by structuring their 
interpretations around only one of its aspects. “Marxist and functional explanations have
tended to marginalize the concepts of ‘reflection’ and ‘subjective formation.’ Cognitivist 
sociologies, on the other hand, have reproduced conceptions of subjectivity which are 
abstracted from the ‘actual’ complexity of the ethical life” (1998, 161). Each of these 
options is made possible only through the labor of reflection, the creation of duality 
between subject and object, concept and intuition, etc. (1998, 26). 
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Abbinnett’s work is unique, in that he seeks to understand the notion of the 
“substance” of modernity in a speculative fashion; for him this means that
it develops (non-teleologically) through re-cognition of the contradictory relations into 
which the concept (universality) of self-consciousness is articulated . . . [A] speculative 
conception of a social science . . . demands re-cognition of “heteronomy” (otherness, 
exteriority) as a form reproduced through the “reconstruction” of ethical life: it is the 
“thought” of reconciliation among elements (productive relations, social differentiation 
and interdependency, subjective meaning and cognition) represented, experiences and 
theorized as discrete independent and hierarchical (32).
Abbinnett’s work is rich, and is complementary to my focus here. His focus on the 
particularities of the paradigms of sociological thought, and their convergence on the 
themes of alienation, solidarity, and morality (161ff.) opens up a space for a speculative 
construal.
3.2 The literature on Adorno
While the research on Adorno is voluminous, work that pertains to his sociology, or to 
his relationship to sociological theorists, remains sparse. Many of the texts that attempt a
kind of overview or relatively broad coverage of Adorno’s work (e.g., Hammer 2005; Jay 
1984; Wilson 2007) contain some discussion of his understanding of sociology and social
theorists, but tend to focus more on the “critical theory of society” and the “positivist 
dispute.” In terms of monographs, exceptions to this rule are Benzer (2011), Jarvis 
(1998), and Rose (1978), who each spend some time discussing Adorno’s interpretation 
of the work of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. 
As the first comprehensive study of Adorno’s thought published in English, Rose’s 
work (1978) has arguably never been surpassed. She offers a thorough discussion of the 
concept of “reification” in Adorno’s work, and its relationship to Marx, Lukács, and 
Simmel, while her discussion of Adorno’s critique of positivism contains a reading of his 
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sociological writings and coverage of his understanding of Weber and Durkheim. She 
interprets Adorno’s critique of sociology as a part of his attempts to reconceptualize 
dialectical thought. Rose’s work on Adorno (see also 1981 and 1993) is incisive, and will 
be used in my analysis here.13 
Jarvis’s “critical introduction” to Adorno (1998) contains a discussion of some 
aspects of classical sociological theory in his chapter on Adorno’s “critical theory of 
society.” According to Jarvis, Adorno’s reading of the limitations of the thought of 
Durkheim and Weber was due to his Marxian materialism. Consequently, he focuses his 
energy on a discussion of concepts such as “class,” “ideology,” and “commodity 
fetishism,” which illuminate the critical character of Adorno’s materialism.
Benzer (2011) has recently provided the first complete interpretation of Adorno’s 
sociology.14 Framing his discussion around the idea of “society as a sociological 
problem,” Benzer provides great detail and insight on the nature of “sociological 
material” for Adorno, questions of theory, critique, and praxis, and an especially 
illuminating discussion on the nature of his sociological “constellations.” However, the 
present work is complementary to Benzer’s, in that it provides some of the philosophical 
background for the approach to sociology it examines. 
Articles addressing sociological aspects of Adorno’s work have tended to focus either
on questions of methodology and the empirical (Drake 1990; Wilson 2004), or on his 
relationship to particular sociological figures (Gartman 2012; Hagens 2006; Karakayali 
13 Indeed, over the course of my research, I have come to largely agree with Rose that Adorno’s 
work remains within the orbit of neo-Kantianism, and the story I tell here supports her more 
esoteric work. While her Hegel Contra Sociology spelled out an elaborate and sophisticated 
account of the need to “return to Hegel,” its exceedingly difficult style, combined with its free 
roaming over Hegel’s entire oeuvre, have resulted in its neglect within sociology. 
14
 An earlier book (Müller-Doohm 1996), available only in German, took Adorno’s sociology as its 
focal point, but attempted a less comprehensive view.
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2004; Morrison 1978; Susen 2011). There has been some work on Adorno’s critique of 
Durkheim (Benzer 2011; Hagens 2006; Jarvis 1998; Rose 1978). The relatively sparse 
coverage here may be in part because of the belief that, as Hagens (2006, 228) has 
recently put it, “[t]he critical approach to Durkheimian sociology carried out by Adorno 
has in its general form become an integrated part of sociology itself.” In other words, the 
critique is at this point standard. Yet I believe that there is more to the story than Hagens
acknowledges. He schematically partitions sociology into a “hypercritical” camp, which is
anti-empirical, in his opinion, against empirical social research. In Adorno’s terms, from 
the Positivismusstreit, this is the “social engineers” versus the “totality” theorists. The 
upshot of Hagens’ argument is that, since Adorno and Durkheim represent the two polar 
tendencies that still today structure the field of sociology, we can consider the 
relationship between them as a means of overcoming that split. His prospective account 
of the “correctives” that the thought of Durkheim and Adorno can supply for one another
takes the form of something like a “mutual recognition.” However, despite Hagens’ 
efforts, the split remains.
This attempt to essentially place Durkheim within the sphere of the “positivists” that
Adorno took such pains to criticize is well-founded, but ultimately unproductive. It 
interprets the distinction between “critical” and “positivist” approaches in terms of a 
dichotomy, and in this sense resembles Adorno’s own method of understanding the 
classical tradition in sociology. In Adorno’s analysis, the “double character” of sociology 
reflects the contradictory nature of modern society, and is reflected in the conflicting 
approaches of Durkheim and Weber (EP 33/316; ES 23ff./10ff.; PE; PS; S; See Benzer 
2011, 19-21; Jarvis 1998, 44-48; Rose 1978, 82-86). While Adorno emphasizes this split 
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in order to highlight the objective contradictions of society, Hagens suggests that the 
bifurcation of sociology in traditional and critical components follows the acceptance or 
rejection of “prevalent social conditions” (229). I would like to link these two 
problematics in my discussion here. By vaguely proposing that Adorno and Durkheim 
can “serve as each other’s correctives”, Hagens avoids the significance of this issue for 
Adorno’s own sociological contributions. Downplaying Adorno’s commitment to 
empirical sociological research, Hagens presents a caricature of a “critical theorist” who 
negates everything which does not consider the totality. Adorno’s commitment to 
sociology in fact went well beyond the critique of its main practitioners. Hagens’ analysis 
begs the question of the nature of the relationship between traditional and critical forms 
of sociology, which haunts all of Adorno’s own work in the form of the relationship 
between philosophy and sociology.
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Chapter 2 The philosophical context: German idealism
1. Introduction
Due in part to the primary position of the analytic perspective within North American 
philosophy, the significance of German idealism has been relatively neglected until 
recently.15 Paralleling the broader split between analytic and continental philosophy, the 
neglect of post-Kantian idealist themes has been felt within social theory as well. In a 
recent review article, Espen Hammer notes that the “Kant-to-Hegel” story in particular, 
which has been so important within German philosophy, has been largely neglected 
within the Anglo-American philosophical and intellectual-historical tradition (2003, 
521). More broadly, Robert Pippin (1997, 5f.) argues persuasively that the framework 
articulated in German idealism (in particular, in its Kantian and Hegelian varieties) 
regarding conceptions of “agency, self-determination, and rationality” remains profitable
in coming to terms with contemporary, modern or postmodern, society, and has been 
more often misunderstood than comprehended, even within “continental” philosophy. 
However, as Hammer’s article is in part intended to demonstrate, the tides have turned 
in recent years, with interest in post-Kantian German idealism flourishing concurrent to 
the demise of the dominance of the analytic philosophical paradigm.16 As my argument 
here centrally concerns this neglected tradition, in this chapter I will cover some of the 
necessary philosophical background.17
15
 This has been noted recently by several commentators, e.g., Ameriks (2000a), Beiser (2007), 
Hammer (2003; 2007), Rockmore (2005). The most thorough account of the “rehabilitation” of 
Hegel within analytic philosophy is Redding (2007).
16
 In Ameriks’ (2000a, 3) analysis, analytic philosophy arose specifically from a rejection of 
German idealism.
17
 My account of German idealism is necessarily schematic; I select the themes most relevant to 
my problematic, without a claim that this is the story of German idealist philosophy.
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In their post-Enlightenment quest for what Pippin (1997, 6) has called a “wholly 
critical, radically self-reflexive or rationally ‘self-authorizing’ philosophy,” German 
idealists sought to understand the modern quest for, and meaning of, freedom. This 
involves fundamentally the overcoming of dogmatism through a commitment to 
reflexivity and “rational justification.” Accordingly, Hammer traces two primary themes 
within German idealist philosophy, those of “autonomy” and “objectivity” (represented 
in his account by, respectively, the work of Terry Pinkard and Frederick Beiser).18 The 
concern with autonomy or self-determination focuses on the notion that “to be self-
determined means to have one’s thinking and acting open to the authority of reasons as 
opposed to external givens, and thus to be able to say why one prefers one line of 
thought or action over another; it is to take up a critical stance on oneself such that what 
one does becomes transparently endorsable within a community of thinkers and actors” 
(523; emphasis added). To put it schematically, the concern with autonomy was in part 
directed against the Kantian separation of freedom and materiality, and for an 
integration of the subject of freedom and its “objective” context (527). 
Within an epistemological account of objectivity, on the other hand, the concern is 
placed on overcoming a limited subjective viewpoint. As Frederick Beiser notes, “The 
problem with the subjectivist [i.e., Kantian] interpretation is that it stretches the mental 
18
 Hammer’s analysis is useful in making a very broad distinction between those who view Hegel’s
work as a continuation — and perhaps completion — of Kant’s transcendental idealism (e.g, 
Pinkard and Pippin), and those who claim that his intent was to return to some form of pre-
critical (in the Kantian sense) metaphysics (e.g., Beiser). While this debate is vibrant in the recent 
philosophical literature, I leave this frame aside in the present work, as it is arguably beyond 
reasonable scope. It could, however, be productively taken up in future work, as the central 
philosophical issues (for example, whether to consider the social in ontological terms, or social 
constructivist ones) remain at stake within social theory. On the recent debate in philosophy, see 
Beiser (1995); Kreines (2005); Pinkard (1996); Siep (1991).
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and the subjective to do the work of the ideal or the intelligible, so that it becomes the 
reality of the entire world; but then the concept of the subjective is in danger of losing all 
meaning” (2002, 6). Beiser tells the story of a progressive “de-subjectivization” of 
philosophy, from Kant to Hegel, which is a move away from the philosophical grounding 
of knowledge in the claims of the autonomous subject. “In subjective idealism the ideal 
or the rational is the subjective, mental, or spiritual; in objective idealism it is the 
archetypical, intelligible, and structural” (11).
Though schematic, the interpretations of Hammer and Beiser capture the themes I 
would like to explore here. At the substantive heart of accounts of the philosophical 
heritage of early sociological theory is the conception of the subject-object relationship. 
As we’ll see below, one of Hegel’s primary complaints against Kant was regarding the 
essential “subjectivity” of his approach. Having made his Copernican turn, Kant was 
seemingly trapped within a subjective perspective, and any attempt to move beyond this 
resulted in contradiction. The Kantian dualism of subject and object was sharply 
criticized by the “absolute” idealists, most prominently Schelling and Hegel. For 
instance, Manfred Frank (1989, 256) claims that “one thought . . . sustained Schelling’s 
philosophy from beginning to end: It is the conviction that Being (understood as 
seamless identity) cannot be deduced by unfolding reflective relationships.” This is the 
claim that brought him, and consequently his friends and intellectual colleagues 
Hölderlin and Hegel as well, beyond Kant’s “subjective idealism”, and “beyond the point 
where the abstract subject stands in opposition to its other.” The notion of an 
overcoming of a formal dualism is thus central to the discussion here. Kant had 
attempted to put some basic limits on human knowledge, and thereby to preclude 
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properly metaphysical inquiry. Hegel’s early proclamation that the task of philosophy 
was precisely to know the absolute (D 93f.) constituted the ground of his Kantian 
critique; but the precise nature of his aims has been long debated.19 What is less 
contentious is that the concept of the absolute is the key to the speculative nature of 
Hegel’s philosophy.
The absolute can be said to contain the “identity” of subject and object, but, as 
Beiser points out, the claim of subject-object identity is not easy to parse from our 
contemporary perspective (2005, 61f.). As opposed to the Kantian theory, according to 
which the constitutive subject imposes a form of subject-object identity on the object, 
and in the process retains a fundamental dualism, for Hegel, the identity of subject and 
object “essentially means that the subjective and the objective, the intellectual and the 
empirical, the ideal and the real — however one formulates the opposition — are not 
distinct substances but simply different aspects, properties or attributes of one and the 
same substance” (Beiser 2005, 64).20 For Hegel, famously, identity also includes the 
“identity of identity and non-identity,” and his version of idealism is designed not to 
collapse everything into the absolute, but rather to illuminate its speculative character. 
“If philosophy is to explain the opposition between subject and object in ordinary 
19
 Regarding the debates about the religious or secular, metaphysical or non-metaphysical nature 
of Hegel’s philosophy, Beiser notes that we cannot even assume a uniform sense of “metaphysics” 
in both Kant and Hegel, since Hegel would not accept a Kantian notion of the transcendental: 
For Hegel, the problem with traditional metaphysics is not that it attempted to know the 
infinite, but that it had a false interpretation of the infinite as something transcending the 
finite world of ordinary experience . . . Regarding the precise status of Hegel’s metaphysics, it
is necessary to walk a fine line, a middle path between inflationary and deflationary, or 
exorbitant and reductionist readings. While inflationary or exorbitant readings make the 
absolute into a superentity, deflationary or reductionist readings reduce it to nothing more 
than abstract or pious talk about particular things (Beiser 2005, 55-6). 
The problem of the interpretation of the absolute will become relevant as it is used to understand 
the concept of society.
20
 Beiser thus emphasizes the Spinozist origins of the Hegelian identity of subject and object.
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experience, then it must somehow show how the single universal substance, in which the
subject and object are the same, divides itself and produces a distinction between subject
and object. The philosopher faces an intrinsically difficult task: he [sic] must both 
surmount and explain the necessity of the subject-object dualism” (Beiser 2005, 65).
The concept of “idealism” itself, whose sense underlies the philosophies of both Kant
and Hegel, can be approached through this notion of subject-object identity. Some of the 
distinctions between the Kantian and Hegelian versions will become clear in the 
following discussion; however, there is no single straightforward meaning of the term to 
which we may appeal. “The negative meaning of ‘idealism’ implies that most things that 
are commonly taken to be real are not so in fact . . . The positive interpretation of 
‘idealism’, in contrast, involves seeing the term as adding rather than subtracting 
significance” (Ameriks 2000a: 8). The idealism of neither Kant nor Hegel should be 
considered along the lines of a British idealism;21 the critical, or transcendental, idealism 
of Kant, did not bring the reality of “real” objects into doubt, but rather attempted to link
them essentially to the forms of subjective experience. 
Hegel’s version can be (and has been) seen to be an extension of Kant’s claims, in 
terms of the further extension of the power of the subject, but in my opinion this is 
misleading. Rather than a transcendental realm of the subjective, for Hegel the ideal of 
reason which structures the world stems from the absolute. Reality is “conceptual” in 
that consciousness cannot simply grasp it immediately according to its own (i.e., 
consciousness’s) rules. 
21
 As Marx well understood, it is a kernel tenet of German Idealist philosophy that the knowing 
subject is capable of productive activity. Although he stresses the priority of the object, this notion
of the spontaneity of the subject is crucial for Adorno as well.
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[T]hought seeks to form a concept of things, this concept . . . Cannot consist in 
determinations and relationships that are alien and external to the things . . . [T]hinking 
things over [Nachdenken] leads to what is universal in them; but the universal itself is 
one of the moments of the concept. To say that there is understanding, or reason, in the 
world is exactly what is contained in the expression “objective thought.” But this 
expression is inconvenient precisely because “thought” is all too commonly used as if it 
belonged only to spirit, or consciousness, while “objective” is used primarily just with 
reference to what is unspiritual (EL §24R).
Reason, as the ideal, is not brought to things by the subject, but rather is already within 
things.
The history of social and sociological theory has also been haunted by the dichotomy
of subject and object. Hegel is frequently cited as an important influence on Marx, whose
“conflict” approach to sociology has long since been canonized. However, the 
significance of Hegel and the entire post-Kantian “objective” or “absolute” turn, has 
rarely been discussed in detail in this context.22 I begin here with a brief interpretation of
Kant’s “subjective” idealist perspective, followed by the significant aspects of Hegel’s 
philosophy, as they were developed through an engagement with Kant. This is intended 
to serve as both a brief introduction to their philosophical perspectives, as well as 
22 The dominant philosophical concepts of the time found their way into new forms of 
“sociological” theory. However, charting the history of these appropriations and transitions is 
difficult. The relevant philosophical concepts underwent significant change during the period, and
are hotly contested today. Yet an account of them remains central to intellectual work today. Karl 
Ameriks has noted recently that Kant’s critical philosophy had by the 1780s “quickly achieved 
extraordinary prominence, and yet by the 1790s it was overshadowed to such a degree in his own 
land that that the very ideas that Kant had put at the center of philosophy — the new 
‘transcendental’ notions of ‘deduction,’ ‘idealism,’ and ‘autonomy’ — took on a meaning that he 
could no longer recognize” (2000b, 2-3). Ameriks here makes the point that our current 
understanding of the concepts of German idealism, and those of contemporary philosophy that 
have derived from them, is still fundamentally up for debate, and this “has ramifications for our 
own era’s conception of itself as an heir to the Enlightenment” (3). Ameriks is concerned 
primarily with the “fate of autonomy” in the conception of the self, and his goal is to recover the 
original sense of Kantian autonomy that was “covered over” by the post-Kantian idealists, but we 
can extend the point: it is only through continued engagement with and interpretation of the 
intellectual heritage of our contemporary theories, and an attention to the ways in which concepts
have shifted meanings in relationship to various systems of thought, that we can understand our 
relationship to our own heritage, which in turn is essential for contemporary self-understanding.
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preparing the groundwork to understanding Adorno’s specific appropriation of their 
philosophies.
2. Kant
Kant’s “Copernican revolution” marks the onset of his critical philosophy, and is typically
regarded as the beginning of an idealist philosophy in Germany. Responding to the 
dominant empiricism of his time, Kant claims that our knowledge of the external world 
is in fact limited by the necessary forms that our cognition must take. He emphasizes 
that we cannot have direct knowledge of the “external world;” rather, the object of 
knowledge must reflect the subject; subject and object are epistemologically connected in
that the forms of consciousness, which are given transcendentally, necessarily structure 
our perception of the world. Kant criticizes the philosophers who came before him, who 
believed that they could discover rigorous metaphysical knowledge, claiming that they 
were “groping among mere concepts.”
[U]p to now it is been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the 
objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through 
concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to 
nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of
metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which 
would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them,
which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us (CPR B 
xvi).
Kant’s intention is to demonstrate that reason can only access what is within our 
experience, and thus to rein in improper metaphysical speculation. Beginning with the 
subject of knowledge rather than the object, Kant hypothesizes that one must analyze 
reason itself in order to find out what we may legitimately know. Paradoxically, it is only 
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from this beginning that we will be able to transcend the contingent knowledge of our 
own experience.
In the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant attempts to recuperate such an objective basis 
for knowledge, through his form of transcendental criticism. In part, this was a response 
to the skepticism of Hume, who claimed that all knowledge must be empirically and 
subjectively based. Kant focused on the delineation of a form of judgment and knowledge
that he called the “synthetic a priori” — a  notion which is fundamental to Kant’s 
epistemology and his critical philosophy in general. A priori judgments are made prior to
any form of experience, while judgments which are a posteriori are made on the basis of 
experience. It is this a priori knowledge that had been criticized from an empirical 
standpoint by Hume. However, Kant wants to rescue another type of judgment and 
knowledge, the synthetic a priori, which is both prior to and independent of experience. 
These requirements then form the condition of possibility of experience, according to 
Kant’s transcendental argument. Kant used this category to show how knowledge 
required both the passive senses and the active understanding. Against the empiricists, 
who claimed that all knowledge was grounded in sensory experience, and the 
rationalists, who claimed that knowledge stemmed from the structure of the mind itself, 
Kant postulated a new category of knowledge which is prior to experience, yet not 
analytic nor tautological. According to this view, there are categories which structure our
thought (forms) that in some sense depend upon experience but that do not derive from 
experience.
This unusual and contested form of knowledge stems from the fundamental split 
that Kant assumes between the intuition and understanding. According to Kant, the 
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understanding uses an active synthesis to make sense of chaotic information coming 
through the intuitive senses. For Kant, experience is “nothing but a continual joining 
together (synthesis) of perceptions” ([1783] 1997, §5). “Without sensibility no object 
would be given to us, and without understanding none would be thought. Thoughts 
without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind . . . The understanding 
is not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are not capable of thinking anything. 
Only from their unification can cognition arise” (CPR B 75). Kant’s “transcendental” 
critique then investigated not empirical forms of knowledge, but the conditions of 
possibility of knowledge. These conditions are both necessary, and universal, and thus 
constitute an objective foundation for knowledge, against the arguments of the skeptics. 
“[I]t is easy to show that in human cognition there actually are such necessary and in the 
strictest sense universal, thus pure a priori judgments” (CPR B4). The notion of the a 
priori applies to both intuition and understanding. There are “pure forms of sensible 
intuition”, namely space and time, which Kant analyzed in the “Transcendental 
Aesthetic” section of the Critique of Pure Reason. But there are also the categories, 
which are forms which structure the way that the understanding processes sensory 
intuitions.
Synthesis is a procedure which Kant believes lies at the root of our cognitive 
abilities. He refers to it as “the action of putting different representations together with 
each other and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition” (CPR A78/B103). 
The manifold is the term Kant uses to refer to the “material” which comes to the mind 
through the senses (see CPR A77; B139). Pure synthesis is transcendental; an “act of 
spontaneity” or freedom (CPR B151; A 78/B103; CPR B130). The autonomous 
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synthesizing power of the subject is thus reliant upon the dualism inherent in Kant’s 
account between cognition and intuition; synthesis, or combination, is the productive 
subject acting upon the pure receptivity of sensation. 
One of Kant’s primary aims was to establish once and for all which types of 
knowledge are valid and which are not. He established some basic limits on human 
knowledge, and showed that there are some fundamental questions (i.e., the traditional 
questions of metaphysics) that cannot be answered. We can have no knowledge of what 
lies “beyond” physical reality. Or rather, the only knowledge of the ‘beyond’ that we have 
is the formal knowledge of the categories of reason. For example, we can know 
“substance” and “cause.” It is therefore time to move away from traditional metaphysics 
and investigate our knowing itself, rather than naively assuming that we can 
unproblematically access the ‘true’ nature of reality. Kant, in making this move, because 
he believed that he had effectively established the existence of the noumenal realm, could
not find a way to bridge the gap between the subject and the objects of knowing. 
Consequently, although there is a “real” empirical world out there, which is to be 
distinguished from the world as it appears to us, the only knowledge we can have about it
will be necessarily structured by the form of our cognition. The critique of reason then 
shows that reason itself is necessarily limited, and this strict limitation on our certain 
knowing has implications for our forms of science and our scientific method. Kant’s 
transcendental critique can be seen to be an argument for a method of scientific 
knowledge.
A fundamental feature of Kant’s critique then is its focus on the subject of 
knowledge. After Kant, epistemology no longer looks to uncover the objective structure 
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of reality, but rather to investigate the forms of knowledge that are imposed by the 
subject of knowing itself. As both Hegel and Adorno would emphasize, the objective 
ground of knowledge for Kant flows through the subject (see, e.g., EL §42; KK 56/33; 
143ff./93ff.). In epistemological terms, this has a kind of individualizing effect: the 
certainty of our knowledge is based upon the requirements of a “transcendental” subject.
Although not equal to an empirical individual subject, the concept of the transcendental 
subject is abstracted from individual subjects; and in any case, this foundation for 
knowledge is secured through an analysis of subjectivity itself.23 Kant wants to move past
a merely subjective experience to an objectively valid knowledge, but the only way he can
do this is by moving through the individual subject itself to the “transcendental subject”.
The I think must be able to accompany all my representations, for otherwise something 
would be represented in me that could not be thought at all . . . Thus all manifold of 
intuition has a necessary relation to the I think in the same subject in which this manifold
is to be encountered. But this representation is an act of spontaneity, i.e., it cannot be 
regarded as belonging to sensibility. I call it the pure apperception, in order to distinguish
it from the empirical one, or also the original apperception, since it is that self-
consciousness which, because it produces the representation I think, which must be able 
to accompany all others . . . I also call its unity the transcendental unity of self-
consciousness . . . (CPR B 132).
The notion of apperception, which was to be so influential for Hegel, describes the 
act of the transcendental subject, the requirement for the combination of concept and 
intuition which constitutes experience as the experience of a subject. As “the highest 
principle in the whole sphere of human knowledge” (CPR B 135), transcendental 
apperception intends an “original combination” which creates the condition under which
representations “belong” to a particular subject. Here Kant posits a form of 
consciousness which lies “behind” the empirical consciousness and accompanies it in its 
23
 The point is Adorno’s. His complaint is that this “reduction” of knowledge to the individual 
eliminates altogether the social factors through which the individual itself is always already 
mediated. For Adorno’s criticism of Kant, see (KK 219/144-145).
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experience. The unity of consciousness is necessary for thought; also, the unity of the 
world is constituted by the subject itself. I unify my world through my mind’s activity, yet
in doing this I discover my own relation to the fundamental structure of subjectivity. The
critical turn in philosophy, which would influence early sociological theory and method, 
is in large effect a turn inward towards the individual subject, in the sense that this 
subject is the model for its transcendental counterpart. There is, in effect, no unity of the 
social world, except that which is constituted by each individual subject in their manifold
of apperception.24
Kant splits his theory of the subject further by assuming a strict separation between 
theoretical and practical reason. The beginnings of this split are evident in the Third 
Antinomy of Pure Reason, where Kant exposes the problems that pure reason gets into 
when it tries to think about freedom and causality (CPR B 472ff.). Quite simply, the 
physical necessity that characterizes nature cannot hold for the subject as well. There 
must rather be two forms of causality: one which holds in the natural world, and one 
belonging to the world of the rational will, or of freedom.25 This split, which takes hold 
both within causality and within the subject, has origins in the fundamental split (which 
may be traced back to Descartes) that Kant assumes between knowing and doing. Each 
has its own form of reason: pure reason is that faculty which is used to know the 
phenomenal world; practical reason is that which is used to know how to act. Kant’s 
critiques of these forms of reason both focus on their a priori basis in law. The result is a 
subject which is both a part of the phenomenal world, and separate from it: “. . . [A] 
24
 This point is emphasized by Hund (1998).
25
 “Will is a kind of causality of living beings in so far as they are rational, and freedom would be 
that property of such causality that it can be efficient independently of alien causes determining 
it, just as natural necessity is the property of the causality of all nonrational beings to be 
determined to activity by the influence of alien causes” ([1785] 1996, 94).
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rational being . . . has two standpoints from which he can regard himself and cognize 
laws for the use of his powers and consequently for all his actions: first, insofar as he 
belongs to the world of sense, under laws of nature (heteronomy); second, as belonging 
to the intelligible world, under laws which, being independent of nature, are not 
empirical but grounded merely in reason” ([1785] 1996, 99). While Hegel would have an 
extensive critique of Kant’s moral philosophy, as well as of his epistemology, the 
importance of this theme is in the legacy of Kant’s abstract dualism of knowledge and 
action for the classical social theorists.26 We can read this as the beginnings of the split 
between knowledge and practice that Hegel, Marx and the critical social theory which 
followed them tried to overcome.
3. Hegel’s critique of Kant’s theoretical philosophy
I will briefly outline a few of the important moments in the development of Hegel’s 
version of an “absolute” or an “objective” idealism, in contradistinction to Kant, and then
explicate some of the key concepts of Hegel’s philosophy that are crucial for 
understanding Adorno’s version of critical social theory. I do not wish to launch any new 
grand interpretation of the relationship between Kant and Hegel, but rather just to 
discuss those elements which are relevant for Adorno’s critique of philosophical 
26
 Susan Stedman Jones (1980, 101-4) takes Kant’s twin foci on science and morality and through 
them reads the history of the discipline of sociology. Kant wanted to validate both concepts, in 
light of the skepticism of Hume. “[I]nsofar as the aim of sociology is an objective understanding of
man, it is tied up with the idea of science. But, insofar as it is concerned to improve or emancipate
man, it throws in its lot with morality and must therefore deal with or give accord to the idea of 
freedom . . . [A]lthough Kant rescued the idea of an objective describable world from the dangers 
of skepticism, solipsism and idealism, he handed it on to the human sciences with an apparently 
unbridgeable chasm between theoretical understanding of action and concern for its moral 
significance.” Curiously, Jones doesn’t investigate Hegel’s critique of Kant in this context.
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idealism, which in turn structures his entire body of work.27 Adorno appropriates much 
of Hegel’s critique of Kant; and in many ways the question as to the exact nature of 
Adorno’s Hegelianism is important here. Ultimately, I agree with Rose (1981) that 
Adorno fails to overcome the neo-Kantian influence which structures virtually all 
sociological thinking, but it is the details here which prove to be interesting.
Hegel understood philosophy historically; and he very consciously situated his own 
work within the philosophical tradition. From very early on in his career he was 
concerned to present an alternative to the subjective forms of idealism, represented most
prominently by Kant and Fichte.28 Kant, in Hegel’s opinion, made a tremendous step 
forward philosophically, in his articulation of the concept of the transcendental subject, 
through which reason may potentially grasp itself as the absolute; yet it remained 
content with a merely finite and subjective form of knowledge (VGP3 426f.).29 One of the 
primary goals of Kant’s critical philosophy — the determination of a set of limits which 
would serve to legitimate non-metaphysical forms of thought — served effectively to 
fatally curcumscribe his own philosophical thinking. Since philosophy, in Hegel’s 
historical version, is “the story of the discovery of the thoughts about the absolute which 
is [philosophy’s] subject matter” (EL §10), Kant became derailed from the true task of 
philosophical thought. The understanding of thought as merely subjective forestalls the 
possibility of adequately reflecting on the oppositions of subject and object, finitude and 
27
 I give no review of the literature on Hegel, which is voluminous; rather, I will detail my own 
understanding with reference to a few key secondary sources. The following works have been 
influential in my understanding of German idealism and Hegel’s philosophy in particular: Beiser 
2002, 2005; Fackenheim 1967; Franco 1999; Hinchman 1984; Marx [1975] 1988; Pippin 1989; 
Rose 1981; Rosen 1974; Stern 1990, 2009.
28
 See D and GW; as well as later comments in EL and VGP3.
29
 “Critical philosophy holds on to the factum that universality and necessity, being also essential 
determinations, are found to be present in what is called experience. And, because this element 
does not stem from the empirical as such, it belongs to the spontaneity of thinking, or is a priori” 
(EL §40).
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infinity. This implies that the “fundamental principle” of his philosophy is “the 
absoluteness of finitude and, resulting from it, the absolute antithesis of finitude and 
infinity, reality and ideality, the sensuous and supersensuous, and the beyondness of 
what is truly real and absolute” (GW 62). By remaining within a subjective, 
“psychological” standpoint, Kant’s philosophy retains a strict dichotomy between subject
and object; it institutes the limit as law.
A result of this flaw is a problematic understanding of knowledge itself. Kant’s 
method of philosophizing and his theory of knowledge come necessarily under joint 
critique here. His prioritization of subjectivity leads to his method of transcendental 
critique, in which he sets out to use thought reflexively to discover its own nature. 
Although it has a long history in Western philosophy, this procedure of trying to secure a 
foundation of certainty for knowledge is, from Hegel’s perspective, “absurd.” In his 
Introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Hegel unpacks the implications of this type
of approach, which begins with the “fear of falling into error,” and “presupposes that the 
absolute stands on one side and cognition on the other” (PG §74). Hegel’s famous reply is
to undertake an explication of the “science of the experience of consciousness,” which 
attempts to “follow” natural consciousness on its path towards true knowledge. 
There are a couple of characteristics of this approach that I’d like to foreground. The 
first is the very idea of phenomenological procedure which begins with consciousness 
taken “naturally” and proceeds to show how it develops within itself. Hegel’s description 
of the path that natural consciousness must take as a “series of configurations which 
consciousness goes through . . . the detailed history of the education of consciousness 
itself to the standpoint of science” (PG §78) can easily be misunderstood. Although the 
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Phenomenology culminates in “absolute knowledge,” it does not follow a linear path to 
enlightenment. The point to emphasize is Hegel’s refusal to provide a solid foundation 
for knowledge. Although there are numerous thorny issues that arise here, Hegel’s 
science provides a procedure through which the conscious subject comes to reflect on its 
own knowing as it happens. There is no appeal to a transcendental realm. 
The second related point is that the relationship between the subject of 
consciousness and its object becomes an internal one. Once conscious knowledge “finds 
itself” through the recognition that it has itself been going beyond its own limits, it 
begins to understand itself, to grasp its “concept.” “With the positing of a single 
particular the beyond is . . . established for consciousness, even if it is only alongside the 
limited object” (PG §80). Consciousness distinguishes itself from its object, and in the 
process ties itself to it; it distinguishes the objects being-for-consciousness from its being
-in-itself, and calls the latter “truth” (PG §82). However, its philosophical education 
begins with the recognition that what it takes to be the object, the in-itself, is actually an 
in-itself for-consciousness. That is, in contemplation of the object, the subject of 
consciousness realizes that it simply cannot be outside of its reach; it is only in-itself 
according to the knowing consciousness that contemplates it (PG §85). When Hegel says 
that consciousness now has two moments, and two objects, he refers to this reflexive 
doubling; both aspects “fall within the knowledge which we are investigating” (PG §84).  
Again, while this is a feature that has been variously interpreted, the key is to 
recognize that Hegel has not thrown away the real world, but rather reconceptualized it. 
Hegel wants consciousness, and the observing philosopher, to recognize that it has no 
privileged access to the real, independent world, and that knowing objects fundamentally
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involves knowing that we know them. The “criterion” by which we judge the veracity of 
our knowledge cannot be simply the object; rather, it involves a comparison of “whether 
its knowledge of the object corresponds to the object or not.” If there is found to be a lack
of correspondence between them, consciousness does not “alter its knowledge to make it 
conform with the object,” the object itself is altered alongside the knowledge of it: “as the
knowledge changes, so too does the object” (PG §85).30
Kant’s version of philosophy thus served as a crucial starting point for Hegel. He 
placed great significance on Kant’s distinction between merely reflective “understanding”
and properly speculative “reason”; for Hegel the former consists of finite forms of 
cognition which are based upon experience, which are termed “appearances” (EL §45 A).
The understanding is a limited, subjective form of cognition, in that it knows its objects 
only as appearances, rather than as things-in-themselves. “[T]hey do not have the 
ground of their being within themselves, but within something else” (EL §45 A). Hegel’s 
opposition here – the distinction between appearance and essence – is not merely for 
consciousness, but is rather one that holds for the objects in themselves. This distinction 
captures Hegel’s proposed move away from a subjectively-based idealism to one which is
speculative, which thinks the absolute. 
Before I discuss Hegel’s conception of philosophy in more detail, I want to briefly 
mention his criticisms of the philosophies of Fichte and Schelling.31 Unsatisfied with the 
30 Hegel refers to this movement of consciousness as “experience,” which I will examine further 
below.
31
 I cover Hegel’s critique of Fichte and Schelling briefly, due to their significance for Hegel’s own 
approach. He claimed that beyond the philosophical systems of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling, “there
are none” (VPG3 479). Pippin argues that “In beginning to outline his own position by contrast 
especially with Kant and Fichte, and by beginning early on to distance himself from Schelling, 
Hegel reveals more clearly [in the early Jena essays] than elsewhere how to understand his 
position in terms of those of his predecessors, how his contrasts make sense only within a certain 
continuity, and how that continuity is often more important than the contrasts” (1989, 60).
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dualisms of Kant’s philosophy, Fichte proposed to understand the “I” of self-
consciousness as an activity, as the source and original unity of both subject and object. 
In his explicit attempt to complete Kantian philosophy, Fichte took the principle of the 
transcendental unity of apperception and “extracted” the Ego as its purer form (Fichte 
[1802] 1982; see D 79). This allowed him to move beyond Kant’s “dead pigeonholes of 
the intellect” to the “principle of speculation” as “the identity of subject and object” (D 
80). However, in Hegel’s estimation, Fichte was no more successful in properly handling 
this move than Kant had been.
The principle of Fichte’s system is the pure thinking that thinks itself, the identity of 
subject and object, in the form of Ego = Ego. If one holds solely and directly to this 
principle and to the transcendental principle at the basis of Kant’s deduction of the 
categories, one has the authentic principle of speculation boldly expressed. However, as 
soon as [Fichte’s] speculation steps outside of the concept that it establishes of itself and 
evolves into a system, it abandons itself and its principle and does not come back to it 
again. It surrenders Reason to the intellect and passes over into the chain of finite [acts 
and objects] of consciousness from which it never reconstructs itself as identity and true 
infinity (D 81).
While this conception proved influential for Hegel, he also found it too dualistic, as 
Fichte had no coherent conception of the relationship between the subjective “I” and the 
objective “I” (Hinchman 1984, 35f.). Fichte had not completed the shift to a speculative 
form of philosophy, because he did not understand the “identity in difference” between 
subject and object. His philosophy thus ultimately remained subjective, and forestalled 
any attempt to gain knowledge of the absolute: “The Absolute of the system shows itself 
as apprehended only in the form in which it appears to philosophical reflection” (D 81).
If he derived a notion of the identical subject-object from Fichte, Hegel’s notion of 
the absolute stemmed also from Schelling. Schelling responds to Kant and Fichte by 
attempting to ground their transcendental philosophy in a Naturphilosophie. The 
identical subject-object is for Schelling not the subjective “I” but rather “nature” (Bowie 
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1994, 57). Schelling referred to this development as a move from subjective idealism to 
objective idealism. “In making the universe the subject rather than predicate in his 
formula for objective idealism, Schelling was reversing the order of logical priority from 
subjective idealism. The world was now the ground or explanans of the ego, and not 
conversely, as in [Fichte’s] Wissenschaftslehre” (Beiser 2002, 555). Schelling’s 
dissatisfaction with subjective forms of idealism stemmed from his opinion that 
consciousness itself cannot serve as a proper grounding for philosophy. For Kant and 
Fichte, it is the “I” that is the ground or requirement of thought; however, for Schelling 
and other Romantics, this is inadequate, because the identity of subject and object that 
self-consciousness requires cannot be given by self-consciousness. “[T]he very possibility
of self-consciousness requires a higher ground that transcends it . . . Because subject-
object identity transcends self-consciousness, it cannot be regarded as something 
subjective; hence the romantics identify it with being, substance, or the absolute” (Beiser
2002, 357-8; see Schelling [1801] 2012).
Hegel’s version of philosophy took its leave from these origins within German 
idealist philosophy. Although strongly influenced by Schelling and Romanticism, Hegel’s
famous criticism highlighted his attachment to the critical, transcendental tradition. The 
trouble with Schelling’s conception of the Absolute is that he cannot articulate it (Pippin 
1989, 87). In the famous critique from the Phenomenology, it is the “night in which . . . 
all cows are black” (PG §16). The critical, subjective tradition of Kant and Fichte led to 
the realization that reflexive analysis of self-consciousness will lead us to a form of 
objective knowledge. Schelling’s insight is that reason is the “total indifference of 
subjective and objective” ([1801] 2012, 145); and so it proposes to overcome the dualism 
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of subject and object, of concept and intuition. However, Schelling’s reliance upon an 
indeterminate “intellectual intuition” became more objectionable to Hegel, and his 
idealism moved to a conception of the “concept,” through which the articulation of 
subject and object can be made (Hinchman 1984: 42; see PG, Preface). 
Pippin makes clear that through all of this we remain within the Kantian intellectual 
orbit:
[I]f Kant is right and knowledge cannot (ultimately or totally) be a matter of empirical 
determination and association, or a matter of the mind’s rational grasp of its own 
ideas . . . because the human subject must be in some sense self-determining, somehow 
responsible for what it takes to be a unity within its experience . . . then the proper 
account of such an activity, and especially what quickly became the problem of its 
“ground”, are indeed the fundamental problems of philosophy . . . If Kant’s reliance on 
the pure forms of intuition and the fixed, logical requirements of judgment will not 
ground such an activity, then we have either a theory of a self-creating subjects 
(terminating in Fichte’s Sollen) or Schelling’s self-intuiting subject (1989, 63-64).
The problem of the “ground” continues to haunt contemporary epistemology. If we 
cannot accept Kant’s attempt to circumvent skepticism through recourse to the 
transcendental, then our options appear to be limited. Hegel’s attempt at a non-
foundational approach has intrigued many; yet, as I’ve emphasized, its complexities and 
implications are still being parsed.32 
32 Žižek similarly encapsulates the relevant distinctions here, arguing that the two options for 
interpreting Kant’s transcendental, as either noumenal or not, both lead to the dissolution of his 
system, but in different ways; he identifies this as a “necessary equivocality:” 
[I]f, on the one hand, we stick to the identification of the transcendental I with the 
noumenal Thing-Self, the noumenal Self phenomenally appears to itself, which means 
that the difference between phenomena and noumena dissolves — “I” becomes the 
singular subject-object given to itself in the “intellectual intuition”, the “eye which sees 
itself” (the step accomplished by Fichte and Schelling, but unconditionally prohibited by 
Kant: intellektuelle Anschauung as the “absolute starting-point” of philosophizing). If, on 
the other hand, the I of apperception — this autonomous agent of the constitution of 
reality — is not a noumenal Thing, then the difference between phenomena and noumena
again dissolves, yet in a wholly different way: in Hegel’s way (Žižek 1993, 19).
The character of “Hegel’s way” here, as Žižek also points out, relies upon his rejection of the 
conception of intellectual intuition, his commitment to the “irreducible gap that separates 
discursive intellect . . . from intuition”.  
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Hegel of course explicitly formulated his philosophical vision as an alternative to 
those of Fichte and Schelling; he was committed to finding a way of incorporating both 
while moving beyond their limitations. His task was to show how a truly speculative 
philosophy could think an absolute which is not hypostatized or abstract. While the full 
depth of Hegel’s solution is beyond my scope here, in the remainder of this section, I will 
explore — through a discussion of some of Hegel’s key concepts — some of the ways in 
which his philosophy provided an alternative vision which would prove so influential for 
Adorno. The concepts I will discuss are “speculation,” the “absolute,” the “I,” the 
“concept,” “spirit;” and “experience.” 
3.1 “Speculation”
As I’ve mentioned above, in his analysis of Kant’s philosophy, Hegel engages in a critique
of what he refers to as merely reflective forms of philosophical thought, which he 
counterposes to properly philosophical (speculative) thought.33 The opposition between 
reflection and speculation parallels that between understanding and reason. In brief, the 
distinction is based upon the ability to conceptualize the absolute. For Hegel, the central,
defining task of philosophy lies in this effort to grasp the absolute, and therefore must 
move beyond the limitations prescribed by Kant.
The task of philosophy is to construct the absolute for consciousness. But since the 
productive activity of reflection is, like its products, mere limitation, this task involves a 
contradiction. The absolute is to be posited in reflection. But then it is not posited, but 
canceled [aufgehoben werden]; for in having been posited it is limited. Philosophical 
reflection is the mediation of this contradiction (D 25/94).
33
 Pippin (1989, 68) notes that Hegel’s early conception of speculation is primarily negative, 
specifying that moves beyond the empirical or the metaphysical; a positive conception is more 
difficult to grasp: the mind’s activity as “freely determined moments of Absolute Subjectivity.”
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Philosophical reflection — the understanding, the “instrument of philosophizing” — 
fails to conceptualize the absolute because it is merely the “positing of opposites.” It 
instead finds itself locked in an infinite regress: “Every being, because it is posited, is an 
opposite, it is conditioned and conditioning;” each time it attempts a determination, it is 
left with its opposite, the undetermined (D 26/95). The merely reflective activity of the 
intellect results in contradiction because all it is capable of producing are oppositions. 
Each determination is only determinate by virtue of being bounded by the 
indeterminate; its work is therefore never complete, and never capable of being 
completed. Speculative reason allows a way of escaping this perpetual motion, through 
the recognition of the unity in opposition.
Yet, importantly, philosophical reflection is not merely an error, or a dead end; 
rather, it is a necessary step on the path towards a properly speculative form of 
philosophical thought. There can be no speculative reason without reflective 
understanding. “[U]nderstanding as the force of separation already presupposes an 
identity into which its dissolving power cuts” (Gasché 1986, 39). In this way, it is led, in a
sense, through its own unresolved contradictions, to speculative reason. In Hegel’s own 
characterization, philosophical reflection is only ideal, and can only posit ideal 
oppositions. The subject-ego which is in “absolute opposition” to the object is not real, 
but only a “mere form of cognition” (D 98/158). To obtain a real form of opposition, both
the subject and the object must be “posited as Subject-Object, both subsisting in the 
absolute” (D 99/159). Absolute, or speculative, reflection then comes about through the 
self-destruction of philosophical reflection, as it recognizes that it, as reflection, can only 
exist in opposition to the absolute (D 28/96; see Gasché 1986, 40). The move to 
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speculative reason is then made through the cancellation of the opposition of the subject 
of reason and its object.
True philosophical thought must be speculative, according to Hegel.34 Philosophy 
here moves into its own, beyond finite forms of thought. In this sense, speculation 
overcomes the hypostasis of the ego, and “coincides with the necessity of philosophical 
thought as such, to the extent that philosophical reflection transcends the factual given 
and moves towards its ultimate determining grounds . . . [it begins] to signify . . . the 
necessary demonstration of the givenness of being, of the cognitive objectivity of the 
world and its absolute ground” (Gasché 1986, 42). We can identify this as a type of pure 
reason, although not in a Kantian sense. Kant’s form of purity was established via the 
transcendental turn, through which any relation to experience is excised, while for Hegel,
the transition from reflection to speculation consists in a mode of unification. Hegel 
assesses Kant’s analysis of natural cognition versus transcendental critique, and finds a 
“third alternative, one that Kant himself pursued: reflection on the nature of experience 
and on the concepts involved in it” (Inwood 1992, 272).
 In the Encyclopedia Logic, Hegel describes speculation as constituting the third, 
unifying, productive or positive moment of the dialectic (EL §82). While philosophical 
reflection ends in endless opposition, speculation manages to unify these contradictions. 
In this context, Hegel separates “the logical” into “three sides”: 1) abstraction, or the 
understanding; 2) dialectic, or the “negatively rational;” and 3) speculation, the 
“positively rational” (EL §79). The dialectic entails the self-sublation of the finite 
34
 “Thinking is the absolute activity of reason itself and there simply cannot be anything opposite 
to it. But if it is not so posited, if it is taken to be nothing but reflection of a purer kind, that is, a 
reflection in which one merely abstracts from the opposition, then thinking of this abstracting 
kind cannot advance beyond the intellect, not even to a logic supposed capable of comprehending 
reason within itself, still less to philosophy” (D 28/96-7).
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determinations of the understanding. While, for the understanding, such determinations
are limited externally, the dialectic recognizes that “the finite is not restricted merely 
from outside; rather, it sublates itself by virtue of its own nature, and passes over, of 
itself, into its opposite” (EL §81A1). The dialectic is concerned with things in and for 
themselves; it operates immanently, and leads to an “immanent transcending” (EL 
§81R). While the dialectic is then negative, in the sense that it sceptically undermines the
certainty of the understanding, speculation turns this into a positive result, by grasping 
the oppositions of the determination of the understanding and the dialectic. If the 
understanding, despite its own self-understanding, is not static certainty but rather 
sublates itself, then speculation is the achievement of true rationality, because it 
encompasses both the understanding and its opposites (EL §82A). Speculation thus 
entails a move beyond mere abstraction to a grasping of the concrete:
(1) The dialectic has a positive result, because it has a determinate content, or because its 
result is truly not empty, abstract nothing, but the negation of certain determinations, 
which are contained in the result precisely because it is not an immediate nothing, but a 
result. (2) Hence this rational [result], although it is something-thought and something-
abstract, is at the same time something-concrete, because it is not simple, formal unity, 
but a unity of distinct determinations. For this reason philosophy does not deal with 
mere abstractions or formal thoughts at all, but only with concrete thoughts (EL §82R).
Although a key to Hegel’s thought, the concept of speculation is not itself easily 
grasped. It is essentially a move to totality, which is a move beyond a mere “standpoint” 
to something fundamentally broader. If Hegel’s philosophy of speculation represents the
unification of thought and nonthought (Gashé 1986, 44), this explains the difficulty 
many have had in comprehending it. We’ll see below that both Marx and Adorno 
determined Hegel’s philosophy to be ideological because of this pretension to totality. 
Each attempted to follow Hegel only part way along the path of speculation, exiting 
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before reaching the absolute. For now we can get a better grasp on Hegel’s originality by 
examining the concept of the absolute, which is precisely were speculation leads us.
3.2 The “Absolute”
Hegel’s own version of idealism can be seen as an attempt at a synthesis of what I’ve 
examined here as subjective and objective idealism, and his originality lay in his 
discovery of “a way to conceive of the absolute such that it would only manifest itself to 
human consciousness (and hence only exist at all!) within the dualistic terms mapped 
out by Descartes, Kant, and Fichte” (Hinchman 1984, 41). As I’ve emphasized, Hegel 
agrees with Schelling that Fichte’s attempt to solve Kantian problems via the concept of 
the absolute ego did not resolve its dualisms, but only shifted the conflict. Schelling’s 
romantic vision of the absolute as an organic whole which encompasses both subjectivity
and objectivity is the idea for the Hegelian absolute; but Hegel also critiques  Schelling’s 
absolute for remaining indeterminate as an intellectual intuition, the famous “night in 
which . . . all cows are black” (PG §16). In his formulation (which foreshadows Adorno’s 
critique of “repetition”) Hegel complains that Schelling’s version of objective idealism 
only apparently illuminates a mediation between consciousness and the absolute. “[A] 
closer inspection shows that this expansion [to a speculative science] has not come about
through one and the same principle having spontaneously assumed different shapes, but 
rather through the shapeless repetition of one and the same formula, only externally 
applied to diverse materials” (PG §15). In other words, Schelling’s absolute is merely an 
“abstract universality.”
As discussed above, Hegel views speculation as leading in fact not towards 
indeterminacy but to concreteness. “[E]verything turns on grasping and expressing the 
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True, not only as Substance, but equally as Subject” (PG §17). With this statement — 
from the Preface to the Phenomenology of Spirit, which is designed to be an 
introduction to Hegel’s entire system — Hegel announces his intention to unify subject 
and object, as well as the philosophies of subjective and objective idealism. The key is to 
provide an account of the absolute as a concrete totality, rather than merely an abstract 
one. By conceiving of the absolute in this way, Hegel essentially removes the limits to 
philosophical thought set by Kant. For Hegel it is possible to know the thing in itself, the 
noumenal realm, because there simply is no strict heterogeneity between the 
phenomenal and noumenal realms, between the subject and the object.
[E]ven the objectivity of thinking in Kant’s sense is itself . . . only subjective in its form, 
because, according to Kant, thoughts, although they are universal and necessary 
determinations, are still only our thoughts, and are cut off from what the thing is in-itself 
by an impassable gulf. On the contrary, the true objectivity of thinking consists in this: 
that thoughts are not merely our thoughts, but at the same time the In-itself of things and
of whatever else is ob-jective (EL §41A2).
The very notion of objectivity is reconceptualized here, from a characteristic that derives 
from the transcendental, to one that is developed through connection to the absolute. As 
Hegel points out in the introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit, both the essence of 
the object (its being-in-itself) and its appearance (its being-for-us) fall within 
consciousness. “[T]hese two moments, ‘Notion’ and ‘object’, ‘being-for-another’ and 
‘being-in-itself’, both fall within that knowledge which we are investigating” (PG §84). It 
is therefore wrong to presume them to be opposed. They are to be differentiated, but 
only with the recognition that they lie within a greater dialectical unity of subject and 
object. As the subject changes, so too does the object. The object moves from being an 
object in-itself, to being for-consciousness in-itself, just as the subject’s knowledge of the 
object changes accordingly.
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Although Hegel’s concept of the absolute is thus designed to avoid the problems of 
indeterminacy he attributed to Schelling’s view, it is nevertheless often relegated to a 
metaphysical obsolescence by critics. Hegel in fact states that his philosophy both begins 
and ends with the absolute, a circularity that can mask the process of development that 
occurs within the system of philosophical thought. The true is the whole, for Hegel, 
meaning that philosophy’s goal is to begin with the absolute as an abstract universality, 
and to eventually grasp it as a concrete totality of substance-subject (PG §20). A key 
aspect of this journey is the recognition of the reflexive structure of the “I” and the 
“concept.”
3.3 The “I” and the “Concept”
In Hegel’s philosophy, the subject, or the “I,” retains an essentially active character; 
“Thinking represented as a subject is that which thinks, and the simple expression for 
the existing subject as thinker is ‘I’” (EL §20).35 The “I” is negative activity, a self-
relating; it is comprised of a “distinguishing of itself from itself” (EG §413). The “I” is the 
activity of diremption, of splitting of subject from object. This negation occurs as a 
determination, as the creation of the subject (“I”) and the object (not-“I”). The “I” as 
subject and its object only come into being through this process of negation. Hinchman 
explains the process concisely:
When I try to think this “I” [i.e., the Fichtean absolute ego] as it is “before” it splits apart 
into subject and object, I thereby split it (i.e., myself) into subject and object. This defeats 
my attempt to think it as a third thing “behind” them. But I can now think it as the 
activity of negation through which subject and object are determined (i.e., given limits 
and hence specific being). Thus, paradoxically, the “I” reveals itself to me in the same 
movement by which it is concealed (Hinchman 1984, 44; emphasis added).
35
 The combined discussion of the structure of “I” and of the “concept” was suggested to me by 
Hinchman’s approach (1984, 44f.).
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This notion of the negative activity of the subject has important consequences for the 
conception of the absolute at work in Hegel’s philosophy. The absolute is this process of 
determination, rather than a “thing,” an abstraction. The “I” is a form of negation, 
determination, through which subject and object are first posited. This is the key to 
Hegel’s form of speculation.
The key to the concept of the concept is the Kantian unity of self-consciousness. 
Hegel notes this explicitly in the Science of Logic. “The concept, when it has progressed 
to a concrete existence which is itself free, is none other than the “I” or pure self-
consciousness. True, I have concepts, that is, determinate concepts; but the “I” is the 
pure concept itself, the concept that has come into determinate existence” (WL 
2:253/514). According to Hegel, we cannot understand either the concept or the “I” 
unless we do so in tandem; furthermore, this must be done for each through the two 
moments of universality (as “pure self-related unity”) and individuality (as “self-related 
negativity”) (WL 2:253/514). The key to the structure of the “I” and the concept then lies 
precisely in this transformation of the relationship between subject and object. The “I” 
only appears through its negative, determining activity. It self-dirempts, splits into 
subject and object, and in so doing it shows the connection not just between subject and 
object, but between the prior whole, the totality, and its finite moments. “The ‘I’ is one 
side of the relation and the whole relation in the sense that as a self confronting a not-
self, it is limited, finite, empirical ‘I’. But it is also the absolute as the negative activity 
that posits the difference between ‘I’ and not-‘I’, dividing and identifying them at the 
same time” (Hinchman 1984, 45).
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At the risk of getting lost in complexities, here is Hegel’s own description of the 
“objectivity” of the “I” and of the concept, from the final chapter of the Phenomenology:
The nature, moments and movement of this [absolute] knowing have, then, shown 
themselves to be such that this knowing is a pure being-for-self of self-consciousness; it is
“I,” that is this and no other “I,” and which is no less immediately a mediated or 
superseded universal “I.” It has a content which it differentiates from itself; for it is pure 
negativity or the dividing of itself, it is consciousness. This content is, in its difference, 
itself the “I,” for it is the movement of superseding itself, or the same pure negativity that 
the “I” is. In it, as differentiated, the “I” is reflected into itself; it is only when the “I” 
communes with itself in its otherness that the content is comprehended [i.e. in terms of 
the Notion]. Stated more specifically, this content is nothing else than the very movement
just spoken of; for the content is Spirit that traverses its own self and does so for itself as 
Spirit by the fact that it has the “shape” of the Notion in its objectivity (PG §799).
The move beyond understanding to speculation is shown here through consciousness’s 
own comprehension of itself as self-differentiation. The reconciliation here between the 
subject and the object, or between the concept and its content, is made through this 
comprehension. Instead of an “I” which “possesses” its concepts, which subsumes its 
intuitions under conceptual universals, we have an “I” which makes the object its own, 
“brings it into its own form” (WL 2:255/516). The process of the “I” coming to 
comprehend itself in its other, involves the absolute because this very process constitutes
the absolute.
The structure of the concept, which mirrors that of the “I,” is also centered around 
this process. Hegel takes pains to differentiate his “concept” from the way in which it is 
typically understood. In the philosophy of reflection, the concept is essentially a form of 
abstract universality, under which particulars are brought together. The concept in this 
view is a universal which is brought by the mind to order sensory intuition. Hegel’s 
speculative concept, by contrast, is itself “self-particularizing,” in that it undergoes its 
own process of diremption into moments (Hinchman 1984, 46). “What is universal about
the Concept is indeed not just something common against which the particular stands on
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its own; instead the universal is what particularises (specifies) itself, remaining at home 
with itself in its other, in unclouded clarity” (EL §163 A1). As the “truth of substance,” and 
the result and foundation of being and essence — the first two moments of the Science of
Logic — the concept of the concept gives Hegel’s philosophy a characteristically post-
Kantian perspective. Here we see again how the subjective perspective has been 
transcended. The realm of objectivity and universality that is accessed through the level 
of the concept turns Kant’s thought upside down, in the sense that it represents a logical 
basis for spirit (as well as for nature). Taking his inspiration from the synthetic unity of 
apperception, Hegel lauds Kant’s distinction between the subjectivity of the empirical “I”
and the objectivity of the transcendental “I”, but complains that for Kant, although “the 
concept is given as the objective element of cognition, consequently as the truth . . . it is 
taken to be something merely subjective, and we are not allowed to extract reality from 
it, for by reality objectivity is to be understood, since reality is contrasted with 
subjectivity” (WL 2:256/516). What comes before the concept, for Kant, is the “empirical 
material”, which is raised to universality through the abstraction of the understanding. 
Hegel views Kant’s recognition of synthetic a priori judgment as a good beginning to 
speculation, as it is “fully opposed to any empty identity or abstract universality which is 
not internally a synthesis ” (WL 2:261/520). However, Kant’s theory did not live up to 
this promise, instead relying upon a notion of “synthesis” which implies a merely 
external form of unity.
The structure of the concept and of the “I” are then central to Hegel’s speculative 
philosophy. Both refer to a level of logic, or conceptuality, which forms the basis of his 
version of absolute idealism. We will see below that the status of the logical within 
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Hegel’s system becomes problematic on any attempt to employ his thought. A related 
concept, to which both Adorno and Marx would refer, is that of “spirit.”
3.4 “Spirit”
For Hegel, the world, even the world “of appearance,” cannot possibly be unified by the 
(individual) knowing subject. If we were to try to do this, for example, we would not be 
able to account for the subject’s additional status as object. Hegel’s solution is to begin 
with the “absolute” which is the whole out of which the subject/object split is generated, 
and to conceive of the absolute as spirit, which is another way of talking about the 
absolute as a process.
That the True is actual only as system, or that Substance is essentially Subject, is 
expressed in the representation of the Absolute as Spirit . . . The spiritual alone is the 
actual; it is essence, or that which has being in itself; it is that which relates itself to itself 
and is determinate, it is other being and being-for-self, and in this determinateness, or in
its self-externality, abides within itself; in other words, it is in and for itself . . . The Spirit 
that, so developed, knows itself as Spirit, is Science (PG §25).
For Hegel, the journey to knowledge entails the recognition that there is a larger totality 
in which the individual subject moves. If there were not this Absolute, then we would 
merely be isolated subjects.
The point of Hegel’s chapter on self-consciousness in the Phenomenology is that the 
naive consciousness necessarily must go through this process in coming to know itself. It 
begins by trying to find certainty in its own sense perception, and then subsequently 
through the understanding. In each of these moments, consciousness attempts to ground
its knowledge in something external to it. However, it comes to the realization that the 
in-itself which it has been seeking is in reality a moment of itself as subject. With this 
recognition, consciousness has raised itself up toward the truth of the Concept as the 
unity of subject and object. “If we give the name of [Concept] to the movement of 
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knowing, and the name of object to knowing as a passive unity, or as the “I”, then we see 
that not only for us, but for knowing itself, the object corresponds to the [Concept]” (PG 
§166). Consciousness is now aware that in its process of attaining knowledge of the 
external, of the other, it is in fact knowing itself.
With the formulation of consciousness knowing itself we approach the concept of 
Geist. As Inwood notes, in its most general sense, Geist refers to “the human mind and 
its products, in contrast to nature and also to the logical idea” (1992, 275). With the 
category of spirit we can begin to see the reach of Hegel’s concepts; far from being 
merely a logical term, spirit is intended to capture concrete social history. The 
inspiration for Geist in the Kantian transcendental ego should not be read as a latent 
Kantianism; rather the category denotes the shift from “subjective” to “objective,” in the 
sense of “social” or “intersubjective” (Williams 1987, 3f.). The story of the experience of 
consciousness in the Phenomenology moves from the relationship of consciousness to its
objects, to intersubjective relationships in the chapter on self-consciousness.
A self-consciousness, in being an object, is just as much “I” as “object”. With this, we 
already have before us the [concept] of Spirit. What still lies ahead for consciousness is 
the experience of what Spirit is — this absolute substance which is the unity of the 
different independent self-consciousnesses which, in their opposition, enjoy perfect 
freedom and independence: “I” that is “We” and “We” that is “I”. It is in self-
consciousness, in the [concept] of Spirit, that consciousness first finds its turning-point, 
where it leaves behind it the colourful show of the sensuous here-and-now and the 
nightlike void of the supersensible beyond, and steps out into the spiritual daylight of the 
present (PG §177).
Self-consciousness becomes spirit, the “truth of self-certainty,” as it progresses through a
dialectic of recognition with an “other.” 
As Williams points out, this move to spirit is the move beyond the Kantian 
transcendental realm, to the immanence of social interaction. Spirit, unlike the Kantian 
transcendental ego, is not a structural a priori, but rather the result of intersubjective 
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experience (Williams 1987, 3). The question for Kant becomes how to account for the 
relationship between the transcendental subject and the empirical one. In his 
abandonment of the transcendental as a structural a priori realm, Hegel moves past the 
aporia of their relationship.
The problem of foundations is not simply abandoned, but is rather displaced from the 
beginning of philosophy (the so-called first philosophy) to its end, i.e, to the results of 
philosophical labor. Critical subjectivity is not a given, but must be accomplished, 
brought about. The result of philosophical labor is not a transcendental ego purified of all 
empirical content, but rather something which is historically and culturally shaped, a 
developing foundation. What holds this notion of a non-foundational transcendental 
together with the equally strange notion of a developing foundation is Geist (Williams 
1987, 7).
Williams goes on to discuss the ambiguities in Hegel’s conception of Geist. Using the 
reading of Habermas, which postulated a fundamental conflict between the 
interpretation of Geist as interactive communication, and an idealist version in which 
Geist is formed through reflection on the finite, Williams notes that the interpretive 
options for Geist constitute the split between the left and right Hegelians. 
Whether the absolute spirit is interpreted theologically as God, or anthropologically 
as the community, obviously has implications for the conception of the relationship 
between the individual and the social community, as well as that between consciousness 
and its object. It is perhaps the relationship between these two dyads that is at the heart 
of the issue. By using the term Geist ambiguously (as Williams and Habermas would 
say), Hegel “is never able to clarify satisfactorily the relation between the Geist which 
functions as a medium, and the Geist which is the self-consciousness which 
comprehends the intersubjective medium” (Theunissen 1970, 58; quoted in Williams 
1987, 13). We’ll see below that this ambiguity is central to Adorno’s thought.36 Spirit is in 
36
 That is, the relationship between spirit as a social dialectic and spirit as a mode of philosophical
thinking, through which it ascends to absolute knowledge, reflects its origins in the philosophy of 
“identity.” Since, as we will see, Adorno cannot abide such identity, the ambiguity becomes in fact 
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a sense the absolute in its self-movement, the movement towards what Hegel refers to as 
the “idea.” The principle of movement stems from the negation at its heart. As the “unity 
of Concept and objectivity” or of the concept and “reality”, the idea represents a state of 
“truth” (WL 2:499/698; EL §213). The idea is present in the thing, in the institution 
(Hinchman 1984, 61). If it is present, then it is true, it is actual. The idea is the 
“immanent standard of judgment for each thing” (62). If it is not actual, not true, then it 
is merely contingent, arbitrary. For Hegel, this is of no interest to philosophy.
Making sense of Hegel’s use of spirit is not an easy task. After delineating nine 
distinct senses of the term in Hegel’s work, Inwood (1992, 275f.) identifies three 
common features among them: (1) spirit is “pure activity”, with no “underlying 
substratum”; (2) it develops in stages through self-reflection; and (3) “it takes over, both 
cognitively and practically, what is other than itself, nature as well as lower levels of 
Geist, and realizes itself in them.” This last refers to (subjective) spirit’s capacity for 
“over-reaching” its object.37 This is essentially the power of speculative, dialectical 
movement, the power to move through the process of diremption and reconciliation. 
“[I]n the negative unity of the idea the infinite overreaches the finite, thinking 
overreaches being , and the subjective, the objective” (EL §215).
Some of the key paired moments of spirit are finite/absolute and 
subjective/objective. Subjective spirit refers to the activity of consciousness, while the 
finite, objective spirit is the social context, the network of social relations. Spirit thus 
captures the dichotomy between the individual and the social in a way that Kant’s 
concept of the transcendental could not. “In searching for adequate terms, then, we are 
more severe.
37 See also Fackenheim 1967, 20f.; 98f.
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faced with the problem that genuine social standards cannot be simply external to 
individual selves, nor be simply their individual or collective product” (Fackenheim 1967,
46). In the Phenomenology, Hegel’s discussion of spirit comes as the “truth” of observing
reason, which is pressed towards the recognition of itself in the “external” world. While 
this makes some intuitive sense, the link between this form of spirit and that represented
by self-consciousness is obscure. The “turning point” for consciousness in its journey 
towards spirit comes with the development of self-consciousness.38 The two themes I 
would like to draw out here are these movements of consciousness: to self-
consciousness, through the breakdown of self-certainty, and to an objective form of 
spirit. There are two primary developments of consciousness here: one is the recognition 
that being-for-itself is identical to being-for-another (i.e., knowing the other is knowing 
oneself) (PG §166); the other is the transition from reason to spirit, through the 
recognition of itself in the world. In less Hegelian language, the distinction here is 
between two different relationships: (1) of individual consciousness and its perceptual 
other, and (2) of individual consciousness and the “social whole.” The corresponding 
relationships are of subject/object and part/whole. This sets up the dialectical 
relationship between the subject and the object, and between the part and the whole. 
Both are crucial.
3.5 “Experience”
We finally come to the notion of experience, which Hegel discusses most directly in the 
Introduction to the Phenomenology. The subtitle of the work is the “Science of the 
38
 On this “turning point”, see Pippin (1989, 143ff).
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Experience of Consciousness,” which suggests the centrality of the concept.39 Hegel’s 
conception of experience stems from the negation of mere “understanding,” the 
transition to speculation. As we’ve seen above, for Hegel philosophical reflection is 
merely a finite reason; it is a means of abstracting the subject from the object, of 
breaking up the concrete whole into its abstract parts.40 It is an analytical form of reason,
which subsumes particulars beneath abstract universals.
To break an idea up into its original elements is to return to its moments, which at least 
do not have the form of the given idea, but rather constitute the immediate property of 
the self. This analysis, to be sure, only arrives at thoughts which are themselves familiar, 
fixed, and inert determinations. But what is thus separated and non-actual is an essential 
moment; for it is only because the concrete does divide itself, and make itself into 
something non-actual, that it is self-moving (PG §32).
With the overcoming of the separation between understanding and intuition, Hegel 
merged the logic of thought with that of the empirical world, and he brought together the
phenomenal and the noumenal. The categories are not merely categories of our 
subjective understanding, but apply to the world itself (Lumsden 2003, 44). The concept 
of a philosophical experience of consciousness is designed to work from the this state of 
reconciliation. The world is unified not through the transcendental subject, but rather 
through this idea of a philosophical experience.41
Hegel introduces the concept of experience in the Phenomenology as a “dialectical 
movement which consciousness exercises on itself and which affects both its knowledge 
and its object;” such experience produces a “new true object” (PG §86). This is clearly a 
critical conception of conscious experience, in which consciousness reflects upon its 
39
 Though it also brings up questions about the relationship between the Phenomenology and the 
rest of Hegel’s system. See, e.g., Forster (1998).
40
 See, for example, W. Marx (1988, 44f.)
41
 As Lumsden also notes, the overcoming of the dualism of concept and intuition is the central 
concern of both the Logic and the Phenomenology’s concept of experience. These are the two 
Hegelian texts most important to Adorno.
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object, discovering a new object which is no longer in-itself but rather for-consciousness. 
Here we have effectively a splitting of consciousness and of its experience of itself. 
Hegelian experience is this dialectical move through the splitting and unifying of subject 
and (new) object. Against our common sense notion of experience, Hegel posits 
experience as a reflexive action, as consciousness beginning to experience itself. 
Consciousness is led towards this form of experience by necessity. “Only in plumbing the 
depths of what [the object] is for us shall we ever attain to what it is in itself” (Lauer 
1976, 37).42
Experience then for Hegel captures the relationship between subject (consciousness)
and object, as they move dialectically. Hegelian science is the science of the experience of
consciousness, because it is here that we can enter into Hegel’s system of philosophy. 
The relationship between a “natural” or common sense form of consciousness, and the 
critical variety that comprises philosophical experience, also points to that between 
empirical science and Hegelian scientific philosophy, and has numerous repercussions 
for a conception of science which was to be appropriated by Adorno. The “objectivity” of 
the categories is then differently grounded in Hegel than in Kant. For Kant, objectivity 
was grounded through the universality and necessity of the transcendental subject. For 
Hegel, on the other hand, the categories are objective simply because they reflect the 
42
 See also (PG §36), where Hegel discusses the experience of consciousness in terms of spirit: 
The Science of this pathway is the Science of the experience which consciousness goes 
through; the substance and its movement are viewed as the object of consciousness. 
Consciousness knows and comprehends only what falls within its experience; for what is 
contained in this is nothing but spiritual substance, and this, too, as object of the self. But 
Spirit becomes object because it is just this movement of becoming an other to itself, i.e. 
becoming an object to itself, and of suspending this otherness. And experience is the name 
we give to just this movement, in which the immediate, the unexperienced, i.e. the abstract, 
whether it be of sensuous [but still unsensed] being, or only thought of as simple, becomes 
alienated from itself and then returns to itself from this alienation, and is only then revealed 
for the first time in its actuality and truth, just as it then has become a property of 
consciousness also.
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logic of the concept which underlies spirit. The concept of experience unifies the subject 
and object. It is the process of alienation and reconciliation, in the progress towards 
science (PG §36). This is obviously not an empiricist conception of experience. 
Experience is not solely empirical, and consciousness does not simply receive passive 
sensations and form them. “Consciousness is conscious of an object and its own 
consciousness of what it takes to be the truth of that object. Experience is this 
comparison” (Lumsden 2003, 46). Hegelian science is then built upon a form of “naive” 
experience, on which it operates. 
While it is difficult to concisely explicate Hegel’s philosophy, in the foregoing discussion 
I have briefly discussed some of his key terminology. Within the context of German 
idealist philosophy, as I have presented it here, Hegel’s work represents an attempt to 
overcome what he sees as the limitations of Kant’s perspective. Kant’s transcendental 
solution to the modern problems of autonomy and objectivity resulted in conception of 
the conscious subject which is strictly cut off from its surrounding world. While keeping 
the same motivating questions and concerns in mind, Hegel refused any recourse to 
transcendental argument, relying instead on a phenomenological perspective through 
which philosophical reason became more properly self-grounding. A significant question
is the extent to which Hegel’s solution provides another plausible position or framework 
for interpretation within social theory and philosophy. If Kant’s work provided a 
fundamental challenge to philosophical positions such as rationalism and empiricism, as 
well as those of naturalism and realism, how should we characterize Hegel’s own 
approach? Although this question cannot be answered definitively here, below I discuss 
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Hegel’s critique of empiricism in more detail, as a means of both further specifying his 
particular version of idealism, and to prepare for a later discussion of the Hegelian 
influence on forms of classical social theory.
4. Hegel’s critique of empiricism and the Wissenschaftlich task of 
philosophy
Hegel’s version of philosophical Wissenschaft (“science”) is of course a far cry from the 
empirical scientific method that has developed since the enlightenment, and the 
Hegelian heritage of thinkers such as Marx and Adorno draw precisely on some of these 
moments which apparently diverge so starkly from this heritage. Now that I’ve covered 
some of the basic conceptual aspects of Hegel’s philosophy, I’d like to focus on the 
question of Hegel’s relationship to empirical science.43 This question is central for 
understanding the Hegelian heritage in current forms of critical thinking, as well as the 
relationship between philosophy and sociology in general.
In many ways scientific thinking is, for Hegel, analogous to forms of reflective 
philosophy. Inwood (1983, 51) notes that Hegel differentiates between the conceptions of
experience which relate to philosophical versus scientific thought. Both philosophy and 
science have their origins in experience. Perhaps the broadest distinction is that 
empirical philosophy and empirical science do not seek truth “in thought itself”, but 
rather from experience, from “what is outwardly or inwardly present” (EL §37). Hegel 
does not condemn empiricist thought; the empirical stance of consciousness has the 
advantages of both self-certainty and freedom, liberation from tradition and doctrine. 
43
 To avoid confusion, I will refer to Hegelian science by its German name, Wissenschaft, and 
reserve the term “science” for the empirical methodology which is characteristically associated 
with it in the North American context.
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“In empiricism there lies this great principle, that what is true must be in actuality and 
must be there for our perception. This principle is opposed to the ‘ought’ through which 
reflection inflates itself, and looks down upon what is actual and present in the name of a
beyond that can only have its place and thereness in the subjective understanding” (EL 
§38R). Although empirical science cannot (a lá Hume), guarantee universality or 
objectivity, Hegel’s complaint is that it rests on a set of unquestioned assumptions 
regarding its objects and its methods (EL §1). The ultimate reliance on the empirically 
given is, in actuality, a sign of unfreedom for Hegel, since the empirical is ultimately 
merely something given (EL §38A; Inwood 1983, 67). Scientific reason begins with the 
empirical, and it produces laws and theoretical concepts (EL §7). In doing so, it both 
“prepares” perceptual data for philosophical thought and compels consciousness to go 
beyond this finite, limited perspective. Consciousness experiences “cravings of thought,” 
which lead to the need for and the rise of philosophy (EL §12).
Hegel’s critique of the scientific rationality characteristic of the Enlightenment 
emphasizes the need for a philosophical reason which will adequately address truth. 
Both empirical philosophy and empirical science neglect the “sole obligation of 
philosophy — to determine whether . . . thoughts and relationships possess truth in-an-
for-themselves” (VGP3 310). Science takes what is empirically given as fact, and even 
though it reasons about it, it does so by employing concepts in an empiricist way. It uses 
concepts to tell a story of what happens in the natural or human world. Philosophy’s task
is quite different. Rather than being comprised of “a narrative of what happens,” 
philosophy should be “a cognition of what is true in what happens” (WL 2:260/519).
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The true is the conceptual, in Hegel’s sense; it is what is universal within thought, 
what is objective (EL §21). “[E]ven though the universal is a product of thought, it is 
nevertheless objective: without its presence in being there would simply be nothing there
to experience” (Hinchman 1984, 78). The empiricists cannot recognize this truth, but 
stay committed to using concepts blindly, not seeing their intimate connection to 
“reality.” Hinchman explains the critique clearly:
On the one hand, they take sense particulars to be real and independent of mental 
activity. Yet in order to say anything about sense experience they must use categories of 
the understanding, dissecting and analyzing the concretum of sense experience. This 
procedure has two consequences. First, the empiricists do not realize that the products of 
analysis — abstract thought like force and law or, in political philosophy, natural rights 
and passions — transform the concrete totality of experience precisely because they are so
abstract . . . Second [Hegel] argues that these empiricists deceive themselves into 
believing that they have depicted things as they really are, when in fact they are doing just
the opposite” (1984, 78; See EL §38).
True philosophical reason then recognizes the import of the empiricist procedure. The 
universals, in the form of concepts, that it brings to bear on sensory data are already 
immanent to it. The independence of the scientific observer from her reality, which she 
takes for granted, is already a product of abstraction, of the negative activity of the “I”. 
Hegel’s philosophical reason is the process of recognizing this, it is the “reduction and 
absorption” of the material of sense perception “into its essential being that in turn 
manifests itself only in the concept” (WL 2:259/519). Empiricists in this way have made 
an error which was not overcome by Kant; even though he grasped the significance of the
“I”, he nevertheless upheld the strict separation of intuitions and concepts.
The turn towards philosophy involves a version of Kant’s Copernican revolution, a 
turn towards the subject and its powers of constitution. Philosophy only begins, in a 
sense, after science, when consciousness comes to reflect upon itself and its mode of 
apprehending its world. The abstractions of scientific reason are the beginning point of 
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speculative philosophy, in which they are seen in their false abstractness. Here the 
“object” of science changes from the unproblematic empirically given to that which is 
observed by the subject. The object therefore comes to contain the subject, because the 
subject understands its own role in its formation. “The essential character of all 
development in Hegel’s philosophy requires . . . that the thinker to whom an object is 
given shed his ‘detached’ attitude toward it and recognize that his increasingly more 
adequate cognition of the object is simultaneously an ever more concrete development of
self-knowledge” (Hinchman 1984, 54). The “I” makes itself into its own object, and only 
through this procedure can it come to grasp the concept.
As “reason,” philosophy seeks a form of comprehension that the “understanding” 
cannot achieve. It goes beyond empirical science because it attempts to comprehend its 
own concepts, rather than trusting in them blindly. But still, it works only with “what is,”
in the sense that it begins not in arbitrary abstraction, but instead with the immediacy of 
sensation (EL §38); however, it recognizes that what presents itself to consciousness is 
not “the unconditioned in and for itself” (WL 2:260/519). In the pursuit of “truth” in that
which already is, Hegel’s philosophical reason does not import ideality; rather, it tries to 
recognize the conceptual (ideal) in “reality.” Philosophy which is “genuine” is then 
necessarily an idealism, a speculative idealism. It’s “most important proposition” is the 
“ideality of the finite” (EL §95). 
This ideality is, for Hegel, the conceptual. It is also described as the “objectivity” of 
thought, discovered through the self-reflection of consciousness. “[T]hinking things over 
leads to what is universal in them; but the universal itself is one of the moments of the 
Concept. To say that there is understanding, or reason, in the world is exactly what is 
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contained in the expression ‘objective thought.’ But this expression is inconvenient 
precisely because ‘thought’ is all too commonly used as if it belonged only to spirit, or 
consciousness, while ‘objective’ is used primarily just with reference to what is 
unspiritual” (EL §24R). For Hegel, this is the path to the “logical.” In performing this 
task, reason goes beyond modes of reflective thought, in that it attempts to account for 
itself, and its own negativity. It cannot rest content with pursuing an empirical mode of 
thought, once it comes to the recognition that it has created the empirical world through 
its own negation. The speculative nature of idealism, as philosophy, stems from this 
move of the “I” attempting to understand itself. “The ‘truth’ of empiricism is the ‘I,’” and, 
since the “truth” of the “I” is spirit, philosophy is lead directly into the intersubjective, 
societal realm in its pursuit (Hinchman 1984, 93). The nature of speculation involves this
ability to grasp the whole, to see the “I” in its power of negativity and differentiation.  
5. Conclusion: the German idealist heritage
Though abbreviated, I hope to have given a sense in the foregoing of some of the issues 
involved in Hegel’s critique of Kant. The issue is substantially more complicated than as 
articulated by, e.g., Hund, according to whom the transition is hallmarked by a move 
from psychological subjectivity to sociological objectivity, through Hegel’s “complete 
sociological overhaul” of the Kantian transcendental subject (Hund 1998, 233). There is 
more at stake than simply reading Geist as the social or the institutional. Hegel’s key 
concepts of Geist, absolute, concept, and speculation involve not only a recognition of 
the insufficiency of Kantian subjectivism, but also an appreciation for the (speculative) 
identity of subject and object. 
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Kant’s critical revolution provides a way of rethinking the relationship between 
subject and object (or mind and world) by claiming that the first necessary task is an 
examination of the possibility of the subject’s own knowledge. Kant sought a way out of 
strictly metaphysical accounts, and his transcendental solution radically undermines 
both rationalist and empiricist accounts, and began the perspective of transcendental 
idealism. Hegel criticizes Kant’s conception of the subject as being merely formal, 
complaining that the subject is not just an empty form which receives its content. 
Instead Hegel introduces the idea that the “I” and the “concept” are identical, in terms of 
having the same structure, and articulates the dynamic character of both. The formal 
quality of the transcendental unity of apperception is rejected, and Hegel substitutes a 
subject that is self-relating, that determines itself through its own judgment. It is in this 
way that, for commentators like Pippin, Hegel’s account should be understood as a 
completion of Kant’s critical turn, rather than as a turn to some pre-critical metaphysical
position. Kant’s criticism of empiricism led to his account of the transcendental 
conditions of experience, for the active, spontaneous character of consciousness, but 
relied upon a form of deduction that Hegel could not accept. 
The move from a “subjective” to an “absolute” form of idealism is then at the center 
of the Kant to Hegel story; but the details are notoriously difficult to spell out. Pippin 
articulates one of the difficulties: “If one denies that there are ‘formal’ conditions for the 
possibility of any apperceptive experience, what else can one counterpose except an 
empirical or psychological or conventional or pragmatic account of how we come to 
acquire ‘what we find the hardest notions to give up’ in the self-construals that make up 
our experience?” (1989, 38-9). What precisely are we to make of the self-determining 
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subject (and the self-determining concept), and what impact should it have on our 
philosophy and social theory? If we accept the claim that the Hegelian spirit does not 
refer to some theological or cosmic entity, how should we understand it? The history of 
Hegel interpretation quickly demonstrates the difficulty of these questions; however, this
does not deny their significance. My account takes seriously that claim that Hegel’s 
philosophy is more accurately (and interestingly) conceived as a proposal for 
understanding the nature of a self-conscious subjectivity, and its relationship to its own 
“conditions of knowledge” (see Pippin 1989, 39). The social-theoretical significance of 
Hegel’s philosophy stems in large part from this attempt to “de-transcendentalize” the 
Kantian subject, including the confusion about how we then might interpret its 
“conditions.” 
A brief examination of Hegel’s conception of the relationship of spirit to nature will 
underscore the complexity of his response to Kant. As I’ve discussed, Hegel’s 
philosophical system involved Geist as a central concept, in which it is primarily related 
to both nature and to logic. Geist is a complex concept; in the Phenomenology, Hegel 
traces the path of consciousness as it progressively develops into Geist, while in the 
Encyclopedia, there is a transition from nature into spirit. The issue of the relationship 
between the natural and the spiritual (human) is an important one, especially for my 
narrative here. Adorno’s own concept of “natural history,” which is a rethinking of the 
concept of “second nature” in Marx and Lukács, relates fundamentally to this question. 
How should we understand the difference between the natural world and the human 
world? What implications does this have for our practice of science, philosophy, and 
politics? 
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In terms of the relationship of spirit to nature, Pippin (2008, 45ff.) highlights three 
aspects of Hegel’s claim: (1) anti-dualism; (2) self-relation; (3) freedom as achievement. 
Pippin emphasizes that, for Hegel, nature is explicitly not the other of spirit. There is 
some point at which nature evolves into spirit, but a spirit which has always presupposed
nature. Spirit is the “truth” of nature, in the sense that, for nature to know itself, it must 
become spirit. The structure of self-relation is then also a key to the category.  “Natural 
beings begin to understand themselves in ways not explicable as self-sentiment or mere 
self-monitoring because the form of their reflexive self-relation is an aspect of what is to 
be represented, not a separable, quasi-observational position and they come to be able to
hold each other to account on bases other than natural need” (Pippin 2008, 46). We are 
then beyond the realm of “natural facts;” but we have achieved a form of spirit which is 
not fully abstracted from its natural origins.44
The second theme that Pippin discusses, in the context of the relationship of spirit to
nature, is self-relation, which “has a normative as well as an irreducible first-personal 
character and beings which can be said to have established such a relation require a 
different sort of account from those applicable to nature itself, or require a different way 
of rendering intelligible the (still) naturally embodied states and relations achieved” 
(Pippin 2008, 51). Spirit involves negation of immediacy, the overcoming of nature 
44
 Pippin admits that his interpretation makes Hegel into a rationalist, committed to the 
assumption that “to be is to be intelligible” (2008, 49); and he notes that this points toward a 
concern with standards of explanation.
[F]or Hegel, while knowledge of anything finite and conditioned inevitably gives rise to 
questions about the conditions for such finite knowledge and so ultimately to a search for the
unconditioned (or the ultimately satisfying explanation), that ascent does not lead us beyond
the limits of experience, but deeper into ourselves and the nature of our own normative 
requirements, “legislated” for ourselves. This is not to “anthropologize” the unconditioned 
(for Hegel, free, rational self-legislation is what he calls the “Absolute”) . . . Hegel just takes 
very seriously the claim that “God” became man, that spirit’s (finally satisfying) knowledge of
itself and its legislative activity is “the unconditioned” (Pippin 2008, 49-50).
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through the subjective taking of nature.45 While the subject can exist in a natural state, 
spirit constitutes itself through a reflection on this state as a process of achievement, 
which cannot be understood as a natural process; it is, rather, a “way of taking up the 
world and so presupposes a way of understanding the world, with several 
presuppositions and so already a distinct mode of orientation and direction” (Pippin 
2008, 53). In this way, there is no ontological break through which spirit “appears;” it is 
a “return to itself out of nature.” Hegel’s non-dualist account here is an example of the 
kind of “foundationlessness” which occurs in his philosophy. The relationship of nature 
to spirit cannot be described as one of foundation, nor can spirit be considered to be 
“emergent” in a Durkheimian sense. Both accounts remain mired in dualism. 
The third characteristic in this account is “spirit as freedom as achievement.” The 
essence of spirit is freedom. “[I]t is of the very nature of spirit to be this absolute 
liveliness, this process, to proceed forth from naturality, immediacy, to sublate, to quit 
its naturality, and to come to itself, and to free itself” (EG; quoted in Pippin 2008, 56). 
Spirit actively achieves its own freedom, not by getting rid of necessity, but by coming to 
recognize itself in its own context. Spirit is the process of freeing itself from nature.
For Hegel, then, spirit is a complex concept, intended to encompass a variety of 
“improvements” on Kant. It encompasses both “subjective spirit” and “objective spirit,” 
as well as “absolute spirit.” While the full scope of its intricacies cannot be examined 
here, I intend to investigate some of its implications for the development of a social 
science, a mode of investigation which aims, at some level, precisely to investigate this 
realm. Although some have attempted to detach the notion of “objective spirit,” to serve 
45
 Pippin notes in this context that “an awful lot of work . . . is being done by the notion of 
‘negativity’ appealed to, the denial of immediacy.” The  objects of this “stance” are initially 
“feelings, sensation, rituals, habits” (2008, 53).
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as the object of a social science or Geisteswissenschaften, it is not so easily abstracted. 
The absolute, as the “formation process of subjects and objects” (Rosen 1974, 42), or as 
spirit coming to know itself, is simply not separable from its subjective and objective 
moments. If it is the absolute that joins the subjective and the objective, how can it be 
excised without relinquishing a grasp on the whole? If we try to see the social as that 
which mediates subjective and objective, how can we avoid losing a conception of 
freedom? In many ways, we will see that the attempt to manage this detachment is at the
center of key issues for classical social theory.
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Chapter 3 Adorno’s critique of philosophical reason: 
Engaging German idealism
1. Introduction
The entirety of Adorno’s broad intellectual work is deeply indebted to the heritage of 
German idealist philosophy. Although there are many other important intellectual 
touchstones for Adorno (e.g., Freud, Nietzsche, Weber, Benjamin), it is the philosophies 
of Kant and Hegel, and the complex relationship between them, which most significantly
structure Adorno’s views of the nature of knowledge and our experience of the social 
world. One needs to go no further than Adorno’s key category of the “nonidentical” to 
view the significance of the German idealist heritage. This is not an original recognition; 
as O’Connor, among others, points out, an understanding of Adorno’s philosophy is 
simply impossible without understanding his relationship to Kant and Hegel (2004, 
16).46 I will argue that it is equally true that an understanding of Adorno’s sociology and 
social theory is impossible without this background as well, in part because his 
conception of sociology and science is so intimately tied to his understanding of 
philosophy. Consequently, the numerous critiques of styles of philosophical thought 
which recur throughout Adorno’s oeuvre are integrally related to his critiques of forms of
sociology and social theory. We cannot look at one without looking at the other, not 
because together they constitute some kind of Hegelian whole of reason, but rather 
46
 One of the characteristics of Adorno’s work is the diversity of the ancestral relations that have 
been attributed to it. Bozzetti (1996; 2002) makes the detailed case for Hegel as the primary 
touchstone; O’Connor (2004) for Kant; Bernstein (2001) for Weber. In my opinion, the priority of
Hegel for Adorno seems clear: “These days it is hardly possible for a theoretical idea of any scope 
to do justice to the experience of consciousness, and in fact not only the experience of 
consciousness but the embodied experience of human beings, without having incorporated 
something of Hegel’s philosophy” (H 252/2).
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because Adorno’s understanding of the possibilities for modes of thinking and 
experiencing in modern, capitalist society, takes its cue from the concrete history of the 
relationship between philosophy and science, and because, for Adorno, any form of 
properly philosophical thought must come to terms with the social character of its 
content. The idea is that, if Adorno’s perspective on knowledge owes much to the 
German idealists, then by examining this relationship, we can better understand both 
Adorno’s own conception of knowledge – including its relationship to philosophical and 
sociological practice – and the significance of the German idealist heritage for versions of
classical social theory.
In this chapter I would like to isolate a few of the most relevant themes from 
German idealism that inform Adorno’s work. The topic is of course extremely broad, and 
I cannot hope do justice to its complexity here. Through a detailed discussion of 
Adorno’s engagement with the philosophies of Hegel and Kant, I will lay out the 
groundwork for understanding Adorno’s conceptions of subject and object, their 
relationship in terms of identity and nonidentity, and the category of experience. To do 
this, I will begin with Adorno’s understanding of the significance of Kantian philosophy, 
and then move on to describe his attempts to come to grips with Hegel. This order 
reflects what I consider to be Adorno’s deeper engagement with and commitment to 
Hegel’s philosophy, and also the significance of Hegel’s critique of Kant for Adorno’s own
perspective. For Adorno, Hegel is the most significant of the post-Kantian German 
idealists, and at the same time he represents a fundamental move away from Kant 
towards a dialectical philosophy of the absolute. Accordingly, I will pay attention to the 
ways in which this move haunts the whole of Adorno’s work. The argument that I will 
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propose is that this problem of the relationship of a subjective, transcendental, and an 
objective, absolute idealism will explicate Adorno’s complex understanding of the ways 
in which the social experience of the individual as a knowing consciousness must be 
understood, as well as the ways in which the social, or society, is to be found within the 
process and product of reason itself.
This chapter will also serve as an explication of Adorno’s distinctive conception of 
the nature and demands of critical philosophy. The defense of a nonidentical 
relationship of subject and object in Adorno’s philosophy must be seen in relation to 
these debates. I will work out my interpretation of the notion of the nonidentical during 
the course of this discussion. Adorno’s critical reaction to idealism was based upon his 
recognition of the failure of enlightenment reason; accordingly, it is important to 
remember that Adorno is involved in a specifically philosophical, and epistemological, 
task. “Adorno develops [his] account of rational experience through a critique of the 
epistemological models available in modern philosophy” (O’Connor 2004, 1). It is 
difficult to, as O’Connor does, reduce Adorno’s thought to a couple of main concepts. 
Due to the nature of his thought, there is not an easy hierarchy of concepts, some of 
which are more fundamental than others. My discussion of his work in terms of the 
heritage of German idealism is intended to begin to explicate Adorno’s conception of 
what the nature of philosophy, or critical thought generally, should be in the context of 
contemporary capitalist society. It is largely a story of nonidentity against identity, or 
dialectic against positivism, but I will not attempt to reduce it to such a slogan. One of 
the most important things for a “geistig experience” is to reflexively recognize the 
priority of the object, and its (the conscious subject’s) own “natural” attempt to dominate
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the object. But in addition to explicating this process, I want to begin to bring out the 
conception of the social that lies behind, as it were, Adorno’s critique of idealist 
philosophical thought, both in terms of the subject and the object; and also to view this 
within the framework of German idealism’s problematics of autonomy and objectivity. 
This will set up a more explicit discussion, in later chapters, of the ways in which 
Adorno’s thought goes beyond, as he was always quick to point out, some form of a 
sociology of knowledge. 
Adorno’s work is not then strictly philosophical; he considers philosophical reason 
to be fundamentally imbricated with society and social forms, and to that extent there is 
no “internal” and “external” of philosophy.
Adorno argues . . . that reference to social experience is part and parcel even of apparently
“purely” logical or epistemological concepts themselves. Adorno calls such reference 
“metalogical” [ND 139/135]. Metalogical reference is not brought to concepts from 
somewhere else. All concepts already contain an element of reference to experience and 
are unthinkable without such reference. Immanent critique seeks to make explicit the 
reference to social experience which is already sedimented in the form of an analogy, not 
because philosophy and social experience are really in some way unconnected matters, 
but rather because the division of intellectual labour which has increasingly led them to 
be separately considered, under the professional headings of “philosophy” and 
“sociology,” is a real division, and cannot be wished away (Jarvis 1998, 153).
In this way, as Adorno puts it in the preface to Negative Dialectics, philosophy needs 
“stringently to transcend the official separation of pure philosophy and the substantive 
subject matter” — a prescription that he derives from Hegel (ND 10/xx). Through his 
engagement with the German idealism of Kant and Hegel, Adorno begins to unfold the 
defects and potential of an “adequate” philosophical reason, and to formulate his attempt
to articulate and present critical intellectual work which is “adequate” to its context.
In this chapter I will demonstrate the relevance of these issues for Adorno’s critical 
philosophy, which in turn will prepare my larger argument about his social and 
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sociological theory. Adorno’s work can be read as an attempt to “rematerialize” German 
idealist philosophy, in terms other than those of Marx or the Marxists of the Second 
International. To the extent that Adorno seeks a materialist philosophy — and we will see
that he considers his thought to be materialist, according to his conception of the term —
we need to understand the concept of idealism against which it was directed; otherwise, 
we cannot get beyond a superficial understanding of his work. In his engagement with 
the philosophies of Kant and Hegel — as well as with the work of Marx, which I will cover
in a later chapter — Adorno prepared the critical philosophical framework through which
he interpreted both the concept of society and the nature of critical and scientific 
sociological thought.
2. Adorno’s critique of Kant’s philosophy
In his elaboration of the negative dialectic, Adorno frequently refers to aspects of Kant’s 
critical philosophy. The broad outlines of Adorno’s critique of Kant are clear: Kant’s 
philosophy remained unconsciously riddled with the contradictions of bourgeois society. 
However, in characteristic Adornian fashion, this fact is both the source of the strength 
of Kant’s philosophy, as well as its limitation. For Adorno, the philosophical expression 
of the separation of the subject and object, as expressed most importantly and forcefully 
by Kant’s transcendentalism, is a correlate to their real, material separation, “the 
rivenness of the human conditions, the result of a coercive historical process” (SO 
742/246). Kant’s work is important to Adorno because he (Kant) managed to express — 
even  if only implicitly — the contradiction that is necessarily inherent in philosophical 
epistemology and experience. Any philosophy which claims to promote a new experience
of the object, and a new relationship between subject and object, must come to terms 
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with the current situation for, and understanding of, these terms. For Adorno, Kant’s 
philosophy is not just important for the history of philosophy, but it is also important 
historically, in that his philosophy expresses the nature of bourgeois subjectivity. “Like 
all intellectual phenomena [wie alles Geistige überhaupt], a philosophy does not stand 
outside time; it exists within time — not merely in the sense that it can be forgotten, or 
subject to different interpretations, but rather in the sense that its own content [Gehalt] 
unfolds in time, forming a variety of configurations [Konstellationen] that release 
meanings and generate meanings that were not remotely considered at its inception” 
(KK 270-1/178). Adorno will reconfigure both the subject and the object in part from a 
critique of Kant’s understanding of these concepts. 
Adorno considered Kant’s philosophy to be fundamental for an understanding of 
modern thought, and his engagement with Kant’s work lasted throughout his life.47 The 
characteristic dualisms of Kant’s philosophy were read by Adorno as signs of a 
problematic underlying reality. Adorno relied partially on Kant’s refutation of idealism to
establish his own conception of materialism.48 For Kant, the subject’s self-consciousness 
cannot be prioritized over its consciousness of external objects. The subject may afford 
itself primacy, but it does not know itself more immediately than it does externalities 
47
 In an essay on his early mentor Kracauer, Adorno explains how he learned to approach 
philosophical texts: 
For years Kracauer read the Critique of Pure Reason with me regularly on Saturday 
afternoons . . . Under his guidance I experienced the work from the beginning not as mere 
epistemology, not as an analysis of the conditions of scientifically valid judgments, but as a 
kind of coded text from which the historical situation of spirit could be read, with the vague 
expectation that in doing so one could acquire something of truth itself. If in my later reading
of traditional philosophical texts I was not so much impressed by their unity and systematic 
consistency as I was concerned with the play of forces at work under the surface of every 
closed doctrine and viewed the codified philosophies as force fields in each case, it was 
certainly Kracauer who impelled me to do so” (NL2 58-9; italics added).
48
 The content of Adorno’s version of materialism, and its relationship to Marx and Marxism, will 
be discussed in a later chapter.
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(CPR B276; O’Connor 2004, 23f.).49 The relation between subject and object then in 
Kant shows, through the notion of experience, an “immediate relation”, that is both 
“nonconceptual,” since it is a relationship of a subject to an object that is undetermined, 
but yet still remains within “the space of reasons.” Although Kant’s thing-in-itself 
supplied inspiration for the Adorno’s conception of the non-identical, it also contains 
problems for Adorno, the most central of which is the “chorismos” – Adorno’s term for 
the gap – that exists between the noumenal and phenomenal realms. On Kant’s model, 
the subject-object relationship remains an aporia. In an attempt to get beyond this 
impasse, without crossing over into a problematic Hegelian “identity,” Adorno insists 
that the object retain a fundamental conceptuality (read: subjectivity), and he relied in 
part on Hegel’s critique of Kant to argue this.
[F]or Adorno the problem with the thing-in-itself is not, as it was for Kant’s immediate 
successors, that it is incompatible with idealism. Rather the problem is that it is an empty 
and therefore nonviable concept of an object. Kant’s strategy is, in effect, to demonstrate 
the limits of subjectivity, and that limitation leaves space for objects. However, because 
objects in themselves are what is on the other side of a limit, they are characterized as 
entirely other than the objects that can be apprehended by a subject . . . Adorno offers a 
certain picture of Hegelian philosophy in order to give objects conceptual quality, 
something which Kant, it seems, cannot (O’Connor 2004, 178n6).
Adorno’s critique of Kant begins with this critique of the thing-in-itself, but his goal is to 
both illuminate the contradictions of Kantian philosophy, as well as to show just how it 
should be surpassed.
49
 O’Connor goes on to give a short critique of Kant’s Refutation of Idealism, on the grounds that 
Kant has made a leap from the idea that time consciousness requires external objects, to the 
subject’s “immediate experiential grasp of them”. By mixing up the conditions of inner 
experience, with experience itself, Kant neglects to demonstrate any necessary connection 
between object and representation. This then “leads to conflicting accounts of what objects are: 
are they representations, or are they entirely other than representations, being things-in-
themselves that underlie representations.” This critique is insightful because it shows how Kant 
shows only the limitations of subjectivity, but “cannot give substance (quite literally) to the 
objects which mark these limits” (2004: 24-5). Framing the issue in these terms highlights 
Adorno’s central concern with Kantian philosophy.
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2.1 The fetish of the transcendental (i.e., the fallacy of constitutive subjectivity)
Adorno’s perspectives on “nonidentity,” and/or the “priority of the object,” are his way of
attempting to counteract the influence of idealist philosophy, which in his opinion falsely
prioritizes the subject of knowledge. One way in which Kant succumbed to this 
prioritization was through his submission to a “foundation mania [Fundierungswahn]” 
(KK 30/16).50 Adorno concedes that Kant’s philosophical procedure of the self-reflexivity
of reason allowed him to establish what he saw as the transcendental foundations of 
experience (KK 18/7; ND 178ff./176ff.). He notes in his interpretation that this self-
reflexive method of Kant allowed him to both ground knowledge positively in our 
experience, and, on the other hand, to limit reason from straying into “speculations 
about the Absolute.” These are obviously two sides of the same coin: by seeking to 
provide a positive foundation for our knowledge, Kant draws a line of validity between 
our forms of knowledge, ruling some out and some in. Such a method is premised on the 
assumption that our reason may just as validly investigate itself reflexively and criticize 
itself, as it may take other more “externally” directed forms. The issue of the 
“foundation” and that of “self-reflexivity” are then essentially linked for Kant, as the path
towards a secure foundation is through reason’s own reflection on itself. The idea of a 
foundational prima philosophia, or “first philosophy” is anathema for Adorno, because it
arrogantly assumes that there must be some principle to which everything can be 
reduced. In Adorno’s opinion, any first philosophy is necessarily a dualistic and idealist 
one (ND 142/138, 188/187; KK 242/160; ME 22f./14f.). So, it is not just Kant’s 
50
 Adorno critiqued others, for instance Heidegger in Negative Dialectics and Husserl in Against 
Epistemology, for similar reliance on certain foundations for knowledge. Unlike Hegel, he 
generally read the attempt by the subject to secure a sure foundation for its knowledge as a part of
our “craving for security” (ND 185n/184n). See also the first chapter of Dialectic of 
Enlightenment.
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transcendentalism that is at fault, but merely his very intention to get to the “bottom” of 
things. This is the hubris of idealist (and other) philosophy. “It is not for philosophy to 
exhaust phenomena, according to scientific custom, to reduce them to a minimum of 
propositions” (ND 24/13).
The idea of a first philosophy requires a belief in what Adorno refers to as the 
“subjective reduction,” which is the process by which the subject “forgets” itself in its 
essential mediation with the object, and attempts to “reduce” the object to the subject, as 
precisely in Kant’s transcendental deduction (ND 178ff./176ff.). Here Adorno’s critique 
follows more or less directly that of Hegel. This ultimate reduction to the subject 
paradoxically results from an attempt to reach a kind of epistemological “objectivity.” It 
also goes hand in hand with the attempt to understand the world completely, to create a 
complete system of philosophy.  In an examination of the hidden assumptions of Kant’s 
transcendental procedure, Adorno notes that the very notion of the transcendental has 
the character of reality [Gegebenheit] (KK 32/17).51
In Kant’s terms, the manifold which is intuited is “given” in a way that is left 
undetermined; but also, as Adorno is quick to note, on the other side, the “peculiarity of 
our understanding,” the a priori unity of apperception, may also not be examined further
(CPR B145; KK 32/17). There is a tension here between the procedure of reduction 
through abstraction, the uncovering of the “foundations” of certain phenomena or forms
51
 Regarding the very idea of assumptions in philosophy, Adorno notes that
 A mode of thought that is absolutely free of assumptions would in reality be a kind of 
thought that is tied to nothing but pure thought itself. In other words, the philosophical 
problem par excellence, namely the problem of the relation of consciousness to its objects, of
the subject to the object, would be prejudiced in a quite specific sense, namely in the idealist 
sense that everything that exists is the subject, that is, consciousness or spirit. Only if that 
were the case, only if spirit could itself generate all the preconditions of all knowledge 
without reference to anything alien to itself, would the postulate of a knowledge free of 
assumptions be satisfied (KK 30/15).
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of knowledge, and the positing of the “given.” The given of course serves as a foundation, 
and the “mania for foundations” must at some point come to an end in something which 
is merely taken as given. The lesson that Adorno takes from this is that one should not, 
in philosophy, “feel the need to begin at the very beginning” (KK 31/16), since it will only 
lead to a problematic positing of a subject as the “origin” of the very objectivity of the 
world — “[t]he appearance [Schein] that the transcendental subject is the Archimedean 
point” (ND 182/181). In Adorno’s analysis, the very attempt to provide an objective 
foundation for knowledge is necessarily subjective.
In this way, the subjective reduction, as an attempt at a form of scientific objectivity,
paradoxically results in more subjectivity, rather than less. Accompanying the 
supposedly foundational transcendental subject is what has been termed Kant’s 
“empirical realism,” his thesis that we only have access to appearances, to phenomena, 
and not to noumena, things-in-themselves.52 Adorno refers to this as a Kantian theory of 
alienation.
By making the experienced world, the immanent world, the world in its this-ness, 
commensurate [kommensurabel] with us, by turning it into our world, so to speak, 
something like a radical metaphysical alienation is achieved simultaneously . . . The more 
the world is stripped of an objective meaning and the more it becomes coextensive with 
our own categories and thereby becomes our world, then the more we find meaning 
eliminated from the world . . . [T]he more the world in which we live, the world of 
experience, is commensurate with us, the less commensurate, the more obscure and the 
more threatening the Absolute, of which we know that this world of experience is only a 
detail, becomes . . . In other words, this darkness, that is, this consciousness, means that 
the more secure we are in our own world, the more securely we have organized our own 
lives, then the greater the uncertainty in which we find ourselves in our relations with the 
Absolute. The familiarity with our own world is purchased at the price of metaphysical 
despair’ (KK 168-9/110-1).   
This interpretation sets up Adorno’s characterization of Kant’s philosophy as a “salvage 
operation [Rettung]” (KK 172/113). It is the attempt by a subject, through the limitation 
52
 I am not differentiating between noumena and things-in-themselves here, since the distinction 
is not important to my concerns. On this distinction, see Collins (2009).
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of consciousness, to “make himself at home” in the world (a theme which Adorno had 
first explored in Dialectic of Enlightenment). It also implies an unstable system in which,
as consciousness becomes more and more certain of its “objective” knowledge, it creates 
at the same time an ever increasing irrationality of the noumenal world. Perhaps against 
“common sense,” Adorno sees the process of subjectivization in Kant as being the 
counterpart to that of reification. “[T]he more that is inserted into the subject, the more 
the subject comes to constitute knowledge as such, then the more that determining 
factors are withdrawn from the object, and the more the two realms diverge” (KK 174-
5/115; see also KK 267f./176; ND 190ff./189ff.). The philosophical prototype for this 
dynamic Adorno finds in the rationalism of Descartes.
Adorno also, however, explicitly criticizes the concept of the transcendental, Kant’s 
particular version of foundationalism. His critique here is based upon the nature of 
abstraction. The movement through abstraction to the sphere of the transcendental is a 
loss of the subject’s relation to the object. Adorno’s proclamation of the priority of the 
object means that the subject should remain aware of the thing that it thinks, in its very 
thingness (i.e., as distinct from its apprehension by thought). Adorno describes the 
object as the “something” which is indissoluble, which may not be abstracted away. This 
critique is reflected as well in his proclamation that there can be no Sein without 
Seiendes, no “being” without “beings.” Adorno refers to this “something,” which must 
not be forgotten, as a “metalogical rudiment [Rudiment] ” (ND 139/135). It is the 
element that is beyond the logical, which we nevertheless discover within it.
This is the “anthropological-materialist turn” of his critique, which Adorno credits to
Schopenhauer (H 263/16; see O’Connor 117ff.). There are two main aspects of this 
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critique, which are articulated, naturally enough, in the hyphenated term. The 
“materialist” aspect of the turn, or critique, is highlighted by the critique of idealist forms
of abstraction. One of the keys to idealist philosophy — which applies to both the Kantian
and post-Kantian varieties, albeit in importantly different ways — is that it ends up with 
only an abstract conception of the world, it loses its connection to material substance at 
some point along the way. The priority of the object thus applies to the object of the 
conscious subject, as well as to the subject itself as object.
What results from abstraction can never be made absolutely autonomous vis-à-vis what it
is abstracted from; because the abstractum remains applicable to that which is subsumed
within it, and because return is to be possible, the quality of what it has been abstracted 
from is always, in a certain sense, preserved in it at the same time, even if in an extremely 
general form. Hence if the formation of the concept of the transcendental subject or the 
absolute spirit sets itself completely outside individual consciousness as something 
spatiotemporal, when in fact the concept is achieved through individual consciousness, 
then the concept itself can no longer be made good; otherwise that concept, which did 
away with all fetishes, becomes a fetish itself (H 263/15).
Kant’s work is problematic because of his comfort working within the transcendental 
sphere. In a sense, the transcendental subject becomes dually abstracted, twice removed,
from the object. The very notion of the transcendental is contested by Adorno both due 
to its origins in abstraction, and more generally due to its attempt to serve as a source of 
grounding. The critical materialism of Adorno’s philosophy is designed to begin its 
criticism with these abstractions and rediscover, or rescue, their materialist sediment.
As an example, Adorno criticizes Kant’s conception of universality with the claim 
that it stems simply from a general understanding of concept formation. A concept is 
universal if it covers all of the individual items which have characteristics which it 
includes (KK 214/142). Concepts arise through the selection and isolation of “arbitrary” 
elements; this procedure is not aimed at real understanding of the thing, but rather aims 
to subsume things under concepts. Adorno characterizes this as a means of imposing the 
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qualities of the subject on the object of knowledge. In terms of universality, then, Kant’s 
model stems from this method of extensional logic: something is universal if it holds for 
all. Adorno characterizes this as “the universality of subjective reason, a universality 
generated simply by the constitution of the human subject that comprehends things in 
this way and no other” (KK 216/143). In other words, in order to understand and know 
the object in front of it, to seek objective validity, the subject “reduces” itself to this form 
of universality (ND 142-3/139). In order to justify the universality that he requires for his
account of knowledge, Kant simply uses the notion of the structure of experience, and 
consequently of the mind. The mind requires such universality in order to experience 
and know. In Adorno’s terms of a critical materialism, this critique essentially holds that 
Kant has unacknowledged assumptions in his argument, which relate to the concrete, 
material nature of the subject. By claiming that universality is a necessary condition of 
“objective” knowledge, Kant follows the logic of subjective concept formation. This 
method abstracts problematically from the objects themselves; however, it also abstracts 
from the subject of knowing. Instead of the empirical individual knowing subject, we 
have the subject in its transcendental-ness; instead of the way that actual human 
individuals think, we have the necessary preconditions of all experience.
The critique holds as well for the fundamental Kantian distinction between 
sensations and intuitions, content and form. If experience, according to Kant, is to 
consist in the unity of sensation and intuition, in that the sensual content is structured 
by the forms of the understanding, then how are we to make sense of the abstract 
transcendental subject? The idea of the “form” has been derived through abstraction, or 
“hypostatization,” and thus separated from anything empirical. How then can empirical 
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sensation be “given” to such a form? (ME 147/142). Perhaps a more pressing issue 
concerns what it is that we are doing when we attempt to reason about reason in such a 
fashion. Adorno argues that Kant ends up with some form of knowledge which lies 
somewhere between psychology and logic — that is, between a form of knowing focused 
on the empirical aspects of the mind, versus one that deals with a so-called “pure reason”
(KK 40/22). Kant’s critique thus falsely implies that there is a mode of reasoning which 
may retain the connection between the logical (or transcendental) and the material (or 
empirical). Although Adorno’s criticism is easy to make, we’ll see below that Adorno’s 
own work brings up similar issues.
On the other hand, this form of critical procedure is also anthropological, in that the
metalogical “sediment” that it attempts to rescue is fundamentally social. With respect to
the Kantian transcendental subject, Adorno argues that its universality reflects 
necessarily the universality of our social existence; and more generally that the 
categories derive their universality (problematically under-theorized by Kant) from their
generality. They
have their universality in the fact that they are the forms of all conscious persons . . . and 
that compared to them the individual consciousness stands opposed to the social 
consciousness in the same ratio as the relatively accidental and particular stands opposed 
to necessity and its laws, to the universal which operates in accordance with rules . . . In 
the Critique of Pure Reason Kant made the sustained attempt to make a very clear 
distinction between the subject that he made the focus of his analysis and the empirical 
subject. He arrived at this abstract subject, as is the case with every concept, by 
abstracting from a multiplicity of individual subjects. We might then say that I cannot 
meaningfully talk about the transcendental subject or what he calls in the Prolegomena 
“consciousness as such,” if I insist on discussing just one single consciousness. For the 
single consciousness will never yield more than what is in it, and there is not direct 
evidence to support the idea that what we say about it possesses universality (KK 218-
19/144-5; emphasis added).53
53
 Also see the critique in Negative Dialectics: “What becomes manifested as universal in [moral 
categories], according to the model of the Kantian concept of law, is secretly something societal 
[ein Gesellschaftliches] . . . The concept of universality was won by the multiplicity of subjects and
then became independent as the logical objectivity of reason, in which all particular subjects, and,
apparently, subjectivity as such, disappear” (ND 277-8/282).
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In other words, the universal is obtained through a process of comparison and 
elimination, through the jettisoning of everything that  is merely contingent.54 In Kant’s 
estimation, however, it derives its authority from the “law.” Objectivity and universality 
stem from conformity to law, be it laws of reason or moral laws. As Adorno argues, if we 
begin from a strict individual subjectivity, we are unable to reach a universality; and if we
try to simply begin with the universality, we presuppose what we endeavor to establish 
(KK 219-20/145). This is one of the moments in the Critique of Pure Reason where Kant 
comes up against the dialectic, and Adorno praises him for leaving the matter 
unresolved. At the moment where the move to the “true speculative sphere” was 
indicated, Kant chose to stick to his transcendental guns. “Adorno argues that as soon as 
we are able to identify the ‘I think’ in empirical terms its status (as the ground of 
experience) is denied as a consequence” (O’Connor 2004, 119). The material moment of 
the transcendental subject must be admitted; but once it is admitted, the Kantian system
breaks down.
Adorno further discusses the character of the transcendental subject in both 
material and social-anthropological terms as related to the activity of labour. This 
critique has a dual structure. The subject of knowing is said to be related to the activity of
labouring on an object; and the transcendental subject is said to be in reality a function 
of the system of capitalist labour. The status of these relationships is in question. With 
the notion of self-preservation, Adorno further extends his anthropological critique. The 
domination by the subject, in Kantian idealist philosophy as well as in other 
philosophies, is seen to be a natural part of the human struggle for existence. Nature 
54
 From the perspective of Hegel’s critique regarding Kant’s attempt to critique reason before 
employing it, we could consider this problem in Kant’s philosophy to stem from his lack of 
secondary reflexivity with regard to his own thought processes.
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must be subdued because the subject perceives its own powerlessness. “The primacy of 
subjectivity is a spiritualized [spiritualisiert] continuation of the Darwinian struggle for 
existence. The oppression [Unterdrückung] of nature for human purposes is merely a 
relationship of nature; therefore the superiority of the nature-dominating reason and of 
its principle [is] appearance [Schein]” (ND 181/179; translation modified). The idea of 
labour as a form of coming to terms with a hostile nature is central here. The spontaneity
of the subject in Kant’s system, its ability to actively structure its experience though its 
transcendental form, Adorno claims is derived from the sheer activity of working on 
nature. The transcendental subject, in addition, has its origins in “the immortalizing 
domination [Herrschaft], won through the principle of equivalence . . . However, 
provided that the unity of consciousness is modeled on objectivity — that is, is measured 
according to the possibility of the constitution of objects — it is the conceptual reflex of 
the complete, unbroken fusion of the acts of production in society, through which the 
objectivity [Objektivität] of commodities, their ‘concreteness’ [Gegenständlichkeit], is 
first established at all” (ND 180-1/178-9).
The thesis of the transcendental subject is, according to Adorno, simply unfeasible, 
because Kant has not solved the problem of its relationship to the empirical, individual 
object. In more general terms, Adorno is at pains to demonstrate, against Kant, the 
inseparability of the constituens from the constitutum. In this context, the argument 
attempts to re-link the transcendental subject, the “I think,” with the empirical subject. 
“If you separate the constituens — that is, the pure consciousness through which the 
actual world comes into being—from the constitutum — that is, the world in its broadest 
sense—then the former, the constituens, cannot even be imagined without the 
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constitutum being imagined simultaneously” (KK 223/147). The refusal of Kant to make 
a speculative move beyond this dichotomy was criticized, as Adorno notes, by the post-
Kantian idealists, who ended up with an absolute which could encompass both 
constituens and constitutum. This move is no more open for Adorno than it was for 
Kant. The contradiction — that we cannot conceive of either the constituens or the 
constitutum without its counterpart, and hence cannot find an ultimate ground — 
cannot, according to Adorno, be solved philosophically.55 In the particular terms that we 
are examining here, this contradiction obtains in the relationship between the empirical 
and the transcendental subjects. It
must instead be comprehended in its truth. If there is a point at which the transition to a 
dialectical conception of philosophy is compelling, this would seem to me to be the place 
to start. There is no empirical self without the concept, without those elements not 
reducible to mere existence and objectivity. On the other hand, there is no concept, that 
is, no such pure “I” that could not somehow be reduced to an empirical self. Both of these 
are present in Hegel (KK 223-4/148).
Although this critique of the Kant’s transcendental subject in many ways mirrors that of 
Hegel, Adorno’s concerns are also quite different. For Hegel, Kant’s work was necessarily
limiting, in its restrictions to a possible experience, and problematically dualistic. It 
refrained from moving from the perspective of the understanding to that of speculation. 
While Adorno’s critique is indebted to both Marx and Lukács, he uses Hegel most 
consistently in his writings on Kant. Below I will investigate the ways in which Adorno’s 
55
 This theme of philosophical activity versus its others will be discussed further below. For 
Adorno, the positive and negative aspects of Kant’s philosophy collide in the notion of the given, 
the irreducible, the foundation. “The search for the utterly first, the absolute cause, results in 
infinite regress. Infinity cannot be posited as given with a conclusion, even though this positing 
seems unavoidable to total spirit. The concept of the given, the last refuge of the irreducible in 
idealism, collides with the concept of spirit as complete reducibility, viz. with idealism itself. 
Antinomy explodes the system, whose only idea is the attained identity, which as anticipated 
identity, and finitude of the infinite, is not at one with itself” (ME 37/29-30). Kant at least showed
that this attempt at an unconditioned form of knowledge is inherently contradictory (O’Connor 
2004: 27-8).
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critique differs from that of Hegel, in the course of coming to terms with his general 
Hegelian inheritance. As a first step, I’ll discuss Adorno’s positive use of Kant.
2.2 The “deepest thing in Kant:” the experience of the block
Adorno also takes pains to emphasize the continued value of Kant’s philosophy for 
contemporary critical thought. According to Adorno, it is one of the hallmarks of Kant’s 
philosophy that it illuminated the antinomies which result from this form of subjectivist, 
foundational philosophical procedure. This very recognition continues to enamor 
Adorno of Kant’s philosophical perspective. For Adorno, the distinction between Kantian
and post-Kantian idealism lies in this crucial recognition by Kant, if only unconsciously 
within his writings, that a systematic philosophy, a prima philosophia, is ultimately an 
untenable goal. Kant’s saving grace is his continued reliance on the concept of the thing-
in-itself. “[W]hile Kant does situate the unity of existing reality and also the concept of 
Being in the realm of consciousness, he simultaneously refuses to generate everything 
that exists from that realm of consciousness” (KK 33-4/18). Rather than a problem, 
Adorno sees this fundamental contradiction in Kant’s philosophy as an important 
benefit. The recognition that there is a “block” to consciousness, a limit beyond which we
simply may not go, is essential to Adorno’s thought as well.
This block, which represents the fundamentally antinomical character of Kant’s 
philosophy, is the “anti-idealist” element of Kant, and an inspiration for Adorno’s own 
conception of materialism (ND 379/386). That the constituens, for instance, cannot be 
separated from the constitutum, is both recognized and denied by Kantian philosophy. 
In the Kantian conception, the block points to the particular kind of experience that 
Adorno wants to salvage. Although Kant valued the rationality of science, he understood 
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that it was not revealing “the ‘true’ essence of nature . . . [I]t is a metaphysical 
experience implicit in the doctrine of the block in the Critique of Pure Reason that the 
object of nature that we define with our categories is not actually nature itself. For our 
knowledge of nature is really so preformed by the demand that we dominate nature . . . 
that we end up understanding only those aspects of nature that we can control’ (KK 
266/175-6; emphasis added). Here we can see the importance of the theme of alienation, 
and its essential link to a form of subjectivism. The importance does not lie ultimately in 
the cognitive sphere, but in alienation from nature as an experience. When we find that 
we are “alienated from what we are really looking for,” this constitutes an experience 
which “is hard to express in rational terms, because the sphere of rationality is the sphere
that contradicts experience”. Adorno’s move beyond cognition to a variety of experience 
— a move which is “embedded” within Kant’s own work — becomes central for Adorno 
(KK 267/176).56
This Kantian block is clearly read by Adorno as the philosophical precursor to his 
own notion of the nonidentical: “it is a kind of metaphysical mourning, a kind of memory
of what is best, of something that we must not forget, but that we are nevertheless 
compelled to forget” (KK 268/176). For Adorno, Kant represents an important stage in 
the dialectic of reason, because in his work the important metaphysical questions of 
philosophy — which have since been forgotten — remain to be discovered. Adorno goes 
so far as to say that the most central aspect of Kant’s philosophy is the idea of rupture 
56
 It is this experiential core which separates Kant sharply from the positivists, who recognize no 
such contradiction in our procedure of knowledge. Adorno notes that Kant’s philosophy was the 
last instance (before the analytical or “linguistic” turn, that is) of philosophy being in fundamental
agreement with science. With Hegel, all of this went out the window. But in Kant, although he 
believed strongly in science, his thought retained antinomies which would not be tolerated by 
scientists or by positive thought in general.
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(KK 270/178). One of the interesting aspects of this account, is that it is precisely the 
form of critique which cannot rely solely on a form of rationality, since a form of 
experience is at its heart. In this way, the dualisms which characterize Kantian 
philosophy are both real, and only apparent. The block on the achievement of an 
absolute knowledge, the fundamental limits on our thought, are real, but for Adorno they
are related not to the transcendental structure of experience, but rather to our modern 
structure of society. Kant was right to find this sphere outside of the capacity of reason, 
but he erred when he legitimated it by securing its position too well. The Kantian block 
represents the “truth” of bourgeois society. It thus contains the central contradiction of 
Kant’s idealism within itself.
Adorno’s work thus ultimately relies upon a conception of the form of a society 
based upon exchange. Although his work is riven with implied analogies between forms 
of thought and social forms, he refrains from specification. Kant’s philosophy becomes 
an index of a contradictory society. The transcendental subject
has its reality in the immortalizing domination, attained through the principle of 
equivalence. The abstraction process, transformed by philosophy and only attributed to 
the perceiving [erkennend] subject, occurs in the actual [tatsächlich] exchange society. 
The determination of the transcendental as that of the necessary, which accompanies 
[sich gesellen zu] functionality and universality, expresses the principle of the self-
preservation of the species. It provides the legal basis for the abstraction, without which it
cannot proceed [abgehen]; it is the medium of self-sustaining [selbsterhaltend] reason 
(ND 180/178-9).
In plain terms, Kant’s transcendental subject serves as a form of legitimation for 
exchange society, since it institutes its form of abstraction. The cognitive and the social 
in this analysis are linked in an indeterminate way, as are the cognitive and the 
experiential. In the terms of his anthropological-material critique, Adorno suggests that 
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Kant’s texts themselves encapsulate an experience which reflects, in some sense, both 
corporeal and social forms.
2.3 From the block to the nonidentical
The “block” that Adorno emphasizes in Kant’s philosophy stands for the centrality and 
importance of what Adorno termed the “nonidentical.” Both terms serve to provide a 
limit to reason, although we cannot simply read the nonidentical as the thing-in-itself. As
Thyen emphasizes, interpreting the nonidentical as merely the nonconceptual gets us 
into trouble, for then we cannot make sense of Adorno’s claim to use the power of the 
concept to break through conceptuality. Nonidentity instead defines a limitation of 
thought, the recognition of thought’s inability to truly identify the object.
Nonidentity is not just the complement to identity, the other of identity. It is rather the 
constructive limit-concept [Grenzbegriff] of the conceptual, of identity itself. A positive 
determination is therefore presumably impossible, because Negative Dialectics, whose 
subject is mediation, cannot define the nonidentical as positive, utopian counter project 
to identity thought. Its program is something different: negative dialectic aims at the 
remembrance of what Hegel’s formula of the “identity of identity and nonidentity” 
implied. If one grasps nonidentity as a moment of an open-ended reflection, then 
nonidentity moves conceptually close to that which negative dialectics means at its core. 
It is specified as the consistent consciousness of nonidentity (Thyen 1989, 198).
Nonidentity is the “limit of identity,” and therefore cannot be separated from it (Stahl 
2005, 180). Insofar as Adorno’s critique of idealist philosophy is constituted by a critique
of identity,57 the concept of nonidentity lies at its center (as does the priority of the 
object, contrasted with idealism’s priority of the subject).
Nonidentity has been examined as an expression for a collection of related concepts, 
such as “other,” “foreign,” “different,” “nonconceptual,” “particular,” and “indissoluble” 
(Stahl 2005, 179; Guzzoni 1981, 105ff.; Thyen 1989, 204), which stem from Adorno’s 
myriad uses of the term. However, the notion of the nonidentical as something which is 
57
 This will be demonstrated in the next section.
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fundamentally other can be misleading, as Thyen (1989) has emphasized. Adorno’s use 
of the substantive may be partly to blame here. Yet he introduces the concept, in 
Negative Dialectics, in the context of the claim that “thinking means identifying,” stating
that “[d]ialectic is the consistent consciousness of nonidentity” (ND 17/5). Nonidentity 
signifies here the limits of identification; although thinking is identifying, there is always 
something that is not encompassed within this relationship of identity. If we choose to 
interpret this as a “remainder” — “[t]he smallest remnant [Rest] of nonidentity sufficed 
to deny the identity, which was total according to its concept” — as a “something,” we are
in fact identifying and hypostatizing (ND 33/22).
Against an ontological conception of nonidentity, Thyen argues persuasively that the
dialectical mediation of identity and nonidentity means precisely that they are not 
independent of one another, in the way that the terms “conceptual” and “nonconceptual”
are. “Nonidentity as a mode of cognition is remembrance that identity is not an 
ontological last; even more, that there is absolutely no last in the sense of a final 
principle, whether it is called identity or nonidentity” (Thyen 1989, 203). The distinction 
is crucial, for it relates centrally to the question of the status of Adorno’s critical 
procedure, and its relationship to scientific or more rational forms of thought (Adorno’s 
“identity thinking”). Yet this account also reminds us that Adorno’s conception of 
nonidentity cannot be fully understood from within a Kantian framework. The very 
tendency to interpret the nonidentical on analogy with the thing-in-itself — although 
Adorno himself is guilty of this at times — stems from the occlusion of Hegel’s own 
critique. The concept of nonidentity thus captures the immanent critique of Kant, and 
sets up Adorno’s engagement with post-Kantian idealism. “What survives in Kant . . . 
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is . . . the memory of nonidentity. . . The construction of the thing in itself . . . is that of a 
nonidentical as the condition of possibility of identification, but also that which eludes 
categorial identification’ (ND 286/290-1; translation modified). As a memory or 
remembrance of the priority of the object, the nonidentical captures a moment of what 
Adorno referred to a “metaphysical” or geistig experience.
Kant’s philosophy, then, according to Adorno, contains a fundamental paradox, 
which is (paradoxically) its strength. The substance of this paradox is that the 
relationship between the knowing subject and its object is considered to be constitutive, 
in terms of the phenomenal appearance of the object, but nevertheless remains 
fundamentally incomplete, in the sense that the object in its noumenality remains 
forever uncaptured by the knowing subject. It is easy to see the appeal of this 
interpretation for Adorno, since his work is based upon the essentially nonidentical 
relationship between subject and object. In fact, it is the “subjective reduction” of the 
world which is in many ways the beginning point of Adorno’s critique. To the extent that 
Kant attempted this, his philosophy went wrong; to the extent that he failed to fully 
achieve it, his philosophy should be retained as a model of thinking.
The transcendental abstraction must be relocated within its social and material 
context, otherwise, it will be “overcome [ereilen] by the forgotten” (ND 178/176). The 
remedy, in Adorno’s terms, is the addition of a second reflection to the first, Kantian one.
Kant takes experience and, through reflection, produces the transcendental; taking his 
initial cue from Hegel, Adorno reflects on the reflection and, through the negation of the 
negation, produces a subject which is rematerialized (rather than reconciled with the 
absolute). He attempts to reverse the abstraction, the attempt by the subject to make 
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itself autonomous; this is not an undoing, nor a sublation, but rather a further 
determinate negation. The subject is to recognize its continued reliance on its object. In 
the terms of the relationship of universal to particular, the particular (empirical subject) 
has become only an exemplar of the universal, a contingency, without any necessary 
relation to it. The universal effectively splits the particular into two: the part that it 
subsumes, and the part that is left over. “The particular reduces itself, as the other of the 
universal, to an indeterminate in-itself without relation to an other . . .” (Tichy 1977, 78). 
The claim to universality is the beginning focus of critical resistance. “Universality, itself 
a concept, comes thus to be conceptless and inimical to reflection; for the mind to 
perceive and to name that side of it is the first condition of resistance and a modest 
beginning of practice” (ND 337/344).
To the extent that Adorno seeks to transgress dualisms through a second reflection, 
his critical philosophy is the direct inheritor of the Hegelian dialectic. Although 
“[a]ntinomy explodes the system” of idealism (ME 37/29) — a crucial feature for 
philosophy, according to Adorno — Kant was not a witness to such an event. He thus 
missed the dialectical potential of contradiction. Hegel on the other hand, as we’ll see, 
made it in a sense too dialectical, in terms of too progressive or developmental. The 
alienation of subject from object, of universal from particular, can be witnessed from an 
Hegelian perspective.
3. Reading Adorno reading Hegel
The reconciled condition would not annex the alien with 
philosophical imperialism; rather, [it] would have its 
happiness in [the fact] that, in the granted proximity, it 
remains the distant and different, beyond the 
heterogeneous and [beyond] its own (ND 192/191).
103
As we’ve seen, Adorno derives his critique of Kant directly from Hegel, although he also 
substantially modifies it. One of the advances of the Hegelian philosophy, if not the 
primary one, according to Adorno, is its ability to go beyond the mere formalism of the 
Kantian perspective. In the move from a subjective idealism to an objective or absolute 
one, philosophy began to speak about content once again, instead of just form. Although 
Adorno’s writings are full of praise for Hegel’s philosophical work, he also provides a 
substantive critique, in many ways modeled on those of Marx and Lukács. “Hegel had 
provided philosophy once again with the right and capacity to think substantially 
[inhaltlich], instead of putting itself off with the analysis of empty and, in an emphatic 
sense, void forms of knowledge. Where it even deals with the substantial at all, 
contemporary philosophy falls back either into the convenience of the Weltanschauung, 
or into that formalism, that “indifference” [Gleichgültige], against which Hegel had risen
up” (ND 19/7; translation modified).58 This move to “substantiveness” eliminates the 
problematic grounding of objectivity in subjectivity, that we saw in Kant; but the way 
that Hegel achieved this substantive perspective was through an identity of subject and 
object, which translates, for Adorno, into the unacceptable priority of the subject. The 
way in which consciousness can have access to its object (rather than just to the 
appearance of the object to consciousness) is by positing its identity. “For Hegel, the 
determinate particular was determinable from spirit, because its immanent 
determination must be nothing but spirit. Without this supposition, according to Hegel, 
philosophy would be incapable of recognizing [erkennen] that which is substantial and 
essential” (ND 19/7; translation modified). In Adorno’s mind, Hegel has clearly erred 
58
 See also (H 306f./67f.), where Adorno claims that the contemporary relevance of Hegel’s 
philosophy is exactly in this going beyond Kant to where philosophical knowledge has lost its 
limitations.
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here, in that he has effectively canceled the supposed substantiveness of philosophy at 
the same time as he established it. This “materialist” perspective results in Adorno’s 
reading of the idealistic and ideological perspective of Hegelian philosophy in the social 
and historical realm. For Adorno, as we’ll see below, the turn toward content in 
philosophy must be achieved solely through negation.
Adorno’s claim is that his own critical moves come from inside the philosophy of 
Hegel, rather than simply making an abstract negation of his absolute idealism. He 
attempts to rescue the key category of the negative, the nonidentical, and the 
contradiction that it entails from the core of Hegel’s thought, against what he views as 
the turning point, at which Hegelian philosophy ultimately settled back upon identity 
(Jarvis 1998, 172). Adorno’s reading of Hegel will ultimately be grounded in paradox; he 
wants to keep the notion of the thing-in-itself from Kant, an effort which corresponds 
with his rejection of the Hegelian absolute through the reinstitution of a primary Kantian
dualism; but he also wants to keep the critical moment of Hegelian dialectics, and he 
suggests that if Hegelian philosophy had remained true to itself, that it would have found
its way to his own “negative” dialectics. But this is clearly wishful thinking. What we can 
observe in Adorno is a two-fold heritage from Hegel: 1) the notion of critique, of 
determinate negation, which is the heart of the dialectic that Adorno finds so crucial; but 
also 2) the notion of the absolute, which Adorno will appropriate through Marx for his 
understanding of modern society. But there is a third point, which is that Adorno 
believes the radical moment of Hegel comes through his conception of absolute idealism,
not despite it. We cannot just take the method and leave the system, as some thought we 
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could. Adorno knows this is not possible. But then how do we come to terms with his 
understanding of Hegel?
As I’ve already noted, the crucial significance of Hegelian idealism for Adorno lies 
precisely in its transgression of the Kantian block, its attempt to remove the barriers to 
thinking the absolute which were postulated by Kant. It may not be immediately 
apparent why such a move back to idealism from this “anti-idealist” moment of Kantian 
philosophy should be so important for Adorno’s critical materialist philosophical 
perspective. But it is the very connection which Hegel finds between subject and object 
which is crucial for Adorno, although this is paradoxically the very motor of what he 
considers to be an untenable and ultimately ideological Hegelian idealism.
“The first lesson that Adorno took from Hegel is that philosophical categories 
preserve societal and historical experience” (Bernstein 2006, 90). In this way, Adorno 
appropriated a level of “second reflection” from Hegel, through which philosophical 
concepts were examined, in order to gauge their appropriateness to their subject matter 
(Walsh 1987, 212). However, as we’ll see, this claim brings its own set of theoretical 
difficulties. The general idea of Adorno’s critique of Hegel is to take his “positive 
dialectic” and recoup from it a more critical “negative dialectic.” Although this claim is 
stated simply enough, there is no simple relationship between these two forms. 
“Adorno’s idea of negative dialectic is not a simple reversal of Hegel, another attempt 
brusquely to ‘stand the dialectic on its feet’ . . . Adorno attempts to prevent a dialectical 
thinking of which he takes Hegel to be the outstanding exponent from freezing into a 
method or a world-view and thereby becoming, precisely, undialectical” (Jarvis 1998, 
168). The idea is more to take the critical, negative potential of the (early) Hegel, and 
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take it down another path, one that avoids the later Hegel’s conservative turn; such a 
move will involve an attempted reconceptualization of the relationship between concepts
and concrete history.
Adorno ostensibly understands the logistical difficulties in appropriating Hegel’s 
work: it cannot be taken piecemeal, artificially separating a method from the system; and
it clearly cannot be taken in its systematic entirety. Although the initial point is that 
forms of reason and rationality must be situated socially and historically, it is decisive for
Adorno’s philosophy that it begins from an engagement with Hegel’s claims about logic 
and epistemology, rather than his social and political thought (Jarvis 1998, 169; Rose 
1978, 58). He does not, for example, just want to excise the radical dialectical “method” 
of Hegel and leave the metaphysical Hegel behind. Rather, he wants to critically examine
the spirit of Hegel’s philosophy, and to find its key. Adorno’s reading of Hegel engages 
most positively with the work of the early Hegel, primarily in the Phenomenology and 
the Logic, against his critical reading of the Realphilosophie of the later Hegel — 
especially the Philosophy of Right and the Philosophy of History. The key categories that
Adorno appropriates from the early phenomenological Hegel are those of dialectic, 
mediation, and experience, which of course are all closely interrelated. Adorno wants to 
rescue the critical intention of Hegel, but to leave his actual employment of it — 
especially in the social-historical realm — aside.
In the following discussion I use Adorno’s theoretical relationship with Hegel as a 
means of articulating Adorno’s own social-philosophical categories. This analysis will 
then highlight the fact that Adorno’s struggles to articulate his philosophical position 
relative to German idealism result in his own sociological aporiae. My discussion takes 
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the form of a series of examinations of Hegelian themes which have been reconfigured by
Adorno to suit his own concerns. Throughout, we should keep in mind Bernstein’s 
(1997a) caution that Adorno should not be read as a naïve commentator on Hegel. This is
an important consideration, because, at times, Adorno’s linguistic style can make his 
critique seem more simplistic than it is.
3.1 Dialectic and speculation
Adorno clearly takes his key category of the dialectic from his reading of Hegel (and 
Marx). The notion of the dialectic, Adorno argues, is the “epitome of Hegel’s philosophy” 
(H 258/9). As I discussed in the previous chapter, in the Hegelian conception of 
dialectic, thinking is negation, rather than simply an operation that follows 
transcendental rules (H 304/64; see EL §12R). Although he largely agrees with Hegel on 
this count, in his articulation and employment of the “negative dialectic,” Adorno 
attempts to divorce dialectic from the corresponding notion of speculation – a move that 
isn’t possible from Hegel’s own perspective. 
Adorno agrees with Hegel that “[t]he central nerve of the dialectic as a method is 
determinate negation”(H 318/80). As the central nerve, the procedure of determinate 
negation aims directly at the object of thought itself. Rather than subsuming the object 
under some classificatory rules of thought, it attempts to recognize the fundamental 
priority of the object. Such an attempt is valued by Adorno because it goes beyond the 
attempt by the subject to deceive itself about its own hegemony. In Adorno’s reading, by 
recognizing the priority of the object, the subject necessarily puts itself in check; but this 
leads, for Adorno, to the continuation, rather than the resolution, of antagonism. For 
Adorno, this contradiction is not “the vehicle of complete identification,” but rather ‘the 
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organon of its impossibility’ (ND 156/153). In other words, the very emphasis on 
nonidentity over the identifications of thought signifies the reality of contradiction, 
which philosophy cannot, and should not try to, overcome. In terms of the Hegelian 
schema of the dialectic, Adorno notes that it is his own intention to explicitly 
deemphasize the moment of “synthesis;” instead, he wants to capture the “inner 
structure” of thought (VND 16/6), rather than merely deducing how it is regulated. The 
commitment to contradiction and the rejection of synthesis, is Adorno’s way of 
emphasizing “the way in which, as Hegel used to express it, the concept moves towards 
its opposite, the non-conceptual” (VND 17/6).
This is quite clearly a selective reading of Hegel. Although his concepts are difficult 
to pin down, we can consider two aspects of his category of negation. As discussed above,
the concept of negation for Hegel can mean something like determination, as in the 
negative activity of the “I” as self-determining, an “immediately negative self-relation” 
(EG §413). In the context of his Logic, Hegel breaks “the logical” down into the three 
moments of (a) the abstract understanding; (b) the “dialectical or negatively rational” 
moment; and (c) the “speculative or positively rational” moment (EL §79). Although the 
distinction between the negatively rational and positively rational moments of the logical
isn’t an important feature of his philosophical system as a whole, Hegel here refers to the
negative moment of the dialectic as “the soul of all genuinely scientific cognition” (EL 
§81). Working with the results of the understanding consciousness, the dialectical 
process is a negation and “immanent transcending” of the one-sidedness of its 
determinations. The speculative moment is then the “apprehension of the unity of the 
determinations in their opposition” (EL §82). Although this analysis may help to 
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understand Adorno’s motivation for his proposed negative dialectics, it arguably 
mischaracterizes Hegel’s own view. Insofar as negation for Hegel is determinate 
negation, it always in fact has a positive moment.59 
Like Marx, Adorno wants to give the dialectic a “materialist” twist, though he is clear
to differentiate this from any form of actually existing “dialectical materialism.” For 
Adorno, Hegel’s idealism remained ultimately idealist, because it remained premised on 
the priority of the subject, as demonstrated by the dialectical synthesis of the concept. In 
the move to the priority of the subject, Hegel, in Adorno’s opinion, did not adequately 
maintain his critical negativity, and his philosophy ultimately became a “positive 
dialectics.” In other words, Adorno cannot locate enough resources for his “nonidentical”
within Hegel’s account of dialectical philosophy. He claims that the negation of the 
negation will not suffice – it is an affirmation (ND 161/158). The process which leads the 
negation of the negation into positivity is criticized by Adorno as fundamentally at odds 
with the spirit of the dialectic, and as contradicting the youthful inclinations of Hegel.60
The negated is negative, until it passes away [vergehen]. This breaks decisively from 
Hegel. On the other hand, to smooth out the dialectical contradiction, the expression of 
59 Cf. The Science of Logic: 
The one thing needed to achieve scientific progress – and it is essential to make an effort at 
gaining this quite simple insight into it – is the recognition of the logical principle that 
negation is equally positive, or that what is self-contradictory does not resolve itself into a 
nullity, into abstract nothingness, but essentially only into the negation of its particular 
content; or that such a negation is not just negation, but is the negation of the determined 
fact which is resolved, and is therefore determinate negation; that in the result there is 
therefore contained in essence that from which the result derives – a tautology indeed, since 
the result would otherwise be something immediate and not a result. Because the result, the 
negation, is a determinate negation, it has a content. (WL /33).
60
 Adorno makes it clear that his vision of the relentless negativity of negation stems from his 
reading of the Phenomenology: “The Hegelian synthesis is throughout an insight into the 
insufficiency of that movement, into its production costs. It solidly achieved the consciousness of 
the negative essence of the dialectical logic which he undertook as early as in the Introduction to 
the Phenomenology. Its imperative — to merely watch such a concept until it begins to move, by 
virtue of its own meaning, its identity, becoming unidentical with itself — is one of analysis, not 
synthesis” (ND 159/156).
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the indissoluble nonidentical, through identity, is to ignore what it conveys, to return to 
pure consistent thought. That the negation of the negation is something positive, can only
be asserted by one who presupposes positivity, as all-conceptuality, from the beginning 
(ND 162/160; my translation).
This decisive break is required because of Hegel’s unjustified philosophical assumptions;
he presupposes the absolute, an identity which must always be rediscovered.
Adorno’s critique here depends importantly on his analysis of social reality. We 
could say quite simply that the negativity or irreconcilability of Adorno’s thought is 
based upon his experience and understanding of contemporary society. He views any 
movement towards reconciliation with an objective, institutional reality is in effect a 
capitulation to a wrong reality (VND 27f./14f.). Although Hegel’s idea of the falsity of the
abstract individual, its necessary interrelationship with the objective social totality, was 
foundational for social thought and the theory of society, with the theory of 
reconciliation he in fact underestimated the alienated character of society. Modern 
society is doomed to remain “pure externality” according to its essence; or at least it may 
not be reconciled through the actions of the individual subject. For Adorno, any 
attempted reconciliation of the subject with objectivity presupposes that this objectivity 
“must itself be in the right” (VND 31/16).
Adorno thus argues that it is the third movement of any particular stage of the 
dialectic which is so problematic. The “ascent,” which constitutes the progress of the 
Hegelian dialectic, approaches the perspective of the absolute, overcoming all 
particulars. But for Adorno, this dialectical progression reflects in fact the domination of
the subject, which it also simultaneously hides; the contradictions which have arisen 
between the subject and the object become inscribed in the object itself.
Irreconcilably, the idea of reconciliation forbids its affirmation in the concept. If it is 
objected that the critique of the positive negation of the negation injures the vital nerve of
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Hegel’s logic and allows absolutely no more dialectical movement, then this is restricted, 
through trust in authority, to Hegel’s self-conception. The construction of his system 
would unquestionably collapse without that principle; dialectic has its experience-content
not in this principle but rather in the resistance of the other, against identity. Hence its 
power [Gewalt]. Subject is also embedded in this, insofar as its real domination produces 
contradictions; but these seep into the object. Ascribing dialectic purely to the subject, [it]
removes the contradiction through itself, [and] removes the dialectic also, in that it is 
expanded to the totality. It arose, for Hegel, in the system, but does not have its measure 
therein (ND 163/160-1; my translation; emphasis added).
In other words, in Adorno’s estimation, it is only from within Hegel’s own vision of the 
dialectic that the severing of the moment of reconciliation proves fatal to the dialectic. 
From the perspective of Adorno, the “experience-content” of the dialectic lies in the 
moment of resistance, the experience of thought as negation, not that of reconciliation. 
And so the “vital nerve” of the dialectic is expressed in this moment of contradiction, and
the move towards reconciliation is the move back towards the domination of the subject, 
away from the resistance of the object, because it is the subject itself which achieves it.61
This is a crucial distinction which may be difficult to grasp. While Hegel’s own 
concept of experience is centered upon the subject’s consciousness of its own relation to 
its objects, and its corresponding progressive development, Adorno wants to claim that 
true dialectical experience is instead based upon the permanence and ubiquity of 
contradiction. While Hegel’s subject is on its way to the recognition of itself in its object, 
Adorno’s counterpart is — like that of Kant — bound for a disappointment, in that it will 
come to the realization that this recognition is always only partial. One of the keys here is
that, for Adorno, the path to Hegelian conceptuality is therefore blocked. I will discuss 
the impact of this further below.
61 Simon Jarvis captures this point nicely: “For Adorno dialectic is thought’s repeated experience 
of its inability finally to identify what is non-identical to it. So far from being an experience which 
is only made possible by the ‘identity of identity and non-identity’ . . . this is an experience which 
is only made possible by the non-identity of identity and non-identity, by the fact that identity 
and non-identity are not the same. Non-identity, more radically than identity, makes dialectical 
experience possible” (1998, 173).
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Crucially, a negative dialectics recognizes the contradictory or antagonistic nature of
the totality, and this is what Adorno believes separates it from Hegelian dialectics. The 
persisting contradiction “is the index of the untruth of identity, of the realization of the 
comprehended in the concept.” Since thinking is an identification, identity “appears” in 
thought. “Conceptual order contentedly veils that which thought wants to understand” 
(ND 17/5; my translation). The “conceptual totality” is structured according to our 
formal logic, and therefore reflects its limits. Contradiction is then the nonidentity that is
implicit within this system of identity. In Adorno’s vision, we simply begin with our own 
thoughts, and we are moved towards their inadequacy; thought is compelled in a 
dialectical direction by its “inevitable insufficiency, its guilt about what it thinks” (ND 17-
8/5-6; my translation). This dialectical movement of consciousness is familiar from the 
Phenomenology, but Adorno wants to re-situate it within a “real” totality — that is, 
society — a move which he believes will prevent the subjective identifications of Hegel’s 
system from winning out. The despair of the experiencing consciousness that Hegel 
described so potently is merely the expression of a larger despair, the pain of the 
“administered world,” “raised to a concept” (ND 18/6).62
For Adorno, then, dialectics is the recognition of the necessary inadequacy of 
thought, and Hegel is accordingly criticized for his presumption of the attainment of an 
“absolute” knowledge, which relies on his presupposition of an all-encompassing 
absolute (ND 164/160). The ultimate acceptance of the identity of identity and non-
62
 One can appreciate the ambiguities of Adorno’s language here. With his style of writing, and his
continuous engagement with different philosophical perspectives (sometimes acknowledged and 
sometimes implicit) it can be exceedingly difficult to interpret such a significant concept as 
“concept.” Adorno often appears to be using such a term according to Hegel’s own distinction 
between formal and speculative reason; but then his critique can seem to imply a lack of self-
understanding on Hegel’s part with regard to his own perspective. As a result, Adorno may easily 
appear to be have a naive understanding and critique of Hegel; or he may be seen as attempting to
“use Hegel against Hegel.”
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identity is at the heart of the problem. This is correlated with the real nature of 
contradiction, the antagonistic whole. The particulars, which Hegel took joy in 
overcoming as isolated and partial, represent for Adorno the critical persistence of 
contradiction. Hegel’s “circular” methodology, his systematic philosophy, must 
presuppose the totality before it even begins, and for Adorno this invalidates it, as based 
upon the indefensible claim that the truth is the whole. Such a claim admits the ultimate 
spiritual and absolute nature of the totality, which in turn reflects a “fetishistic” 
perspective on the concept as in itself a “self-sufficient totality” (ND 23/11). The 
recognition by consciousness of the necessary yet problematic identifications of thought 
is the recognition of the contradiction between concept and object, between subject and 
object, and this in turn admits the fundamental heteronomy of the concept, its necessary
dependency on the nonconceptual. This is the move from the domination of the subject 
to the “priority of the object.”
The priority of the subject is cognition via identity, while the priority of the object is 
the consciousness of nonidentity. Yet Adorno’s precise understanding of Hegelian 
identity is difficult to puzzle out. He clearly understands it as a form of speculation, and 
believes “that what makes speculative identity speculative, rather than merely abstract, is
its continued reliance on the experience of difference. He repeatedly stresses Hegel’s 
insistence that absolute knowing is nothing without the process which leads up to it” 
(Jarvis 1998, 170; see ND 379/386). This understanding of speculation is imperative for 
sufficiently grasping Hegel’s work, and it initiates a distinction between propositional 
claims and their truth content. Adorno’s analysis of the copula stems directly from 
Hegel. The proposition of identity can state a formal form of truth, but not a speculative 
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one. When the claim is made that “A is B,” this expresses the identity of A and B, but it 
misses their nonidentity; or rather, it cannot express both at once. As Hegel emphasizes, 
“the proposition, in the form of a judgment, is not adept to express speculative truths” 
(WL 1:93/67). Its formal truth relies on a process of abstraction from the multiple 
“determinatenesses” of the subject of the sentence. In other words, the (formal) form of 
the proposition does not match the (speculative) content of the proposition. 
This appears to be Adorno’s point, as well as Hegel’s. The difference comes in terms 
of the result of the dialectical reflection. In his discussion of “pure being” and “pure 
nothing” in the first chapter of the Science of Logic, Hegel notes that the trouble with the
formal proposition which states the identity of being and nothing is contradictory – it 
has “movement” – because it attempts to simultaneously express their identity and 
nonidentity. This type of contradictory expression is impossible with the proposition. 
The speculative content could be expressed by the combination of the proposition and its
negation, but this creates a problem in that the propositions would not be connected, 
would “present their content only in an antinomy,” while their content itself is identical. 
Hegel’s solution is to bring together the determinations of the propositions, to unite 
them “absolutely – in a union which can then only be said to be an unrest of 
simultaneous incompatibles, a movement” (WL 1:94/67). The movement is of course 
that of becoming, which represents another way of attempting to articulate the 
speculative content. The distinction between “pure being” and “pure nothing” is “empty,”
according to Hegel, because each is pure and hence completely indeterminate. “[T]he 
distinction depends, therefore, not on them but on a third element, on intention. But 
intention is a form of subjectivity, and subjectivity does not belong to the present order 
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of exposition. The third element in which being and nothing have their subsistence must 
however also be present here; and it is present indeed, it is becoming” (WL 1:95/68). 
What results is a unity of moments. From the perspective of the understanding, 
unity is a “subjective reflection,” as expression of “abstract sameness.” But the third 
which results from the dialectical motion is not merely an abstraction; it has “various 
empirical shapes” (WL 1:97/69). The key is in the recognition of the being of 
consciousness in the world; consciousness does not exist in isolated abstraction from its 
content (WL 1:103/74). The copula is the attempt to unify thought and the world. 
Although “there is never a neat resolution to the meaning of the copula, the ‘is’ or ‘and’ 
that binds together logic and nature or logic and spirit” (Hutchings 2006, 106), Adorno 
believes that this is not emphasized enough in Hegel’s work. He wants to keep 
speculation in terms of the interconnection between form and content, but rejects the 
speculative unity of logic and spirit that goes with it.
Hegel’s version of speculative thinking holds that contradiction may obtain 
“objectively,” and so thought has no right to rule it out. This is the position that Adorno 
wants to follow; but, while getting his inspiration for the objectivity of contradiction from
Hegel, he at the same time wants to go beyond it. Hegel identified the objectivity of 
contradiction, but, while it served as the motor of the dialectic, it ultimately brought that 
dialectic to a standstill in the absolute. In contemporary society, “objective 
contradiction . . . weighs more heavily than for Hegel, who first sighted it” (ND 155-
6/153; my translation). The change that Adorno alludes to here consists in the vast 
difference between human experience in contemporary society, in relation to that of 
Hegel’s era. Hegel could delude himself that the reconciliation of contradiction was 
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possible in the absolute, because the experience of contradiction was not as severe as it is
in Adorno’s time. In the contemporary world, “[e]xperience denies, to that which 
appears contradictory, reconciliation in the unity of consciousness” (ND 155/152; my 
translation). Adorno’s critique accordingly seeks those contradictions which cannot be 
eliminated in thought.
Adorno’s own category of the nonidentical then takes its direct inspiration from 
Hegel’s understanding of speculation, of dialectical movement. His complaint is 
ultimately that Hegel’s philosophy could not live up to its own dialectical standards. 
Adorno’s rhetorical style makes an analytical presentation of his conceptual content 
challenging. At the risk of some repetition, I would like to now re-approach the 
postulation of the nonidentical against Hegelian identity from the perspective of a couple
of key concepts. The first is what Adorno terms “compulsory substantiality,” what we 
could call “materialism;” the second is “mediation;” and the third the “particular.” The 
discussion of these concepts I believe is essential in fully fleshing out Adorno’s 
relationship to idealism.
3.2 The “compulsory substantiality” of subject and object
Despite the Kantian tone of what we’ve seen so far of his critique, Adorno does not 
simply impeach Hegel for an out of touch idealist method; rather, he praises Hegel’s 
philosophy explicitly for moving towards a concreteness or “substantiality” 
[Sachhaltigkeit] that he believes could never be illuminated through the formalism of 
Kant. In his analysis, rather than accepting the limitations that Kant put on reason, 
Hegel refused to be intimidated by them (H 252/2, 306-7/67). He thus emphasizes that 
Hegel’s philosophy is a move away from the pure epistemological perspective of Kant, 
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away from the merely transcendental characteristics of knowledge. With the negation of 
the separation of form from content, Hegel brought the content of thought itself within 
the purview of philosophy; the concrete material was then open to it. With Hegel, 
“[p]hilosophy acquires the right and accepts the duty to appeal to material moments 
originating in the real life process of socialized human beings as essential and not merely
contingent” (H 306/67). The important point here for Adorno is that Hegel has 
performed this move through his method of critique. He has not simply shifted to a 
“realistic frame of mind” [realistische Sinnesart] (H 253/3), but rather has concentrated 
the power of idealism and brought it to the material. Therefore the concrete, material 
moment should not be thought of as something which is sought outside of idealism, but 
within it.
This issue is at the heart of the relationship between thought and reality, as well as 
that between Hegel’s philosophical “method” and its subject matter. Adorno puts this 
point as follows: “Hegel’s substantive insights . . . are produced by speculation, and they 
lose their substance as soon as they are conceived as merely empirical” (H 253/2-3; 
emphasis added). As we’ve seen, the substance of Hegel’s “absolute idealism” is the 
speculative identity of form and content, and of thought and being. This can seem a 
paradoxical source of material knowledge, but Adorno finds just the opposite. Beginning 
with the subjective, finite understanding, Hegel created a ladder leading to the absolute; 
Adorno, on the other hand, seeks something like a trap-door, or an escape hatch, that 
allows the subject access to its other, without ever acknowledging the absolute which 
encompasses them. Perhaps a better way to put this is that the Adornian subject 
identifies the absolute as ideology, as constituted by the exchange society. 
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Adorno, however, seems to waver on his interpretation of the absolute, at times 
referring to the “suspended” quality of Hegelian philosophy (H 261/13), and at others 
declaring that Hegel, by considering that absolute to be developed through the motion of 
the finite itself rather than as something existing a priori, has avoided a “leap” into the 
absolute that Adorno notes was characteristic of Schelling and others (H 254/5). While 
the inconsistency is characteristic of Adorno, we can consider this an indication of the 
significance of Hegelian thought for his philosophy, and of his struggle to “liberate” the 
dialectic from idealism.
The problem is similar to that of the positive result of the negation of the negation, 
which we encountered above. Hegel’s idealism approaches a materialism through its 
very character as idealism. In Hegel’s version of a “total knowledge,” he considers that 
“every one-sided judgment intends, by its very form, the absolute” (H 255/6). This idea 
is, somewhat paradoxically, essential for Adorno:
Speculative idealism does not recklessly disregard the limits of the possibility of 
knowledge; rather, it searches for words to express the idea that a reference to truth as 
such is in fact inherent in all knowledge that is knowledge; that if it is to be knowledge at 
all and not a mere duplication of the subject, knowledge is more than merely 
subjective . . . In proper Hegelian terms one might say — at the same time altering him in 
crucial respects through interpretation that subjects him to a further round of reflection 
— that it is precisely the construction of the absolute subject in Hegel that does justice to 
an objectivity indissoluble in subjectivity (H 255/6).
Knowledge must go beyond mere subjectivity, which it may do by finding the objectivity 
inherent in it. While Kant regressed towards the transcendentally objective, Hegel 
proceeded outwards, towards the absolute. 
The individual, finite judgments that comprise the understanding, must in fact find 
their way  to the absolute if they are to constitute any form of objectivity. Adorno believes
that the key to avoiding this subject-duplication is for the individual subject to follow 
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Hegel’s prescription in the Introduction to the Phenomenology to achieve a method of 
“mere watching” [reines Zusehen] of the object (PG §85). According to Adorno, by means
of this method, “Hegel is able to think from the thing itself out, to surrender passively, as
it were, to its authentic substance” (but he also notes that this is only possible “by virtue 
of the system”) (H 255/6). This passivity, or receptivity, on the part of the subject implies
a “respect for the specific, comprehending which means nothing other than obeying its 
own concept” (H 256/7).
 However, the passivity of the subject to which Adorno wants to adhere, while 
designed to oppose the autonomous spontaneity of the Kantian transcendental subject, 
can be easily misunderstood. It is not intended to be a submission to the empirical 
object, as with a presumably subject-less empiricism, but rather a form of waiting, or 
“prioritization.” The priority of the object does not imply a purely passive consciousness, 
but rather one that is constrained (ethically, if not epistemologically) by the particularity 
of the object. As discussed above, the Adornian subject does not constitute the object, it 
is the object’s “agent” (SO 752). Such a role requires an attention to the nonidentity 
between subject and object, as well as an understanding of the subject’s own role in 
perpetuating it. Adorno’s understanding of the relationship between subject and object 
results in a seeming bifurcation of consciousness, but rather than a naïve consciousness 
and a “scientific” one, Adorno’s theory gives rise to a reified and a critical consciousness.
To illustrate the distinction between the Hegelian and Adornian schemas here, 
consider the relationship of the naïve subject of consciousness and its object. In both 
cases, this natural consciousness begins, through reflection, to question its own 
relationship to its object. In Hegel’s case, the subject overcomes the immediate 
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“objectivity” of the object, its in-itselfness, and realizes that it is only in-itself for-
consciousness; it discovers its own role in negating or determining its object, and such a 
recognition results in a transformation of both subject and object, which Hegel refers to 
as experience. Although the subject does not constitute its object in a Kantian sense (i.e., 
transcendentally), it does play an essential, active role in its determination.
It is Hegel’s conception of the activity of the subject that Adorno cannot abide; 
Adorno’s subject is active in a very different way. The reified subject of consciousness 
must become conscious of its fundamental nonidentity with its object, and it does so 
through its own thoughtful activity. This movement is motivated not by a desire for 
reconciliation, but rather through a very bodily experience of suffering. While this is a 
mode of self-reflection, and a rejection of the immediacy of the given, 
The effort implied in the concept of thought itself, as the counterpart of passive 
contemplation, is negative already – a revolt against being importuned to bow to 
every immediate thing. Critical germs are contained in judgment and inference, 
the thought forms without which not even the critique of thought can do: they are
never determinate without simultaneously excluding what they have failed to 
achieve (ND 19).
In this way, Adorno focuses on the “failure” of thought to achieve identity with its objects
through judgment. The key to the subject’s activity is then recognition of a visceral 
rejection of its “natural” state of reification; an “unconscious tendency” becomes 
conscious. The subject’s activity is negative in the sense that it plays a fundamental role 
in the prevention of continued identification. In characteristically paradoxical fashion, 
such an activity is also a form of passivity, yet requires “the most intense efforts on the 
part of the concept” (H 256/7), because, as we’ve seen, it is part of the “nature” of 
subjectivity to identify, to project itself onto the object. For Adorno, this Zusehen is the 
attempt to rescue the spirit of dialectical analysis from the disaster of its synthesis.
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Adorno’s misinterpretation of Hegel here is instructive. Hegel’s discussion of the 
procedure of Zuschauen is part of his critique of Kantian epistemology, but he uses it to 
emphasize the internal character of the criterion. We could say that Hegel’s subject is 
watching the “concept” here, while Adorno’s is primarily watching the thing, the object. 
At the center of Hegel’s argument is the claim that the concept and the object are both 
present within the subject, within consciousness. The “movement” that occurs stems 
from consciousness’s recognition that what it took to be an object in-itself is really an 
object in-itself for consciousness. In this way, a new object arises. For Adorno, by 
contrast, the object, or thing, is allowed to speak through the efforts of consciousness. 
These efforts, however, according to Adorno, do not involve recognition of the identity of
thought and being, but rather a recognition of the limitations of the concepts of which 
consciousness makes use. 
Adorno’s point here is that he has taken from Hegel the recognition that, since the 
object is always already mediated by spirit (H 256/7), that since the “given,” with which 
the subject is confronted, is already concept (ND 156f./153f.), the subject needs to be 
passive through its own exertion, because this is the only way to truly grasp it as what it 
is, rather than merely seeing it subjectively, through identification. Adorno’s stated 
reliance on Hegel for this recognition is puzzling; one interpretation is that Hegel is more
significant for Adorno rhetorically than theoretically. “Because as Hegel conceives it all 
phenomena . . . are inherently spiritually mediated, what is needed in order to grasp 
them is not thought but rather the relationship for which the phenomenology of a 
hundred years later invented the term ‘spontaneous receptivity.’ The thinking subject is 
to be released from thought, since thought will rediscover itself in the object thought; it 
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has only to be developed out of the object and to identify itself in it” (H 369/140). In this 
context, Adorno is making a point about Hegel’s disinterest in forms of argument, but 
the two points are importantly related, and will allow me to make a crucial distinction 
between Adorno’s style of expression and its theoretical content. 
Hegel’s philosophy requires “the most extreme efforts” of thought, but it also 
“moves within the medium of a thought freed from tension” (H 370/141). Adorno takes 
his own approach to the linguistic expression of philosophy from Hegel’s model. 
Consciousness moves into a state of “relaxation” and allows itself to open up to 
“associations.” This works successfully for his own critical style of philosophical writing; 
but it causes other problems. Adorno’s intellectual subject encounters the texts of Hegel 
as its object, and it moves ethically in the direction of relaxation. But the further claim is 
that what is given is always already mediated, “spiritually mediated,” which implies that 
the relaxation of thought opens itself up in the direction of spirit. Adorno effectively 
makes his roughly-Marxian interpretation of spirit work for him here; while the 
nonidentical that he seeks is precisely filtered out of a pre-established mediation of 
subject and object, Adorno at this point excises the absolute, reducing spirit to “the 
objective dynamic of society” (H 256/8). The confusion is compounded by his retention 
of the Hegelian language: spirit/society is always already “concept.”
Just what the notion of the object as always already meditated by society as spirit is 
supposed to do for us theoretically will be uncovered, gradually, in what follows. For 
now, I would like to emphasize the significance of the concept of spirit, and the ways in 
which it is translated from a Hegelian to an Adornian idiom. Adorno’s move away from 
Kant’s dualism of subject and object, to the dialectical mediation of subject and object in 
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Hegel, is a move from Kantian subjectivity to Hegelian “spirit”-uality, which correlates 
with a move from a merely “subjective experience” to a form of “spiritual experience.” 
Two dimensions should be pointed out here: the “compulsory substantiality” that 
Adorno’s version of philosophy incorporates from Hegel, through the shift from subject 
to spirit, reconfigures the relationship between consciousness and its object, but it also, 
consequently, fundamentally alters the nature of both subject and object. The subject is 
now materially and ontologically grounded; it is not abstract and formal as in Kantian 
philosophy. The object is also uncovered in its materiality, and in particular this 
contains both a material (physical) axis as well as a social (conceptual) one. The 
particular object is linked to totality and universality in two basic ways: through a social 
mediation of labour, and through a mediation by consciousness, which employs concepts
and language that are always already socially mediated. It is this duality that is 
responsible for some of Adorno’s most perplexing passages, in which a conception of the 
relationship between “spheres” of society and knowledge is key. The confusion stems, I 
believe, from a conflation of two dynamics: that of the part and the whole, and that of the
subject and the object. Each of these corresponds to a different dimension of the “object” 
or the “nonidentical,” as well as to a conception of “spirit.”63
To return to the “compulsory substantiality” of the subject-object relationship, the 
theoretical innovation Adorno attributes to Hegel, we can see that Adorno’s 
63
 This situation necessarily alters the conception of philosophy and its object. If it must bring in 
content, rather than attempting to isolate its discussion to form, then this implies that 
philosophy’s self-image as a discipline which is “internal” to reason must be discarded. The 
relationship between philosophy and the special or individual sciences, with which Adorno was 
concerned from the time of his inaugural lecture, is traditionally characterized as if philosophy 
provided theoretical reason and access to validity claims, while the sciences handled the “extra-
philosophical” empirical. “Philosophical analysis encounters immanently, within the supposedly 
pure concept and its truth content, the ontical, before which the purity-claim cringes, and which 
it, trembling arrogantly, assigns to the individual sciences” (ND 141-2/138; my translation).
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interpretation relies upon an selective reading of Hegel. Adorno wants to claim that 
Hegel’s work provides a model for philosophy overcoming its abstractness; however, this
“material” moment of Hegel’s idealism relies upon the Hegelian understanding of the 
identity of subject and object, and cannot easily be translated into Adorno’s framework. 
Adorno instead retains a commitment to Hegelian idealism due to his own 
understanding of the “conceptuality” of the object; yet the subject’s own activity in 
relation to its object should be seen as a refusal to remain content with its own role. 
Hegel has brought the subject and object together substantially, but ignored or 
misunderstood, according to Adorno, the need for the subject’s resistance to its own task.
3.3 Mediation and foundationlessness
As O’Connor (1999) has identified, the concept of mediation is essential to Adorno’s 
thought.64 However, providing a reasonable degree of specificity to the term requires 
some work. We have seen already Adorno’s hostility to the idea of anything “first,” or 
primary, in philosophy. This first, as an immediate, denies the ubiquity of mediation 
(ME 15/7). The concept of mediation refers to that by which the subject and object are 
connected, as are all of the conceptual dualisms that Hegel and Adorno criticized in 
Kant. In the previous section I discussed Adorno’s claim that philosophy finds its 
“substantiality” through the subject’s mediation with the object. Here I focus on the 
character of this mediation. “[D]ialectic means nothing other than insisting on the 
64
 O’Connor claims that the concept of mediation is in fact the most central concept for Adorno, 
despite the fact that it remains “equivocal” in the work of both Hegel and Adorno. While I will not 
investigate the concept in as much analytical detail as he has, I agree that, at least for Adorno, the 
concept is too “adaptable.” O’Connor errs, however, in finding only two significant axes for the 
concept of mediation in Adorno, “subject-object mediation” and “conceptual mediation.” Part of 
my task here is to argue that Adorno relies heavily on a third sense of mediation, a “social 
mediation,” which, although it is constituted by the relationship between the particular, or 
individual, and the universal, cannot be reduced to O’Connor’s “subject-object mediation.”
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mediation of what appears to be immediate and on the reciprocity of immediacy and 
mediation as it unfolds on all levels” (CM 11).65
Adorno is fond of referencing Hegel in his claim that “there is nothing between 
heaven and earth that is not mediated” (NL1 20; see also KK 275/181; H 298/57), a claim
which follows directly from the central place that Adorno accords the dialectic. While we 
could derive a similar claim from the substance of Hegel’s philosophy, Adorno’s use goes 
beyond the merely Hegelian idea of mediation. One of the advantages of the Hegelian 
terminology for Adorno is that with it he utilizes what he calls, in relationship to the 
concept of dialectic, its “double-character.” Dialectic is “both a method of thought, but 
also more, namely a determinate structure of the thing [Sache]” (EDi 9). The same holds 
for mediation, contradiction, etc. But the Hegelian heritage is also problematic here, 
since Adorno never clarifies exactly in which sense this double character is intended. In 
arguing that everything is mediated, Adorno refers not just to conceptual mediation, but 
also to a social mediation, which stems from the nature of capitalist society.  While 
Hegel’s concept of mediation arguably applies both to a conceptual mediation and to an 
historical version, these are not strictly separated, due to the systematic nature of his 
philosophy. For Adorno, on the other hand, social mediation is a form of historical 
mediation, but it is also different.
Adorno’s idea of a “mediation through objectivity” goes beyond Hegel’s idea of the 
movement of the concept. The question in a sense is the nature of mediation as it 
concerns the nonidentical.
65
 “[T]he point about dialectics is not to negate the concept of fact in favour of mediation, or to 
exaggerate that of mediation; it is simply to say that immediacy is itself mediated but that the 
concept of the immediate must still be retained” (VGF 32-3/21).
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The mediation of essence and appearance, of concept and object [Sache], also does not 
remain as it was, the moment of subjectivity in the object. What the facts mediate is not 
so much the subjective mechanism, which preformed and grasped them, as the 
objectivity behind that which it can experience, which is heteronomous to the subject. It 
refuses to surrender to the primary subjective sphere of experience, is prior to it. In the 
subjective mechanisms of mediation, it extends to the objectivity, in which any subject, 
even the transcendental, is harnessed. The pre-subjective order, which for its part 
essentially constitutes the epistemologically-constituting subjectivity, ensures that the 
data, according to their requirement, are apperceived in this way and not otherwise’ (ND 
172-3/170-1; my translation; emphasis added).
The idea of an objectivity which lies beyond the realm of experience, reminiscent of the 
thing-in-itself, becomes central to the negative dialectic, and at times appears to define 
the nonidentical itself. In terms of society, this split within the “concept,” of subjectivity 
and objectivity, is reproduced. In other words, the priority of the object is socially and 
historically (materially) determined, and the subject is therefore deformed by its 
determination with the social system. “The superiority of what is objectified in subjects, 
which prevented them from becoming subjects, inhibits also the knowledge of the 
objective [das Objektive]; this is what became of what once was called the ‘subjective 
factor’. Now subjectivity is rather the mediated as objectivity, and such mediation is 
more urgently in need of analysis than conventional [mediation]” (ND 173/171; my 
translation). The subject’s encounter with objectivity comes from its own experience of 
the object, which it understands through a conception of its own mediation by 
objectivity. If it recognizes its own “going beyond” of subjectivity, in terms of its own 
objective content, then the subject can recognize objective mediation in general.
The immediate with which we begin our quest for knowledge is only a false 
immediate. Discussing the famous passage from the Phenomenology, in which Hegel 
explains how the truth is the whole since the absolute must be a result, Adorno 
emphasizes the anti-dialectical dread with which the concept of mediation is initially 
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rejected by consciousness, which as Hegel notes stems only “from ignorance of the 
nature of mediation” (EDi 32f.; PG §21). Mediation comes into play with the recognition 
“that one does not grasp concepts unchanged, but instead must change them in order to 
grasp them — in other words, that being is a becoming, that truth itself is actually 
dynamic” (EDi 32). The “movement of the concept” in Hegel’s philosophy is not a 
component of thought, but is required in order to affirm concepts. It stems from the 
matter [Sache] itself, from its internal contradiction” (EDi 36; H 310/71). Adorno goes 
on to note that Hegel’s claim that the “true is the whole” is a step that need not be taken. 
Although Hegel found his version of truth in the ascension to the absolute, Adorno of 
course claims that this is unnecessary. In fact, Adorno’s turn away from the absolute and 
the truth of the whole can be seen precisely as the elevation of the notion of mediation 
over any kind of absolute or whole. In the movement of mediation, “determined in itself 
from the matter [Sache], movement itself has the character of truth, when there can be 
no absolute as all-encompassing totality” (EDi 36).66 
The relevance of the emphasis on mediation is illuminated in Adorno’s conception of
the relationship between the particular and the universal. The point of mediation is that 
it is not the middle, in between its relationship poles that characterizes it; rather, 
mediation occurs within each pole itself.67 For example, for Adorno the individual is a 
dialectical category because it cannot be understood apart from the whole in which it is 
situated. Both the individual thought, and the material individual, are always “false” in 
66 The role of subjectivity, as we’ve seen, is to actively/passively “surrender” to the movement of 
the Sache. This will “cure thought of its arbitrariness,” of its limiting subjectivity (H 314/75).
67
 “Precisely this, that not only is each one moment the problem of the other moment but each 
moment necessarily requires the other moment in order to be thought at all — this inner 
mediation, not simply mediation between moments, seems to me the strongest argument in 
favour of dialectical philosophy” (PT 1: 222; quoted in Bozzetti 2002, 310n9).
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that they are always more than themselves. Each is an individual, but nevertheless 
reveals the inadequacy of its individuality (H 319/81). Going beyond the Kantian block 
means precisely moving from a consideration of individuals in relationship within the 
whole, to a dialectical conception, because we take what is immediate (the individual) 
but we do not take it as final. Identical thought recoils from the block, from the 
indissoluble. It surrenders to the ideal of knowledge, and thereby shows its respect for it 
(ND 163/161). Such a “resignation of theory before the individual” cancels the potential 
of philosophy that was discovered by Hegel.
“What is, is more than it is. This more is not imposed upon it, but remains 
immanent to it, like that which is displaced from it” (ND 164/161; my translation). 
Dialectics, nonidentity thinking, is then designed to lead through the particular to the 
universal, through the object to the subject. The “thinking insistence” leads from the 
individual object, not outward to the universal that it supposedly exemplifies, but rather 
inward to its essence. But here it nevertheless finds the universal.
Communication with the other crystalizes itself in the individual, which is, in its 
existence, mediated through it . . . The universal dwells in the center of the individual 
matter [Sache]; it does not first constitute itself in the comparison of an individual with 
others, because absolute individuality . . . is the product of the process of abstraction, [a 
product] which is elicited [ausgelöst] for the sake of universality. While the individual 
cannot be deduced from thought, the core of the individual would be comparable to those 
works of art which are the most individuated, which deny all schemata, whose analysis 
typically rediscovers moments of universality in the extremes of their individuation, their 
own buried participation (ND 164/162; my translation).
For Adorno, the universal is immanent in the particular, a fact which defines both the 
strength and the weakness of Hegel’s philosophy. The priority of the object, the focus on 
the particular, as against the domination of the universal, is the liberation of mediation, 
in a sense, since it is the moment of mediation in which negation is primary, and the 
Hegelian dialectic “incomplete.”
129
Through the role of the subject examined above, negative dialectics finds the 
possibility inherent in the object, which has been denied to it. The object contains 
“conceptual mediation” within itself.
The reason for [the] insistence on the τόδε τι [particular existent] is its own dialectic, its 
conceptual mediation in itself; it is the place of operation for comprehending the 
nonconceptual in it. Mediation in the midst of the nonconceptual is no remnant from a 
complete subtraction; it is not that which refers to a bad infinity of such procedures. 
Rather mediation is the ύλη [matter] of its implicit history . . . In the reading of the 
existing as text of its becoming idealist and materialist dialectic converge. However, 
while, for idealism, the inner history of immediacy justifies this as a stage of the concept, 
it materialistically becomes the measure not only of the untruth of concepts, but also of 
the existing immediate (ND 62/52; my translation).
For Hegel, it is through the experience of Geist that the fallacy of the primacy of the 
immediate is undermined. Think here of the progress of spirit in the first chapters of the 
Phenomenology. This is an adequate expression of “the experiential content 
[Erfahrungsgehalt] of idealism” (H 301/61), and expresses the ways in which idealism is
important beyond its “epistemological and metaphysical positions.” The crucial 
movement of knowledge through dialectic or speculation, from isolated reflections to a 
connection with the absolute, is identified by Adorno as stemming from a spirit of 
idealist philosophy present not only in Hegel but in Fichte and Schelling as well. Their 
willingness to go beyond Kant towards an experience of “infinity” or “wholeness” 
signaled precisely their ability to critique the “privations of the finite.” “In the theoretical 
sphere, idealism represented the insight that the sum total of specific knowledge was not 
a whole, that the best of both knowledge and human potential slipped through the 
meshes of the division of labor” (H 302/62). 
Idealism represents this materialist insight because there is a form of wholeness or 
totality which goes beyond that of mere “objective spirit.” Here Adorno creates tensions 
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again, because he has difficulty articulating how these insights are simultaneously so 
revolutionary and restrictive, how the dialectic can be divorced from the system.
In Kant, critique remains a critique of reason; in Hegel, who criticizes the Kantian 
separation of reason from reality, the critique of reason is simultaneously a critique of the
real. The inadequacy of all isolated particular definitions is always also the inadequacy of 
the particular reality that is grasped in those definitions. Even if the system ultimately 
equates reason and reality and subject and object, the dialectic turns its polemic against 
the irrationality of mere existence, the enduring state of nature, by confronting a specific 
reality with its own concept, its own rationality (H 315-6/77).
Since negativity is not abstract but determinate for Hegel, it does not merely criticize 
concepts, but it “intervenes in the reality that is the content of the self-criticizing 
concept: society” (H 316/78). The move to content, then, is only a part of the move 
towards the immanent sociality of the object.
The fact of the individual consciousness confronting the actuality of their 
relationship to the social totality, the discovering or uncovering of the mediations of the 
individual and the universality, is the beginning moment of the negative dialectic. It is 
the reflection on Hegel’s own reflections.
The methexis [participation] of each individual in the universal, through thinking 
consciousness — and the individual first becomes as thought — already transcends the 
contingency of the particular vis-à-vis the universal, on which the Hegelian and later the 
collectivist disdain for the individual was based. Through experience and consistency 
[Konsequenz], the individual is able to see the truth of the universal, which this disguises,
for itself and for the other, as blindly self-asserted power. According to the current 
consensus, the universal is justified by its mere form as universality. Itself a concept, it 
thereby becomes conceptless, inimical to reflection; the first requirement of resistance, 
and modest beginning of praxis, is that spirit sees through it, and names it (ND 337/344; 
my translation; emphasis added).
The form of universality that is at work here, and which goes beyond the merely formal 
conception, is a concrete totality which becomes reified. Adorno here uses the concept of 
“concept” again, describing reification as the process of moving from a conceptual form 
of being to a state of being “conceptless.” But the perspective of the individual 
consciousness, with respect to the immediate universal or totality can only be described 
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in terms of spirit with difficulty. Adorno is banking on Hegel again here, but his own 
view cannot justify the claim. The self-reflection of spirit cannot be translated into a 
consciousness seeing through a reified form of universality. The significance of 
dialectical mediation has led Hegel’s epistemology to be called “circular” and 
“foundationless.”68 Although he gives the dialectic a critical, negative turn, Adorno is also
attempting to achieve a similar state of knowledge.69 Everything is mediated, nothing is 
merely complete in-itself. But the foundationlessness that Adorno seeks relies upon a 
Hegelian conception of the absolute, just as much as “mediation” does. In the transition 
to his own categories, Adorno loses Hegel’s framework, and is forced to rely upon a 
dualistic perspective on the individual/universal relationship, as well as on the 
subject/object one.
3.4 The judgment of the particular
To briefly touch upon a topic that will be of more significance below, the power and 
potential of Hegel’s idealist dialectic is effectively canceled by his treatment of the 
particular. Adorno criticizes Hegel for inconsistency regarding the individual 
consciousness, and his handling of the category of the particular in general. According to 
Adorno, Hegel’s “aversion” to individual consciousness led him to back away from the 
recognition of the universality which is inherent within individuality; instead they are 
subjected to the necessity of society. Hegel “mistreats the individual, as if it was the 
immediate, whose appearance he himself is destroying. With this, however, the absolute 
68
 On the former, see Rockmore (1986); examples of the latter are Winfield (1984) and Houlgate 
(2005).
69
 Bernstein (1997a); see also (2004, 46, n3).
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contingency of individual experience also disappears” (ND 55-6/45-6; my translation).70 
The individual loses its “contingent” character in two ways, in terms of its subjection by 
the universal of society, and in terms of its subjectification through discursive thought. 
The universal character of thought, in terms of its employment of concepts, connects 
individual experience to the universal; but also in terms of its “natural history.”
Through its participation in the discursive medium, [individual experience] is, according 
to its own determination, more than merely individual. The individual becomes the 
subject, insofar as it objectifies itself, by virtue of its individual consciousness . . . Because 
it is universal in-itself, and to the extent that it is, individual experience also reaches the 
universal. Yet, in epistemological reflection, logical universality and the unity of 
individual consciousness are mutually dependent. This pertains not only to the 
subjective-formal side of individuality; every content of individual consciousness is 
brought to it by its bearer [Träger], for the sake of its self-preservation, and reproduces 
itself with it. Through self-examination [Selbstbesinnung], individual consciousness can 
free itself from it, to expand itself. Toward that end is the agony of the universal, 
compelled to a tendency to attain dominance over individual experience (ND 56/46; my 
translation).
The universality which is inherent in the individual comes as a result of its own 
determination. Through its own thought, the individual subject objectifies itself, which 
results in universality not only through its conceptual determination, but also through 
what we could call its “material determination.” But how are we to make sense of this 
type of determination? We can make a distinction between the individual subject in its 
role as object, and in its role as subject. In the latter, consciousness makes itself a subject
through its own negative process. But the former has another dimension; in addition to 
its own determination through its negative process as subject (and hence simultaneously 
object), consciousness presumably, as content, has its own material history, a residue. 
70
 This stems from the unrecognized ideological character of his thought: “In unresolved 
opposition to the pathos of humanism, Hegel explicitly and implicitly orders human beings, as 
those who perform socially necessary labor, to subject themselves to an alien necessity. He 
thereby embodies, in theoretical form, the antinomy of the universal and the particular in 
bourgeois society” (H 290/46).
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The agony of the domination by the universal spurs consciousness to a forgotten 
mode of “differentiation [Differenzieren],” through which the mimetic moment — the 
“elective affinity between that which knows and that which is known” — becomes a 
model for experiencing the object. “The mimetic moment . . . fuses [verschmelzen] . . . 
with the rational one. This process synthesizes itself [sich zusammenfassen] as 
differentiatedness [Differenziertheit]” (ND 55/45). The key to this process is that the 
subject has “fused” the material (the “mimetic power of reaction”) with the logical 
(“logical organ”), into a power or faculty that can then retain its “contingent” character. 
The opposition to Hegel here is focused in the conception of contingency which Adorno 
believes Hegel’s philosophy cannot accommodate. The “formal side” of individuality, 
determined reflectively and discursively, must be balanced by a mode of individuality 
which is materially grounded in the mimetic moment of differentiation. What Adorno 
will alternately call a “philosophical,” “metaphysical”, or “geistig” experience requires 
that the individual consciousness grasp the universal through self-objectification. Rather
than seeking a universal concept to subsume itself under, it looks within. To reason and 
experience “scientifically” is to simply use abstractions; philosophical experience rather 
reflects upon itself, and this allows it to recognize the contradiction between the 
universal and the particular.  
However, Hegel’s emphasis on the reconciliation of the dialectic entailed an 
ideological identification with the totality, and hence with the “subject” of idealism. 
Hegel’s philosophy was always in fact moving towards the absolute, and although 
Adorno found this problematic enough in the realm of consciousness and logic, it was 
unequivocally totalitarian in the sphere of social and political philosophy. Due to the 
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continued development of capitalist rationality since Hegel’s time, his philosophy has 
become more and more ideological, coming to describe aspects of social reality more and
more accurately.
“The whole is the untrue,” not merely because the thesis of totality is itself untruth, being 
the principle of domination inflated to the absolute; the idea of a positivity that can 
master everything that opposes it through the superior power of a comprehending spirit 
is the mirror image of the experience of the superior coercive force inherent in everything 
that exists by virtue of its consolidation under domination. This is the truth in Hegel's 
untruth. The force of the whole, which it mobilizes, is not a mere fantasy on the part of 
spirit; it is the force of the real web of illusion in which all individual existence remains 
trapped. By specifying, in opposition to Hegel, the negativity of the whole, philosophy 
satisfies, for the last time, the postulate of determinate negation, which is a positing (H 
324-5/87-8).
Adorno claims that Hegel unconsciously forecasted the triumph of the absolute, which 
simultaneously gave his philosophy new meaning, and condemned it to impotence.
The starting point for Adorno then, in the individual’s self-reflection, leads directly, 
through the always already embedded social, to the recognition and negotiation of 
contradiction — the persistence of the particular. What Adorno reads as the demise of 
the particular within Hegel’s system can be recuperated through a recognition of the 
continued “negativity” of the capitalist social totality. Society is a “negative totality,” 
constituted through the antagonistic relations of capital. Adorno’s analysis situates 
individuality, and individual experience, within the “objective” social tendency, and 
hence privileges it. The conception of social reality as an externality is an ideological 
untruth, yet also true; and to that extent it is experienced as an immediate self-certainty. 
The individual experiences an otherness, which it must get beyond through critical 
reflection. In so doing, in realizing the ideological nature of its absoluteness, “the 
possibility emerges of discovering the universal in the individual itself” (Tichy 1977: 
108).
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The very grimness with which a man clings to himself, as to the immediately sure and 
substantial, makes him an agent of the universal, and individuality a deceptive notion. On
this, Hegel agreed with Schopenhauer; what he had over Schopenhauer was the insight 
that the abstract negation of individuality is not all there is to the dialectics of 
individuation and universality. The remaining objection, however — not just against 
Schopenhauer but against Hegel himself — is that the individual, the necessary 
phenomenon of the essence, the objective tendency, is right to turn against that tendency,
since he confronts it with individuality and fallibility (ND 319-20/325-6).
Adorno’s own notion of the individual here is then an attempted revision of Hegel, who 
did not take it far enough. Although he acknowledged the dialectical relationship 
between individual and universal, Hegel continued to suggest that a reconciliation was 
possible. 
My discussion here over the course of the chapter has focused primarily upon the 
multiple criticisms and interpretations of Kantian and Hegelian philosophy that 
structure Adorno’s thought. Through an exploration of the primary significant themes of 
dialectic and mediation I have emphasized some of the ways in which Adorno takes his 
critical inspiration from Hegel’s philosophy, as well as some of the issues that arise from 
his attempt to hold on to both Kantian and Hegelian perspectives. With this 
understanding, I would like to turn to an explication and discussion of Adorno’s key 
concept experience which is at the heart of the negative dialectic. It is here that we will 
find the key to both the significance of the German Idealist heritage for Adorno’s 
thought, and to his conception of the nature of intellectual work involved in philosophy 
and sociology.
4. The negation of idealism through geistig experience
The wealth of experience on which thought feeds in 
Hegel is incomparable . . . Through what is experienced, 
the abstract idea is transformed back into something 
living, just as mere material is transformed through the 
path thought travels (H 293-4/50).
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Adorno’s engagement with German Idealism culminated in his conception of a form of 
experience capable of breaking through the reified social and intellectual forms which 
characterize modern capitalist society. The problems of thought in contemporary society,
its tendency towards identity, are reinforced and compounded by what Adorno refers to 
as the “withering” or “emaciation” of experience (MM §33; AT 54/31). This phenomenon 
describes the demise of the individual within the universal structures through which 
society is constituted. Alienation has progressed to such an extent that the individual has
become utterly powerless within the totally socialized society. The disproportion of 
reality “to the powerless subject, which makes it incommensurable with experience, 
renders reality unreal with a vengeance. The surplus of reality amounts to its collapse; by
striking the subject dead, reality itself becomes deathly” (AT 53/31). Bernstein notes that
the demise of experience, for Adorno, involves two trends: universals are no longer 
constitutive for individual lives; and the objectivity of truth claims is not recognized as 
related to individual experience (1997b, 182). The collapse of experience is specifically 
the loss of the experience of diremption, of the capacity of the individual subject to feel 
and to recognize its separation from the universal, a state that Bernstein calls “radical 
immanence.”
In contrast to the analysis of the historical withering of experience, Adorno puts 
forward a conception of a form of experience which may access a mode of being beyond 
this state of immanence. The concept of a geistig experience stems directly from 
Adorno’s engagement with German idealist philosophy.71 Although the phrase “geistige 
Erfahrung” has been translated as both “intellectual experience”72 and as “spiritual 
71
 It is also heavily indebted to Benjamin. On this relation see Bernstein (2001, 111ff.); Foster 
(2007); Jay (2005, 312ff.).
72
 E.g., by Rodney Livingstone in the English edition of Lectures on Negative Dialectics (VND).
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experience”,73 I will retain the German adjective here in order to highlight its distinctive 
character, and because of the unfortunate connotations of the English terms. The term 
derives from the Hegelian Geist — “spirit” or “mind” — and thus inherits all of the 
translation difficulties of the earlier term. While not claiming that Adorno’s geistig 
experience contains the same nuances as Hegel’s Geist, I do want to emphasize its 
fundamental Hegelian origins. In this section I will cover how Adorno characterizes this 
form of experience in relation to other forms of experience as well as other forms of 
reason. One of his aims, in turning to a notion of experience over mere thought, is to 
bring together the split between sensation and cognition which, as we saw above, 
characterized Kantian philosophy. Geistig experience for Adorno captures the 
recognition of the priority of the object, of nonidentity, and therefore understands the 
limits of reason; but it also includes a bodily, affective component, as well as a collective 
or social one, both of which supplement the negation of idealism that Adorno hopes to 
achieve. The term geistig experience is suggestive in that it helps us to understand that 
for Adorno, there is no “pure” form of experience. Experience is always mediated with 
thought, and is in this sense always intellectual experience. But it is also always mediated
by spirit, and so can be considered spiritual experience as well.
4.1 Geistig   experience against mere “science” 
In his essay on “The Experiential Content of Hegel’s Philosophy,” Adorno notes that it is 
precisely the conception of Geist in post-Kantian German idealism that he is interested 
in, because it is this concept alone which adequately encompasses the dialectic of subject 
and object which is so important to him. This has applications at the levels of both 
73
 E.g., in Foster (2007).
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ontology and epistemology. The shift is one from a mere epistemological subject to Geist;
and there is a corresponding move from a conception of philosophy as a science, to a 
form of critical philosophical practice which is based upon geistig experience. 
Adorno’s conception of a philosophical geistig experience obviously owes much to 
Hegel’s own conception of experience. Hegel’s description of the path from natural 
consciousness to science (or, alternatively, from reflection to speculation) emphasizes 
the relationship between experience and development and change. Hegel shows the 
reader how consciousness may change itself, through its own power of “going beyond,” 
in contradistinction to Kant who deduces the universal laws or limits of thought. 
Consciousness thus has a history, in both its form and its content. 
Adorno, however, in discussing the significance of this form of experience, makes it 
clear that he is not adopting Hegel’s own concept of experience. In a characteristic move, 
he reads Hegel’s philosophy as a philosophical expression, as a riddle that needs to be 
deciphered, as well as reading it for content:
My theme is the experiential substance of Hegel’s philosophy, not experiential content in 
Hegel’s philosophy. What I have in mind is closer to what Hegel, in the introduction to his
System of Philosophy, calls the “attitude of thought to objectivity” . . . I am interested 
in . . . the Hegelian spirit, the compelling force of the objective phenomena that have been
reflected in his philosophy and are sedimented in it . . . My inquiry is concerned with 
what [Hegel’s] philosophy expresses as philosophy, and this has its substance not least of 
all in the fact that it is not exhausted by the findings of individual disciplines’ (H 296/54-
5).
Adorno assesses the timeliness of his attempt to rescue the concept of experience, noting 
that the Kantian emphasis on what is immediately given has only increased in strength, 
as the “omnipresent mediating mechanisms of exchange” have taken over our social 
world. In Adorno’s estimation, the Kantian conception of subjective experience underlies
diverse modes of thought, from positivism to phenomenology, and he views his work as 
139
the recuperation of a conception of a form of experience which accords with Hegel’s 
understanding of the priority of dialectic and mediation.  “At the present time Hegelian 
philosophy, and all dialectical thought, is subject to the paradox that it has been 
rendered obsolete by science and scholarship while being at the same time more timely 
than ever in its opposition to them” (H 297/55).
Hegel’s philosophy is thus significant for its mode of expression as well as for its 
theoretical substance. The conception of science put forward by empiricist positivism, 
which has come to dominate the sciences according to Adorno, relies upon the notion of 
a pure sensible experience, which in Kantian fashion is effortlessly taken up and 
presented to the intellectual capacity of the mind. Adorno’s argument against this form 
of scientific conception is based upon his reading of Hegel’s (and Fichte’s) critique. The 
notion of a geistig experience is derived from the move towards a substantiality that we 
discussed in the previous section, which was pioneered by the post-Kantian idealists, and
which goes fundamentally beyond a constitutive subjectivity, to the objects themselves, 
to a recognition of “what is not itself one with cognition” (VND 122/82). Such a mode of 
experience, which constitutes Adorno’s model for philosophical thought in general, is 
characterized as “a full, unreduced experience in the medium of conceptual reflexion” 
(ND 25/13; VND 122/82). It is “unreduced” because it reflects on and transcends the 
“reduced” experience of empiricism, and in doing so, it dialectically rescues the intention
of empiricism, by working from the bottom up, rather than from the top down. 
In terms of content, at the core of the Hegelian philosophy,  according to Adorno, is 
the notion of experience, which is integrally related to the dialectic as the “unswerving 
effort to conjoin reason’s critical consciousness of itself and the critical experience of 
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objects” (H 258/9-10). A key move for Hegel, as we’ve seen, is the discovery of the 
mediation which is inherent within any immediate. For experience, this means that that 
which is immediately perceived is debunked through a critical reflection (i.e., 
consciousness establishes the object through negation/determination, and then comes to
see itself doing so). Since there is no more strictly inaccessible sphere of noumena, 
everything which exists is spiritual, i.e. mediated by spirit, and the perceiving 
consciousness must always take this into account. As Hegel famously demonstrated in 
the first chapters of the Phenomenology, consciousness may not experience the pure 
particular, but always finds the universal at the same time.
Adorno, on the other hand, complains that Hegel’s understanding of dialectical 
experience ultimately relies too much upon reconciliation, upon identity. But this 
critique stems from an understanding of the negativity of the antagonistic system of 
society, and a commitment to the experience of it. Hegel’s “negation” is not negative 
enough, because it posits an identity of subject and object, and consequently forgets the 
fundamental difference between idea and reality (ND 329/335). Hegel’s  version of 
experience contains an account of the critical education of consciousness, but it remains 
limited, in Adorno’s opinion, simply because it overcomes the Kant’s limitations only by 
presupposing identity (ND 162/160). The failure to account for the radical nonidentity of
the object produces a “reduced” form of subjectivity and experience.
There is a tension here between the version of Hegelian philosophical critique that 
Adorno wants to appropriate, and his transformation of it through his own immanent 
critique. For all of its insight, the critique of Kantian and scientific thought performed by 
Hegel must now be modified; its materialist core must be brought out. Adorno claims 
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that there is an element of Hegel’s philosophy which is unconscious, that it does not 
properly understand itself, and it is ultimately this element — and not its own self-
understanding — which separates it from the heritage of Enlightenment rationalism. It 
articulates a “new expressive need” which is “more important even than Enlightenment’s
self-critique, the emphatic incorporation of the concrete subject and the historical world,
or the dynamization of philosophical activity” (H 304/64). This is the need to articulate 
aspects of our experience of the social world which are not captured by individual 
scientific pursuits, or by scientific reason itself. Rather than simply inquiring into the 
conditions of possibility of experience or of the validity of scientific knowledge, Hegel 
represented a trend which sought to reflectively examine the limits which had been 
placed on knowledge, which made it so obviously incongruent with experience. Adorno 
wants to reflexively apply a form of Hegelian critique to Hegel himself.  
The “experience of consciousness,” which is followed in the Phenomenology, is 
Adorno’s model for the social experience of modernity. The turn towards content 
constitutes the “doubling” of the subject of consciousness in post-Kantian philosophy. 
Hegel thematizes the relationship between the naïve consciousness which directly knows
its object, and the critical reflective consciousness which examines the naïve 
consciousness. The limits of the naïve consciousness are then overcome through this 
process of splitting and reflection. The finite, limited consciousness is grasped in its 
finiteness by a critical consciousness which posits itself as infinite, as able to achieve the 
absolute. By viewing the critical limitations of the limited, scientific consciousness, the 
doubled subject understands the relationship between consciousness and its objects; it 
sees its own failures; and it is the contradiction between these two aspects of 
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consciousness which drives philosophical thinking. “Contradiction, proscribed by logic, 
becomes an organ of thought: of the truth of logos” (H 311-2/73). 
The naïve consciousness, which Adorno refers to as a scientific consciousness, is the 
Kantian mode of thought which alienates subject from object, form from content. It is 
myopically concerned only with its own rules and procedures, with the ways in which it 
handles objects. The critical Hegelian turn through this doubling of consciousness, is 
also the materialist moment in which the content of thought is considered in its 
relationship to the subject. The experiential content of Hegel’s philosophy is then this 
moment of dialectical contradiction. His attention to the suffering of the alienation of 
subject and object, consciousness and world, forms the basic experience that moves his 
philosophy. He recognized that it is only through this second reflection that 
consciousness can realize its own untruth, that thought can move beyond itself. “This 
says more about his reflection of reflection than the irrationalist gestures into which 
Hegel sometimes let himself be misled in his desperate attempts to rescue the truth of a 
society that had already become untrue. Hegel’s self-reflection of the subject in 
philosophical consciousness is actually society’s dawning critical consciousness of itself” 
(H 313/74-5).
This highlights an additional reason for the contemporary significance of the 
experiential content of Hegelian philosophy. Adorno claims that Hegel’s thought in fact 
foreshadowed the rise of society as a total system. “Dialectical contradiction is 
experienced in the experience of society . . . ; it is in the dialectical contradiction that 
there crystallizes a concept of experience that points beyond absolute idealism. It is the 
concept of antagonistic totality” (H 316/78). It is at this point that Adorno again 
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launches his social critique. Capitalist society, as an antagonistic totality, reflects, has an 
“affinity” with, the conception of antagonistic totality in Hegel’s thought. Adorno’s 
critique is then not just a realization about the character of contemporary society, it is 
just as much a realization about the status of Hegelian philosophy. The experience that is
had by subjects in contemporary capitalist society is captured, presciently, by Hegel’s 
dialectical philosophy, which now contains the key for an understanding of our society. 
This might appear a strange result, as it has little or nothing to do with Hegel’s actual 
analysis of society, but stems directly from his conception of dialectical contradiction. 
Hegel’s understanding of what Adorno terms “reification,” of the necessary dialectical 
relationship of immediacy and mediation, has come to describe the relationship of 
consciousness to its social surroundings. The necessary principle of division or 
alienation, which Hegel attributed to the natural consciousness, is then related in a much
more specific way to its social context. Such divisions were the source of the 
contradictions that drive Hegel’s dialectical philosophy forward, and their concrete 
versions are just as much the motor of social development.
The key, as before, is the necessary ubiquity of mediation. Just as the subject as 
consciousness is always already mediated by the universals of thought and logic, the 
concrete human individual is always already mediated by society. The apparently 
primary individualism of the subject of capitalism is analogous to the apparent primacy 
of the conscious subject of philosophical reason. But the category of totality is essential 
to each case. For consciousness, it is the whole of the absolute through which diremption
and mediation are understood. And for the social subject, it is the totality of a society 
which structures social antagonisms. Each whole is only constituted through its 
144
contradictions. However, the spheres of the social and the conceptual, which Adorno 
often seems to be analogically relating are in fact related in a much more determinate 
manner. Because of the turn towards content performed by Hegel, we know that 
knowledge is never pure in itself, but it always centrally related to its content, and its 
content is always already social. In effect we have the social moving in both on the side of
the subject/form and on the side of the object/content. The forms of thought are social 
because they are always already mediated by universality — a universality which is 
essentially related to the social sphere, rather than to some transcendental-logical world.
The content of thought, what it is that we are thinking about, is always already social 
because it has been constituted through the social process of history.
This explains what it is about the concept of experience as dialectical contradiction 
that, according to Adorno, “points beyond absolute idealism.” Absolute idealism breaks 
down the apparent immediacy of both the subject and the object of knowledge. It does 
not rest with appearance and tradition. For Adorno, the crucial limitations of absolute 
idealism lie in its failure to critique the totality itself (H 323/86). Adorno believes that 
Hegel’s critical advance over Kant lay in his transcendence of dualism; but at the same 
time he laments the loss of the Kantian “discontinuity” between phenomena and 
noumena. “Hegel thought away the difference between the conditioned and the absolute 
and endowed the conditioned with the semblance of the unconditioned. In the last 
analysis, by doing so he did an injustice to the experience on which he drew” (H 323/86).
In other words, in Hegel’s philosophy, the very movement towards a reconciliation of 
subject and object, universal and particular is the negation of the foundational 
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experience of dialectical contradiction — a move which presages the actual withering of 
experience in contemporary capitalist society.
Such a philosophical, or geistig, experience begins phenomenologically with that 
which is given to consciousness, and it must find contradiction where seemingly none 
exists, in the pacified totality. Through its receptivity to the object, it begins to witness 
the dialectical contradiction which exists between thought and its object. The 
contradictions that seem to inhere within thought are “reproductions” of the 
contradictions that objectively exist between thought and its objects (thought’s “other”). 
And it is the very attempt to think in terms of producing judgments of identity that 
reveals these contradictions in thought itself. The identities which we take for formal are 
in reality speculative (i.e., in Adorno’s sense, riven with contradiction).
Thought, by sinking itself in that which initially confronts it, in the concept, and 
becoming aware of its immanent contradictory [antinomisch] character, clings to the idea
of something which would be beyond contradiction. The opposition of thought to what is 
heterogeneous to it reproduces itself in thought as its immanent contradiction. Reciprocal
critique of the universal and particular, identifying acts which judge whether the concept 
does justice to that with which it concerns itself [dem Befaßten], and also whether the 
particular fulfills its concept, are the medium of the thought of the nonidentity of 
particular and concept (ND 149/146; my translation).
The effort of thought to negate its object takes the form of a judgment which is aware of 
its identification and the remainder. Adorno believes that his conception of experience is 
more critical than that of Hegel because it remains committed to reality’s contradictions 
and to its own aporia. Its task is to “lend a voice to its unfreedom” (ND 29/18), by sheer 
negation and revolt. Not content to progress dialectically up Hegel’s ladder to the 
absolute, Adorno’s version of experience continually recognizes the significance of 
nonidentity.
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This geistig character of the given encompasses not only the mediation of the object 
through Geist, but also importantly, the corporeal nature of the subject, and the 
experience of suffering of the individual (O’Connor 2004, 71f.).
The allegedly elemental facts of consciousness are more than merely this. In the 
dimension of pleasure and displeasure, that which is corporeal [Körperliches] rises up to 
it [consciousness]. All pain and all negativity, the motor of dialectical thought, are the 
often mediated, sometimes unrecognizable, shape of the physical, as all happiness aims 
for sensible fulfillment and acquires its objectivity in it . . . In subjective, sensible data, 
this dimension — for its part that which contradicts spirit in it — is weakened, as it were, 
to its epistemological after-image (ND 202/202; my translation).
Here Adorno emphasizes the material basis of subjectivity and its significance. The 
motor of the dialectic is in fact in the physical realm, in the pain of the feeling organism. 
Such feeling becomes “data” for consciousness, but its real origins remain fundamental 
to it. 
The transition towards content then includes not only the priority of the object in its 
mediation, but also the physical nature of the subject and its social context. Knowledge 
and being are united through subjective experience. Adorno here takes the despair of 
consciousness in the Phenomenology and transforms it into a bodily sensation, a form of
physical suffering. Adorno’s dialectic moves from the force of this suffering, which is 
both mental and physical; the “radical difference” of body and mind stems only from the 
subject’s abstractions (ND 202/202).
The role of “theory,” as something of a bridge between a scientific and a dialectical 
cognition, is to prevent ideology from setting in, or more precisely to undermine it once 
it has. Theory “corrects the naivety of its self-confidence, without it however having to 
sacrifice the spontaneity, at which theory, for its part, aims” (ND 41/30-1; my 
translation). Thought requires both passivity and spontaneous activity, it must be able to
“overshoot the object,” since it no longer pretends to be one with it (ND 39/28). Adorno 
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characterizes this moment as the growing independence of thought, vis-à-vis the object, 
which is denied by Hegel’s total mediation. The subject realizes through its experience of 
pain and negativity that the subject and the object cannot and will not be reconciled, and 
the demands upon it only increase in their antagonism.
Such an account contains significant contradictions. Adorno remains committed to a
Hegelian recognition that everything is always already spiritual; however, he also 
upholds the stringent negation of the subject, the “resistance of thought to the merely 
existing” (ND 31/19; my translation). The Kantian roots of Adorno’s conception of the 
nonidentity of subject and object are perhaps clearest in his occasional comments on the 
subject’s freedom. In order to perform its duties of articulating the priority of the object 
– a task which consequently discloses the subject’s own fullness – consciousness must 
contain a moment of freedom. This moment is not achieved, but rather appears to stem 
from its own powers as a material subject. Adorno’s theory of the subject thus contains 
its own form of duality, which consciousness must recognize but not create:
Theory and geistig experience require their interdependency. It does not contain answers 
to everything, but rather reacts to world which is false to its core. Theory has no 
jurisdiction over what would be carried away by its spell. Mobility is essential to 
consciousness, [and] no accidental quality. It means a doubled mode of behaviour: that 
from within, the immanent process, essentially dialectical; and a free one, just like one 
stepping out from the dialectic, unattached. Both however are not merely disparate. The 
unregulated thought has an elective affinity to the dialectic, which as critique of the 
system, remembers what would be outside the system; and the power, which the 
dialectical movement releases in cognition, is that which revolted against the system. 
Both positions conjoin themselves through critique, not through compromise (ND 41-
2/31; my translation).
Here we can see that Adorno’s conscious subject retains an enigmatic quality, a 
recollection of the “outside,” which constitutes it own transcending power.74 
74 Adorno also addresses the freedom of the subject in the context of its activity of judgment: 
Judgment and inference [Schluß], the thought forms which the critique of thought cannot 
dispense with, contain in themselves critical germs. Their determinateness is always 
simultaneously the exclusion of what they did not achieve, and the truth they want to 
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It is clear that Adorno’s concept of geistig experience is reliant upon a “dialectical 
cognition” or a “nonidentity thinking,” but the concepts are decidedly not coterminous. 
Adorno’s attempt to expand philosophy beyond a merely scientific — and for that reason,
subjective — reason, in the model of Kant, is based upon the critique that cognition itself 
is “living experience.” The attempt to reduce reason from experience to mere cognition 
excludes non-scientific thoughts — i.e., ones that are not universal and necessary — as 
inferior. The struggle of cognition to understand its own inadequacy is one part of 
geistig experience. “In the identifying attempt [Ansatz], what it eliminates, according to 
its own essence, cannot be retrieved later [läßt sich nicht ergänzend nachholen]; at best 
the attempt is to be changed out of the knowledge of its inadequacy. However, that it 
does so little justice to the living experience that cognition is, indicates its falsity, the 
inability to achieve what it itself puts forward, namely to ground [begründen] 
experience” (ND 380/387; my translation). The mere idea of cognition providing such a 
grounding contradicts “what experience knows about itself,” which is that it “always also 
changes its own forms” (ND 380/387). This is the key Hegelian shift towards a notion of 
experience, through the permission thought gives itself to think the absolute; however, 
Hegel and the other post-Kantian idealists ultimately remained under the same spell as 
Kant, the spell of the social totality (ND 161/158).
organize negates — albeit with questionable justice — that which they did not characterize 
[das nicht von ihnen Geprägte]. The judgment that something is so potentially repels 
[abwehren] [the fact that] the relation of its subject and object may be other than the 
judgment expressed. The thought forms aim further than that which is merely existing, 
which is given. The peak [Spitze], which thought directs against its material, is not only the 
domination of nature become spiritualized. While the thought does violence to that which it 
synthesizes, it simultaneously follows a potential that waits in its opposite, and 
unconsciously obeys the idea of atoning, to the pieces, for what it did. This unconscious 
becomes conscious for philosophy. Unreconciled thought is joined with the hope of 
reconciliation; because the resistance of thought to the merely existing, the domineering 
freedom of the subject, also aims at what was lost through its preparation [Zurüstung] of the 
object (ND 30-1/19; my translation).
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The notion, then, of a geistig experience captures in part Adorno’s critical-
phenomenological Hegelian inspiration. The subject which undergoes such experience is 
the one which seeks to heal the deformation brought on by the historical processes which
“ground” intellectual abstraction. The Kantian subject of experience is “reified” in the 
sense that it has already experienced this “emaciation” of experience, its diremption into 
form and content. It becomes a constituting subject, by forgetting something 
fundamental, and this is the main form of delusion that philosophy must combat, using 
the “power of the subject” to do so (ND 10/xx). The form of alienation with which 
Adorno is primarily concerned is that of subject and object, or of mind and world, and it 
is Hegelian to that extent. 
But how are we to characterize this mode of experience, which cannot be primal or 
originary, nor reconciled in a Hegelian sense? What is the subject of a restricted 
experience supposed to achieve? The answer for Adorno is importantly related to his 
conception of forms of intellectual pursuit. I agree with Foster, who claims that Adorno’s 
understanding of the problematic forms of abstraction, alienation, and restricted 
experience “must ultimately be understood in term of the expressive possibilities of 
language” (2007, 13). Adorno’s remedy is not modeled on the systematic character of 
German idealist philosophy, nor on a Marxian conception of praxis. Rather, Adorno 
“sought to show that the systematic narrowing of the possibilities for cognitive 
experience is, in the modern world, ultimately related to a specific distortion within 
language” (Foster 2007, 16). The notion of a geistig experience that Adorno develops can
be seen to be the basis for his theory of language. In general, the issue falls under a 
broader one, which is the relationship between aesthetic and intellectual forms in 
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Adorno’s work. Although I cannot explore the intricacies of Adorno’s aesthetics here, a 
few further comments on this dimension of experience are in order.
Adorno’s emphasis on the priority of the object is, of course designed to be a mode 
of individual, subjective experience. Adorno wants no part of the fetish of a rational or 
scientific “objectivity.” In the “Dedication” of Minima Moralia, he argues that Hegel’s 
characteristic “liquidation” of the particular, due both to his commitment to 
philosophical system and to his “indifference” to actual social-historical trends, mirrored
a devaluation of individual experience. The experience of consciousness, on which the 
analysis of the Phenomenology was based, cannot be directly carried over into a 
contemporary pedagogical form. In his attempt to make philosophy substantive, Hegel 
(according to Adorno) neglected the individual subject. Adorno’s intention, from his 
post-war perspective, is to remedy this neglect through the disintegration of systematic 
philosophy into aphoristic, “constellational” form. Only such a form can overcome 
Hegel’s failure to mediate the individual and bourgeois society (MM 16/17-18). Such a 
revaluation of the individual is Adorno’s way of resisting the totalization of society, by 
examining the very dialectical relationship between individual and society which has 
been so neglected in modern thought. “Because for Adorno ‘society is essentially the 
substance of the individual,’ then in giving objective expression to ethical life in this 
[aphoristic] form, the individual ‘calls his substance by its name,’ that is, reveals the 
(deforming) social substantiality composing broken subjective existence” (Bernstein 
2001, 43).75
75
 Although this discussion is truncated for reasons of space, issues of language, representation, 
configuration and constellation are at the center of Adorno’s understanding of geistig experience, 
and they are necessary for a full understanding of the relationship between Adorno’s and Hegel’s 
concepts of experience. As Bernstein notes, Adorno’s belief is that “now only aphorisms can 
sustain the Hegelian demand to ‘penetrate into the immanent content of the matter’ and not 
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It is not least here, at the level of individual experience and its expression, that 
Adorno’s program is designed to work. The subjective, individual character of 
experience, and its aesthetic character, intertwine. The individual, both as concrete 
individual and as subjective consciousness, is always already socially mediated. Through 
geistig experience, it “corrects” its own starting point as individual (H 303-4/63-4). It is 
experience itself which is contradictory; experience in contemporary, totalized society 
has been emaciated, but Adorno simultaneously wants to hold onto its contradictory — 
and therefore revolutionary — nature. 
It is this dichotomy of an analysis of the seemingly total destruction of experience 
brought about through capitalist modernity, and the claim that the contradictions of 
society can never be reconciled by experience, that bothers many of Adorno’s critics. But,
as Bernstein (2001, 40ff.) shows, such an antagonistic dichotomy is essential to Adorno’s
work. Individual, subjective experience must be both “a refuge of ethical life apart from 
beyond it.” Bernstein goes on to provide a framework for connecting Adorno’s theory of 
experience to his mode of philosophizing, which I would argue is an essential starting point for 
understanding the sociological content and import of Adorno’s work. 
[T]he combination of first-person experience and objective reflection is meant to provide an 
analogue of the dual perspectives in the Phenomenology: natural consciousness and 
philosophical consciousness. However, instead of the philosophical perspective emerging 
behind the back of natural consciousness, as in Hegel, in [Minima Moralia] each aphorism, 
as well as groups, or, as he calls them, “constellations” of aphorisms, is meant to invoke both 
the internal perspective of the subject and the reflected or external view of the observer. 
Aphorisms, thus, are meant to inherit the procedure of employing negativity — the 
immanent cancellation of merely subjective experience — and through so doing to track 
subject becoming substance, i.e., showing the social constitution of individual experience, 
with the twist that now social substantiality is as much the cancellation of the subject as its 
support (2001, 43n4).
In his account of constellations in Adorno’s sociology, on the other hand, Benzer interprets the 
procedure as a means of grasping the complexity of the social world (2011b, 162ff.). His account 
portrays Adorno as being trapped in a Weberian dilemma of continually attempting to obtain a 
level of conceptual (if not scientific) rigor that he knows can never be achieved. Although Benzer 
usefully highlights the significance of the textual dimension in Adorno’s sociology, his limited 
understanding of Adorno’s conception of experience constrains his analysis of his constellation. I 
develop this critique elsewhere.
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the demands of the economy,” and be fundamentally deformed by the rationalization of 
society.
4.2 The experience of objectivity
A geistig experience is fundamentally related to the experience of social objectivity, and 
it is this fact that distinguishes Adorno from idealist conceptions of experience, both 
Kantian and Hegelian. The sheer negativity of experience stems from the negativity of 
the social totality, from the pain that it causes. The class relationship is the primary 
conditioning factor of experience. Because of this, a geistig experience relies upon, and 
begins in, the experience of the social. “[O]ur most immediate experience is that we are 
all harnessed to an objective trend.” This is a fundamental experience for us, but then we 
are asked to prove the existence of a universal (VGF 28/17). The negotiation of this 
experience, in terms of the response of a “natural consciousness” to it, determines the 
future of critical theory. The individual must begin with her own experience, and find the
contradictions, and the universal, within it (Tichy 1977, 107f.). 
This is clearly not a “rational scientific” procedure. Adorno is not using concepts in 
an empirical way, nor is he using a form of Hegelian “internal” criteria. He even claims 
that empiricism’s “trivial” conception of experience as being based in sensible reality has 
“no validity in geistig experience,” because geistig experience is always already mediated
through Geist (VND 131/89). While this shows his hostility to forms of empiricism, it 
does little to clarify his own practice, which is based upon a form of memory. “The 
measure of such objectivity is not the verification of assertions through repeated testing 
but rather individual human experience, maintained through hope and disillusionment. 
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Such experience throws its observations into relief through confirmation or refutation in 
the process of recollection” (EaF 8).
There is a tension within Adorno’s work between the direct, or immediate, 
experience of society, and the discovery and articulation of society within forms of 
thought. We can trace the problem back to his account of the relationship between 
sensible intuition and intellectual concepts. While he relies upon the claim that 
everything has always already been mediated by Geist, he remains committed to a 
Kantian separation between concept and intuition. This gives rise to his complex 
articulation of the activity and passivity of the subject. According to his commitment to 
the priority of the object, Adorno imagines a subject which “pursue[s] the inadequacy of 
thought and object” in order to “experience [this inadequacy] in the object” (ND /153). In
this sense, society can be just another object which the subject must experience in 
antagonistic fashion – an object which is socially constituted (historically sedimented) 
but yet is never fully conceptual. 
The Hegelian themes of substantiality and foundationlessness come together in 
Adorno’s claim that, for example, “[t]he a priori and society interpenetrate” (SO 
750/252). How do we make sense of such a claim? The a priori is the universal and 
necessary, that which is prior to experience, which is seen as subjective—individual and 
contingent. The claim that this realm is mediated with society is similar to Adorno’s 
claim, adopted from Sohn-Rethel, that society is in fact the transcendental subject. If 
every object is a part of the social totality, then this holds for the cognitive objects of our 
consciousness, as well as physical objects, including ourselves as physical subjects.
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5. Conclusion: Adorno between Kant and Hegel
Any account of Adorno’s thought has to come to terms with what he sometimes referred 
to as its “speculative” nature—that is, its necessarily fragmented, aphoristic, exaggerated 
character. Given this, any attempt to iron out its contradictions is largely a fool’s errand. 
This holds no less for an understanding of his relationship to German idealism. Adorno 
reads Kant and Hegel selectively and partially; he makes claims of deception, ideology, 
lack of nerve, etc., in the aim of establishing and justifying his own perspective. His 
readings of Kant and Hegel cannot be reconciled. Hegel is valued for his dialectical and 
critical perspective, for the systematic nature of his thought which mirrors the structure 
of contemporary exchange society. Kant is derided for his subjectivity and relied on for 
his transcendental skepticism or realism. Yet such an analysis is instructive, as it helps us
hone in on some of the epistemological complexities of social theory. To this end, 
identifying complexities and contradictions can be useful. To conclude the present 
chapter, I will discuss the key issues and questions which arise from Adorno’s 
“determinate negation” of German idealism.
My claim in this chapter has been that Adorno’s philosophy, in terms of his 
conception of the nature and requirements of critical social thought, as well as his 
understanding of geistig experience, is situated somewhere in between the “subjective” 
idealism of Kant and the “objective” idealism of Hegel. Adamant in avoiding the aporiae 
and ideologies of systematic philosophy, Adorno claims that his “logic of disintegration” 
— one of his terms for the negative dialectic — will avoid the problematic syntheses of 
either the transcendental subject, or the of the positive dialectic of Hegelian spirit. In this
sense, the grand systematic philosophies of German idealism serve, typically, as a 
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negative model for Adorno’s own work. However, according to the primary themes of 
German idealist philosophy that I have identified above – namely the themes of a self-
determining subjectivity and its relationship to a form of objectivity – Adorno’s work 
clearly relates to this philosophical tradition.
In an article that situates Adorno precisely between Kant and Hegel, Bernstein 
(2006) unifies the perspectives of Kant and Hegel into what he terms the “semantic 
thesis of idealism:” the identification of the unity of the subject and the unity of the 
concept. He discusses Adorno’s contradictory intentions in Negative Dialectics — to (1) 
break through constitutive subjectivity using the power of the subject, and (2) to strive 
by way of the concept to transcend the concept — as the critique of both Kantian and 
Hegelian philosophies. In these terms, Adorno was concerned to move beyond both a 
constitutive subjectivity (Kant) and a constitutive conceptuality (Hegel). Kant had used 
the power of synthesis, in the subject, to ground his version of objectivity, while Hegel 
has used the conception of synthesis in the dialectical movement of the concept. What 
Bernstein refers to as the “ambiguity” of Adorno’s interpretations of Kant and Hegel 
stems from the fact that he sees within them both a form of identity thinking, in terms of 
the claim of the semantic thesis of idealism, and some aspect of the nonidentical, in the 
object of thought in Kant, and in dialectical experience in Hegel (Bernstein 2006, 103).
Adorno moves forward from Hegel’s dialectic, or perhaps we should say that he 
moves back. He wants to liberate the particular and the (human) individual, which he 
believes were ultimately dominated by the universal in Hegel’s thought. His 
appropriation of the Hegelian dialectic and concept of experience are situated within a 
Marxian materialist theory of society. The result is a mode of thought which wants to 
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simultaneously lift the Kantian ban on thinking the absolute, and respect it as a socially-
necessary ideology. It is the relationship between the particular/individual and the 
universal which is difficult to grasp here, vis-à-vis the conception of the relationship 
within Hegel’s philosophy. For Hegel, the movement towards the absolute is the 
movement of the reconciliation of subject and object, particular and universal, a move 
which Adorno diagnoses as having undermined the original spirit of the dialectic. 
However, for Adorno, the notion of the absolute is necessary only ideologically.
Yet there is something unsettling about Adorno’s use of the antagonistic whole, i.e., 
society, within his philosophical work.  Although he claimed to “remain true to the 
Phenomenology of Spirit in [his] view that the movement of the concept, of the matter at
hand, is simultaneously the explicitly thinking movement of the reflecting subject” 
(Adorno, letter to Scholem, quoted in Bozzetti 2002, 296), his reliance on the Kantian 
“block” belies such Hegelianism. Adorno’s rejection of the constitutive subject of 
transcendental idealism leads to his employment of absolute idealism and consequently 
to an engagement with the concept of the absolute. It is only the notion of the absolute 
which allows Adorno to proceed from an immediate engagement with the “given” as a 
conceptual reality, and to examine forms of logic and rationality, as well as forms of art 
culture such as music, literature, and knowledge, as “containing” social forms. 
This recognition stems from the analysis of a nonidentity which critically bounds our
rationality. There is always an “additional factor” to rationality, which is rooted in forms 
of full experience, rather than merely in abstract thought itself (VGF, Lecture 24). 
Against Hegel’s identifications, Adorno wants to preserve the nonidentity of identity and
nonidentity, in terms of its location within the world and within consciousness, thought, 
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and language. He essentially goes against Hegel when he claims that the paradox of 
nonidentity entails that we may not capture its complexities in one simple sentence (EDi 
121). This entails the move beyond rational science, and consequently grounds Adorno’s 
critique of any theorist who attempts such a pure form (e.g., Durkheim, Husserl, 
Popper). It is the attempt by spirit to write its own history that separates Hegelian 
Wissenschaft from the reason of the Enlightenment (H 304/64). Kant remained in the 
orbit of the positive sciences, while Hegel tried to give expression to that which cannot be
captured by science. We can now see that the Hegelian concern with content is with the 
content of experience, not with some primordial or objective realm of being.
In Hegelian philosophy, the relationship between social and political philosophy and
epistemology is closely related. No longer are we in the situation with Hegel, as we were 
with Kant, in which the “empirical” (real) is strictly bracketed from our knowledge. The 
real, empirical world is open for philosophizing, and Hegel takes advantage of this. This 
is in fact one of the reasons for the interest in Hegel within the “social sciences,” and for 
Adorno’s long fascination with his work. The stakes of what I have been describing as 
Adorno’s engagement with German idealism relate centrally to his conception of critical 
philosophical and social theory. My claim is that it is only through this story that we can 
further understand Adorno’s relationship between the classical theorists of society: Marx
and Durkheim. In the next chapters, I will investigate the relationship here, focusing on 
the ways in which Adorno’s interpretation of German idealism structured his 
understanding of these classical sociologists, and how both of these encounters (i.e. the 
philosophical and the sociological) determined Adorno’s ideas about the nature of 
critical reasoning within, and about, society.
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Considering that Hegel’s speculative system of philosophy is a critique not only of an
instrumental scientific reason, but of metaphysical, empirical, and critical philosophical 
thought in toto, how are we to assess Adorno’s critique and appropriation of Hegelian 
thought? Given the apparent completeness of Hegel’s treatment of the options for 
thought, on what grounds may he be legitimately critiqued? Furthermore, what are the 
available options for such an “appropriation” of Hegelian speculative and/or critical 
philosophy for the discipline of a scientific sociological thinking? These are some of the 
problems that Adorno would ultimately not find his way around.76
76 It is along these lines that Rose (1981) critiques not only Adorno but all of sociological thought 
for the inability to sufficiently account for Hegel’s critique of Kant. In her analysis, the turn from 
speculative philosophy to sociology must be constituted by a denial of precisely the speculative 
character of Hegel’s thought. To pose a form of social or historical materialism, in which the 
categories of thought are “grounded” in real social material being, is to return from the Doctrine 
of the Concept back to that of Essence (Longuenesse 2007). In this sense it is a denial of the 
properly speculative potential of Hegel’s thought.
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Chapter 4 Knowledge, objectivity and sociality: Hegel, Marx, 
Adorno
[S]ociety is manifested [erscheinen] in phenomena the 
way, for Hegel, essence is. Society is fundamentally 
concept, just as spirit is. (H 267/20).
1. Introduction
Adorno had a career-long interest in and engagement with the thought of Marx, which 
centrally structured his critical accounts of knowledge and society. While the thought of 
Hegel is central to the work of both Marx and Adorno, teasing out the details of these 
inheritances is a complicated task.  Adorno’s critique of Hegel itself contains many 
typically Marxian moments, although Adorno’s version of a “critical materialism” is 
ultimately quite different from that of Marx. Perhaps the most prominent difference 
between the thought of Marx and Adorno lies in Adorno’s explicit attention to 
subjectivity, knowledge, and culture, and his tendency to leave social structural 
theorizing largely to others.77 In his own analysis, Adorno referred to the critical, 
material method of Marx as of crucial significance for his own approach to critical 
philosophy, and frequently related his version of critical theory explicitly back to Marx’s 
critique of political economy (see, e.g., EP 307/25). A thinker of his time, Adorno sought 
to promote a critical, antidogmatic version of Marxist thought to counter the dogma of 
the Orthodox Marxism of Eastern Europe.78 However, the value and significance of the 
Marxist character of his work has been continually questioned. Generally placed within 
an “Hegelian-Marxist” intellectual genre, Adorno’s work exhibits a complex relationship 
77
 Here I’m referring to the ways in which Adorno situated his own work within the broader work 
of the Frankfurt School. See, e.g. Jarvis 1998; Müller-Doohm 2005; Wiggershaus 1994; Abromeit 
2011; Jay 1974.
78
 Here Adorno’s starting point involves the mediation of Lukács (1971), who pioneered the 
conception of Marxism as a “method”.
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to the thought of both. In this chapter, I explore the ways in which Marx’s turn away 
from philosophy towards a critical social “science” provided a model for Adorno’s own 
critical engagement with both philosophy and sociology. Of particular importance in this 
regard is the relationship between the logics of philosophy and science, and the 
empirical and theoretical investigation of the social world. 
Marx famously came to reject his early philosophical explorations, in favor of a 
critique of political economy which he felt could have a significant political effect on the 
world.79 His work has subsequently been seen as a paradigm of sociological thought. 
However, the nature of Marx’s “method,” in Capital and elsewhere, has continued to be a
source of intellectual investigation and debate. Although Marx famously never wrote a 
work devoted to his dialectical method, the nature of his approach stemmed from his 
understanding of Hegel. The intellectual connection to Hegel has of course been a 
significant part of this discussion. Here I’d like to frame the issue in broader terms 
relating to the translation of philosophy into a sociological mode of thought. As William 
Maker has pointed out, “Marx’s critique is at the center of an Auseinandersetzung 
between what are closely related but nevertheless sharply contrasting views on the 
nature and limits of philosophy itself and on the proper relation between philosophical 
theory and reality and the relation between the philosophy and his age” (1989, 72). We 
could make a similar statement regarding Adorno; although he did not reject philosophy 
in the manner of Marx, Adorno clearly believed that philosophy had become sterile as a 
result of its original detachment from, and subsequent colonization by, science.
79
 Among the voluminous literature on Marx, there are two recent works which stand out for their 
primary focus on this theme. Brudney (1998) discusses Marx’s work in relation to the Young 
Hegelians from a philosophical perspective, while Mah (1987) puts it in a more historical context.
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As I have emphasized above, Adorno sought to make philosophy “substantive” in 
some Hegelian sense; and he criticizes sharply Kant’s “allergy to the empirical” (KK 
248/164). Hegel had the insight to link the forms of consciousness to the concrete events
of history in the Phenomenology; however, the rising significance of a “positivist” form 
of science has left philosophy with a correspondingly impoverished role. The recourse 
here, according to Adorno, is a recuperation of the dialectical conception of subject and 
object, of constituens and constitutum. The dualisms of Kantianism must be transcended
in an authentic way (i.e., not in the fashion of “fundamental ontology”). We must 
transcend the rupture precisely by moving through it, by showing that “the rupture is 
mediated through itself” (KK 250/165). According to Adorno, this is the way that one 
passes philosophically to social categories (ND 198/198). “What has to be done is to hold 
fast to this ineluctable duality, a duality that cannot be ignored and that recurs in 
concrete form at every stage of history, but at the same time, within this state of 
differentiation, to define the element of unity as its other” (KK 250/165). In Adorno’s 
conception we are thus led from philosophy to the concrete society, though the 
recognition of the necessary dialectical relationship between thought and being. We 
cannot ever ground being within thought, as a first philosophy attempts to do.
Adorno conceived of his philosophical project as an explicit critique of the 
pretensions of Hegelian philosophy. He understood his critical procedure, at least in 
part, through the concept of immanent critique, in the sense that his dialectical 
perspective admitted no “standpoint” for the critique which is external to the sphere 
within which it is performed. In this characterization of a critical method, he drew 
crucially on Hegelian categories of negation, contradiction, and dialectic (O’Connor 
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2011); however, the precise nature of his Hegelian heritage is still in question. In the 
current chapter, as a means of pursuing the relationship between Adorno and Marx, I 
examine the substance of their critiques of Hegel’s social and political philosophy. This 
will entail a discussion of the the nature of Adorno’s understanding of Marx, which 
structures his appropriation of Hegel’s critical philosophy. My problematic in this 
chapter relates this theme more explicitly to social theory. This discussion will then set 
up my discussion in the following chapter on Adorno’s relationship to Durkheim; this 
latter discussion will hinge on the understanding of society as some sort of fundamental 
ground, a “sociologism of Durkheim or a “sociology of knowledge” in the manner of 
Mannheim. Here I explore the nature of a Adornian-Marxian alternative, as influenced 
by a critical procedure. 
In many ways Adorno should be considered to be a “dialectical materialist,” as long 
as one clarifies the nature of this designation precisely. Adorno certainly believed that 
Marx had pioneered the most valuable form of critical theory, and his own perspective 
continually reiterated the necessity of empirical sociological investigation. My ultimate 
question here is then how does this notion of critique inform an understanding of a 
critical theory of society? At issue here will be both the relationship of “method” and 
“matter,” in Hegel, Marx, and Adorno, as well as — due to the immanent and dialectical 
character of the critique — the conception of society that develops in the thought of each.
The conceptualization of society brings in the theme of the relationship between the 
individual and the social. This reaction to and critique of Hegel’s philosophy framed the 
understanding of the social reality developed by both Marx and Adorno. I will argue that 
both took on a view of “society” and of a critical knowledge practice that were shaped by 
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their engagements with Hegel. The concept of the “absolute” is largely at the center of 
each of their complaints. The term is frequently conceived of as a kind of ideal entity 
which swallows up the empirical, concrete world. The remedy to this is then to attempt 
to sever the dialectical method from the “system” of Hegelian absolute philosophy.80
The chapter proceeds as follows. I expand on my discussion of Hegel in Chapter 
Two, by exploring in more detail aspects of the philosophical program of the 
Realphilosophie, as Hegel understands it. I then explore the critique of Hegel begun by 
Marx early in his career, followed by a discussion of Adorno’s specific critique of Hegel’s 
philosophy of history and of right. The concluding discussion will then analyze the 
options for theorizing society developed by Marx and Adorno through their respective 
critiques.
2. Hegel’s Realphilosophie, the Doppelsatz, and the immanence of thought
Although I have discussed the speculative character of Hegel’s philosophy in Chapter 
Two, here I would like to focus specifically on relevant aspects of the Realphilosophie, or 
Hegel’s social and political philosophy, as articulated primarily in the Philosophy of 
Right and the Encyclopedia. However, there are some further terminological and 
conceptual issues which must be clarified before we can truly make sense of Hegel here; 
a necessary precursor to comprehending the influence of his thought. To put it simply, 
the systematic nature of Hegel’s philosophy refers to the fact that its parts comprise a 
80
 As I have argued, Hegel’s idealism is an absolute one, in the sense that he comprehends the 
speculative identity of thought and being. This implies that Hegel’s Logic, for instance, is not just 
a logic, in the traditional sense, but is also an ontology (Hyppolite 1997). It applies to both the 
categories of thinking and the categories of being. This then has further implications for the rest 
of Hegel’s “system.” The system is comprised of the logic, the philosophy of nature, and the 
philosophy of spirit (Logic – Nature – Spirit). A central question of this chapter then concerns the
relationship between the logic and the spheres of nature and spirit.
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unity. This is most easily evident in the Encyclopedia, which consists of a logic, a 
philosophy of nature, and a philosophy of spirit. One of the key questions for interpreters
has been the relationship among these parts, which is related to the key Hegelian 
relationship between the “conceptual” and the “real.” While I have gone some way 
towards an interpretation of this relationship above, here I would like to draw out some 
of the complexities for understanding Hegel’s practical or political philosophy. 
The key to understanding Hegel here is to recognize that he is not advocating the 
application of logical categories to social reality or “the real world” in general (Kolb 
1986, 84f.). For Hegel, this distinction simply doesn’t make sense. For example, for 
Hegel, if an object or a concept has a high level of “reality,” this means that it is further 
along its path toward “actuality” than one that is less “real.” Here, we do not have a more 
traditional opposition between “real” and “ideal,” often interpreted as “material” and 
“immaterial,” but rather a distinction according to the realization of the objects 
“conceptuality.” While many have interpreted this to mean that, in Hegel’s philosophy, 
the (ideal) categories of logic create the realms of nature and spirit, a more accurate 
interpretation is that the ultimate duality of these spheres cannot be recognized by 
Hegel. Here I follow Kolb, who argues that “it is not necessary to resolve this problem in 
full; we need only emphasize that the transition from the logic to the more real sciences 
is not a move outside the categories of logic. Hegel is not developing a set of categories 
that is then applied to some foreign entities or embodied in some concrete material” 
(1986, 85). 
To grasp the world speculatively, we must move beyond the dualisms of reflective 
thought, and see the systems of mutual mediations that constitute the whole. 
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Thought and its relation to reality must be thought in terms of the motion of the absolute 
form: universality (the logic), particularity (the logical categories spread out in otherness 
in nature), individuality (the logical categories as forming self-aware individuals, spirit). 
Each of these moments exists through the others; no one moment is ‘first’ . . . This 
relentless extension of encompassing unity is meant to forestall questions of the kind we 
usually ask about causes and mechanisms . . . For Hegel, our yearning for explanatory 
mechanisms reflects a failure to understand how the logical categories are more 
fundamental than any explanation we could give of their transition to nature and spirit. 
Whatever account one gave beyond the logical sequence would be structured in terms 
taken from prior stages within that sequence and would not get behind or outside it to 
talk about its application or embodiment (Kolb 1986, 86-7).
This notion of “absolute form,” discussed in the Science of Logic, represents the 
“completion” of the Hegelian system of philosophy; that is, it marks a completion only in 
terms of reaching the standpoint of the totality, of the “gathering together” of the 
syllogisms (Gabriel 2011, 89). In short, the absolute form marks the move to absolute 
knowing. 
For our purposes here, we can focus on the Philosophy of Spirit, leaving aside the 
Philosophy of Nature and its interpretive difficulties. Again, this move from logic to 
spirit (via nature) is not a move beyond the logic, but rather marks most significantly an 
advancement in concreteness (EG §377). The key conceptual differentiation within this 
sphere is between “subjective spirit,” “objective spirit,” and “absolute spirit.” Hegel 
describes them this way:
The development of spirit is, that it [is]:
(1) in the form of a relationship to itself, within it, is the ideal totality of the idea; that is, 
it has before it all that its concept contains; its being is to be self-contained and free — 
subjective spirit.
(2) in the form of reality, as of the world, which produces, and is produced by it; that in 
which freedom is existing necessity — objective spirit.
(3) as an in and for itself and eternally produced unity of the objectivity of spirit with its 
ideality or concept; spirit in its absolute truth — absolute spirit (EG §385; translation 
modified).
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The category of spirit then contains its own path of development, which links subjective 
and objective spirit into the unity of absolute spirit. If we understand subjective spirit as 
internally related, and objective spirit as externally related, and also of these moments as
following a progressive increase in concreteness and complexity, we can begin to 
understand the place of social and political “reality” within Hegel’s thought. As Hegel 
explains in the addition to this paragraph, spirit itself “emerges” from nature, as an 
undifferentiated determination, as a universal. It then becomes “for itself” by 
“particularizing, determining itself.” “As long as mind stands related to itself as to an 
other, it is only subjective mind, originating in nature” (EG §385). Importantly, the 
movement to objective spirit marks the progression not just from the “ideal” to the 
“real,” but also from freedom as a principle to existing freedom.81 The sphere of objective 
spirit is that of “supra-individual trans-subjective spirit,” it is the concrete 
particularization of subjective spirit (Riedel 1984, 3). Individual self-consciousness exists
now only in relationship to supra-individual structures.
Hegel began to think about the ways in which the social world should be 
comprehended philosophically early in his career. In his essay on Natural Law, he 
criticized both the empiricist and formal modes of understanding the political world 
([1802] 1975). This early critique would be complemented by his later work on the 
Philosophy of Right, which itself is an expansion of the section on “objective spirit” in his
Encyclopedia.82 
81
 There are difficult problems related to Hegel’s own philosophical development, and the various 
ways in which he characterized this practical sphere over the course of his career. The term 
“objective spirit” was not used until the Encyclopedia of 1817. Previously, he had focused on the 
“system of ethical life” and “practical philosophy.” On the nature and significance of the 
conceptual development, see Riedel (1984, Chapter 1).
82
 Hinchman (1984, 185) emphasizes the continuity between Hegel’s earlier work and his 
conception of objective spirit, in the form of the theme of the overcoming of the dualisms of 
modernity.
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In these works, as well as others, Hegel developed his critique into an account of 
Sittlichkeit, or “ethical life.” As with so many Hegelian concepts, the interpretation of 
ethical life has been contentious. Roughly, it alludes to the overcoming of the subjective 
and objective positions within social and political life: 
Both principles which we have so far considered, the abstract good and the 
conscience, lack their opposite: the abstract good evaporates into a complete 
powerlessness which I can endow with any content whatsoever, and subjectivity 
of spirit becomes no less impoverished in that it lacks any objective 
significance . . . The unity of the subjective with the objective good which as being
in and for itself is ethical life . . . [E]thical life is not just the subjective form and 
self-determination of the will: it also has its own concept, namely freedom, as its 
content (PR §141A). 
With the Aufhebung of morality into the sphere of ethical life, Hegel attempts to resolve 
the Kantian dichotomy of freedom and necessity; however, his speculative move here has
typically been misread. While Hegel sought an account of ethical life which stressed the 
sustained significance of subjective freedom, many continue to interpret Hegel’s social 
philosophy as containing an implicit conservatism or even totalitarianism.83  
2.1  The  p  roject of the   Philosophy of Right 
The Philosophy of Right is not exactly a philosophy of the state; its subject matter is 
rather “right” [Recht]. According to Hegel, the work comprises a speculative “science” of 
this concept, and thus distinguishes itself from earlier political philosophies. The 
phenomenon of “right” is the result of the struggle for recognition, through which, 
famously, the individual consciousness, the “I,” becomes the “we” of spirit (PG §177ff.). 
There are two significant dimensions of this transition from self-consciousness to spirit: 
one relates self-consciousness to its historical-material world; the other relates it to 
83
 For good discussions of the criticisms, as well as the responses, see Franco (1999) and Patten 
(1999).
168
another self-consciousness. The dialectic of lordship and bondage results in an 
accomplishment of “mutual recognition,” which is the beginning of the path to 
universality, to true freedom. “The result of the struggle for recognition brought about by
the concept of spirit is universal self-consciousness . . . The mutually related self-
conscious subjects, by setting aside their unequal particular individuality, have risen to 
the consciousness of their real universality, of the freedom belonging to all, and hence to 
the intuition of their specific identity with each other . . . It is only when the slave 
becomes free that the master, too, becomes completely free” (EG §436Z). Here, in the 
ethical political sphere, we have the creation of a speculative relationship, in which 
subject and object are united; this becomes the “substance” of ethical life. 
The concept of freedom is thus at the center of Hegel’s political philosophy, and a 
crucial aspect of his understanding of right, Recht. Hegel discusses the latter term as 
“any existence in general which is the existence of the free will. Right is therefore in 
general freedom, as idea” (PR §29). Franco (1999, 173) notes that the German term 
Recht has a much wider meaning than the English “right;” Rather than referring a 
subjective claim, the German term refers in general to the objective conditions or 
structures with which the subjective must operate and exist. Hegel’s discussion of right 
in terms of freedom then refers to the necessity of such objective conditions for the 
achievement of real freedom. Additionally, Peperzak notes that this term “involves not 
only positive law, studied in the various divisions of jurisprudence . . . , but also the right 
which precedes and supercedes all positive law, for example the ‘right’ of history, which 
lets nations rise and fall. Hegel’s philosophy of right provides an analysis of the whole 
world of human rights and laws insofar as these constitute an objective realization of 
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freedom” (1987, 1). Hegel thus seeks to replace the notion of natural law with the 
“philosophical doctrine of right” or the “doctrine of the objective spirit” (Peperzak 1987, 
3), and argues that the doctrine of natural law is problematic in that it uses a restricted 
conception of nature, as isolated to the “natural world,” rather than including the 
“essence” of human beings as well (see also EG §502).
The key for Hegel is that the social and political order (objective spirit) is not 
“unnatural” or artificial, but rather is the very realm in which freedom can be actualized.
The expression “natural law,” which has hitherto been common in the philosophical 
doctrine of right, is ambiguous as to whether the law is, as it were, already implanted 
directly by nature, or whether it exists because of the nature of things, i.e., because of the 
concept. The former used to be the customary meaning, so that  . . . a “condition of 
nature” was poetically created, in which the law of nature should dominate; whereas the 
condition of society and the state required a limitation of freedom and a sacrifice of 
natural rights. In fact however, right and all its determinations are based on free 
personality alone, a self-determination which is the opposite of the determination of 
nature. A natural condition is therefore a condition of violence and injustice, of which 
nothing truer may be said than that one ought to leave it. Society, by contrast, is the only 
condition in which right has actuality. What is to be limited and sacrificed are precisely 
the arbitrariness and violence of the state of nature (EG §415).
 The focus on “right” [Recht] marks the Philosophy of Right as a text which is primarily 
concerned with freedom and ethics; this is the substance of the state. Hegel’s approach 
seeks to look toward empirical social reality, and to discover within it the principles 
which we may use to comprehend it. Although he would be roundly criticized for his 
idealist, anti-empirical method, Hegel’s political philosophy and his Realphilosophie in 
general are necessarily tied to the empirical world. However, as Hinchman (1984, 188-9) 
argues, if, in our judgment of the social world, we eschew the transcendental in favor of 
existing “second nature,” how do we avoid slipping into conservatism or relativism? This 
is one of the most important questions regarding the interpretation and potential 
appropriate of Hegelian social and political philosophy.
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How, then, should we categorize the project of the Philosophy of Right? Rather than 
a purely descriptive account of the modern state, or merely a normative one, Hegel 
approaches the concept of right and the modern state philosophically; that is, he seeks to
comprehend the state through the concept. As I’ve emphasized, for Hegel the approach 
of philosophy is distinctive. To be practicing philosophy when we study a particular topic
X, we must seek to grasp the concept of X “in its living development and actualization,” 
to see it as a “type of the absolute Idea” (EG §377A). For Hegel, although philosophy 
cannot anticipate developments in the world, it is not a mere recapitulation. It is rather 
the “conceptual root” of history, its “supreme blossom;” it is “the consciousness and the 
spiritual essence of the whole situation, the spirit of the age as the spirit present and 
aware of itself in thought” (ILHP 25). The most famous of Hegel’s claims on this point is 
that philosophy is “its own time comprehended in thoughts,” and that “To comprehend 
what is is the task of philosophy, for what is is reason” (PR 26/21).
Again, we should take care to remember that Hegel’s philosophy of the state is not 
an independent work; it comprises a part of his philosophical system, as part of the 
doctrine of objective spirit. While often appropriated to other purposes, Hegel’s concept 
of objective spirit is thus an essential part of his system, and therefore must be 
understood as such. Divorced from the system, it “loses at least part of its truth” 
(Peperzak 1995, 52). One should also note that the Philosophy of Right was originally 
intended as a mere supplement to the discussion of objective spirit in the Encyclopedia, 
and that the state does not represent the highest achievement of spirit in either work.84 
84
 Peperzak (1995, 52) argues that the transition from objective spirit to absolute spirit was 
“obscured by Hegel” in the Philosophy of Right. He attributes this to Hegel’s desire to lessen the 
conflicts inherent in the level of the state, due to his intention of demonstrating the usefulness of 
philosophy for national politics.
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Rather, the concept of objective spirit is meant to function as a transition between 
subjective spirit and absolute spirit. As a middle term, objective spirit is, like “essence” in
the Science of Logic,  intended to be merely a way station on the path of dialectical 
development. The more general point is that in Hegel’s system, the categories of 
subjectivity and objectivity must eventually be transcended, sublated into an absolute. In
the Encyclopedia, the realm of spirit develops out of the philosophy of nature, and 
represents an advance over the natural, in terms of complexity, because of the nature of 
spirit itself as “absolutely restless being, pure activity” (EG §378A). 
As the “truth” of nature, spirit is characterized by its structure, which is that of the 
“I” (EG §381A). In its most basic form, the “I” is simultaneously something individual 
and something universal. Spirit does not develop out of nature; rather, nature is spirit in 
its “self-externality,” is the “absolute prius.”
[A] different relationship obtains with the mind or spirit than makes world history. In 
this case, there no longer stands, on the one side, an activity external to the object, and on
the other side, a merely passive object: but the spiritual activity is directed to an object 
which is active in itself, an object which has spontaneously worked itself up into the result
to be brought about by that activity, so that in the activity and in the object, one and the 
same content is present (EG §381A).
In the Encyclopedia, spirit’s progress is from subjective to objective to absolute. 
Subjective spirit is spirit in its self-relation, as “self-contained and free”; objective spirit 
is “the form of reality,” in a “world produced and to be produced by it.” Despite its own 
inward freedom, subjective spirit eventually finds itself “in relation to an external and 
already subsisting objectivity” (EG §483). Absolute spirit is the unity of subjective and 
objective spirit, spirit in its “absolute truth.” Restricting himself to the social and political
sphere, in the Philosophy of Right Hegel traces the progression of objective spirit 
through its moments. 
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To put it most simply, the most significant issue for the appropriation of Hegel’s 
social and political philosophy becomes how to interpret its relationship to the rest of 
Hegel’s systematic philosophy. Hegel’s own thoughts on this relationship are 
encapsulated most concisely, if not most lucidly, by his well-known claim that “what is 
rational is actual; and what is actual is rational” (PR 24/20). In the next section I 
discussion the significance of this claim for understanding Hegel’s philosophy.
2.2 Reading the Doppelsatz
In the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel famously characterizes the relationship 
between the “rational” and the “actual.” Hegel’s dictum, that “what is rational is actual; 
and what is actual is rational,” is important in the context of the larger discussion of the 
Preface. It is a shorthand way of describing Hegel’s perspective of absolute idealism, as it
applies to the ethical world, the world of spirit. According to Franco (1999, 123), the 
sentence “contains Hegel’s most succinct, not to say provocative, statement of his views 
on the crucial issue of the relationship between philosophy and historical-political 
actuality, or between theory and practice.” An examination of this “Doppelsatz” will 
allow us to further clarify Hegel’s terminology, concepts, and approach.85 We have seen 
that the relation between reason and reality is a key theme for our discussion; there are a
number of clues we can glean from the Preface regarding Hegel’s conception of this 
relationship.
The claim of the Doppelsatz comes in the context of the main theme of the preface: 
the necessity of Hegel’s speculative philosophical perspective for understanding the 
“ethical world,” and most particularly the state. Hegel starkly differentiates his 
85
 My reading of the Doppelsatz, and Hegel’s philosophy in general, has been influenced by: 
Hardimon (1994), Franco (1999), Rose (1981), and Longuenesse (2007).
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philosophical perspective or method from the more popular philosophy of the time, 
which is represented by Fries and derided by Hegel as “superficial.” Hegel specifies that 
his book is primarily concerned with (philosophical) science, and his comments in the 
Preface can be seen as an elucidation of his idea that “in science, the content is 
essentially inseparable from the form” (13/10). Differentiating his work from that which 
merely attempts to postulate new opinions about the state (in which the form of the 
claim is considered to be external to its content), Hegel states that speculative or 
“scientific” philosophy has to help the content, which is already rational, attain a 
rational form by starting out from itself (14/11). There is no simple way to explain the 
development of the concept as the distinctive form of knowledge of the Hegelian system. 
The perspective of the concept is what distinguishes speculative philosophy from 
“superficial” forms as mere opinion.
In order to attain the level of the concept, we have to look at the reason inherent in 
our subject matter, in this case the state. We have to “consider the rationality of right, 
and this is the business of our science” (17/14). We cannot just treat the state from the 
perspective of our subjective feelings, as Hegel believes Fries does, nor can we just look 
at it “simply” empirically. Instead, we have to consider that it has a “refined structure,” a 
“complex inner articulation,” a rationality inherent to it (18/15). The philosophy of right 
as a science then seeks to comprehend the state as a rational entity (Neuhouser 2011). 
This crucially involves beginning from an empirical investigation of social reality. 
Although the “science of society” is normative, it is not simply the postulation of an 
“ought.” “[S]ince philosophy is exploration of the rational, it is for that very reason the 
comprehension of the present and the actual, not the setting up of a world beyond which 
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exists God knows where” (PR 24/20). This claim, which precedes the Doppelsatz, 
expresses Hegel’s criteria that thought cannot look beyond current “reality,” because it 
has actuality only in the present.
For what matters is to recognize in the semblance of the temporal and transient the 
substance which is immanent and the eternal which is present. For since the rational, 
which is synonymous with the Idea, becomes actual by entering into external existence, it 
emerges in an infinite wealth of forms, appearances, and shapes and surrounds its core 
with a brightly coloured covering in which consciousness at first resides, but which only 
the concept can penetrate in order to find the inner pulse, and detect its continued beat 
even within the external shapes (25/20-1).
The key here is not that the “rational” Idea is an ideal structuring force, existing prior to 
“external existence;” but rather that there is a “substance” to be sought as the totality of 
subject-object relations. 
The Doppelsatz is thus a speculative proposition. Read in one direction, it claims 
that what is rational is (or “becomes”) actual. In the passage above, Hegel claims that the
rational is synonymous with the Idea, a statement that should make us quickly aware 
that we are not seeking a common sense interpretation of “rational” here. The Idea is the 
final stage of the “Doctrine of the Concept” in the Science of Logic, it is the stage in which
thought returns to itself after diremption into essence, aware of itself and its 
concreteness. The Idea is the “pure form of the Concept’ (EL §237); and so we could 
translate the claim that “what is rational is actual” as “what is conceptual is actual.” Of 
course, we likewise cannot interpret Hegel’s term “actual” in a common sense way. Hegel
is not claiming that what is rational or conceptual simply exists in reality. Actuality 
(Wirklichkeit)  for Hegel refers instead to what is conceptually necessary. In the Logic, 
actuality is the third and final stage in the “Doctrine of Essence,” and represents the 
unity of essence and appearance. The overall movement of the “Doctrine of Essence” is 
one of relation, where the immediate being of things has been surpassed. Rather than 
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simple being, we have semblance or appearance (Schein) reflecting an essence. Things 
here do not simply exist, they appear. Hegel’s section on Essence moves from essence as 
ground, to appearance, and then to actuality, which represents the unity of the first two 
moments. 
Hegel is clear to differentiate his notion of a speculative form of comprehension 
from the viewpoint of the “abstract understanding.” In this speculative mode, “thought is
assumed to be synonymous with subjective representation, planning, intention, and so 
on; and . . . actuality is assumed to be synonymous with external, sensible existence” (EL 
§142A). Hegel then clarifies his usage of “actuality:” “As distinct from mere appearance, 
actuality, being initially the unity of inward and outward, is so far from confronting 
reason as something other than it, that it is, on the contrary, what is rational through and
through; and what is not rational must, for that very reason, be considered not to be 
actual.” It is no mere modality as it was for Kant, a product of an inward reflection; 
rather, it has as its moments possibility and contingency, which “have their inward 
reflection in the actual” (EL §145). In other words, actuality, as speculative unity, 
understands reason as internal to it; it is reason actualized.
Lest we try to understand the actual as a subordinate category for Hegel, note his 
claim in the Encyclopedia that “the content of philosophy is actuality” (EL §6).86 Hegel 
makes this statement in the course of introducing his philosophical method. He goes on:
The first consciousness of this content is called experience. Within the broad 
realm of outer and inner thereness, a judicious consideration of the world already
distinguishes that which is only appearance, transient and insignificant, from 
that which truly and in itself merits the name of actuality. Since philosophy is 
distinguished only in form from other ways of becoming conscious of this same 
identical import, its accord with actuality and experience is necessary. Indeed, 
this accord can be viewed as an outward touchstone, at least, for the truth of 
86
 Also see Hegel’s comments on the actual in the Preface to the Phenomenology.
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philosophy; just as it has to be seen as the supreme and ultimate purpose of 
science to bring about the reconciliation of the reason that is conscious of itself 
with the reason that is, or actuality, through the cognition of this accord (EL §6).
Here Hegel claims that the truth of philosophy is measured by its accord with actuality. 
We can interpret this to mean that philosophical thought reflects on itself and its 
context; that is, it reflects explicitly on this accord between itself and actuality. In this 
reflection, it approaches its goal, which is the reconciliation of self-conscious reason with
actuality. Actuality, as the Aufhebung of essence and appearance, is itself now overcome 
into the concept. As experience comes to know its actuality, it becomes reason.
In the addition to this paragraph, Hegel refers explicitly to his dictum about 
actuality and rationality from the Philosophy of Right. He notes that these “simple 
propositions” have not been received well, and have been attacked. At stake here is the 
content of philosophy, i.e. actuality. As we’ve seen, the concept is what differentiates 
Hegl’s speculative science from other modes of philosophy. Regarding the traditional 
philosophical concept of “existence,” Hegel clarifies that it must be problematized.
[W]hat there is is partly appearance and only partly actuality. In common life 
people may happen to call every brainwave, error, evil, and suchlike “actual,” as 
well as every existence, however wilted and transient it may be. But even for our 
ordinary feeling, a contingent existence does not deserve to be called something-
actual in the emphatic sense of the word; what contingently exists has no greater 
value than that which something-possible has; it is a existence which (although it 
is) can just as well not be . . . The notion that ideas and ideals are nothing but 
chimeras, and that philosophy is a system of pure phantasms, sets itself at once 
against the actuality of what is rational; but, conversely, the notion that ideas 
and ideals are something far too excellent to have actuality, or equally something 
too impotent to achieve actuality, is opposed to it as well. However, the severing 
of actuality from the Idea is particularly dear to the understanding, which regards
its dreams (i.e., its abstractions) as something genuine, and is puffed up about 
the “ought” that it likes to prescribe . . . If the world were the way it ought to be, 
what then would become of the pedantic wisdom of the understanding’s “ought to
be?” When the understanding turns against trivial, external and perishable 
objects, institutions, situations, etc., with its “ought”. . . it may very well be in the 
right; and in such cases it may find much that does not correspond to correct 
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universal determinations. Who is not smart enough to be able to see around him 
quite a lot that is not, in fact, how it ought to be? But this smartness is wrong 
when it has the illusion that, in its dealings with objects of this kind and with 
their “ought,” it is operating withing the concerns of philosophical science. This 
science deals only with the Idea — which is not so impotent that it merely ought 
to be, and is not actual — and further with an actuality of which those objects, 
institutions, and situations are only the superficial outer rind (EL §6A).
The relation between thought and reality is precisely what is at stake in this passage. The 
understanding is free to think whatever it wants, free to abstract its concepts from the 
actuality of the world, but in doing so it ends up with impotent criticism of contingent 
truths. We are reminded here of the bewildering “variety of opinions” from the Preface to
the Philosophy of Right. Just as in that work Hegel counterposes mere “opinion” to the 
truth of the concept, here he opposes mere existence to actuality, and then mere actuality
to the concept. The most important consideration here is that the Idea, as the pure 
Concept, includes actuality within itself; it cannot be divorced from actuality. From the 
recognition of this perspective, speculation or “philosophical science” has a stronger 
claim to criticism than the understanding does. Precisely because of the fact that it has 
recognized the distinction between existence and actuality, it has rooted its “ought” in 
the determinateness of its objects.
It may then appear as if the Doppelsatz is merely a tautology, an empty claim.87 
However, such a criticism ignores precisely the speculative form of the proposition. As 
Franco notes, “the connection that Hegel is trying to make between actuality and 
rationality is more than merely analytic or definitional” (1999, 132). Part of what it 
means for something to be rational or conceptual for Hegel is that it be actualized; and 
part of the meaning of actuality is that it is necessarily conceptual. But these do not then 
denote the same states or processes. The speculative nature of the statement is crucial 
87 See, e.g., Franco (1999, 132), Hardimon (1994, 55-6), and Avineri (1968, 127).
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for its interpretation, and has lead to many confusions. As crucial concepts of the Logic, 
then, the speculative identity of rationality and actuality represents a specific claim about
logical development of Hegel’s philosophy. By saying that rationality and actuality imply 
or become each other, Hegel is linking two important categories of the Logic’s doctrines 
of Essence and of the Concept. I will return to this topic in my discussion of Marx’s and 
Adorno’s interpretations of Hegel. The Doppelsatz thus indicates the status of the 
Philosophy of Right as speculative science. The state represents the speculative unity of 
the spheres of the family and civil society, in which the will finally achieves a form of 
“social freedom” (Neuhouser 2008). The philosophical intention of the work is to 
provide a “scientific proof of the concept of the state” (PR §256A). In other words, Hegel 
seeks to demonstrate the dialectically necessary progression of spirit (as the will) from its
immediate abstract form to the state of Sittlichkeit. In this way, the form of the state is 
seen to be rational.
2.3 The logic of the state
Hegel’s Logic cannot be easily divorced from his philosophical understanding of society 
(Kolb 1986, 40; see Rose 1981). If we briefly examine the “Doctrine of Essence” from the 
Science of Logic, and then contrast it with the dialectical move to Concept, we will 
ultimately be better able to understand the Hegelian heritage of both Marx and Adorno. 
At the stage of essence within the Logic, “each member is thought of as constituted by 
interaction with others, but there is not yet any thought of the system as a whole 
distinguished from its members, and the whole remains indeterminate” (Kolb 1986, 58). 
As the second attempt at understanding the absolute within the Logic, essence is the 
negation of being, the beginning of a transition from being to concept. The middle stage 
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of essence represents the level of a merely reflective form of philosophical reason, which 
understands the social system in terms of its dichotomies and oppositions.88
In Hegel’s analysis, the categories of the “Doctrine of Essence” are insufficient for 
grasping the modern world. Only the logic of the concept will do. Not only does the logic 
of essence not provide a satisfying account of philosophy, but is also does not “give a way 
of thinking the relation of formally universal institutions and independent particular 
members” (Kolb 1986, 59). The insufficiency of essence is corrected by the perspective of 
the concept, where Hegel introduces “categories pertaining to questions of idealism and 
to a kind of ontological monism” (Kolb 1986, 60). The logic of the concept is the 
speculative comprehension of thought itself. In it, we can understand both its freedom 
and self-determination. To revisit Hegel’s concept of the concept briefly, as we first 
encounter it in the Encyclopedia, we learn that it is “the substantial might which is for 
itself . . . [it] is what is free; and since each of its moments is the whole that it is, and is 
posited as inseparable unity with it, the Concept is totality; thus, in its identity with itself
it is what is in and for itself determinate” (EL §160).89 It is only once we reach this stage 
that we have reached the position of absolute idealism (EL §160A). This is where we shift
from a reflective understanding of concept as a form of thought, to a Hegelian 
88
 The Logic as a whole can be described as a logic of reflection, so central is the concept to 
Hegel’s overall project (Longuenesse 2007, 30f.). The key distinctions are between 1) a simple or 
“isolated” reflection; 2) a merely philosophical, or external reflection; and 3) a speculative, 
absolute, reflection, which we can also characterize as immanent. Both philosophical and 
speculative reflection attempt to connect reason to the absolute; however, philosophical reflection
does this in only a formal way: “Philosophical reflection originates in opposites, and the formal 
insight into the necessity of a unity of opposite terms. It posits this unity in opposition to the 
initial dualistic structures, as their ‘beyond.’ When philosophical reflection expounds the true 
nature of this identity, it sets it forth as the binding power of irreducible opposites. Consequently, 
it can conceive of the original synthesis as a union only in the form of an antinomy of absolutely 
dualistic terms” (Gasché 1986, 36). Philosophical reflection raises itself up to a “purely formal or 
antinomic synthesis” (37). This is a unity, but only an abstract totality.
89
 For my general purposes here, I refer simply to Hegel’s “logic,” without differentiating between 
the quite different works.
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conception of it as an “infinite and creative form.” “[T]he concept is a true concrete; for 
the reason that it involves being and essence, and the total wealth of these two spheres 
with them, merged in the unity of thought” (EL §160A). But this is also an approximation
of the absolute (yet to be further refined), and, like the absolute, the concept is a 
(speculative) unity of subjective and objective, and of form and content. The concept is 
not a form which is applied to content, as in the view of it from the understanding; 
rather, the concept contains its own content.90
If the realm of the conceptual is where we find a Hegelian version of objectivity, 
then, in terms of the “Doctrine of the Concept,” this is comprised of the moments of 
universality, particularity, and individuality. The relationship among these moments is 
crucial to comprehending the concept. If they do not remain intimately interrelated — if, 
for instance, the universal is detached from the particular via abstraction — then we 
“stray away from the way of the concept, abandoning the truth,” which of course is the 
whole. The universal in this scenario “is only a surface that becomes progressively more 
void of content” (WL 2:296-7/546). Here we have empirical concepts which we may 
employ, but not ones with “philosophical necessity,” which are “necessary structures for 
thought, and . . . can serve as criteria for correcting some ordinary conceptions, for 
example, conceptions of the state” (Kolb 1986, 63).
90
 In an interesting passage, Hegel discusses why, given the stark differences between the concept 
of the concept according to the understanding and speculative reason, he has chosen to retain the 
term Begriff. He claims that, on a deeper analysis, the similarities between the two versions can 
be seen. “We speak of a deduction of a content from the concept, e.g. of the specific provisions of 
the law of property from the notion of property; and so again we speak of tracing back these 
material details to the concept. We thus recognize that the concept [viewed from the perspective 
of the understanding] is no mere form without content of its own: for if it were, there would be in 
the one case nothing to deduce from such a form, and in the other case to trace a given body of 
fact back to the empty form of the concept would only rob the fact of its specific character, without
making it understood” (EL §160A).
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As we have seen above, the concept has the structure of the “I.” “True, I have 
concepts, that is, determinate concepts; but the “I” is the pure concept itself, the concept 
that has come into determinate existence” (WL 2:253/514). A feature of this structure is 
its universality, “a unity that is unity with itself only by virtue of its negative relating” 
(WL 2:253/514). As such a unity, the “I” is simultaneously a singular individuality, and 
the speculative unity of opposites that gives the concept (and the “I”) its character. 
“[T]he conceptual comprehension of a subject matter consists in nothing else than in the
‘I’ making it its own, in pervading it and bringing it into its own form, that is, into a 
universality which is immediately determinateness, or into a determinateness which is 
immediately universality” (WL 2:255/516). The universal thus is a key category for 
Hegel, and he is careful to emphasize the distinctions between his own concept of the 
universal and that of other (reflective) philosophers. The key lies in the fact that, for 
these others, the concept of universal is typically understood in terms of abstract 
generality, as something that is derived through abstraction from particulars. Hegel 
wishes to emphasize specifically that “the universal of the concept” is determinate, it is 
“not just something common against which the particular stands on its own; instead the 
universal is what particularizes (specifies) itself, remaining at home with itself in its 
other, in unclouded clarity . . . It is of the greatest importance, both for cognition and for 
our practical behaviour, too, that we should not confuse what is merely communal with 
what is truly universal” (EL §163A1). The “true” universal is concrete rather than 
abstract; it is a concrete unity containing the moments of universality, particularity and 
individuality. Abstract universality, on the other hand, is abstract because “the mediation
is only a condition, or is not posited in it. Because it is not posited, the unity of the 
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abstraction has the form of immediacy, and the content has the form of indifference to 
its universality” (WL 2:284/537).
In such passages, we can see that the category of mediation is intimately linked to 
that of the true or concrete universal. There must be a change in the character of 
mediation in order to move from an abstract universality to a concrete one. In the 
context of the Philosophy of Right, there are actually three kinds of universality, as Kolb 
points out (1984, 71). One corresponds to traditional society, in which the moments of 
the universal are immediately a whole; one (formal universality) corresponds to civil 
society, in which the moments of the universal are posited as separate, divided from one 
another; and the final corresponds to the state, which as the absolute form is the 
speculative unity of the first two. At the second stage, of the formal universality of civil 
society, the mediation of the moments has not yet been posited; this is what must occur 
to reach the next stage (Kolb 1986, 71). In this state of concrete universality, each of the 
three moments become more determinate and richer. The mediations between the 
moments of the “absolute form” are spelled out through the discussion of the syllogism 
in the Science of Logic (see Kolb 1986, 72ff.; Henrich 2004; Wolff 2004). This is where 
Hegel spells out the significance of going beyond a binary logic of propositions. What 
results is the articulated, determinate whole, the concrete totality.
To say that the modern state must be comprehended according to the structure of 
the concept then implies that it is rational in this sense. In terms of the relationship 
between the concept as a category of the Logic and the analysis of ethical life in the 
Philosophy of Right, we would correctly say that the question is malformed, since it 
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presupposes an understanding of “category” according to analytic or reflective 
philosophy. Hegel’s concept may not be applied since it is always already present. 
[I]n general the Concept should not be considered as something that has come to be at all.
Certainly the Concept is not just Being or what is immediate; because, of course, it 
involves mediation too. But mediation is in the Concept itself; and the concept is what is 
mediated by and with itself. It is a mistake to assume that, first of all, there are objects 
which form the content of our representations, and then our subjective activity comes in 
afterwards to form concepts of them . . . Instead, the Concept is what truly comes first, 
and things are what they are through the activity of the Concept that dwells in them and 
reveals itself in them (EL §163A2). 
More generally, Hegel clarifies that the Logic itself is not supposed to “contain” reality:
These concrete sciences [of reality] do attain to a more real form of the idea than logic 
does, but not because they have turned back to the reality which consciousness 
abandoned as it rose above the appearance of it to science, or because they have again 
resorted to the use of such forms as are the categories and the determinations of 
reflection, the finitude and untruth of which were demonstrated in the logic. The logic 
rather exhibits the rise of the idea up to the level from which it becomes the creator of 
nature and passes over into the form of a concrete immediacy whose concept, however, 
again shatters this shape also in order to realize itself as concrete spirit. These sciences, 
just as they had the logic as their prototype, hold on to its logical principle or the concept 
as in them their formative factor (WL 2:265/522-3).
The philosophies of spirit (subjective and objective) and of nature then do not bring in to
philosophy some external content; rather, they are generated out of philosophy’s own 
content. While this can be difficult to grasp, the idea is at the heart of Hegel’s conception 
of philosophical science. Hegel makes the transition from the Logic to the 
Realphilosophie via an internal move.91
In his social and political analysis, Hegel is working with the present structure as he 
encounters it, which includes the acts of cognition (Kolb 1986, 58). Nevertheless, as Kolb
(1986, 58) expresses it, the concepts employed in the logic are “categories for 
modernity.” they give “a way of thinking about mutual relations and particular content in
91
 See also (EL §43A): “This advance [i.e., to the philosophy of nature], however, should not be 
interpreted as meaning that the logical idea comes to receive an alien content that stems from 
outside it; on the contrary, it is the proper activity of the logical idea to determine itself further 
and further and to unfold itself into nature and spirit.”
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terms of the whole system.” In this third part of the logic, the concept is seen as the 
“truth” of essence, and we can see things as truly mutually constituted for the first time. 
Here is where the part/whole or particular/universal dynamic is worked out for Hegel; it 
is where “comprehensive unity becomes the central theme” (1986, 59). In other words, 
the unity or totality of the concept is crucial to understanding the state in its terms. This 
allows us to see ethical life not only as a complex unity of dialectically interacting parts, 
but also as a whole which necessarily encompasses subjective and objective elements 
(Wolff 2004). It is only here, at the level of the concept, that we begin to understand 
“foundationlessness.” It is only here that we begin to see the “perspective” of the 
absolute. There are no principles, no foundation to his system, “only the motion of the 
concept and the idea” (Kolb 1986, 88). His system is in this sense presuppositionless. 
This is one of the great appeals for Adorno; but this feature is directly related to his 
employment of the absolute. The only way that there are no “one-way dependencies” is 
due to the structure of the concept and the idea, which is that of “absolute form.”
Thus, the argument of the work is that freedom can only be realized within an 
“objective” system, a self-determining whole that has the structure of the concept 
(Neuhouser 2008, 220). The status of the conceptual logic of ethical life clearly comes 
down to the development of freedom within modern economic and political structures. 
One of the tasks of Hegel’s philosophical project as a whole — a properly philosophical 
task in his terms — is that of reconciling human beings with their modern, objective 
social contexts. The Philosophy of Right forms a part of this overall goal, by attempting 
the comprehension of modern social life as rational. “The project proposes to reconcile 
philosophically reflective individuals by providing them with a philosophical account 
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showing that they — and modern people generally — can be at home in the modern 
world (Hardimon 1994, 136). As Hegel put it,
What lies between reason as self-conscious spirit and reason as present actuality, what 
separates the former from the latter and prevents it from finding satisfaction in it, is the 
fetter of some abstraction or other which has not been liberated into [the form of] the 
concept. To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to delight 
in the present — this rational insight is the reconciliation with actuality which philosophy
grants to those who have received the inner call to comprehend, to preserve their 
subjective freedom in the realm of the substantial, and at the same time to stand with 
their subjective freedom not in a particular and contingent situation, but in what has 
being in and for itself (PR §26-7/22).
Hegel’s diagnosis here is that individuals are suffering from alienation due to a lack of 
understanding of both themselves and their social world (Hardimon 1994, 137). The 
“idealist” or “merely interpretive” nature of this analysis, of course, was hotly contested, 
an issue I’ll revisit after discussing the critiques of Marx and Adorno.
For Hegel, “objective thought” is that of absolute idealism, the perspective of the 
absolute. This is not formal, because it encompasses both form and content (it 
comprises absolute form) (WL 1:44/29). Many have had a difficult time parsing and then
stomaching language like the following:
This objective thinking is thus the content of pure science. Consequently, far from being 
formal, far from lacking the matter required for an actual and true cognition, it is its 
content which alone has absolute truth, or, if one still wanted to make use of the word 
“matter,” which alone is the veritable matter – a matter for which the form is nothing 
external, because this matter is rather pure thought and hence the absolute form itself. 
Accordingly, logic is to be understood as the system of pure reason, as the realm of pure 
thought. This realm is truth unveiled, truth as it is in and for itself. It can therefore be 
said that this content is the exposition of God as he is in his eternal essence before the 
creation of nature and of a finite spirit (WL 1:44/29).
But we do not have to come to an ultimate conclusion here. My goal is to explicate the 
nature of the Hegelian philosophical enterprise, in order to see how it fits “against” 
other, later forms of thought. The use of a dialectical relationship between subject and 
object has been prominent but contested. Sociological thinking that seeks to address 
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knowledge in some fashion, must come to terms with the subject-object relationship as 
well as that between individual and society. Both of these have a “model” in Hegel, which
cannot be taken up easily. I will return to the topic of the character of Hegel’s speculative
philosophy of “reality” below. Now the task at hand is to explore the ways in which the 
critical appropriation of Hegel’s philosophy has structured sociological thinking. I turn 
now to a discussion of the critiques of Marx and Adorno of Hegel’s social philosophy.
3. Marx’s critique of philosophy through the critique of Hegel
Marx’s work is filled with explicit and implicit references to Hegel’s philosophy. He 
claimed famously in the preface to Capital that he had stood Hegel on his head, referring
again to the trope of inversion which was so prevalent in his earlier works. The currency 
of Hegel’s thought at the time of Marx’s philosophical education was overwhelming, a 
fact which was not to last for long.92 After an early attachment to Hegel’s philosophy,93 
Marx began his first substantial critique of Hegel’s philosophical perspective with his 
analysis of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right in 1843, and continued engaging with his work 
throughout his life.94 As would be the case with Adorno, Marx’s own self-understanding 
is dependent upon his understanding of Hegel (Fine 2011). A full analysis of the critique 
of Hegel as it is exhibited in Marx’s early and late works is beyond the scope of this 
paper; what I would like to do here is to examine Marx’s understanding of the deficits of 
the philosophical method and outlook, as demonstrated by Hegel’s Realphilosophie, 
which itself was part of the system considered by many to be the philosophical pinnacle 
of its time. Marx’s understanding of his own “scientific” method was developed through 
92
 Riedel (1984) notes that this is one of the impediments to a full understanding of Marx.
93
 See Mah (1987), Chapter 7.
94
 The most comprehensive coverage of Marx’s relationship to Hegel is Levine (2012).
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these early readings and critiques of Hegel. This is often understood as the beginning of 
Marx’s shift from a philosophical orientation to a “scientific” approach; however, I would
like to problematize that reading, for there is more at stake than just a rejection of 
philosophy and a concomitant commitment to an empirical method. My goal in the 
following is to examine how the speculative idealist perspective of Hegel determines the 
understanding of the “critical materialism” and the “empirical” in the development of 
Marx’s thought.95 This will then set up a discussion of similar themes in Adorno, as they 
are related to both Hegel and Marx.
3.1 The critique of Hegel’s  Philosophy of Right  
So the world that is opposed by a philosophy that is 
complete in itself is one that is rent asunder.
Marx, Dissertation (McLellan 15) 
In the unpublished notes that comprise the “Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State,” 
Marx criticizes Hegel repeatedly for his approach to the study of social reality. The 
critique takes the form of a series of very detailed reading notes on sections §261 to §313 
of the Philosophy of Right. These sections comprise most of Section 3, on “The State,” of 
the third part of that work, “Ethical Life.” The notes cover nearly all of part A of this 
section, on “Constitutional Law,” and indeed all of its first subsection on the “Internal 
95 “The difficulty of characterizing Marx’s conception of science is compounded by the complex 
and more general question of Marx’s relationship to Hegelian philosophy” (Amato 2001, 97). The 
point holds good for the discussion here as well. I do not attempt any kind of comprehensive 
study here. What I shall try to do is to emphasize the ways in which Hegel’s philosophical account
of society influenced Marx, both through its “methodology” and through its conception of society. 
The issue is the selective rejection of Hegelian philosophy. Amato goes on to note that “it has 
never been clear exactly how Marx reconciles the Hegelian-dialectical legacy with his own, 
increasingly empirically oriented social scientific ideas,” and to suggest that there are few non-
analytical attempts to examine this relationship between a Marxian and an Hegelian conception 
of Wissenschaft.
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Constitution.” The three parts of this discussion, which Marx uses as divisions for his 
manuscript, are (a) The Power of  the Sovereign; (b) The Executive Power; (c) The 
Legislative Power. In this part of his work, Hegel analyzes the internal structure of the 
modern state, in the course of demonstrating how it is part of spirit’s development 
toward ethical life. In the long and detailed reading notes, Marx responds critically to 
individual paragraphs of Hegel’s book. Leopold (2007) points out that there are two 
main foci to examine in this work, the critique of speculative philosophy and the critique 
of the theory of the state. I will focus primarily on the former here, although I do not 
believe that these are as separable as Leopold believes; or, rather, while we can separate 
them analytically, one of my goals here is to examine what may be learned by looking at 
these together.96
In his discussion of Hegel’s conception of sovereignty — which is constituted in the 
monarch as the necessary individual moment of the state — Marx comments,
If Hegel had begun by positing real subjects as the basis of the state he would not have 
found it necessary to subjectivize the state in a mystical way. “The truth of subjectivity,” 
Hegel claims, “is attained only in a subject, and the truth of personality only in a person.” 
This too is a mystification. Subjectivity is a characteristic of the subject, personality is a 
characteristic of the person. Instead of viewing them as the predicates of their subjects 
Hegel makes the predicates into autonomous beings and then causes them to become 
transformed into their subjects by means of a mystical process (KHS 224/80).97
Marx refers here to §279, in which Hegel states that sovereignty “can exist only as 
subjectivity which is certain of itself.” According to the concept, the state must have such
an individual moment, or aspect, and since “subjectivity attains its truth only as a 
96 This is of course based upon the more general attempt to separate Hegel's critical “method” 
from his conservative “system,” which was explicitly problematized by Lukàcs and inherited by 
Adorno (see Rose 1981).
97
 Elsewhere Marx puts this point plainly in terms of subject and object: “This leads [Hegel] to 
convert the subjective into the objective and the objective into the subjective with the inevitable 
result that an empirical person is uncritically enthroned as the real truth of the Idea”(KHS 240-
1/98).
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subject, and personality only as a person,” Hegel concludes that this moment of 
individuality must take the form of an individual person, the monarch. Marx complains 
that Hegel’s understanding of the sovereignty of the modern state, encompassed in the 
individual as monarch, is mystified because it has accorded the primary role to 
“subjectivity,” which is in fact a predicate of the subject. Hegel of course is working with 
his previously developed logical categories, viewing the constitution of the state in terms 
of them; but Marx claims that with this method, Hegel has turned the abstract categories
of “subjectivity” and “personality” into “autonomous beings,” which then are 
mysteriously “transformed” into real-life subjects in the form of the monarch.
Paragraph 279 of the Philosophy of Right is interesting in part because in the 
corresponding Remark Hegel justifies his conception of the monarchy explicitly in terms 
of his method of philosophical science. The concept of the monarch is a speculative one, 
he claims, and therefore cannot be grasped by the “reflective approach of the 
understanding.” This is so because the monarchy itself embodies the Idea, and as such it 
unifies the moments of individuality, particularity, and universality, just as the Idea does
in Hegel’s logic. As the Philosophy of Right describes the development of the will from 
abstract right to ethical life, Hegel notes here that the “truth” of personality, and of 
subjectivity generally, can only be a person, a subject which has “being for itself.” 
“Personality expresses the concept as such, whereas the person also embodies the 
actuality of the concept, and only when it is determined in this way is the concept Idea or
truth.” The previous stages (shapes) of the will, the person, the family, society, only 
possess personality abstractly, whereas the state is precisely that form “in which the 
moments of the concept attain actuality in accordance with their distinctive truth.” 
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However, as we’ve seen, the point of the Philosophy of Right, according to Hegel, is 
“nothing other than an attempt to comprehend and portray the state as an inherently 
rational entity” (PR 26/21). The point of philosophical science for Hegel is the 
“comprehension of the present and the actual,” which proceeds by recognizing “in the 
semblance of the temporal and transient the substance which is immanent and the 
eternal which is present” (PR 25/20). Hegel claims that the concept of freedom, which is 
at the center of the work, is best realized by the institution of the monarchy. Hegel 
believes that the sheer empirical individuality of the monarch is essential to the 
realization, or actualization, of the subjective moment of the Idea (EG §542R). In the 
rational state as an organic totality, the monarch, as a single individual, unifies the 
masses.98 Sovereignty, then, for Hegel is the principle of the “rational constitution,” 
which is rational insofar as it is differentiated into powers which each are themselves the 
totality (PR §272). Its determinations are “not self-sufficient and fixed, either on their 
own account or in the particular will of individuals, but are ultimately rooted in the unity
of the state as their simple self” (PR §278).99   
This “essential” subjectivity is exactly what Marx finds so mystical. He reads this as 
stemming from Hegel’s inattention to the basis of the state, which is made up by the 
people, and the self-imposed necessity of having his procedure begin with this fact (KHS 
224ff./80ff.). Marx understands the realization of the subjectivity of the state as merely 
a grammatical error on the part of Hegel, albeit one with tremendous consequences. The
“mystical process” is the transformation of the predicate (“subjectivity” or “personality”) 
into the actual subject (“subject” or “person”). By “transformation” here Marx intends a 
98
 Brooks goes over the details here (2007, 100f.)
99
 Hegel justifies these claims through reference to “animal organism” in the Philosophy of 
Nature (§278R).
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process through which the predicates become independent of their subjects 
(verselbständigen). Marx understands Hegel’s theory of the monarchy as deriving from 
the logic of the idea, which it does; however, he finds fault only with the step from the 
concept of “subjectivity” to the (actually existing) empirical subject, not it seems with the
postulation of subjectivity in the first place. The point for Marx is that a quality such as 
“subjectivity” may not be abstracted from its “real basis,” an empirical individual.100 
Hegel’s reasoning appears exactly backwards to Marx because he sees it as somehow 
resulting in the justification of the individual empirical subject of the monarch. That is, 
he understands Hegel to be employing a form of metaphysical idealism in which the 
material world is seen as an instantiation of “ideal” substances such as concepts.101
Marx goes on to clarify what he believes are the implications of this method of 
understanding:
Hegel makes the predicates, the objects, autonomous, but he does this by separating them
from their real [wirklich] autonomy, their subject. The real [wirklich] subject then 
subsequently appears as a result, whereas the correct approach would be to start with the 
real subject and then consider its objectification. The mystical substance therefore 
becomes the real subject, while the actual [reall] subject appears as something else, as a 
moment of the mystical substance. Because Hegel starts not with a real Ens (ύποχείμενον,
subject) but with predicates of universal determination, and because a vehicle of the 
determinations must exist, the mystical Idea becomes that vehicle. Hegel’s dualism 
manifests itself precisely in his failure to regard the universal as the real essence of the 
finite real, i.e. of what exists and is determined, or to regard the real [wirklich] Ens things
as the true subject of the infinite (KHS 224-5/80).
The separation that Hegel enacts between the predicate-as-autonomous-subject and 
what Marx considers the “real subject” leads him, in Marx’s opinion, into an 
unsustainable dualism. Marx claims that the mystery comes from its uncertain (in 
100
 We will see that Adorno employs a very similar criticism.
101
 This understanding surfaces again in the Grundrisse (G 101): “Hegel fell into the illusion of 
conceiving the real as the product of the thought concentrating itself, probing its own depths and 
unfolding itself out of itself, by itself, whereas the method of ascending from the abstract to the 
concrete is only the way in which thought appropriates the concrete, reproduces it as the 
spiritually concrete. But this is by no means the process by which the concrete comes into being.”
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Hegel’s analysis) origin. Hegel has begun his analysis of the state with the category of 
subjectivity, rather than with the real, empirical subject of the monarch, and then 
reasons backwards to the concrete “vehicle” of that abstraction. The proposed dualism 
here stems from the hidden origins of Hegel’s starting point. Marx declares the proper 
basis to be in being, the existent (ύποχείμενον). In referring back to the Greek origins of 
the concept here, Marx draws on the ambiguity of the term, which may refer to a 
substratum either in an ontological sense or a logical one.102 Aristotle’s concept of 
ύποχείμενον is that of “substance” or “substratum,” both of which underlie and persist 
without change, and can be predicated, but cannot be a predicate itself (Peters 1967, 92). 
This ambiguity is profitable for Marx. The “real subject,” for which he claims priority, is 
to be basic both ontologically, and logically-methodologically. What then is the 
“objectification” of this real subject to which Marx refers? He wants to begin 
methodologically with the empirical individual, and then consider how that subject is 
objectified. This implies that Marx is making some kind of analogy between the process 
of predication and that of objectification.
The conclusion of this passage helps to clarify Marx’s understanding of 
“objectification.” “Thus sovereignty, the essence of the state, is first objectified and 
conceived as something independent. Then, of course, this object must again become a 
subject. This subject, however, becomes manifest as the self-embodiment of sovereignty, 
whereas sovereignty is nothing but the objectified spirit of the subject of the state” (KHS 
225/80). Marx here reduces Hegel’s organic conception of the state, comprised of the 
moments of individuality, particularity and universality, into a dichotomy of subject and 
object. He reads “objective” here as “something independent” and he reads “subject” as 
102
 Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 10, pp. 373f.
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something like non-objectified existence. Although he mixes and matches his terms here,
what Marx refers to as “Hegel’s dualism” is considered to be a result of his (Hegel’s) 
mistaken interpretation of the relationship between subject and object, between the 
universal and the particular, or between the infinite and the finite.
The essence of Marx’s critique of the Hegelian speculative philosophical method is 
then that Hegel’s own philosophical commitments require a problematic dualism and a 
corresponding prioritization of the realm of the ideal or the conceptual. Leopold usefully 
highlights Marx’s critique of Hegel’s “transformation of the empirical into the speculative
and the speculative into the empirical” (KHS 241/98; Leopold 2007, 48ff.). The first of 
these transformations concerns what Marx sees as Hegel’s lack of acknowledgment of the
real, empirical basis of his philosophical abstractions; and the second refers to Marx’s 
concern about the “actualisation of [Hegel’s] categorical framework in the natural and 
social worlds . . . Marx rejects Hegel’s claim that the idea creates and governs the finite, 
insisting instead that speculative philosophy simply provides an imaginative 
redescription of the existing empirical world (as the embodiment of the absolute)” 
(Leopold 2007, 49). Marx argues that the deficiency in Hegel’s approach is characteristic 
of its speculative, philosophical form, which must be corrected with a more properly 
scientific one.
Two of the primary consequences of Hegel’s commitment to philosophy are its 
ideological implications as a justification for the empirically existing, and, relatedly, its 
lack of a “true” level of comprehension of the world. Hegel’s philosophical approach 
entails that “empirical reality is accepted as it is; it is even declared to be rational. 
However, it is not rational by virtue of its own reason, but because the empirical fact in 
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its empirical existence has a meaning other than itself. The fact which serves as a 
starting-point is not seen as such but as a mystical result. The real becomes a mere 
phenomenon, but the Idea has no content over and above this phenomenon” (KHS 207-
8/63). Marx declares that this articulates the “whole mystery” of not just Hegel’s 
Rechtsphilosophie, but of his philosophy in its entirety, and he suggests that Hegel’s 
dichotomous approach constitutes a problematic dualism because he cannot properly 
bridge the spheres of the speculative (philosophical) and the empirical. Instead, he is left 
with the “mystified” conversion of one into the other. For example, Marx complains that 
Hegel’s analysis of the constitution as an organism according to the structure of the 
concept, in §269, relies not upon a proper logical demonstration of the claim, but merely 
upon his own definition of the idea, and an irrational leap to the identification of the 
state as such a thing (KHS 212f./68f.). Hegel moves from speaking of the idea, to this 
particular constitution without any proper justification. “The statement that ‘these 
different members of the state are its various powers’ is an empirical proposition and 
cannot be passed off as a philosophical discovery; nor is it in any sense the result of a 
logical argument” (KHS 212/69). Clearly Marx is alluding here to a systematic failure on 
Hegel’s part to properly understand the requirements of logical, scientific reasoning. 
Marx suggests a new relationship between the “empirical facts” and the rational logic of 
investigation, a non-philosophical relationship. To truly comprehend the state, we must 
begin empirically, not a priori with the idea. Marx actually goes even further than this, 
claiming that, in his confusion, Hegel has “failed to construct a bridge leading from the 
general idea of the organism to the particular idea of the organism of the state or the 
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political constitution. Moreover, even if we wait until the end of time it will never be 
possible to construct such a bridge” (KHS 212-3/69).
Marx’s migration from philosophy to science, thus stems from this reading of Hegel, 
in which the German idealist philosopher is viewed as being inattentive to the 
abstractions involved in thought. It is striking that Marx critiques Hegel here on the 
grounds of a dualist foundation of his thought; while we could turn the claim on Marx 
himself, the aspect that I would like to emphasize here is this idea of a failure to connect 
the speculative and the empirical. With his tenuous grip on the concept of speculation, 
Marx argues correctly that, for Hegel, the Logic has priority; but he infers this to be an 
ontological priority. Marx’s “translation” of Hegelian philosophy into its “method,” 
requires a denial of its properly speculative aspect, which attempts to grasp the totality 
through the concept. The move to science, as the prioritization of the empirical, of the 
object over the subject, demands a reinstituting of the dichotomies that Hegel tried to 
overcome.
Marx’s other primary critique of Hegel in these unpublished writings has to do with 
the understanding of the concept of mediation; and it is here that the difficulties with the
materialist appropriation of Hegel become more evident. The root lies in the critique 
discussed above: Marx believes that Hegel has simply translated a conception of 
mediation from the logical sphere into his account of mediation in the formation of 
Sittlichkeit. According to his logical point of origin, Hegel’s analysis of the state relies 
upon the presupposition of the “organic unity” of its “powers” (PR §299R). Marx 
complains that this is a movement of “taking refuge” in something “imaginary,” because 
he has not logically demonstrated how this conceptual model applies to the situation of 
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the state’s powers (KHS 261/121). Accordingly, the substance of Marx’s critique here is 
that the estates cannot possibly serve the mediating function that Hegel attributes to 
them.
In his introduction of the estates, Hegel claims that their role is “to bring the 
universal interest [allgemeine Angelegenheit] into existence not only in itself but also 
for itself, i.e. to bring into existence the moment of subjective formal freedom, the public
consciousness as the empirical universality of the views and thoughts of the many” (PR 
§301). In less Hegelian language, this means that the estates (legislative bodies 
comprised of representatives from professional groups) are to represent the particular 
and private interests of individuals. This is due to their origin within the sphere of civil 
society. Accordingly, they add substance to the conception of the “universal interest” 
within the state: while the executive branch serves the universal interest by its “nature,” 
the estates serve as a type of bridge between the spheres of civil society and government. 
Hegel characteristically describes this philosophically, as the estates serving to help the 
state develop the universal interest from “in itself” to “for itself.” “The proper conceptual 
definition of the Estates should therefore be sought in the fact that, in them, the 
subjective moment of universal freedom — the personal insight and personal will of that 
sphere which has been described in this work as civil society — comes into existence in 
relation to the state” (§301A). The effect of this is that, through the estates, “the state 
enters into the subjective consciousness of the people” (§301A).
Marx takes issue with this very point. Examining this relationship between the “in 
itself” and “for itself” status of the universal interest, he notes that its (i.e., the universal 
interest’s) coming into the consciousness of the people represents no more than a 
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“symbolic achievement of reality. The ‘formal’ or ‘empirical’ existence of matters of 
universal [interest] is separate from their substantive existence. The truth of the matter 
is that the implicit ‘universal interest’ is not really universal, and the real, empirical 
universal interest is purely formal” (KHS 264/125; translation modified). Marx criticizes 
Hegel here for maintaining a purely formal conception of subjective freedom, in which 
the estates are just “the political illusion of civil society” (KHS 265/126). Marx views the 
estates as consisting of “mere form” because of Hegel’s claim that they are grounded in 
the particular interests of civil society, while the other moments of the state directly 
handle the universal interests of society, being born of that sphere. The estates are then 
“superfluous.” In Marx’s estimation, Hegel has derived the form of the universal interest,
but not the content. In the state, the general or the universal interest is only present as a 
formal entity, and cannot become more than this. Marx claims that Hegel characterizes 
the estates “as the reflection of civil society upon the state, a relationship that does not 
modify the essence of the state. A relationship of reflection is also the highest identity 
between essentially different things” (KHS 277/139).103
In his nascent theorization of class, heavily influenced by Feuerbach, Marx rejects 
the Hegelian conception of a tripartite mediation and speaks instead of the irreconcilable
contradiction between the “real private position” of the individual within civil society, 
and her existence as a “social being” within the universal sphere of the state (KHS 
285/147). This division represents a form of contradiction that cannot be overcome 
103
 One can see here the formulation of Marx’s argument in “On the Jewish Question,” written 
later the same year. In the later essay, Marx excoriates Bauer for his understanding of the 
relationship between the political being of the citizen, and his basis in the sphere of civil society. 
He is speaking of the split between the spheres of universality and particularity within the modern
state, although he does briefly relate this to the situation for the individual, who must “divide up 
his own essence.” In order to exist in the political sphere, the estates must abandon their origins 
in civil society (KHS 281/143).
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through Hegel’s ideological, idealist form of organic unity in the state. He then argues 
more specifically that Hegel fails to understand that the contradictions of the private 
sphere of civil society cannot be canceled or transformed in the incorporation of the 
estates into the legislature.  In essence, Marx explicitly rejects the dialectical motion 
identified by Hegel. For Marx, the reality of the distinction between the spheres of civil 
society and the state entails that the classes must achieve a different meaning in each. 
This is a trick on Hegel’s part, an “illusory identity” (KHS 286/149). We have the 
fundamental shift in perspective here. Marx claims that “There is here an apparent 
identity, the same subject, but it has essentially different determinations, i.e. in reality 
there is a double subject” (KHS 287/149). For Marx, the “real subject” is man, meaning 
“empirical” man. Man as subject can be given any arbitrary predicates, or meanings, but 
this does not make them adequate to their subject; they are just arbitrary abstractions. In
this way, Marx claims that Hegel is merely uncritically interpreting “an old view of the 
world in terms of a new one,” and that “the consequence must inevitably be a wretched 
hybrid in which the form falsifies the meaning and the meaning falsifies the form, and 
neither the form nor the meaning can ever become real form and real meaning” (KHS 
287/149). With this analysis, Marx claims that he has found the key both to modern 
constitutions and to the Hegelian philosophy.104
Marx understands Hegelian mediation to be a form of “middle” which resolves the 
contradiction between extremes, and he correspondingly undertakes to show that it 
instead remains riven with “real” forms of contradiction.
104
 Marx claims that in order to get past this illusion, we have to “take the meaning for what it 
is . . . authentic determination.” Subject and predicate have to be related in a necessary way; we 
must determine whether the predicate “represents its essence and true realization” (KHS 
287/149-50).
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We have already seen that the Estates in common with the executive form [bilden] the 
middle term [die Mitte] between . . .  empirical individuality and empirical universality. 
Since he defined [bestimmen] the will of civil society as empirical universality, Hegel had
to define the will of the monarch as empirical individuality; but he does not allow the 
antithesis to emerge in all its clarity [er spricht den Gegensatz nicht in seiner ganzen 
Schärfe aus]  . . . Thus this “middle term” [Vermittlung] stands in great need of “coming 
into existence”, as Hegel so rightly infers. Far from accomplishing a mediation, it is the 
embodiment of contradiction (KHS 287-90/150-2).
The estates have an “extreme” position, as an “empirical universality” — the “many.” This
is counterposed to the position of the monarch as “empirical individuality” — the “one.” 
Thus the stage is set for the movements of the Hegelian dialectic. Hegel claims that a 
moment of the estates must become a “moment of mediation,” and this will allow the 
estates to move from an “abstract position” to a “rational relation.” However, according 
to Marx, this does not capture the true antithesis of the situation, because the estates are 
already an abstraction from the real “empirical universality,” the “people.” The 
mediation is performed by the legislature, which contains the moments of the executive 
(monarch) and the Estates (the people). The legislature is the “middle term” in the 
syllogism, what Marx derisively calls potpourri. “The middle term is the wooden sword, 
the concealed antithesis between the particular and the universal” (KHS 288/151).
Marx’s point about the impossible status of mediation in Hegel is that the movement
from “abstract position” to “rational relation” occurs only through the submission to the 
concept. “It is a construction of concern [Konstruktion der Rücksicht]. The legislative 
power is developed primarily in consideration of a third thing” (KHS 288/151; 
translation modified). For Marx, this claim leads to the recognition of the Hegelian state 
as “no true state,” simply because “its determinations . . . have no theoretical standing in 
and for themselves”(KHS 289/151).105 According to Marx’s understanding, the antithesis 
on which Hegel’s theory is relying stems from its derivation from the moments of the 
105 Note that this is explicitly the perspective that Hegel argued against in §272.
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concept, and not from “concrete” reality. In reality the estates are not a “universality” but
another particularity, since they cannot embody the whole of civil society. The estates are
hence unable to move from their “abstract position” because they have been derived in 
abstraction; they are so divorced from empirical reality that their nature must remain 
purely formal and abstract, and their development will stem from their relationship to 
the Idea rather than from any “real” relationship they might be in vis-à-vis other 
powers.106 Even in Hegel’s own terms, Marx argues that the relationship between the 
crown and civil society, as they both exist within the legislature, are still in a relation of 
“irreconcilable conflict,” rather than one of mediation (KHS 290/152). The legislature is 
supposed to mediate, but it needs mediation itself (KHS 297/160).
Marx’s claim appears to be that we cannot understand the state in terms of the 
concept of “mediation” unless we adequately judge its empirical, determinate 
components accordingly, rather than becoming caught up in the requirements of the 
concept itself. The larger point is based upon his version of materialist realism, in which 
the “irrationality” of “reality” cannot be reconciled by philosophical reason. “Hegel 
should not be blamed for describing the essence of the modern state as it is, but for 
identifying [ausgeben] what is with the essence of the state. That the rational is actual is 
contradicted [Widerspruch] by the irrational reality [Wirklichkeit] which at every point 
shows itself to be the opposite of what it asserts, and to assert the opposite of what it is” 
(KHS 266/127; translation modified). But Marx’s point is a logical one as well. In his 
106
 Note that Marx in these passages clearly recognizes Hegel’s empirical acumen. In fact, his 
criticism stems from a judgment of Hegel as being in a way too reliant on the reality of the 
modern state. He makes the claim that Hegel’s understanding of the legislature is a product of the
way that this body is derived in the modern state. Hegel’s “abstract,” “formal,” “dualistic” theory 
“follows from the false, illusory, pre-eminently political role of the legislature in the modern state 
(whose interpreter Hegel is)” (KHS 289/151).
201
opinion, the Hegelian conception of mediation is basically inadequate because it cannot 
be used to describe reality. Hegel’s dialectical contortions may appear to work within his 
own system of the logic, but they do not play out in reality, because elements cannot be 
both extremes and mediating factors at the same time (KHS 291-2/154). “Real extremes 
cannot be mediated precisely because they are real extremes. Nor do they require 
mediation, for their natures are wholly opposed” (KHS 292/155).107
In the Left Hegelian idiom, Marx notes that “a truly philosophical criticism” must 
not just show contradictions, but explain them. This is done through “the discovery of 
the particular logic of the particular object,” as opposed to the “general” or “universal” 
logic that Hegel has proposed (KHS 296/159). This criticism is a corollary of Marx’s idea 
that Hegel has begun in the abstract world of the ideal, and has moved from there to 
empirical reality. Marx believes that Hegel’s logic cannot recognize “real” contradiction, 
and so it cannot capture the reality of the current political situation. Hegel cannot see 
this, he cannot see the “particular” logic of the modern state. But the criticism here is 
confused, as Marx slips between two very different complaints: 1) that Hegel’s 
understanding of contradiction does not allow for what he calls “real contradiction;” and 
2) that Hegel has only shown the contradictions in modern society, but has not 
explained them. It is in reference to the second criticism that Marx speaks of finding the 
“particular logic” of the object. To understand the “necessity” of a particular 
contradiction, one has to see where it has come from, which must begin with an analysis 
107 The passage continues: “They have nothing in common with one another, they have no need for
one another, they do not complement one another. The one does not bear within its womb a 
longing, a need, an anticipation of the other. (However, when Hegel treats universality and 
individuality, the abstract moments of the logical inference, as real antitheses, he reveals the 
fundamental dualism of his logic. This point needs to developed further in a critique of Hegel’s 
Logic.)”
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of its empirical setting. Hegel, on the other hand, does not show us the origins of the 
contradictions of the state, because, Marx believes, in fact they originate within his 
system itself. For example, in §304 Hegel claimed that one of the moments of the estates 
must “be given the function of existing essentially as a moment of mediation.” But Marx 
complains that “What is required here is not a “function”, but something more specific” 
(KHS 297/159; translation modified). What this specific something is is left 
undetermined; however the critique is that Hegel’s conception of the estates stems from 
his conception of the logic, of the concept, rather than being based upon the particular, 
existent reality.
3.2 The appropriation of Hegelian idealism
The critique discussed above is one of Marx’s earliest writings, and he famously became 
disenchanted with Feuerbach’s version of anthropological materialism, emphasizing, in 
the Theses on Feuerbach, philosophical idealism’s conception of the activity of spirit. 
Marx famously moved from the critique of philosophy to that of political economy; in 
this section, I will briefly discuss some of the ways in which Marx’s dialogue with Hegel 
structured the later practice of his empirical and “scientific” method. While his 
employment of Hegel’s thought shifted to some extent, in many ways the critique of 
Hegel’s philosophy that he laid out in his early work shaped his formulation of a social 
science.
Marx very quickly moved beyond the Feuerbachian terms of critique, on which his 
critique of the Philosophy of Right was based. According to Marx, Feuerbach cannot 
grasp the subject-object relationship in the way that Marx is looking for, the active 
productivity of critique. The main problem with Feuerbach, for Marx, hinges on this 
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conception of the grounding of philosophy in the real world of human beings. While 
Feuerbach believes generally in this “inversion” of materialism, Marx disagrees with his 
view of “men.” He argues that Feuerbach returns not to man in his sensuousness and 
practicality, but to an abstracted form of man. By viewing human beings only as abstract
contemplative subjects (and as practical objects), Feuerbach misses men in their reality, 
their sensuousness, and their history. He doesn’t see men and women “in their given 
social connection, not under their existing conditions of life which have made them what 
they are” (GI 418). It is in this sense that Marx claims that Feuerbach’s “Man” is an 
abstraction, and that, as a result, materialism and history completely diverge in his 
thought (GI 416, 418). This point is highlighted in Marx’s critique of Feuerbach’s views 
on religion. For Marx, Feuerbach’s procedure of critique by inversion does not go far 
enough. Though he “inverts” religion by recognizing its human basis, he does not realize 
that “religious sentiment” is produced by human beings, not according to their “essence” 
but according to their social conditions.
The process of critique through inversion cannot provide an account of the 
mediation of subject and object that became significant to Marx. In his writings in the 
1844 Manuscripts, Marx had developed an account of labour and of alienation which 
highlighted both the power and constraint of subjectivity under capitalism. These themes
also clearly drew on the account of alienation in Hegel’s philosophy. The attempt to 
incorporate a conception of the activity of spirit lead Marx to translate his early account 
of alienation from the early Manuscripts into value theory and the emphasis on 
commodity fetishism in Capital; this is a pivotal turning point in Marx’s work (although 
not in Althusser’s sense). The significance of this shift lies in the parallel moves from 
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philosophy to science, and from a focus on more subjective concerns to one on 
“objective” social structural forms. Throughout the move, Hegel’s philosophy provided 
the foundation for Marx’s approach. Continuing the themes of his early critique, in the 
Preface to Capital, Marx complains that Hegel transformed “the process of thinking” 
into “an independent subject, under the name of the idea, the creation of the real world, 
and the real world is only the external appearance of the idea. With me the reverse is 
true: the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man, and 
translated into forms of thought” (C 102). Yet he also mentions that Hegel’s Logic 
provided him help in formulating the structure of Capital (Marx and Engels 1955, 93).
Marx’s “materialist” transformation of Hegel involves a substitution of concrete 
human labor for the abstract activity of spirit, but in so doing, Marx himself would lose 
his connection to the realm of spirit. When it comes to the account of commodity 
fetishism, Marx becomes trapped in his own materialist logic, forced to discuss dynamics
of appearance and essence without reference to any form of subjectivity.  Whereas the 
early account of alienation involved the notion of experience, in this later work, the 
structural forms of commodity capitalism become a proxy for an account of the activity 
of spirit. A complex, idealist account of spirit becomes reduced to a form of objectivity. 
But in doing so, we lose connection to the realm of subjective spirit, which is the critical, 
negative power of “overreaching.” This cannot be captured by Marx’s conception of 
labour. The conception of consciousness as a “social product” (GI 44) cannot account for 
it.
Marxian “science” then, in contrast to a Hegelian version, begins only “where 
speculation ends, where real life starts” (GI 37). For Marx, of course, a philosophy such 
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as Hegel’s has been produced by a divided society, and reflects the structure of this 
society, yet Hegel has crucially not recognized this. No matter what “results” his 
philosophy might achieve intellectually, these will never be enough to truly transform 
society. Ideology is thus generated by the structure of society, the social relations that 
constitute it.
Marx essentially has a dual critique of Hegel. On the one hand, Hegel’s account of 
social reality is fundamentally flawed, as it is premised upon the identity of thought and 
being. On the other hand, Hegel’s own procedure of philosophizing is problematic, 
because, as a result of this identity, it looks to the empirical world simply to find evidence
of logic or conceptuality. Based upon his materialist criticism, Marx aims to ground 
knowledge not in forms of conceptuality, but in social-historical forms. Marx’s theory of 
knowledge then, as evidenced by his conception of ideology, is of process which is 
inherently tied to the concrete world of being. Knowledge must be related to its origins in
the “real” world, and theory must reflect this. In the specifically capitalist world that 
Marx criticized, knowledge has become ideological, in that it reflects, but does not 
transcend, the fetishized world of capital. Ideology critique is then a specific procedure 
which relativizes thought to its historical and social origins. Marx’s theory encompasses a
social theory of knowledge in that it attributes a connection between the sphere of 
human interaction (in the economy) and the world of theory and knowledge production. 
Although, due to the influence of the logic of commodities, thought appears to be 
separated from our social being, the essential reality behind this is different. In order to 
foster the true social being that we have lost, we must critically theorize the world we live
in with the social ideal in mind. Our thought must not be divorced from empirical reality;
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but we should not submit to a crude empiricism. We are also active creators, who use our
knowledge to further social change, not just simple reflectors of our social condition. Our
thought must stay tied closely enough to our practical concerns so that we continue to 
recognize that it is only through material change that the contradictions of society can be
overcome.108
In the Introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx discusses his critique of Hegel in more 
methodological terms. He suggests that the method of political economy, of beginning 
with “the living whole, the population, nation, state, several states, etc.,” and concluding 
with “a small number of determinant, abstract, general relations such as division of 
labour, money, value, etc.,” is not “scientifically correct,” because it never reaches the 
level of the “concrete” (G 100f.). Marx argues that it is necessary to begin, not with an 
abstract whole, but rather with the “simplest determinations,” and to move from these to
the concrete whole. In this analysis, Marx brings forward the distinction between modes 
of thought (inquiry) and modes of writing (presentation).109 In starting with the simplest 
determinations, we acknowledge the more complex structures on which they depend, but
we move forward towards them analytically. In fact, the only way to find the “simplest 
108
 “It can be seen how subjectivism and objectivism, spiritualism and materialism, activity and 
passivity, lose their antithetical character, and hence their existence as such antitheses, only in the
social condition; it can be seen how the resolution of the theoretical antitheses themselves is 
possible only in a practical way, only through the practical energy of man, and how their 
resolution is for that reason by no means only a problem of knowledge, but a real problem of life, 
a problem which philosophy was unable to solve precisely because it treated it as a purely 
theoretical problem” (EPM 542/354).
109 “Of course the method of presentation must differ in form from that of inquiry. The latter has 
to appropriate the material in detail, to analyse its different forms of development and to track 
down their inner connection. Only after this work has been done can the real moment be 
appropriately presented. If this is done successfully, if the life of the subject-matter is now 
reflected back in the ideas, then it may appear as if we have before us an a priori construction” (C 
102).
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determination” is to begin with an abstraction and analyze its aspects. This is the mode 
of investigation.
In claiming that the concrete “appears in the process of thinking,” Marx argues that, 
theoretically, it is a result; but it is also “the point of departure in reality and hence also 
the point of departure for observation and conception” (G 101). In such a method, Marx 
appears to be using Hegel’s own phenomenological method, and he praises Hegel for 
beginning the Philosophy of Right with possession, “this being the subject’s simplest 
juridical relation” (G 102). But the whole approach is premised upon the materialism 
which Marx poses in stark opposition to Hegel. According to Marx, it is only because of 
our acknowledgement of the material grounding of the individual subject of 
consciousness that allows us to make this kind of analytic distinction. Whereas Hegel 
“fell into the illusion of conceiving the real as the product of thought concentrating 
itself,” Marx can avoid this by recognizing the distinction between the material origins of 
the concrete (concrete as the physical world as it presents itself to us), the “process by 
which the concrete itself comes into being,” and the reproduction of the concrete 
(concrete as abstracted and “determined”) in thought (G 102). 
This idea would be crucial for Marx’s own method of science/critique in Capital. 
While the details of this method are beyond my scope here, I’d like to emphasize the 
effort Marx is making to differentiate the concrete as immediate apparent and the 
concrete as thought. This is essentially a Kantian distinction between sensory perception 
and conceptual understanding. In invoking it, Marx roots his own analysis in the 
dualisms of Kantian philosophy. While he would attempt to overcome these through an 
account of praxis, when it comes to a conception of thought and theorizing, he will not 
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be able to recover from this move. Although one of Marx’s main priorities is to overcome 
this kind of dualism, and to accentuate the material grounding of subjects and objects in 
the social-historical world, this move captures some of the problematics that develop. 
This distinction is important because it highlights the ways in which the 
Kantian/Hegelian split recurs through social theory. 
Marx famously sought to appropriate Hegel’s dialectical method, to make it rational,
turn it right-side-up, etc. Much of the appeal of Hegel was his understanding of the 
dialectical relationship between subject and object, which grounds his account of the 
relationship between thought and social history. In denying the fundamental “identity” 
premise of Hegel’s philosophy, Marx has closed the door on an adequate account of the 
subjects and objects of society. While Marx’s move from philosophy to an empirical 
social science was enormously productive, it retains limits. In his discussion of 
methodology in the Introduction to the Grundrisse, Marx claimed that 
The totality as it appears in the head, as a totality of thoughts, is a product of a thinking 
head, which appropriates the world in the only way it can, a way different from the 
artistic, religious, practical and mental appropriation of this world. The real subject 
retains its autonomous existence outside the head just as before; namely as long as the 
heads conduct is merely speculative, merely theoretical. Hence, in the theoretical method,
too, the subject, society, must always be kept in mind as the presupposition” (G 101-2). 
With his critique of philosophy as a mode of thought, and in particular his analysis of 
Hegel’s philosophy as conferring logical and ontological priority on the conscious 
subject, Marx lost a plausible account of the “merely theoretical.” 
The empirical is the starting place for Marx’s version of phenomenology. He starts 
with the appearance of society, as a collection of commodities, and moves towards 
uncovering their determinations. “Society” lies behind the scenes here; and, while Marx 
may be able to “keep it in mind,” during his theorizing, as a “presupposition,” the 
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constitution of society will be understood only in terms of labour. While Marx the 
theorist will be reproducing the concrete in thought, this has no bearing on the 
constitution of the social itself. The social dynamics of alienation, of exploitation, and 
totality, all operate on a level external to the thinking consciousness. In his philosophical 
and sociological work, Adorno would make yet another attempt to overcome these 
difficulties.
For Marx, science is also a form of critique; his thought is also intended to be a 
weapon of the proletariat. His “rational” form of dialectic he considers to be “a scandal 
and an abomination to the bourgeoisie and its doctrinaire spokesmen, because it 
includes in its positive understanding of what exists a simultaneous recognition of its 
negation, its inevitable destruction; because it regards every historically developed form 
as being in a fluid state, in motion, and therefore grasps its transient aspect as well; and 
because it does not let itself be impressed by anything, being in its very essence critical 
and revolutionary” (C 103). Knowledge must promote change in the society in which it is 
situated. Dialectical thought is that which goes beyond mere idealist reflection. This is 
the moment of critique. Marx has not just provided a formal analysis of capitalism, but 
has created a form of de-fetishizing critique which undermines the dominating reified 
forms of capital in the social world. Although he speaks of his science sometimes in 
positivist terms, we should not be fooled into considering his science to be based on 
positivist ideals. “Where speculation ends, namely in actual life, there real positive 
science begins as the representation of the practical activity and practical process of the 
development of men” (GI 415).
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Marx’s method is clearly inspired by his critique and “inversion” of Hegel. The 
contradictions which Hegel used to propel his dialectic in the Phenomenology were ideal
in the sense that they were the movements of the subjective mind as it encountered its 
world with an initial naiveté. The dialectic in Marx’s Capital, on the other hand, are 
material in the sense that they are said to arise from the structure of society itself. One 
could launch a number of criticisms of Marx’s critical effort against Hegel. He has clearly
misunderstood Hegel’s project in the Philosophy of Right and the details of Hegelian 
mediation. His form of criticism, initially modeled on that of Feuerbach, remains 
reductive. The turn to materialism is the attempt to secure a foundation for knowledge, 
which, as we’ve seen, is in opposition to Hegel’s approach.
Hegel’s philosophy should not be interpreted as a metaphysical form of idealism, as 
Marx does, because such a form of philosophy would rely on the opposition between 
thought and reality, namely on its denial or negation. But Hegel’s philosophy in fact is 
premised upon the suspension of this opposition (Maker 1989, 86). In Maker’s analysis, 
Hegel’s “rejection of the standpoint of consciousness” for a properly speculative 
philosophy establishes limits which Marx then crosses. The limit, namely, is the 
conception of reality from outside, or from the standpoint of consciousness itself. 
Speculative philosophy “cannot constitute the real — as a category of systematic 
philosophy — in the manner of consciousness, i.e., as a category given in its determinacy”
(Maker 1989, 82). The real may not be conceived as a datum for consciousness. To do so 
it to return to a form of thought which abandons its claims for autonomy.
Marx thus begins with a diagnosis of modernity similar to that of Hegel, but he 
emphasizes the contradictions of “reality,” including the alienated position of 
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presumably scientific knowledge. Viewing Hegel’s own version of philosophical thought 
as ideological, Marx moves towards an improved comprehension through a new form of 
theoretical, dialectical knowledge. “Dialectics, according to Marx, is a process in and of 
reality, discoverable by thought; thought, having uncovered the basic workings of 
dialectic, can then further disclose, through dialectical reasoning, at least the general 
features of the dialectic’s future unfolding in reality” (Maker 1989, 77).110 In this way, 
Marx moves towards a science of praxis.
We’ll now move to an examination of Adorno’s own critique of Hegel’s social and 
political philosophy, and his interpretation and employment of Marx. Marx was 
concerned above all with the critique of political economy as a form of praxis, and his 
work was not reflexive in the way that Hegel’s way. Adorno, in his quest to recuperate 
both philosophy and a form of social science, would pay much more attention to the 
thought processes of both science and philosophy.
110
 Wilson makes a similar point here: 
It is the way that the method of inquiry — empirical rather than speculative in nature — 
combines with the method of presentation that makes the dialectical analysis which follows 
it so different from that of Hegel. It is only after the specifics of the social formation have 
been further abstracted, accumulated and studied in detail that “inner connections” can be 
discerned, and the material reorganized and presented in such a way that the internal 
dynamic through which social phenomena develop and change can be laid bare. From the 
standpoint of an analysis like Hegel’s, based as it is in an a priori dialectical logic of 
categories whose process is independent of, rather than only different from the movement of 
reality it is imposed upon, Marx’s procedure in Capital for generating the concrete wholes 
that emerge from “reflecting” the life of the subject-matter “back in the ideas” can only be 
called dialectical if the term is carefully qualified. It is an a posteriori procedure for 
analysing materials that have been brought to light as a result (and in the form) of detailed 
empirical investigations of real phenomena abstracted to the point of the “simplest 
determinations (Wilson 1991, 62).
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4. Adorno’s critique of Hegel’s philosophy of history
In a previous chapter, I have covered some aspects of Adorno’s critique of Hegel. Here I 
would like to examine his particular critique of Hegel’s social and historical philosophy, 
in the light of his interpretation of Marx. While Hegel and Marx each sought to 
transform philosophical thinking into a form of science (albeit according to very different
notions of “science”), Adorno had very different intentions. While he did not want to 
make philosophy scientific, in either the Hegelian or Marxian conception, he did argue 
throughout his career for the continued relevance of a certain form of critical 
philosophical thought. In this sense, Adorno’s thought can be characterized as an 
attempt to reassess the significance of Hegel’s work in the post-Marx era.111
 Adorno produced no systematic writings on particular works of Hegel’s philosophy; 
however, he did frequently criticize Hegel’s handling of social, historical and political 
concerns, and Negative Dialectics contains a section on Hegel’s philosophy of history.112 
Adorno’s critique of Hegel in this section is often opaque. He employs Marx, Benjamin, 
and Hegel himself in an attempt to reject Hegel’s own conceptions of spirit and history. 
It is not a generous nor a sophisticated reading of Hegel, but rather, typically, a 
polemical one. In this section, Adorno reads Hegel according to Adorno’s own thesis of 
the social domination of the individual. More specifically, he provides a justification for 
his conception of the dominant social totality through Hegel’s philosophy. In the 
following discussion I will emphasize specifically the ways in which Adorno’s critique 
111
 This is true in a double sense: Adorno’s work clearly takes Marx’s critique of Heglian 
philosophy and political economy as its starting point, and is in that sense post-Marxian. It can 
also be construed as post-Marxist, in the sense that Adorno’s work was responding to a historical 
situation in which Marxist political models had become discredited, if not obsolete (see, e.g., 
Hammer 2005).
112 Part Two, “World Spirit and Natural History: Excursus on Hegel” (ND 295ff./300ff.).
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employs that of Marx, with respect to both Hegel’s concepts and his methodology of 
philosophizing. The task here is the identification of Adorno’s diagnoses of the failures of
Hegel’s social and political philosophy, and of the commitments and implications of his 
“solution.”
Before we begin, a brief explication of Hegel’s philosophy of history and the concept 
of the Weltgeist is in order.  In his attempts at philosophizing history, Hegel emphasizes 
the difference between the approach taken via historical inquiry, and that taken by 
philosophy. History is “concerned with what actually happened . . . It gains in veracity 
the more strictly it confines itself to what is given and . . . The more exclusively it seeks to
discover what actually happened” (VPG 25-6). In light of the seeming contradiction 
between this empirical approach, and what Hegel takes to the the task of philosophy — 
“conceptual thinking . . . the activity of the concept itself” — Hegel seeks to clarify the 
way that we should conceive of the relationship between thought and historical events 
(VPG 26). As in its relationship to other forms of spirit (e.g., subjective spirit or objective 
spirit), philosophy sets itself at a remove by acknowledging the presence of rationality in 
the world. It begins with this as its premise, and seeks to discover it within the various 
“shapes” of history, just as it examined shapes of spirit in the Phenomenology (VPG 28). 
The Weltgeist, with which Adorno was concerned, is the “spirit of the world as it 
reveals itself through the human consciousness; the relationship of men to it is that of 
single parts to the whole which is their substance” (VPG 52). Hegel’s Weltgeist is thus a 
form which represents a universal, in this case a historical universal. As such, it remains 
connected to the moments of individuality and particularity. My goal here is not to 
examine Hegel’s philosophy of history according to its own terms, but rather to argue 
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that the structural similarity between the Weltgeist and other forms of objective spirit is 
close enough to warrant my comparison of the critiques of Marx and Adorno. In this 
sense, I am less interested in Adorno’s well-known critique of Hegel’s “universalizing” 
philosophy of history, and more in the explicit and implicit ways in which he critiques 
Hegel’s “ totalizing” social philosophy in general. While this distinction, as we’ll see, is 
somewhat artificial, I pose it here in order to highlight the connection to Marx’s own 
critique of Hegel.
The thrust of Adorno’s critique in this part of Negative Dialectics is that Hegelian 
philosophy, with its central category of Geist, cannot properly grasp the nature of 
contemporary capitalist society. This is because Hegel’s conception of Geist was itself 
modeled upon the social abstraction of the exchange relationship. Consequently, Hegel’s 
philosophy suffers from a similar problem as the social problem of capitalism: a neglect 
of the rights of the particular. In the following, I will focus on two moments of this 
critique; the first is this issue of Hegel’s alleged dismissal of the particular, which Adorno
discusses primarily in terms of the individual social subject; the second is the related 
theme of Hegel’s “deification” of spirit, through an unrecognized hypostatization.
4.1 The neglect of the particular
Adorno articulates a complaint with Hegel’s form of reasoning through a brief 
comparison with Benjamin. Both were interested in “immersion in detail;” but for Hegel 
this always culminated in a totalizing absolute spirit. Adorno credits Benjamin, on the 
other hand, with an attempt to “save inductive reasoning” with the Trauerspiel study 
(Benjamin 1977). Benjamin started small, but, ignoring the “great philosophical issues” 
of the time, he retained a distance from the whole and thereby achieved some form of 
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authenticity. Such a condition is to be measured by its relation to the present state of the 
world. Benjamin’s “aphorism, that the smallest cell of observed reality offsets the 
remainder of the left over world, soon attests to the self-consciousness of the 
contemporary state of experience” (ND 298/303; my translation). The implication here 
is that Benjamin remained true to the form of modern, withered or reduced spirit which 
is characteristic of the times. The unstated claim is both that Hegel relies on a form of 
violence through deductive reasoning — forcing the facts into the theory, as it were — 
and consequently gives the intimate, micrological, details of phenomenal experience 
something less than their due. For Adorno, this signifies the “primacy of the totality [die 
Totale] over phenomenality [die Erscheinung]” a fact which is obscured by Hegel’s own 
hypostasis or reification of the world spirit.
Referring to Hegel’s critique of a concept of Recht which neglects an objective 
component, Adorno responds that the identification of Recht with “subjective 
conviction” must not be so easily dismissed. “What [Hegel] criticizes here as subjective 
conviction constantly recurs in individuals . . . And is perfectly rational in itself. Thus 
however isolated an individual may be, if he criticizes a historical trend which he feels 
powerless to change, this cannot simply be dismissed as the grumbling of the disaffected 
or the irrational protest of someone who feels pangs of emotion” (VGF 93/63; see also 
ND 304/310). Referring to Hegel here as a “demagogue” whose critical thinking is 
“fuzzy,” Adorno complains stringently that Hegel has unjustly denied the objectivity, the 
universality, of the individual. This form of objectivity or universality is accessed by the 
individual through thinking, and Adorno emphasizes that such thought can only occur 
within the individual. This means, for Adorno, that “the subjective experience of the 
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negativity of history” cannot be adequately grasped by Hegel. This claim, however, relies 
upon a reading of the relevant passage as being committed to a form of “collective 
consciousness.” 
The heart of Adorno’s critique is that Hegel does not sufficiently handle the 
contradiction that he introduces, that he is casting the universal as the enemy of the 
subjective individual, while also claiming their unity through mediation. When Adorno 
describes Hegel as being victim to a “subjective bias” (ND 304/309), he means simply 
that Hegel, by not fully following through on his own dialectical logic of mediation, has 
produced an account which denies or deforms both the significance of the objective state 
of alienation, and the power of the particular individual.
[I]f, like Hegel, I say that the course of the world and individual conscience are each 
mediated by the other and that therefore the individual consciousness must discover itself
in the course of the world, while simultaneously teaching that rightly and “justifiably” it 
cannot discover itself in the universal — then in effect it reverts to dualism, to Kantian 
dualism, and even hypostasizes this as a kind of positivity . . . Anyone who, like Hegel, 
insists on mediation should refrain from introducing a chorismos, a separation, at a 
critical juncture; he should refrain from representing the chorismos of reason and 
unreason, chance and necessity, as a positive. The absolute is treated by Hegel . . . as 
spirit, as a spiritual principle. But if this concept of spirit is not to degenerate into 
something vacuous it cannot be allowed to break every link with the living spirit, the 
spirit of individuals (VGF 97/66).
Essentially, the critique here is that Hegel’s analysis is too facile; rather than examining 
the details of Hegel’s account of the mediation of universal, particular, and individual 
(either in the Science of Logic or in the Philosophy of Right), Adorno simply laments the 
introduction of a chorismos in the introduction to his primary work on objective spirit. 
Adorno characterizes this introduction as “positive” because it is a necessary part of the 
dialectical process of overcoming. 
Assessing Adorno’s critique here is difficult; there is an irony in the claim that Hegel 
has insufficiently handled objective contradiction by introducing it into his system. 
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Adorno characterizes himself as the philosopher of mediation, and Hegel as the dualist. 
But to do so, he must make patently false claims, such as that “Hegel simply ignores the 
element of objectivity, of universality, that lies concealed in the particular” (VGF 94/64). 
Of course, Adorno’s goal is not an immanent critique, as much as it is his own version of 
speculative thought. His goal is more political than philosophical, at least in these 
claims. 
We might say that there are historical situations in which the interest in the totality, in 
other words, the objectivity of spirit, can only be found in individuals, namely those who 
consciously and by design offer resistance to the trend. In contrast, what can be called the
semblance of objectivity, the general consensus, is so much the mere reflex of social 
mechanisms that it actually lacks the objectivity commonly assigned to it, as is really no 
more than speculative illusion (LGF 95/64).
Parsing this passage through a Hegelian reading of its concepts is exceeding difficult, as 
Adorno works toward his own “constellations.”113 Suffice it to say that Adorno wants to 
emphasize the access of the individual to the realm of objectivity, through thought, and 
to contrast the collectivity with the truly universal. 
Adorno’s critique of the particular proceeds by analogy, rather than by performing 
an immanent critique. The analysis of capitalist society as being totalized or completely 
socialized [totalvergesellschaft] (ND 309/314) dictates the analysis of Hegel. The social 
integration of the individual has become more or less completed, and the places where 
subjectivity may exist have disappeared (PETG 106). Everyone is subordinated to the 
commodity through the logic of exchange; we become commensurable, identical (ND 
113
 The nature of Adorno’s writing provides some analytical difficulties; the relation of Adorno’s 
thought to that of Hegel and Marx must always be left underdetermined. As a brief example of the
difficulty, take the concept of the “universal” within just this section of Negative Dialectics. Some 
various characterizations are: group opinion (ND 304/308); myth (ND 299/304); the whole (ND 
299/304); that which “reproduces the preservation of life” (ND 305-6/311); that which corrupts 
all individual experience (ND 308/313); that which is contrary to the nature of individuals in 
themselves (ND 305/311); that which “functionalizes” the particular (ND 309/313); that which 
“determines” the individual (ND 311/315); that which humans transfigure into spirit, when they 
come to recognize it (ND 312/316).
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149/146). This critique often takes the form of a critique of social roles, rather than of 
commodities per se (PETG 150). Yet the abstract domination of the individual under 
capitalist exchange does not, prima facie, demonstrate Hegel’s neglect of the particular, 
his “siding with the universal.” Adorno supports his point with a brief commentary on 
some passages from the Lectures on the Philosophy of History, in which Hegel discusses 
that the “universal substance” is not “worldly [weltlich]” (ND 317f./323f.) In these 
lectures, Hegel claims that the individual may not differentiate itself from the Volksgeist,
from the spirit of the people (VPG 60/52). The upshot of Adorno’s critique is that Hegel’s
treatment of individuals vis-a-vis the Volksgeist is merely a kind of intellectual game. 
The real, historical relationship has clearly been one of continuing antagonism, and for 
Hegel to make a claim to reconcile this contraction theoretically only serves to justify the 
brutality of history.
But Adorno also connects this critique to Hegel’s handling of universality and 
particularity in the Logic (ND 320f./326f.). He quotes a passage from the “Doctrine of 
the Concept,” in which Hegel discusses the “particular concept” as having “no other 
determinateness than that posited by the universal itself . . . The particular is the 
universal but it is its difference or reference to an other, its outwardly reflecting shine; 
but there is no other at hand from which the particular would be differentiated than the 
universal itself.—The universal determines itself, and so is itself the particular; the 
determinateness is difference; it is only differentiated from itself” (WL 2:281/534-5). 
Adorno’s conclusion from this passage is that the particular is “nothing” without the 
universal. Of course, this analysis neglects the larger dynamic that Hegel is discussing in 
this passage. It comes in the second part of the chapter on “Concept,” in the first section 
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(“Subjectivity”) of the “Doctrine of the Concept.” In the passage cited by Adorno, Hegel is
in the middle of his tripartite analysis of the concept as universal, particular, and 
individual. The dialectical mediation of these three moments is the essence of the 
concept of Hegel’s “concept,” and would be more fully articulated in the section on 
“syllogism.” By reducing the proposed dialectic to that simply between the universal and 
“particular” (Adorno’s “individual”), Adorno claims to show that the particular is 
“dominated” by the universal.
This position is consistent with that of Marx, in which the tripartite structure also 
gets reduced to a binary of subject-object, universal-individual, mind-world, etc. 
Adorno’s critique in this way reflects Marx’s own, in which Hegel’s forms of mediation 
were reduced to an “inversion” of subject and predicate. Yet Adorno is not a naïve reader 
of Hegel, and we must inquire into the reasons for this form of critique.114 Adorno’s very 
logic of the thought of nonidentity operates through a binary perspective. The priority 
and recuperation of the object, the rescue of the particular from the domination of the 
universal, is the imperative of the world which has become “false” due to its social 
structuring by the commodity form. 
The negative, critical task is to uncover this form of ideology, but it may not be done 
by “merely looking on,” as in Hegel. As we’ve seen, Adorno relies upon a conception of a 
type of experience which can ground critique materially and corporally. There is a 
“content” to experience, an Erfahrungsgehalt, which holds potential. “Even 
philosophical hypostasis has its experiential content in the heteronomous relationships 
[Verhältnisse], in which human relationships became invisible” (ND 299/304; my 
translation). Though elusive, the concept of Erfahrungsgehalt is a key to the negative 
114
 Bernstein (1997) poses such a question.
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character of Adorno’s dialectic. While in Hegel’s philosophy, thought itself constituted a 
negation, this is not negative enough for Adorno, who differentiates between the 
“principle” of the dialectic and “resistance:” “Without question, without that principle [of
positive negation], the construction would collapse; dialectic has its Erfahrungsgehalt 
not in the principle of the other, but rather in its resistance to identity. Hence its power 
[Gewalt] (ND 163/160-1; my translation).
4.2 Siding with the universal
Adorno’s description of the “construction” of the world spirit is reminiscent of Marx’s 
critique of the abstract nature of the universality of the state and of religion in “On the 
Jewish Question” (Marx [1843] 1975). Although ultimately reliant upon individuals for 
its very existence, the world spirit becomes “independent” of the individual. While 
drawing on, and quoting, Marx and Engels, Adorno laments the separation between the 
world spirit and its foundation in real social relations, “the functional connection of real 
individual subjects.” “It is above their heads and right through them, and in this sense 
already antagonistic” (ND 299/304; my translation). The critical reasoning here is 
essentially conducted via an analogy between the world spirit and the Marxian social 
totality. The totality of spirit is comparable to the social totality: “The world spirit 
becomes something independent [ein Selbständiges] in relation to the particular actions 
from which — like the real total movement [reale Gesamtbewegung] of society — the so-
called spiritual [geistige] developments synthesize themselves, and in relation to the 
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living subjects of these actions” (ND 298-9/304; my translation).115 Adorno thus simply 
treats the world spirit as a “social totality” throughout his analysis.
However, what often appears to be analogy is in fact intended to be grounded within
the process of exchange itself, which, in Adorno’s analysis, is the social locus for the 
“identity” of the subjective and objective.
[T]he abstract universal of the whole, which exercises coercion, is associated with 
[verschwistert] the universality of thought, of spirit. This allows it — in its bearer — to 
project itself back on that universality, as if it were realized therein, as if it had its own 
reality for itself. In spirit, the unanimity of the universal became subject, and universality 
holds its own [sich behaupten] in society only through the medium of spirit, the 
abstracting operation, which it executes in a most real manner [höchst real vollzieht]. 
Both converge in exchange, at the same time something subjectively thought and 
objectively valued, in which the objectivity of the universal and the concrete 
determination of the individual subject oppose one another unreconciled — precisely 
because they become commensurable (ND 310/316; my translation).
Here Adorno’s claim is that two different processes come together through the 
mystifying relationship of exchange. These processes are 1) the universal becoming 
subject, in spirit; and 2) spirit socially mediating universality by executing the exchange 
abstraction. The first represents the subjectivity of exchange, the process through which 
the social universal becomes imposed on (determines) the individual subject; in the 
second the objectivity of exchange is constituted through the value abstraction.
Although he never explicitly theorizes the exchange relationship, it remains at the 
center of Adorno’s work, and thus implies a fundamental relationship to the later work of
Marx. While he was heavily invested in the idea of Marxism as a critical materialist 
method, he relied upon Marx’s analysis of exchange for his understanding of society, of 
forms of thought, and the relations between them. In the following passage, Adorno 
115
 Similarly, Adorno elsewhere relates the social “principle” of domination and the nonidentity 
between the concept and its object: “What society tears apart antagonistically, the principle of 
domination [herrschaftliche Prinzip], is the same as that which, spiritualized [vergeistert], 
produces the difference between the concept and that which is subjected to it” (ND 58/48; my 
translation).
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begins to articulate the relationship between the social process of thought and the logical
principle of identification.
The opposition of thought to that which is heterogeneous to it reproduces itself in thought
as its immanent contradiction. Reciprocal critique of the universal and particular, 
identifying acts which judge whether the concept does justice to that with which it 
concerns itself [dem Befaßten], and also whether the particular fulfills its concept, are the
medium of the thought of the nonidentity of particular and concept. And not that of 
thought alone. If humankind is to rid itself of the coercion, which comes in the form of 
identification, it must at the same time achieve identity with its concept. All relevant 
categories participate in this. The principle of exchange, the reduction of human labor to 
the abstract universal concept of average labor time, is thoroughly related [urverwandt] 
with the principle of identification. It has its societal model in exchange, and would be 
nothing without it. Through it, nonidentical particular beings [Einzelwesen] and 
achievements [Leistungen] become commensurable, identical (ND 149/146; my 
translation).
The connection of subject and object is a thus a feature of the society of exchange. This is 
the basis for Adorno’s Marxian-inspired critique of Hegel’s philosophy as ideology. It 
also implies that the very “substantiality” of Hegel’s philosophy, which Adorno had at 
times lauded, comes about through the social action of exchange. Subject and object, 
form and content, are joined in modern capitalist society. The forms of mediation of 
subject and object — both objectively social and subjectively cognitive — are then joined 
in a similar fashion. 
In a statement on the requirements of a geistig or philosophical form of experience, 
Adorno expresses the violent potential of exchange, concealed by idealism:
His [Bergson’s] generation [e.g., Simmel, Husserl, Scheler] sought in vain a philosophy 
which, receptive to objects, substantiated itself. What tradition surrendered, it then 
desired. However, that doesn’t dispense with the methodical reflection, [on] how the 
substantive individual analyses stand on the theory of dialectic. The idealist and 
identitarian philosophical assurances are weak, that [the latter] end up in [the former]. 
However, the whole is objective, not only through the knowing subject, the whole which is
expressed in theory, [the whole] which is to contain analyzing individuals. The mediation 
of both, through the societal totality, is itself substantive. It is also, however, formal, by 
virtue of the abstract lawfulness of the totality itself, of exchange. Idealism, which 
distilled its absolute spirit from this, simultaneously encodes the truth that that 
mediation occurs to the phenomena as a mechanism of coercion; this conceals itself 
behind the so-called constitution problem (ND 57/47). 
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While continually moving among various senses of his key categories such as 
subjectivity, objectivity, and mediation, Adorno here emphasizes the priority of the social
totality, constructed through exchange. He goes so far as to say that the very notion of 
absolute spirit is derived from this social reality. Idealist philosophy, such as Hegel’s, 
both recognizes the power of the social universal, and conceals it.116
The basis of the critique remains, however, that it is an historical event, the rise of 
capitalist exchange society, that has ultimately simultaneously validated and invalidated 
(morally, if not otherwise) the bulk of Hegel’s philosophical system. The idealist doctrine 
of identity, of absolute spirit, of a truncated dialectics, are all adequate descriptions of 
the false reality of capitalist modernity. Hegel’s own mistake was to not see the social 
origins of his theory of conceptuality or “logicity [Logizität]” (EDi 103). It in fact mirrors 
the social relations of exchange, and is thus an “index falsi” — a fetish (ND 311/317). 
Although successful, such a critique relies upon the regression to reflective categories 
that we observed in Marx.
Adorno’s break with Hegel follows from the diagnosis of the failure of his 
philosophy. The “contraction” of the universal into the particular occurs both in the logic 
and in the Realphilosophie, and ultimately condemns Hegel’s own vision of his 
philosophical system. Hegel’s own “groping” for substance, for particularity, was not to 
be satisfied in his work. The relationship between the logic and the Realphilosophie, 
which Hegel discusses in the Preface to the Philosophy of Right, becomes evidence of 
116
 Adorno goes on here to discuss the capacity of “philosophical experience,” to achieve a “double 
path,” recognizing both the universal and the particular: “Philosophical experience does not have 
this universal immediately as appearance [Erscheinung], but rather abstractly, as it is, 
objectively. It is restrained from the exit of the particular, without forgetting what it knows but 
does not have. Its path is doubled, like that of Heraclitus, one leading up and one down” (ND 
57/47; my translation; emphasis added).
224
what Adorno characterizes as a “regression to Platonism” (ND 322f./329f.). This claim 
stems from a rather simplistic reading of the Doppelsatz; Adorno views Hegel’s approach
as a mere searching for the “rational” or the “eternal” in the “actual;” and hence as an 
unwitting justification of the state. Hegel’s point is rather, as we’ve seen, that philosophy 
differentiates itself from more subjective forms of reasoning in its concern with the 
conceptual, with the idea. However, Adorno characteristically misrepresents the 
speculative character of the claim.
In Adorno’s analysis, Hegel “sides with” the universal, because, in his analysis of the 
relationship between the universal and the particular, he lets the claim to identity take 
precedence. Although he recognizes that each requires the mediation of the other, he 
“liked to forget [this] on occasion” (ND 322/328). In order to make any claim to identity 
between the two, requires him to “not deal with the particular as a particular at all” (ND 
322/328). For Hegel, all particularity is always already conceptual. Adorno’s critique 
thus strikes at the heart of Hegel’s philosophical system; he is against any notion of the 
identity of thought and being, because such a claim denies the social realities of the 
postwar world. 
Adorno’s own reliance upon Marx is most evident in his conception of “natural 
history.” Although Hegel has some understanding of the historical component of reason, 
his commitment to identity entails an understanding of spirit ultimately in terms of 
“nature.” He accuses Hegel of “mythologizing history,” quoting the following passage 
from the Philosophy of Right:
Whatever is by nature contingent is subject to contingencies, and this fate is therefore 
itself a necessity — just as, in all such cases, philosophy and the concept overcome the 
point of view of mere contingency and recognize it as a semblance whose essence is 
necessity. It is necessary that the finite — such as property and life — should be posited as
contingent, because contingency is the concept of the finite. This necessity has, on the one
225
hand, the shape of natural power, and everything finite is mortal and transient” (PR 
§324).
The realm of nature and necessity has been given too much power by Hegel; he 
“glorifies” the natural element in second nature. Adorno himself, though claiming that 
the “antithesis of nature and history is both true and false,” sees only the conservative 
implications of Hegel’s conception. Hegel’s account of the rise of spirit from nature 
remains unconvincing in the face of Marx’s own claim that “as long as men exist, natural 
and human history will continue to qualify each other” (quoted in ND 351/358).
Spirit itself has a tendency, according to Adorno, to become alienated from its 
material base, from its origins in nature and in history. The Weltgeist, the Volksgeist, 
and the objective spirit of the Philosophy of Right, all suffer from a form of 
hypostatization. The collective comes to reign over the individual (ND 335/342). Hegel’s 
own analysis of spirit, in his later work, simply foisted on people a form of positivity. 
Spirit thus becomes ideological, having lost its own negativity (ND 350/356).
4.3 Adorno with and beyond Marx
Adorno is committed to the nonidentity of thought and being; he perhaps most 
accurately captures his relationship to Hegel’s social and political philosophy when he 
claims that the “tenor” of the Philosophy of Right is to “dispute away the contradiction 
between idea and reality” (ND 329/335-6). For all of his appreciation of the dialectical 
method, Adorno remains committed to reading Hegel as a conservative when it comes to 
philosophizing about the real world. The changes that Western society has undergone, 
most significantly analyzed by Marx, have left Hegelian philosophy in an uncomfortable 
ideological position. Marx’s analyses of exchange provide the foundation for Adorno’s 
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critique, while Marx’s critique of Hegel’s political philosophy, in terms of its inability to 
grasp the empirical on its own terms, remains more of an inspiration. 
In Hegel’s analysis, the will is comprehended by showing that it has the structure of 
the concept. Clearly, Adorno believes that the third, positive moment of the dialectic is 
utopian idealism. The course of the modern world has clearly shown that the rupture 
between the subjective and objective aspects of the will persists: we continue to be 
dominated by our own institutions, both social and economic. The complaint is clearly 
addressing the “scientific,” speculative character of Hegel’s political thought, which 
constitutes its very status as philosophy, in Hegel’s estimation. While Adorno believes 
that the spirit of the German Idealists’ foundational criticism of scientific reason must be
rescued and maintained, he can tolerate absolutely no degree of affirmation or 
reconciliation.
When Adorno refers to society as “concept,” he is couching his Marxian analysis in 
Hegelian language (H 267/20). To the extent that the logic of the concept is a way of 
comprehending the determinations of a complex system, it would appear to apply. Yet, in
Hegel’s analysis, what is comprehended through the concept is Sittlichkeit rather than 
“society.” Adorno appears to want to appropriate the Hegelian language without its 
specificity. The Hegelian absolute, as a concrete universality, contains internal 
differentiations; it is not a simple prospect of domination by abstract universals. With his
eye on the analysis of capitalist exchange in Capital, Adorno appears to transpose the 
critique of domination through exchange back onto Hegel’s philosophical system, by 
misreading its speculative character. His critique of Hegel posits a close relationship 
between the systematic, absolute form of Hegel’s philosophy and the development of 
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modern society as a system structured by exchange. But the argument is more that Hegel
had given us an insight into a contemporary social form, and that by resisting both we 
can undermine forms of intellectual and social domination.
Hegel’s own speculative procedure through syllogism and mediation necessarily 
rejects any form of causal analysis of actuality (Henrich 2004, 245). The foundationless 
nature of the dialectical structure of the concept is important for Adorno’s own 
understanding of society, but theorectical coherence is lost. Society as both first and 
result, as that which always already mediates both subjects and objects, cannot be made 
sense of in these terms, except perhaps as relationships of capitalist exchange. Adorno 
wants to avoid discussing what comes first, either in philosophical foundational terms or 
in social causal ones, but his analogy to the concept is not explicit enough. It is Hegel’s 
own refusal of causal logic which eliminates any chance to speak in terms of social causes
and social effects. This is due to his very understanding of actuality, which cannot be 
reduced to “social reality.” Adorno’s social critique is premised on notions of causality 
and function. The individual is subjected to domination by becoming functional within 
society.
However, Adorno’s style of writing, especially regarding the relationship between 
forms of thought and forms of social being, takes its cue from Hegel. Adorno praised 
Hegel’s historical acumen in the Phenomenology, without going into much analytical 
detail, and Adorno’s own writing often moves between philosophical or “speculative” 
analysis, and historical claims. This may be the best characterization of the ways in 
which he tries to employ both Marx and Hegel. 
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In Hegel’s philosophy, Geist is “the conceptual link between logic and history . . . 
because it is the actual mediation of subject and object” (Duquette 2007, 88), but, in 
Adorno’s work, Geist becomes even more difficult to interpret. In addition to the 
readings of Geist I’ve discussed above, Adorno also uses the concept to understand 
labour under capitalism. In this case, he emphasizes that spirit is “essentially 
productive” as is Kantian practical reason. He notes that Hegel appropriates the 
“Kantian moment of spontaneity,” and makes it total by having it swallow up both being 
and thought (H 265/17). Adorno describes the key turning point: “But when Hegel no 
longer opposes production and deed to matter as subjective accomplishments but rather 
looks for them in specific objects, in concrete material reality, he comes close to the 
mystery behind synthetic apperception and takes it out of the mere arbitrary hypothesis 
of the abstract concept. The mystery, however, is none other than social labor” (H 
265/17-18). In other words, according to Adorno, Hegel (almost) discovered the 
commodity fetish. Kant’s act of synthesis, the apperception, is the productive capacity of 
the subject. The individual, empirical subject stands in some problematic relationship to 
the transcendental subject, with its apperception. Adorno makes an analogy between the 
relationship of the transcendental subject to the empirical subject, and the relationship 
between logical propositions and “individual acts of thought” (H 265/18).
According to Adorno, Hegel’s concept of spirit is “akin [verwandt]” to the principle 
of labour because it derives self-consciousness out of a labour relation, in the master-
slave dialectic (ND 198/198). In labour, the “I” adapts itself both to its own goal, and to 
“heterogeneous material” (ND 199/198). This material and ontological origin dooms 
what Adorno believes is Hegel’s desired “hypostatization” of spirit. Hegel wants spirit 
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precisely to become total, but its very differentia specifica is based in the fact that it is 
subject, and not a whole (ND 199/199). Here once again we see Adorno’s denial of any 
kind of speculative philosophical procedure. But does this equal a lack of understanding 
of Hegel’s project, or a politically driven neglect? What is the function of this argument 
for Adorno’s thought? For Adorno, the conception of spirit as totality denies the “other” 
of spirit, denies nonidentity. Spirit is no longer a μετάβασις είς άλλο γένος (metabasis 
eis alo genos: transformation to a different genus). Adorno here uses the thesis of 
nonidentity to disrupt Hegel’s “idealist” philosophy. He claims that Hegel’s fundamental 
concept, the concept on which his entire philosophy is based, is a fraud: a totality which 
actually needs something “external” to it. 
The second claim is that ‘[t]he idealist concept of spirit exploits the transition to 
societal labour: it is easily capable of transfiguring the universal activity [Tätigkeit], 
which absorbs individual actions [Tuenden], into the In-itself, while disregarding them’ 
(ND 199/199). Hegel’s concept of spirit performs this function of the fetish, of the 
Marxian theory of value. The alliance with Marx’s theory of value allows Adorno a dual 
critique of both Kant and Hegel. Kant’s transcendental subject ignores the social 
component; while Hegel’s concept of spirit, which he developed out of the transcendental
subject, ultimately ignores the individual-material aspect.
The transition of philosophy from spirit to its other is immanently compelled by its 
determination as activity. Since Kant, idealism cannot pry it loose, not even Hegel. 
Through activity, however, spirit has a part in the genesis, which irritates idealism as 
something that contaminates it. Spirit as activity is, as the philosophers repeat, a 
becoming; therefore not χωρίς (choris: separate) from history, on which it places almost 
greater value. According to its basic concept, its activity is intra-temporal, historical; 
becoming as well as that which has become, in which becoming accumulates. Like time, 
whose universal representation requires something temporal, no activity is without 
substrate, without something active, and without that which it acts [üben] upon. In the 
idea of absolute activity conceals only what should act; the pure νόησις νοήσεως (nóesis 
noéseos: knowledge of knowledge) is the bashful, metaphysically-neutralized belief in 
God the creator (ND 201/200-1).
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Adorno here provides the basis for his critique of philosophical idealism as a whole. 
Spirit is both activity and labour. What is Adorno’s understanding of spirit? What is the 
significance of his use of the concept? Adorno sets up two dichotomies here. On the one 
hand, we have mind and body, and on the other we have subject and object. The 
significance of Tätigkeit (activity) is that it defines Geist (ND 201/200). Adorno reasons 
here as did the early Marx in his critique of Hegel. But he takes it ultimately in a different
direction, reasoning that spirit must not be a totality; it must have something other than 
it, just as labour must work on an object.
It is the opposition or resistance to the “other” which is the experiential content of 
dialectics. This is present within Hegel’s philosophy, but not through Hegel’s own 
conception of dialectical experience; rather, the experiential content is inherent in the 
“intellectual atmosphere” of post-Kantian idealist philosophy itself (H 301/61). In his 
discussion, Adorno refers to the concept as a “spirit” of these forms of philosophy, which 
were not “strictly individuated” nor “fully articulated.” He lauds these philosophies 
because they “do not operate with fixed concepts in the manner of a later philosophy 
modeled on the science the idealist generation opposed” (H 301/60). It is ultimately the 
critique of reflective reason, which encompasses the reason of “institutionalized science,”
which Adorno values in these philosophers. As individuals, but more importantly as part 
of an intellectual movement, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel were driven by a particular 
experience, that of the “resistance to dead knowledge.” This is perhaps most of all 
captured by the “pathos of the word ‘spirit’” (H 301/61-2). One can begin to see here the 
implications for Adorno’s conception of critical theory; it must retain the spirit of the 
idealist conception of spirit, without reproducing its ultimate doctrine.
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In the theoretical sphere, idealism represented the insight that the sum total of specific 
knowledge was not a whole, that the best of both knowledge and human potential slipped 
through the meshes of the division of labor . . . In a total society, totality becomes radical 
evil. What resonates in Hegel along with the need for a progressive integration is the need
for a reconciliation — a reconciliation the totality has prevented ever since it achieved the 
reality Hegel enthusiastically anticipated for it in the concept (H 302-3/62).
Adorno’s negative dialectic does justice to the experiential content of idealist philosophy 
by remaining committed to the object, to the particular. This requires a move beyond 
idealism, to a negative, materialist dialectic. Otherwise it ends up repressing that which 
it seeks to understand (ND 323/330).
 My argument has been that Adorno has performed his own kind of reduction of 
Hegel’s thought, which in some ways parallels, and in some ways employs, Marx’s own 
work. However, Marx uses his critique of Hegel as a means of moving beyond philosophy
(or perhaps realizing it) and solidifying his own conceptualization of a scientific method; 
while Adorno remains committed to the pursuit of a critical form of philosophy. Adorno 
employs a version of Hegel which allows him to argue for his own version of negative 
dialectics or nonidentity thinking, which is a form of thought which bears an 
indeterminate relationship to empirical social science. Adorno employs some of the 
empirical results of Marx’s own work, but he does so in haphazard fashion. While I’m not
suggesting that Adorno should have been a more rigorous empirical thinker, it is 
significant that his own sociological works play such a small role in his philosophy. 
The problems that I’ve posed in this chapter concern the Hegelian model of 
philosophy, and its relationship to the empirical social world. I’ve demonstrated aspects 
of Marx’s and Adorno’s critique of Hegel approach to social and political philosophy; but 
the results are inconclusive. I would argue that neither thinking fully engaged with 
Hegel’s philosophy in this area. Each was intent on articulating their own perspective. 
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5. Conclusion
Both Marx and Adorno took the philosophy of Hegel very seriously. While they each 
reject and appropriate Hegel’s work in their own ways, each is committed to the 
significance of the role of critical reason in understanding the contemporary social 
world. In this chapter, I have sought to articulate some of the conceptual inheritances 
and subsequent issues in the line of thought from Hegel through Marx to Adorno. I have 
examined Marx and Adorno’s critiques of Hegel’s social and political philosophy, and 
interpreted these in terms of the critique of idealist philosophy, and the determination of
a mode of procedure (whether philosophical or scientific) which attempts to utilize 
aspects of Hegel’s thought, while being more “adequate” to contemporary capitalist 
society and its modes of domination and exploitation. 
In the move from philosophy to social science, according to either model here, we 
refine our method of investigating empirical reality, we reconceptualize the relationship 
of thought to reality, and think about the social subject and object within its material 
social historical context. Hegel’s philosophical system allowed him to move relatively 
seamlessly between subjective spirit and objective spirit, but the articulation of these 
spheres becomes more difficult for Marx and Adorno. They have each rejected Hegel’s 
own conception of philosophizing; however, they may not have fully grasped the 
implications of this. For Hegel, “understanding and deepening the presence of mind 
within its actuality is the mode by which philosophy becomes adequate to its real-life 
materials” (Kelly 1978, 21). In their own ways, Marx and Adorno’s commitments to 
materialism meant that they end up struggling to re-connect thought to social reality.
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Maker (1989) has argued persuasively that Marx’s critique of Hegel involved a 
“fundamental conceptual error,” in that he attempted to improve Hegel’s dialectic by 
transgressing the necessary limits to the dialectic that Hegel had argued for. Marx 
argued that Hegel’s own philosophy had to be critiqued and inverted, by examining it in 
its connection to the “real world.” In Maker’s analysis, the basis of Hegel’s claim for the 
scientific character of his systematic philosophy lies in its ability to articulate “what is 
rationally universal and necessary in a manner that is both unconditional and complete. 
Furthermore, this philosophy can lay claim to such unconditional universality and 
necessity, and to completeness for what it articulates, only insofar as this philosophy is 
fully and exclusively self-grounding” (1989, 78). In other words, Hegel stakes his claim 
on the fact that his philosophy constitutes pure and autonomous reason. In order to be 
such, it must not rely on anything external to it; it must be self-determining.117
Any attempt to take Hegel’s approach to this form of scientific reason, and relate it 
back to the “real world,” has necessarily to invalidate Hegel’s own approach. To take this 
path is to retreat to a form of reflective thought, which Hegel sought to overcome 
through the move to the concept, to the absolute. “For the thinking that goes on in this 
way [Kantian reflective thought], even when it reaches its highest point, determinacy 
remains something external; what is still meant by ‘reason’ is then just a radically 
abstract thinking. It follows as a result that this ‘reason’ provides nothing but the formal
unity for the simplification and systematization of experiences; it is a canon, not an 
117
 The philosophical approach is then that which goes beyond the subject-object dichotomy: 
“These views on the relation of subject and object to each other express the determinations that 
constitute the nature of our ordinary, phenomenal consciousness. However, when these 
prejudices are carried over to reason, as if in reason the same relation obtained, as if this relation 
had any truth in and for itself, then they are errors, and the refutation of them in every part of the 
spiritual and natural universe is what philosophy is; or rather, since they block the entrance to 
philosophy, they are the errors that must be removed before one can enter it” (WL 1:37-8/25).
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organon of truth; it cannot provide a doctrine of the infinite, but only a critique of 
cognition” (EL §52). Here we see how, in Hegel’s own terms, Marx moves from 
philosophical science to the critique of thought. He does this with a move back to the 
perspective of consciousness, to the relation between consciousness and what is external 
to it, its object. “[I]f reason can be identified with consciousness, then reason cannot be 
autonomous, for whatever it might come to establish or claim will always be ineluctably 
other-determined: it will be in some way founded in that whose determinate character is,
as a ‘given,’ pre-determined” (Maker 1989, 80). 
While Maker’s point in his article is that Marx’s “materialist dialectic” cannot be 
considered to be scientific in Hegel’s terms, and that Marx’s own procedure is actually a 
form of idealism masquerading as a materialism (in the sense that, having derived his 
approach from Hegel’s systematic philosophy, he then reads these categories into social 
and historical reality), my point primarily concerns Adorno’s rendering of Hegel and 
Marx into his own conception of negative dialectics. While it it true that both Marx and 
Adorno attempt to provide a critique of thought, by relating Hegel’s philosophical system
to material, social-historical reality, Adorno does more work to try and overcome this 
problem. While Marx attempted to substitute a form of critical praxis for Hegel’s 
philosophical approach, Adorno continually argued for the relevance of philosophy, 
given historical events such as the rise of fascism, bureaucratic socialism, and 
commodity capitalism. With his much more thorough engagement with the work of 
Hegel and Kant, Adorno attempted to derive a form of dialectics “at a standstill,” one 
insulated from the progressivism of both the Marxian and Hegelian versions. In doing 
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so, he not only employed Marx’s own materialist critique of Hegel, but also attempted to 
impose a new set of limits on legitimate thought. 
Adorno’s model of nonidentity thinking is a way of accounting for the social-
historical foundations of thinking, and is a critique of thought in this sense; but it also 
aspires to be more than this, in its attempts to use Hegelian concepts to understand the 
relationship of thought and reality. In claims such as that “[t]he only way to pass 
philosophically into social categories is to decipher the truth content of philosophical 
categories,” Adorno does his best to make his project sound like a Hegelian path to a 
Marxian conclusion (ND 198/198). But his work relies upon a notion of society as a form 
of absolute in which subject and object become identified.118 In the conclusion to this 
work, I will discuss the implications of this attempt.119
Before I do so, however, I want to first examine Adorno’s relationship to another 
structural social scientific thinking, Durkheim. Due to his mere pointers to a theory of 
the society of exchange, as well as his tendency to reduce domination to a category of 
society rather than economy, Adorno’s position appears at times to come closer to 
Durkheim than to Marx.120 Certainly Adorno himself would deny the affinity. But the use 
118
 Adorno makes use of exchange less as a social relation and more as a way to bridge the mental 
and the social-material within his work. It is in exchange where the subjective and the objective 
come together, as “something subjectively thought and at the same time objectively valid” (ND 
310/316).
119
 The other important unexplored issue leads us back to Hegel’s conception of Realphilosophie, 
and its relationship to the autonomy of the Logic. We have examined, to some extent, the 
relationship between Hegelian philosophical science, and forms of reflective thought. Hegel 
clarifies this relationship in the Encyclopedia: “[T]he relationship of a speculative science to the 
other sciences is simply the following: speculative science does not leave the empirical content of 
the other sciences aside, but recognizes and uses it, and in the same way recognizes and employs 
what is universal in these sciences, the laws, classifications, etc., for its own content” (EL  §9). In 
addition to the clarification of this conception, there is the additional question of how different 
parts of Hegel’s systematic philosophy relate to others. These discussions are beyond the scope of 
the present work.
120
 For a very different analysis, see Backhaus (1992).
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of the theme of coercion stems from social relations themselves, rather than from 
capitalist labor relations. In the next chapter, I turn to an examination of Adorno’s own 
critique of Durkheim’s sociological thought, and its implications for his conception of 
knowledge, and of the relationship between sociology and philosophy.
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Chapter 5 Experiencing social objectivity: Adorno’s critique 
of Durkheim
Sociology today would need to understand the 
incomprehensible, the entry of humanity into 
inhumanity (G 12/147).
Durkheim’s sociology is neither true nor merely false, 
but rather a crooked projection of truth on a framework 
that has itself fallen into a societal context of delusion 
[Verblendungszusammenhang]. (EDu 279).
1. Introduction
In the last chapter I examined the ways in which Marx and Adorno used their critiques of
Hegelian philosophy as a means of “going beyond” idealist philosophy. While this 
provided a valuable perspective on the influence of Hegelian thought on the origins of 
social science, and on Adorno’s own characterization of the relationship between 
sociology and philosophy, in this chapter I will broaden this perspective by examining 
Adorno’s critique of Durkheim’s sociological thought.
Adorno’s understanding of sociology, and the concept of society itself on which the 
discipline is based, stemmed in part from his engagement with the “classical” authors of 
the sociological canon: Marx, Weber, and Durkheim. It is undeniable that these three 
figures dominate Adorno’s thinking about sociological thought.121 Adorno was fond of 
opposing the thought of Weber and Durkheim, as something of dialectical poles of an 
intellectual perspective on “society.” In his encyclopedia article on the concept of 
“society,” he explained that
121
 I argue this despite Adorno’s significance in the “positivism dispute” in sociology in the 1960s, 
where he engaged with Popper, or, more accurately, a caricature of Popper’s position on the social
sciences. His arguments here were formulated against a form of positivism which Adorno argued 
characterized mainstream sociology, and followed upon his previous critique of Mannheim’s 
positivist perspective (see P and Adorno GS 20.1, 13-45). My rationale here is that Adorno’s 
sustained polemic against “positivist” forms of sociological reason has very close ties to his 
general critique of identity thinking as “instrumental reason,” while his engagement with the 
more “canonical” figures of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim demonstrates a more nuanced and 
respectful perspective.
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the theory of society entrenches itself behind . . . subjectivity . . . Yet we must point out 
that society is both known and not known from the inside. Inasmuch as society remains a 
product of human activity, its living subjects are still able to recognize themselves in it, as 
from across a great distance, in a manner that is radically different than is the case for the
objects of chemistry and physics. It is a fact that in middle-class society, rational action is 
objectively as “comprehensible” as it is motivated. This was the great lesson of the 
generation of Max Weber and Dilthey. Yet their ideal of comprehension remained one-
sided, insofar as it precluded everything in society that resisted identification by the 
observer. This was the sense of Durkheim’s rule that one should treat social facts like 
objects, should first and foremost renounce any effort to “understand” them. He was 
firmly persuaded that society meets each individual primarily as that which is alien and 
threatening, as constraint. Insofar as that is true, genuine reflection on the nature of 
society would begin precisely where “comprehension” ceased. The scientific method 
which Durkheim stands for thus registers that Hegelian “second nature” which society 
comes to form, against its living members. This antithesis to Max Weber remains just as 
partial as the latter’s thesis, in that it cannot transcend the idea of society’s basic 
incomprehensibility any more than Weber can transcend that of society’s basic 
comprehensibility. Yet this resistance of society to rational comprehension first and 
foremost is the sign of relationships between men which have grown increasingly 
independent of them, opaque, now standing off against human beings like some different 
substance. It ought to be the task of sociology today to comprehend the 
incomprehensible, the advance of human beings into the inhuman (G 11-12/146-7).
According to the reified character of capitalist society, Adorno finds that both Weber and
Durkheim have each identified a piece of the puzzle of sociological thought. Adorno sets 
the theoretical viewpoints of Weber and Durkheim into a dialectic which cannot be 
positively resolved, a negative dialectic. Each understands a necessary feature of modern,
capitalist society, but each lacks a complete picture.  Adorno’s point is that these 
irreconcilable alternatives are reflections of a society that is founded upon contradiction: 
the process of exchange.
In opposition to the work of Durkheim and Weber as sociologists, Adorno aims for a 
critical, non-dogmatic form of sociology. Yet there is more to the story. Adorno’s 
engagement with the thought of Weber and Durkheim sought to come to terms with both
its correctness as well as its dogmatism. The importance of Durkheim for Adorno’s 
thought is primarily based upon his [Durkheim’s] conception of the “objective” status of 
sociology, as it was evidenced particularly in two related forms: the coerciveness of the 
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social fact, and the corresponding impenetrability of society as object to its subjects. 
Both stem ultimately from Durkheim’s collective realism. Adorno’s analysis of 
Durkheim’s sociological work as fundamentally anti-dialectical or reified reflected the 
problematic conception of the individual-collective relationship in his theory. The 
dualism of this foundation captures the “objectivity” of his work, in terms of its 
pretensions to a “scientificity.” Although Adorno frequently characterized Durkheim 
simplistically as merely a “positivist,” it is his conception of social collectivity as 
objectivity which gives him his foundational role in classical sociology, both for Adorno 
and for the field as a whole.
I would like to take some steps towards a better understanding of these issues  by 
examining Adorno’s critique of Durkheim in the light of his engagement with Kant and 
Hegel. In his struggles with German Idealism, as we have seen, Adorno wanted not only 
to move beyond idealism altogether, but he crucially adapted parts of each philosopher’s 
work. In his reading of Durkheim, this heritage is still evident. I believe that it 
fundamentally structures his reading of Durkheim. In this chapter, I will discuss this 
theme in two moments: (1) Durkheim’s attempt to rethink Kant’s transcendental 
grounding of knowledge; and (2) What Adorno refers to as Durkheim’s “Hegelianism” 
that is, his affinity with Hegel due to his conception of the collective or the universal, and
in terms of the relationship between sociality and morality. This discussion will then 
involve two essentials of Durkheim’s theory, in the context of his classical status within 
the sociological canon: the “scientific” status of his approach (what Adorno would refer 
to as his “positivism”), which will be seen through Adorno’s eyes as of Kantian heritage, 
and his “holistic” approach to society, which Adorno assimilates to his prior critique of 
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Hegel. The end result is that it is the relationship between sociology and philosophy that 
is at stake, a conception which follows from his German Idealist heritage.
The chapter proceeds as follows. I begin by discussing Durkheim’s attempt to 
ground the Kantian categories sociologically. This will allow an examination of Adorno’s 
critique of Durkheim, which plays on Adorno’s understanding of the Kant-Hegel 
relationship.  
2. Durkheim’s sociological project
The perspective of Durkheim, within the social sciences, moves forward in many ways 
from Kant’s philosophy. In terms of the Kantian or neo-Kantian origins of social science, 
Durkheim provides an interesting case study because of his explicit articulations of the 
methodology of sociology, and because of his belief that philosophical thought (and all 
thought) must be grounded sociologically. Durkheim’s attempt to move the new science 
of sociology beyond the philosophy of Kant is perhaps seen most clearly in his recasting 
of the transcendental deduction of the categories as a sociology of knowledge in The 
Elementary Forms of Religious Life. By examining this aspect of Durkheim’s work, we 
can get a fuller perspective on just how unsatisfying Durkheim’s (and all “scientific”) 
sociology is from Adorno’s perspective, and further understand the significance of the 
heritage of German Idealism for Adorno. Just as he argued that Kant discovered a key 
insight in the retention of “ontological difference,” Adorno wants to appropriate some 
aspects of Durkheim’s “sociological shift” for his own philosophy and social theory. The 
movement to the perspective of the social is an essential one, but there are fundamental 
problems with the way that Durkheim performs it, which, according to Adorno, are 
ultimately destructive for his form of sociology.
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There is a tension within Durkheim’s work which reflects that which we observed in 
Kantian philosophy. This tension remains evident today in the reception of Durkheim’s 
work, for example in the lack of consensus regarding its philosophical status. The 
questions over whether Durkheim is a “realist” or an “idealist,” whether he is a naïve 
positivist thinker who implored his colleagues to consider social facts as “things,” or a 
nuanced idealist philosopher, who believed that social life is made entirely of 
representations, have yet to be settled. The basis of this problem can be seen, through 
Adorno, to be ultimately rooted in Kantian philosophy. It connects centrally to 
foundational problems in the sociology of knowledge and thus to sociology generally. 
The notion of the “independence” of our thoughts or representations from “reality” lies 
at the root here; but the thesis of the “social construction” of reality constitutes an 
attempt at overcoming it. If we shift our perspective to consider the natural world an 
inherently social world, then the issue of idealism or realism, representation or reality, 
begins to blur. Kant’s thought does not lend itself to an easy positioning here, since he 
did not theorize the universal as “collective” in any sense, and also, importantly, did not 
recognize nor theorize the relationship between thought and social reality. Durkheim’s 
thought was also problematic in another way, in that, while it understood correctly the 
“realism” of our collective representations — i.e., understood the universal as a collective 
totality — he still did not recognize the implications of this for his form of sociological 
science.  
Durkheim’s ambitious efforts in this regard entailed the subsumption of 
epistemology beneath a theory of sociality. In the following, I will discuss this attempt, 
along with Adorno’s analysis of it, and go on to discuss their relationship more broadly. 
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Adorno’s own engagement with Kant and Hegel here is central, as it provides a 
framework for understanding not only his analysis of Durkheim’s work, but also the 
problematics and possibilities for social theory in general. Adorno understood this well. 
In his discussion of Adorno’s “complex and lifelong engagement with Kant,” Simon 
Jarvis notes that this engagement attests to Adorno’s recognition that the turn towards 
the social and sociology can provide no shield from the problems of epistemology (Jarvis 
1998, 148). Adorno would remain concerned with epistemology throughout his life; and 
it is in this context that his assessment of Durkheim is significant. Adorno wanted at all 
costs to avoid the transcendental method of Kant.122 As Jarvis also notes, Adorno’s long 
concern was to develop a philosophical materialism, however difficult this may be to 
define. The problem of idealism for Adorno is essentially the problem of the given, of 
something irreducible, beyond which thought cannot go. In such moments, our thought 
is conceived of as passive (Jarvis 1998, 149; see Hegel PG §578). “When thinking comes 
to a halt with an abstract appeal to history, or society, or ‘socio-historical material 
specificity,’ or any other form of givenness, it might as well stop with God” (Jarvis 1998: 
149). We cannot presume access to such an immediacy. Adorno’s quest is to move 
122
 This claim is from Jarvis (1998, 148ff.). O’Connor (2004) in fact claims the opposite, that 
Adorno employs a modified version of Kant’s transcendental critique. The argument is roughly 
this: In O’Connor’s analysis (2004: 25f.; 54f.), Adorno combines a transcendental critical method 
with a version of antinomy that differs from that of Kant, in that it is internal rather than 
external. These may both be called transcendental critique because they are both concerned with 
the contradictions that arise when a philosophy fails to properly account for the conditions of 
possibility of experience. O’Connor considers Adorno’s thesis of the priority of the object to stem 
from an implicit argument about its necessity as a “feature of experience . . . that must be 
assumed in any intelligible discussion of experience.” Jarvis, on the other hand, focuses his 
analysis on Adorno’s practice of metacritique, in the sense that it conducts a further critique on 
the Kantian version. This metacritique emphasizes that Kant’s understanding of experience is 
already impoverished, in that it does not understand its own social-historical genesis. Although 
this could be considered to be an examination of the conditions of possibility of experience, it is 
rather of a particular kind of (reduced) experience. O’Connor wants to claim that Adorno is 
looking for the conditions of possibility of unreduced experience.
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beyond such an abstract appeal, which ultimately reduces to a metaphysical claim. 
Adorno’s critique of, and occasional recourse to, Durkheim typically focuses on 
Durkheim’s attempt to give Kantian philosophy a social turn.
2.1 Durkheim on the individual and the collective
For Durkheim, as opposed to the philosophers who preceded him, the basic reality of the 
world is a social reality in a fundamental way. He is famous for suggesting that there are 
such things as “social facts,” which can be investigated in a positive, empirical manner, 
as in the natural sciences. Durkheim was very involved in furthering the autonomization 
of the academic discipline of sociology. Trained as a philosopher, he argued throughout 
his career for the type of shift in thinking that he saw as necessary for the modern world. 
His conception of the discipline of sociology was founded on this notion of the social fact;
and the “holistic” conception of the social field, as well as the “objective” scientific status 
of his sociology constitute the foundation of Durkheim’s sociological thought. These are 
of course closely related, and can be viewed, in a Kantian light, as two forms of 
objectivity: the “objectivity” of the collective and the “objectivity” of scientific thought. 
This formulation highlights the significance of the relationship between knowledge 
forms, and the individual/collective dynamic, which is at the center of both Durkheim’s 
and Adorno’s work.
According to Durkheim, the sui generis nature of societies must be the starting point
for anyone who wants to conduct a scientific, sociological investigation. Working from an
explicitly holistic perspective, Durkheim postulates “social facts” which pertain only to 
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the totality of society, not its individual parts.123 The first chapter of his methodological 
work, The Rules of Sociological Method, is concerned with the explication of the concept 
of the social fact; nevertheless, the concept still creates some puzzlement today (Gilbert 
1994, 86). Lukes notes that the French term, fait, “has a somewhat different meaning 
from ‘fact,’ signifying ‘that which exists or occurs or is real’ rather than ‘that which is the 
case’” (1973, 9, n. 39). Durkheim is in this way concerned to specify, more rigorously 
than had been done previously, the sense of the “social” which designates certain unique 
types of phenomena. “When I fulfil [sic] my obligations as brother, husband, or citizen, 
when I execute my contracts, I perform duties which are defined, externally to myself 
and my acts, in law and in custom. Even if they conform to my own sentiments and I feel 
their reality subjectively, such reality is still objective, for I did not create them; I merely 
inherited them through my education” (RSM 1; emphasis added). After he notes some 
examples such as the systems of money and language, Durkheim refers to these social 
facts as “ways of acting, thinking, and feeling” (RSM 2).
His well-known definition is that a “social fact is every way of acting, fixed or not, 
capable of exercising on the individual an external constraint; or again, every way of 
acting which is general throughout a given society, while at the same time existing in its 
own right independent of its individual manifestations” (RSM 13). This definition, as 
Gilbert (1994) has noted, is really two separate definitions; I will adopt her language and 
refer to the terms of the first definition as those of “external constraint” and the of the 
second as “generality-plus-independence.”124 In the first definition, a “fact” (something 
123 Based upon his notion of the sui generis status of the social, Durkheim has a conceptual 
problem linking the individual to society, the part to the whole. For a extensive treatment of 
Durkheim’s conception of the part/whole relationship, see Nielsen (1999).
124
 See also Lukes (1973, 11-15).
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that “occurs or is real”) is social when it has some power over the individual, a power 
which is located outside of that individual. “These types of conduct or thought are not 
only external to the individual but are, moreover, endowed with coercive power, by 
virtue of which they impose themselves upon him, independent of his individual will. 
[This is] an intrinsic characteristic of these facts, the proof thereof being that it asserts 
itself as soon as I attempt to resist it” (RSM 2). The second definition claims that the 
social behaviour be “general,” although Durkheim elsewhere states that “sociological 
phenomena cannot be defined by their universality” (RSM 6). The inclusion of generality
appears to be a slip, as a phenomena which is general need not necessarily be social. In 
other words, a belief may be held by each individual within a society or a social group, 
and still not be “collective;” as Durkheim clarified, diffusion among a group is a 
characteristic of a social fact, but to this we must “add as a second and essential 
characteristic that its own existence is independent of the individual forms it assumes in 
its diffusion” (RSM 10).
The criterion of externality clearly sets up a dichotomy between individual and social
in Durkheim’s work; however, he never made the nature of this relationship explicit. One
gets a different understanding of it from the Division of Labor than from the 
Elementary Forms. Durkheim wanted to consider social facts in themselves, and for this 
reason he stated that they exist in themselves, but his language was vague as to the exact 
meaning of this internal/external relationship. Clearly social facts are not “external” in 
the same way as is the natural world, the study of which was a model for Durkheim’s 
conception of method, but rather begin as external to any particular individual. He often 
uses a metaphor of levels when discussing the relationship between the part and the 
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whole, and between the individual and society. The social is an order of a “higher” level, 
which cannot be reduced to, or deduced from, the properties of the lower, individual, 
order.125 As individuals come to associate with each other, a new social order is created, 
which has its own properties and characteristics. 
Such a stance creates problems for a conception of the relationship between the 
individual and the social system, which must be handled by a social theory. The 
problems with this form of dualism become obvious when translated into Durkheim’s 
theory of human nature. Within the human individual, according to Durkheim, there are 
“states of consciousness” which correspond to both the individual and social orders of 
being.
One class merely expresses our organisms and the objects to which they are most directly 
related. Strictly individual, the states of consciousness of this class connect us only with 
ourselves, and we can no more detach them from us than we can detach ourselves from 
our bodies. The states of consciousness of the other class, on the contrary, come to us 
from society; they transfer society into us and connect us with something that surpasses 
us. Being collective, they are impersonal; they turn us toward ends that we hold in 
common with other men; it is through them and them alone that we can communicate 
with others (DHN 337).
Here Durkheim discusses the relationship explicitly in terms of a dualism, claiming that 
the individual and social states of the individual constitute different “classes,” and that it 
is the social state of consciousness which connects us with others.
The conception of the social is, for Durkheim, essentially linked to his holistic 
perspective. His version of sociological explanation, as opposed to both philosophical 
125
 For example: “as the association is formed it gives birth to phenomena which do not derive 
directly from the nature of the associated elements, and the more elements involved and the more
powerful their synthesis, then the more marked is this partial independence. No doubt it is this 
that accounts for the flexibility, freedom and contingence that the superior forms of reality show 
in comparison with the lower forms in which they are rooted” (ICR 30). Lukes (1973, 58) 
postulates that Durkheim was influenced in this view by his mentor Émile Boutroux, a neo-
Kantian philosopher who “maintained that there were different orders of reality, and that each 
was contingent with respect to the one below it: thus, physico-chemical phenomena formed the 
basis of life, but they did not of themselves produce biological phenomena, which were, therefore, 
contingent with respect to them.”
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argument and psychological explanation, requires a specific attention to the “social 
milieu.” (Stedman Jones 2001, 150ff.). However, the characterization of the social 
changed over the course of his career, as did, consequently, the nature of the relationship
between the individual and society. The distinction that is important here is between a 
concept of the social totality, the social “substance,” as a “homogeneous mass in which all
the units are identical . . . Structured at the beginning of all organized society in the form 
of clan based society,” and which undergo change at the level of the whole (Nielsen 1999, 
68; DL 200ff.), and the idea of the social implicit in his theory of collective 
representations (RSM, 34; ICR). I discuss this distinction briefly here, as it is crucial to 
my analysis.
2.2 Durkheim’s epistemological argument: rethinking Kant
The theory of collective representations is developed by Durkheim in The Elementary 
Forms of Religious Life to make a sociological argument against the Kantian 
philosophical conception of epistemology and the knowing subject. For Durkheim, this 
critique constitutes an essential aspect of the argument for the autonomy of sociology in 
relation to philosophy. His  argument attempts to remove the Kantian categories of the 
understanding from their transcendental sphere, and to re-ground them in social 
practices, arguing that “the study of [social] religious phenomena provides a means of 
revisiting problems that until now have been debated only among philosophers” (EF 8). 
According to Durkheim, philosophers have not appreciated the contribution of religion, 
and hence of the essentially social practices which ground it, to the formation of the 
human intellect; and he is clear that his own work is intended to transcend the 
unreconciled philosophical dichotomy of empiricism and rationalism, or “apriorism.” 
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“[T]he rationalism that is immanent in the sociological theory of knowledge stands 
between empiricism and classical apriorism. For the first, the categories are purely 
artificial constructs; for the second, on the other hand, they are naturally given . . .” (EF 
17, n. 22). Durkheim here refers to Kant’s transcendental idealist (apriorist) argument 
that the categories are “pure,” i.e. prior to experience, as well as to an empirical account 
such as Hume’s (to which Kant was in part responding), in which the categories are 
considered to have been derived from experience; he boldly claims a sociological 
resolution to the philosophical debate.
By attempting to work out a social theory of the origins of the categories, Durkheim 
makes up for what he feels is the failure of the philosophers to adequately explain them. 
By remaining trapped within their internalist, reflective methods, philosophers were not 
able to transcend an individual perspective, and consequently stopped short of an 
adequate scientific explanation. The empiricist account remains unable to properly 
account for the universality and the necessity of the categories. As Durkheim puts it, “to 
reduce reason to experience is to make reason disappear,” which eventually leads us into 
“irrationalism” (EF 13). The trouble with empiricism, Durkheim argues, is its inherent 
individualism; it holds that the forms of thought stem solely from our individual 
experience, and hence cannot capture the universality and the necessity which they 
present. The empiricist thesis thus denies “all objective reality;” that is, since it bases the 
forms on individual experience and ultimately on sensation, then they are 
“fundamentally individual and subjective” (EF 13). We have no way of getting from this 
starting point to any kind of “objectivity.” The philosophical approach of a rationalist 
such as Kant, on the other hand, accommodates the power of the intellect to “transcend 
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experience,” but comes at the cost of a “scientific” rationality. The Kantian account can 
“offer neither explanation nor warrant” to this power of the intellect. “‘Merely to say it is 
inherent in the nature of human intellect is not to explain that power . . . To confine 
oneself to saying that experience is possible only on that condition is to shift the 
problem, perhaps, but not to solve it. The point is to know how it happens that 
experience is not enough, but presupposes conditions that are external to and prior to 
experience. . .” (EF 14). A key to his claim is that it is the scientific nature of sociology 
which allows it to overcome the philosophical standpoint.
From Durkheim’s perspective, Kant’s appeal to a transcendental realm for the 
grounding of the categories makes little sense; if they cannot be simply claimed as an 
essential part of human nature, then their origin must be social and historical (EF 10-11). 
Since the categories are “held in common,” they must be of common, social origin. The 
Kantian solution to the opposition of rationalism and empiricism is thus rejected by 
Durkheim. However, to say that the categories are social does not resolve any Kantian 
antinomies.  In his move away from Kantianism, Durkheim wants to retain its dualism of
form and content, which he refers to as its “fundamental thesis.” This thesis states that 
“knowledge is formed from two sets of elements that are irreducible one to the other—
two distinct, superimposed layers” (EF 14). He clarifies that he understands the 
condition of innateness to ultimately reduce to this criterion of duality, since there must 
be an element or form of cognition that is distinct from empirical knowledge. Thus, 
Durkheim’s theory retains a form of dualism, in which knowledge is divided not between 
form and content, but rather according to an individual, empirical part, and a collective, 
categorical part. Empirical knowledge corresponds to an “individual” state, and is 
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“wholly explained by the psychic nature of the individual” (EF 15). The categories, on the 
other hand, are “essentially collective representations,” each of which “translates states 
of the collectivity, first and foremost. They depend upon the way in which the collectivity 
is organized, upon its morphology, its religious, moral, and economic institutions, and so
on.”126 The hiatus between these two forms, or levels, of knowledge, is then directly 
analogous to that between the individual and the social, in that neither one may be 
derived from the other.
 With this analysis, Durkheim essentially grounds the transcendental in the social, 
and translates the Kantian notion of objectivity from a philosophical to a sociological 
idiom. For Durkheim, a category should be considered “objective” in the sense that it 
does not just structure my own experience, but that of everyone (within my 
“civilization”). Durkheim here wants to explicitly move away from a Kantian notion of 
“objectivity,” which relates precisely to the transcendental “I” in that it ‘is grounded in 
the “order and regularity in the appearances” which “we ourselves introduce”’ (Caygill 
1995, 379; see CPR A 89/B 122). The semantic shift made here by Durkheim takes the 
objectivity of the sphere of the transcendental and replaces it with the requirement of 
generality. Something is objective to the extent that it is shared by those in my society or
my “civilization.” As I’ll emphasize below, this shift is precisely what Adorno designated 
in his critique of the Kantian transcendental, when he criticized Kant for leaving his use 
of “we” unanalyzed, but which he would also criticize Durkheim for (KK 258/170).
By designating the categories as collective representations, Durkheim reduces the 
Kantian notions of “universality” and “necessity,” which comprise “objectivity,” to a 
126
 In a footnote, Durkheim clarifies that, although he clearly differentiates the two types of 
knowledge, “there probably is no case in which those two sorts of elements are not found closely 
bound up together” (EF 15, n. 17).
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social and sociological framework; but these both reduce to commonality among a 
collective. He asserts that the units by which our conception of time is organized, the 
divisions of days, weeks, etc., correspond to concrete social events. “[T]he category of 
time expresses a time common to the group . . . This category itself is a true social 
institution” (EF 10; EF 10, n. 6).127 The distinction of the category is thus made according 
to its collectivity; consequently, such categories serve as indices for the relationship 
between the individual and the social. In other words, categories provide a record of the 
social structure, and serve to connect us to both the collective, and, through it, to 
ourselves.
The category of time is not simply a partial or complete commemoration of our lived life. 
It is an abstract and impersonal framework that contains not only our individual 
existence but also that of humanity. It is like an endless canvas on which all duration is 
spread out before the mind’s eye and on which all possible events are located in relation 
to points of reference that are fixed and specified. It is not my time that is organized in 
this way; it is time that is conceived objectively by all men [sic] of the same civilization. 
This by itself is enough to make us begin to see that any such organization would have to 
be collective. And indeed, observation establishes that these indispensable points, in 
reference to which all things are arranged temporally, are taken from social life. The 
division into days, weeks, months, years, etc., corresponds to the recurrence of rites, 
festivals, and public ceremonies at regular intervals. A calendar expresses the rhythm of 
collective activity while ensuring that regularity (EF 10).
Via their social origination, these mental constructs retain a “collective” character, and 
serve as a kind of internal connection between the individual social being (as a possessor 
and user of the categories) and the group. Durkheim refers to these “collective 
representations” as “the product of an immense cooperation;” they contain a “very 
127
 Following Hamelin, Durkheim discusses time as a concept, rather than as an intuition as Kant 
had done, “because there is no difference between the role these notions [time and space] play in 
intellectual life and that which falls to notions of kind and cause” (EF 8, n. 4). This criticism of the
difference appears unsatisfying on the face of it (though see Rawls 2004, 50f. for an account in 
terms of Durkheim’s distinction between perception and emotion); however the distinction is less 
important for my argument here than the claim that time is obviously social, according to 
Durkheim, because it may not be separated from the social practices by which we “divide, 
measure, and express it with objective signs” (EF 9).
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special intellectuality that is infinitely richer and more complex than that of the 
individual” (EF 15).128
In his conception of the categories as collective representations, which “translate 
states of the collectivity” (EF 15), Durkheim shows his affinity with the rationalists, and 
turns the rationalist epistemologist understanding of “collective” into a social conception
of necessity. If the categories are necessary and universal, by virtue of their social origin, 
then they must be coercive. Durkheim’s conceptual translation of Kantian objectivity 
turns universality into commonality, and logical necessity into coercion.
They [the categories] are the most general concepts that exist, because they are applied to
all that is real; and just as they are not attached to any particular object, they are 
independent of any individual subject. They are the common ground where all minds 
meet. What is more, minds meet there of necessity: Reason, which is none other than the 
fundamental categories taken together, is vested with an authority that we cannot escape 
at will. When we try to resist it, to free ourselves from some of these fundamental notions,
we meet sharp resistance. Hence, far from merely depending upon us, they impose 
themselves upon us (EF 13).
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 Recent research has broadened understanding of the “eclectic spiritualist” philosophical 
origins of Durkheim’s concept of “representation,” which underlies his understanding of the 
categories (see, e.g., Brooks (1998); Schmaus (2004); and Stedman Jones (2000; 2001). Susan 
Stedman Jones has done the most extensive work on Renouvier, in English, and provides a gloss 
on his conception of representation,which formed the basis for Durkheim’s own. 
“[R]epresentation is neither a projection, nor a reflection, nor an intermediary between a subject 
and an object. Representation is sufficient unto itself” (Hamelin, Le Système de Renouvier, p. 49; 
quoted in Jones 2001, 68). The implications of such an understanding are significant, not least for
the type of criticism that Adorno launched against Durkheim. Jones’s reading of Renouvier allows
an interpretation of Durkheim’s “externalism” — i.e., his apparent focus on the objective and 
social, through neglect of the subjective and individual — and she clarifies that Durkheim’s 
emphasis on both “external reality” and representations should be seen in light of Renouvier. 
Durkheim “sees both [things and persons] as aspects of general social relations: the person as 
part of, and constituted through, a system of social relations, and material things as the repository
of cultural and economic values’”(2001, 69). Brooks notes that the notions of “moral fact” and 
“social fact” both stemmed from eclectic philosophy (1998, 215). Schmaus (2004) similarly notes 
that Durkheim’s explication and critique of the categories was based upon the way that they were 
understood in the eclectic spiritualist tradition, as “psychologically necessary conditions, which 
led to the subjectivist reading of the critical philosophy according to which it was unable to 
explain or justify the application of the categories to our experience of the external world” (137). 
On this conception, the theory of the categories was thus the property of the discipline of 
psychology, and Durkheim’s attempted appropriation of it for sociology was based upon this 
premise.
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The categories now, in Durkheim’s terms, are a “common ground,” which, precisely by 
this virtue, gain an authority over individuals. Here is where the dependency relation 
becomes inverted: once constituted as “common,” the categories of our reason serve to 
rule us.129
Some further difficulties of this account become clear once Durkheim attempts to 
clarify the nature of the individual/collective dichotomy within the individual. If thought
is to be split between an empirical/individual and a rational/collective moment, then 
social subjects must have direct intellectual access to the collective. Durkheim handles 
this problem with a conception of human nature.
[W]e understand how reason has gained the power to go beyond the range of empirical 
cognition. It owes this power not to some mysterious virtue but simply to the fact that, as 
the well-known formula has it, man is double. In him are two beings: an individual being 
that has its basis in the body and whose sphere of action is strictly limited by this fact, and
a social being that represents within us the highest reality in the intellectual and moral 
realm that is knowable through observation: I mean society. In the realm of practice, the 
consequence of this duality in our nature is the irreducibility of the moral ideal to the 
utilitarian motive; in the realm of thought, it is the irreducibility of reason to individual 
experience. As part of society, the individual naturally transcends himself, both when he 
thinks and when he acts (EF 15-6).
There are significant epistemological implications of such a move. According to 
Durkheim’s account, Kant made an advance when he performed his Copernican turn 
toward the subject, since he thus located rationality within the human individual, but he 
did not take it far enough (DHN 334). For Durkheim, the fundamental duality of “human
nature” consists, in the first place, in the distinction between sensation and cognition, 
129
 At points Durkheim relies upon a functional account of necessity, arguing that it is essential for
individuals because they enable social life. This leads to awkward constructions like “society 
cannot leave the categories up to the free choice of individuals” and “in order to prevent 
dissidence, society weighs down on its members with all its authority,” But the important 
question here is just what this form of social necessity can mean for Durkheim. He claims that 
there is a “very special authority that is inherent in reason and that makes us trustingly accept its 
promptings” (EF 16). This turns out not to be a feature particular to reason itself, but rather one 
deriving from the social component of reason, from its social-ness. It is simply “the authority of 
society, passing into certain ways of thinking that are the indispensable conditions of all common 
action” (EF 16-17).
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intuition and concept. But he translates this distinction into that between the individual 
(sensation) and the collective (cognition). Sensations, for Durkheim, only pertain to the 
human individual, while concepts are “distinguished by the fact that the rules of conduct 
to which they conform can be universalized” (DHN 327). This translation of the Kantian 
duality of concept and intuition stems directly from Durkheim’s understanding of the 
social basis of the categories (concepts). He isolates the external, collective influence into
one “side” of the human being, claiming that its nature is fundamentally split. “Far from 
being simple, our inner life has something that is like a double center of gravity. On the 
one hand is our individuality—and, more particularly, our body in which it is based; on 
the other is everything in us that expresses something other than ourselves” (DHN 328). 
The duality reflects a Cartesian duality of mind and body.
 Durkheim’s engagement with Kantian epistemology retains its dualism while 
attempting to ground it empirically and scientifically. The categories must not be placed 
outside of the realm of nature and of science, which is exactly where the transcendental 
realm lies, according to Durkheim. Although the rationale here is based solely upon 
Durkheim’s theory of science and his faith in its capabilities, this is a presupposition. The
sociological key is to retain the focus on the individual subject, but not to take it as a 
given, to recognize that it has come into being historically, and that therefore we can 
provide an account of its origins and development.130
Through his interpretation of Kant, Durkheim’s sociological account of knowledge 
merges with his attempt at a science of morality, while his refusal to strictly differentiate 
130
 “[T]he important thing to determine from our consideration of the fact that we have aptitudes 
for living both a personal and an impersonal life, is not what name it is proper to give to these 
contradictory aptitudes, but how it is that in spite of their opposition, they exist in a a single and 
identical being” (DHN 334).
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between theoretical and practical reason shows some affinity with Hegel. Is Hegel’s 
critique of Kant then relevant to a full understanding of Durkheim’s work? To explore 
this question, I turn to Adorno’s commentary on and critique of Durkheim. While often 
polemical in tone, and ungenerous in its interpretation, Adorno’s reading of Durkheim is
designed to uncover its potential for a transformed sociological reason. 
3. Adorno’s critique of Durkheim
In this section, I aim to accomplish the following objectives. Given my introduction to 
Durkheim’s work, I want to use Adorno’s reading of Durkheim to show that: (1) Adorno’s
own reading of Durkheim was structured by his interpretation of the philosophies of 
Kant and Hegel; and that (2) this fact can help us understand both the significance of 
these philosophers for sociological reason, and Adorno’s own conception of the 
relationship between philosophy and sociology. Adorno’s most sustained commentary on
Durkheim is in his introduction to the German translation of Philosophy and Sociology 
(EDu).131 
131
 Adorno’s complex relationship to Durkheim’s sociology was prefigured in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment. There Adorno used Durkheim’s work on classification to bolster his case that 
“take on the expression of the fetish” (DE 16). 
Even the deductive form of science mirrors hierarchy and compulsion. Just as the first 
categories represented the organized tribe and its power over the individual, the entire 
logical order, with its chains of inference and dependence, the superordination and 
coordination of concepts, is founded on the corresponding conditions in social reality, that is,
on the division of labor’. Adorno continues: Of course, this social character is not, as 
Durkheim argues, an expression of social solidarity but evidence of the impenetrable unity of
society and power. Power confers increased cohesion and strength on the social whole in 
which it is established. The division of labor, through which power manifests itself socially, 
serves the self-preservation of the dominated whole. . . Power confronts the individual as the 
universal, as the reason which informs reality. The power of all the members of society, to 
whom as individuals no other way is open, is constantly summated, through the division of 
labor imposed on them, in the realization of the whole, whose rationality is thereby 
multiplied over again. What is done to all by the few always takes the form of the subduing of
individuals by the many: the oppression of society always bears the features of oppression by
a collective. It is this unity of collectivity and power, and not the immediate social universal, 
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3.1 Adorno and the Kantian Durkheim
3.1.1 The Epistemological Subject
As we saw in Chapter 3, Adorno’s criticism of Kant’s theory of subjectivity 
emphasized its problematic constitution through abstraction; the Kantian 
transcendental subject dropped any trace of its origins in the concrete, human 
individual. Despite, or rather because, of this, the Kantian subject itself served as the 
ground of objectivity. In its pure abstraction as the transcendental, Kant believed that 
his subject could constitute its reality as appearance or phenomena. The subject as the 
unity of apperception is the guarantor of objectivity, i.e., of necessity and universality. 
However, such “objectivity,” in Adorno’s opinion, remains fundamentally subjective. It 
relies upon “the universality of subjective reason, a universality generated simply by the 
constitution of a human subject that comprehends things in this way and no other. It 
stands in stark contrast to the objective concept of reason such as can be found with 
exemplary force in traditional philosophy in the thought of Plato” (KK 216/143). As 
opposed to Plato, who considered rationality to be an aspect of the things themselves, 
Kant locates it within the human mind. The idea that this form of subjectivity can 
provide an Archimedean point is a “transcendental illusion [Schein]” (ND 182/181).
Adorno in fact acknowledges the contribution of Durkheim to the attempted “de-
transcendalization” of Kantinan subjectivity (H 303/63; KK 255f./168f.; ME 83/76 ; SO 
757/257). In Durkheim’s attempt to rethink the Kantian categories, and consequently the
Kantian subject, Adorno notes the ambiguity in the concept of universality, which he 
solidarity, which is precipitated in intellectual forms . . . Enlightenment finally devoured not 
only symbols but also their successors, universal concepts, and left nothing of metaphysics 
behind except the abstract fear of the collective form from which it had sprung (DE 16-17).
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claims was not admitted by Kant. The criterion of universality implies that something (a 
concept, a judgment) must be valid for all experience, including all future experience; 
but it also implies “something that comes very close to the concept of consensus, the 
agreement of all human beings” (KK 217/143). Following Adorno’s interpretation, we can
say that universality contains an abstract, transcendental moment, as well as an 
empirical moment.
The entire question of this universality . . . would lack substance unless all subjects 
endowed with reason, all human beings — as Kant would insist at this point — must think
in this way, and unless there is a connection between the empirical nature of their minds 
and the mechanism of universality that is supposed to be grounded in reason. Only if 
human beings must think in this way will a proposition be truly universal. What we might
call this anthropological element is therefore implicit here (KK 218/144).
We can read Adorno’s anthropological argument here as being akin to, if not rooted in, 
Durkheim’s critique of Kant. Contra Kant, universality is precisely a social category; 
given this anthropological element of the concept of universality, we should say that the 
empirical subject is in actuality also a social subject. 
 Adorno links this critique explicitly to the concept of necessity, and argues that 
there is a clear analogy to be made between the two dichotomies of individual/universal 
and contingent/necessary. The forms of consciousness “have their universality in the fact
that they are the forms of all conscious persons . . . and that compared to them the 
individual consciousness stands opposed to the social consciousness in the same ratio 
as the relatively accidental and particular stands opposed to necessity and its laws, to 
the universal which operates in accordance with rules . . .” (KK 218-9/144; emphasis 
added). Here again the connection to Adorno’s reading of Durkheim is apparent. 
The interpretation of Durkheim which Adorno frequently articulated emphasized 
the ideological character of his work. He effectively applauds Durkheim for the 
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inspiration of providing a sociological critique of Kantian epistemology, while 
simultaneously taking him to task for his execution. Characteristically, the balance sheet 
is somewhat difficult to draw up, as Adorno often merely gives brief reference to 
Durkheim’s work, rather than engaging with it significantly. The key to understanding 
Durkheim, according to Adorno, is in recognizing the reflection of social contradictions 
within his work. Put differently, Durkheim’s sociology clearly expresses these 
contradictions in theoretical form. Ultimately, “Durkheim’s account is just as antinomic 
as Kant’s” (KK 255/168).
The critiques of Kant and Durkheim often run parallel. According to Adorno, the 
ultimate resting place of the Kantian philosophy on the foundational status of the 
transcendental subject is implicit in the sociological work of Durkheim. Although 
Durkheim fundamentally incorporates society into his conception of knowledge, he does 
so in an abstract and ultimately idealist fashion. Adorno believes that Durkheim 
conceives of society as an abstract given; it is an abstract “something,” which is conceived
exactly as immediate, i.e., unmediated. Durkheim “endorses that which has become 
[Gewordenes], despite the insight into its become-ness [Gewordenheit], for the sake of 
its exact development [um seines so und nicht anders Gewordenseins willen],” (EDu 
273). Due to this conception, Durkheim refrains from sufficiently questioning the status 
of the social as given. (EDu 252).
The issue is interesting to Adorno in part because, from his perspective, he can 
characterize Durkheim as actually recognizing the “double character of Geist,” but 
nevertheless misunderstanding or mischaracterizing the relationship of its two 
moments. It is significant that Adorno here employs the language of post-Kantian 
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idealism to describe Durkheim’s shortcomings. According to Adorno, Durkheim’s 
understanding was “that it [Geist]—societally arisen and an internal moment of the 
societal life-process—confronted being [Dasein] as something new, and developed 
according to its own lawful regularity. He moreover reduced spirit to being” (EDu 274). 
Adorno’s critique here is familiar; he sees Durkheim as having articulated a fundamental
dichotomy of modern society, in that the social is both inter-subjectively constituted, and
reified as objective. He is, like Kant, “pushed to the dialectic.” Durkheim in some sense 
recognized the nature of mediation, but he did not theorize it.
Adorno refers to Durkheim as the unacknowledged founder of the tradition of the 
sociology of knowledge, “probably” influencing Scheler and Mannheim (EDu 274). As 
we’ve seen, this is the problem of attempts to get beyond idealism: they end up positing 
an “immediacy” which should not be conceived as such. In Durkheim’s case this went so 
far as to enable him to “ground” the categories of knowledge sociologically. However, for 
Adorno this is merely a substitution of metaphysics for metaphysics, idealism for 
idealism. Instead of positing a transcendental realm which is to explain the forms of our 
knowledge, Durkheim posits a social one. But this only amounts to something like a 
transcendentalization of the social. This leads to logical difficulties which Adorno claims 
can be seen in Durkheim’s attempted social and sociological grounding of the categories: 
his reasoning is circular, in that, in attempting to explain the social origins of the 
categories, he must employ them (EDu 275). However, this critique, which may be 
modeled on Hegel’s critique of Kant in the introduction to the Phenomenology, is only 
powerful if we assume that Durkheim was engaged in a transcendental deduction of the 
categories. The point is that, in Adorno’s analysis, Durkheim follows an ultimately 
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unproductive path in his attempted sociological reformulation of Kant. According to 
Adorno’s conception, society as spirit must encompass both subjectivity and objectivity; 
and although Durkheim recognizes this to some extent, he cannot link the two 
theoretically, dialectically. He ends up with a conception of objectivity which is collective 
or social—as opposed to Kant’s individually-grounded conception of objectivity—but 
which nevertheless is philosophically and epistemologically problematic.
 Adorno’s complaint that Durkheim’s theory leads to the door of speculation, but 
that he could not cross it, translates into a concern with mediation. “In the most 
advanced places of his speculation, however, flash the possibility that the truth may be 
societally mediated, without truth dissolving” (EDu 275). Durkheim’s notion of 
objectivity here simply reduces to collectivity, but it still lacks an essential mediation 
with the individual. Adorno’s frequent claim that “mediation is involved in everything” 
(KK 224/147) is itself necessarily ambiguous. Roughly speaking, it may refer to social 
mediation, or to the mediation between consciousness and the world. In the discussion 
of Durkheim’s epistemology, then, we must differentiate between 1) the social mediation 
which gives rise to certain forms of knowledge; and 2) the individual mediation of this 
form of knowledge by consciousness. As we’ve seen, Adorno’s critique of idealism holds 
that the transcendental (the “beyond” or the “given”) must not be characterized as such; 
it is rather only “quasi-transcendental” (ND 64/54). This is the reality of reification, or 
the state of being un-mediated. The nature of “social mediation,” the passing of 
everything through social relation, leads up to the moment of knowledge, which then 
must be characterized. So, on the one hand, we have social mediation, and on the other, 
knowledge of such social mediation.
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For Adorno, Durkheim’s “sociologism” falls just as short as Kant’s 
transcendentalism did. In his lectures on Kant, after a long discussion of the relationship
of the constituens and the constitutum, Adorno emphasizes its importance for 
sociological knowledge. However, there is no question of discovering the “origin” or the 
“foundation” of the categories, as Durkheim attempted to do with his epistemological 
claims in The Elementary Forms of Religious Life. The whole “question of which comes 
first — actual existence or formal category — is misguided” (KK 258/170). They are 
rather parts of the same whole, and the notion of them as being independent, of one as 
capable of being first, is only a product of our reflective thought. This is the first 
important point to be learned from Kant in the philosophical realm, and from Durkheim 
in the sociological.
3.1.2 The moral subject
Adorno’s critique of Kant’s moral philosophy proceeds analogously to his critique of 
Kantian theoretical philosophy.132 Just as the Kantian theoretical subject cannot be 
considered to synthesize heterogeneous concept and intuition, the Kantian will cannot 
unproblematically join together reason and desire. Yet, just as with his valorization of the
Kantian thing-in-itself, Adorno believes that something of the Kantian will’s autonomy 
must, against Durkheim, be preserved. In Adorno’s analysis, Durkheim’s conception of 
morality follows closely that of sociality: “All morality appears to us as a system of rules 
of conduct” (DMF 35). “The positivist Durkheim only deduced without hesitation, what 
the transcendental idealist, who would rather accept the contradiction, refused to ignore:
the intelligible, for Durkheim, is leveled [einebnen] to the empirical, by virtue of its 
132
 My analysis here is indebted to Jütten (2010), who clearly demonstrates the parallels.
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character of ‘facticity’ . . .” (EDu 272). What is lost in this reduction of the intelligible to 
the empirical is the nonidentical. In these terms, Durkheim has transgressed the Kantian
block between the intelligible and the empirical, between the noumenal and the 
phenomenal worlds. The implications of such a move are, for Adorno, ideological. But 
the distinction between Durkheim and Kant on this issue is instructive. Their similarity, 
Adorno recognizes, is only “descriptive;” Kant’s central concept of “autonomy” becomes, 
for Durkheim, a social category of sanction. “Contrary to Kant, the moral rule and . . . the
ethical laws themselves are prescribed to the reason of individual consciousnesses from 
outside — not their own, but heteronomously” (EDu 273).133
What he reads as Durkheim’s attention to the fundamental experience of unfreedom
for the individual in capitalist modernity, is a corrective to Kant’s thesis of the autonomy 
of the intelligible sphere; but yet still doesn’t go far enough. Kant’s theory “removes 
freedom from the empirical world and locates it in the intelligible world, where its 
existence remains unaffected by empirical unfreedom” (Jütten 2010, 6). However, rather
than recognizing the nonidentity in the relationship between reason and desire, 
Durkheim collapsed the distinction. For Durkheim, morality becomes purely social, 
according to Adorno; whereas for Kant, it remains the will’s own. This analysis follows 
closely Adorno’s critique of Kant’s theory of knowledge. According to Adorno, reason, 
whether practical or theoretical, is both identical and nonidentical with nature (ND 
285/289), and therefore stands in a necessary dialectical (“natural historical”) 
relationship with both the body and the object. Where Kant had concerned himself with 
the validity of reason, over its genesis (Jütten 2010, 7), Durkheim, admitting the strict 
dichotomy, sought only its genesis. Adorno wants to rethink the relationship.
133
 For a thorough, alternative view on Durkheim’s notion of autonomy, see Miller (1996).
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Freedom towards the object, in the entire tradition of the enlightenment, Hegel included, 
means: detachment from desire [Wunsch] as the father of thought. At the same time, 
however, that behavior is constitutively already embedded in the simple logical judgment,
its claim to truth and to the rejection [Verwerfung] of untruth, which the cliché of 
valuations [Wertungen] , split off from their ground of knowledge, apportions. Thought, 
which the alleged value judgment demonizes, provided that it is not precipitated without 
a context of justification, quietly positions the immanent critical moment of cognition 
(EDu 259).
For Durkheim, in his equation of the social and the moral, ethics becomes “leveled 
merely to a positive science,” but “it wanted to strongly separate itself from the antithesis
of the Is and the Is-Ought” (EDu 272). Although Durkheim recognizes the antinomical 
character of such an attempt, “[h]e holds on to the normative structure of the moral, 
despite its empirical origin.” Here is Durkheim’s primary contradiction: the moral and 
the social both have an autonomy, which parallels that of the social science which 
pursues them. But for Adorno, “The concept of the moral fact is itself a paradox: 
something becomes the given – for Durkheim the social fact – that according to its own 
aspiration would like to be more than merely given, and that, as soon as it becomes 
nothing other than this, it forfeits its emphatic claim’”(EDu 272). How could sociology 
presume to understand morality?
It is here that, in Adorno’s analysis, Durkheim shows his affinity with Kant’s 
practical reason. “We shall show that moral rules are invested with a special authority by 
virtue of which they are obeyed simply because they command. We shall reaffirm, as a 
result of a purely empirical analysis, the notion of duty and nevertheless give a definition 
of it closely resembling that already given by Kant. Obligation is, then, one of  the 
primary characteristics of the moral rule” (DMF 35-6). It is the slippage between the 
notions of coercion and obligation that so bothers Adorno here. In his evaluation, 
Durkheim “derives [it] without hesitation from what the transcendental idealist — who 
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would rather accept contradiction — refused to overlook: for Durkheim, the intelligible is
leveled to empiricism, on account of the character of his ‘facticity,’ which to a certain 
extent Kant also concedes. According to him, every moral rule originates in the social” 
(EDu 272). But, Adorno is quick to point out, this account, despite its “descriptive” 
similarity to Kant, omits entirely the central Kantian concept of autonomy. Adorno’s 
Durkheim reduces morality to the social sanction, and relegates it to a social 
heteronomy.
3.1.3 Durkheim’s subject
The Durkheimian conception of the social object has implications as well for his 
understanding of the subject and subjectivity. We have seen above that Durkheim relies 
explicitly upon a dualistic conception of the human individual. He relates the realm of 
sensory intuition with the individual, physical, material body, and the realm of the 
understanding with the social, spiritual, immaterial. Both of these aspects appear to be 
present within the concrete, human individual. Although he did not write a direct 
critique of Kant on these grounds, Durkheim’s conception of the individual subject is a 
far cry from Kant’s. Following on Durkheim’s understanding of social or collective 
phenomena, he cannot understand the subject in any kind of transcendental fashion. As 
was also discussed above, Adorno’s critique of Kantian philosophy was focused in part on
the conception of the subject. Against the Kantian notion of a transcendental subject, a 
constitutive subject, Adorno posed an “anthropological-materialist” subject (H 263/16 ; 
See O’Connor 2004: 117ff.). Adorno complained that the link between the empirical and 
the transcendental subjects was too vague, and that consequently, the transcendental 
subject becomes a meaningless abstraction. Against the constitutive subject, Adorno 
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argued for a necessary account of the mediation of subject and object, which would solve 
the problem of this abstraction, by recognizing the essential link between subjectivity 
and objectivity, and that would properly prioritize the realm of the object. Objectivity 
must not be grounded in the subject; in fact, there can be no “grounding” of this sort at 
all.
The implicit critique of the Kantian subject in Durkheim’s work is, as far as it goes, 
premised on the same sorts of claims. For Durkheim, the “synthesis” of knowledge is 
performed collectively, not by an individual subject, be it transcendental or empirical. 
Durkheim throws away the Kantian “I think” for an essentially social subject, in the 
sense of one that it is formed through the social process (as opposed to a “collective 
subjectivity”). The limits that exist in its forms of knowledge stem not from the 
transcendental sphere, but rather from the sphere of the “social.” Yet when formulated 
this way, we can see that the Durkheimian shift retains the structure of the Kantian 
subject. Although he has postulated a mode of sociality which in part “constructs” the 
subject socially, the lack of specificity in his theory concerning this relation means that 
the social sphere functions, theoretically, as a transcendental phenomenon. Adorno uses 
this critique to claim that the very notion of the transcendental presupposes a concrete 
sociality. In this sense, he critiques Kant’s theory of the subject, and Durkheim’s 
conception of the social, simultaneously.
Relatedly, Adorno takes issue with the inherent duality in the subject which exists in
the theories of both Kant and Durkheim. Although Durkheim does not want any 
universal or abstract conception of the subject to ground his work, he transposes the 
Kantian duality of the subject into his theory. According to Kant, the world can either be 
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considered from the point of view of the way that it appears, or as it is “in itself” (Carr 
2003, 182). The subject, likewise, can be seen in such dichotomous perspective: either as 
an object of the world, or as a subject perceiving the world, as something constituted or 
constituting. The self, then is both a phenomenal object, something that exists in the 
world as other objects do, but it is also an experiencing self, it constitutes its own 
subjective realm. In an analysis of the transcendental subject, Carr asks:
If experiences, thoughts, ideas are conceived as properties of the self, how do they relate 
to the objects and the world they are about? The answer is usually a confused mixture of 
causality and resemblance, which come together in the problematic notion of 
representation. Posing the questions in this way sets up a barrier between the self and 
world that cannot be bridged, and the result is either a skepticism that gives up on 
knowledge altogether, or an idealism that reduces the rest of the world to the ideas we 
have of it. The first denies the openness to the world that is constitutive of our being as 
subjects; the second denies the transcendence of the world which is an ineradicable 
feature of its sense (2003, 183-4).
This encapsulates the problem that leads to the differentiation, in both Kant and, 
later, Husserl, of the transcendental and the empirical subject. As Carr (2003, 185) also 
makes clear, the “subjective’ conception of the subject, or the self, has priority for Kant 
because it simply cannot be considered an object without first being thought, and 
therefore is always presupposed. (Adorno will use similar reasoning to argue for the 
priority of the object.) This implies the necessity of the subject, its transcendental status. 
The transcendental subject came into being when Kant shifted the way of looking. 
“Instead of looking for everything in experience, we should ask after the conditions of 
possibility of experience. Of course, the ‘I think’ will not turn up in experience . . . 
because it belongs to those conditions of experience. In fact, it is chief among them” 
(Carr 2003, 188).
Such issues are not tangential to my interests here, but rather inhabit a central place
where the distinction between the “empirical” or “real,” and the “ideal” is to worked out. 
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Carr’s analysis makes clear that the so-called “subjective” idealism of Kant stemmed 
from his particular philosophical perspective, the shift in his theoretical position to a 
transcendental, critical viewpoint. Durkheim’s later arguments against both empiricism 
and rationalism are directly related here. The problem, as it has been posed, is the 
turning point in the creation of the dichotomy to begin with. Subject versus object, the 
self versus the world. How do the two relate? Are we to base our work on an empiricism, 
in which the autonomy of the self is denigrated, or on a rationalism, where the world is 
essentially devalued? Adorno pointed out that these two problems really have a common 
origin. The attempt to remove everything “objective,” to get down to the “pure” self of 
reason, is fundamentally misguided. We do not make our reason “objective” by doing so, 
but rather “subjective.” 
Adorno’s reading of Durkheim then emphasizes the limits that its commitment to a 
Kantian form of subjectivity require. According to the interpretation that I have been 
developing here, I’d like to move to a discussion of Adorno’s critique from a different 
angle: from the ways in which it handles “objectivity.” For Adorno, these are best 
understood through a sustained comparison with Hegel.
3.3 Durkheim as Hegelian
In this section, I use Adorno’s discussion and critique of Durkheim to highlight and 
explore both the nature of Adorno’s own project, as well as some of the philosophical 
problems with which both he and Durkheim struggled. I will make the claim that 
Adorno’s own thought isn’t as far from Durkheim’s as he himself appeared to believe. I 
will also point to some issues with Adorno’s reading of Durkheim, which is quite 
schematic; however, since the goal of this study is not to critique the veracity or cogency 
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of Adorno’s interpretation, but rather to explore what it reveals about Adorno’s own 
project, and the project of social science in general, I will not spend much time 
discussing these questions.
The discussion above brought out the issues of a theory of knowledge which 
attempts to ground the structure of thought in the social sphere, rather than in the 
transcendental. In this section, I focus on the concept of “objectivity,” which stems from 
Adorno’s reading of Durkheim and his understanding of contemporary (capitalist) 
society. His consistent praise for Durkheim’s grasp of the objectivity of society was 
always attenuated with the concern that the phenomenon itself was exacerbated by 
Durkheim’s approach to science. Adorno sought to critique Durkheim’s process of 
thought and theorizing here, and to show how Durkheim’s own experience of society lay 
at the root of his theory.
3.3.1 The objectivity of society
According to Adorno’s interpretation, Durkheim had, in his analysis of society, 
discovered one of its fundamental characteristics. Adorno believes that Durkheim 
understands the inherent objectivism of society, its “hardened” character, but also that 
he misunderstands it fundamentally by conceiving of it as an “ideal” and undialectical 
phenomenon. Durkheim “hit on a very central moment of socialization: that something 
originally made by human beings becomes institutionally autonomous in relation to 
human beings” (ES 140/81; see also PS 74f.). Durkheim discovered the social reality of 
reification, but he did not recognize it as such. This is a critique of Durkheim that Adorno
repeats throughout his work. Durkheim’s error of hypostatization stems from his 
conceiving the social along emergentist lines. Here, the undialectical character of 
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Durkheim’s analysis is emphasized in terms of the relationship between the individual 
and the social. If that which is specifically social is related to its “substrate,” the 
individual, as an emergent phenomenon — as with consciousness in the brain, or life to 
matter — then history is denied. The moment of emergence in Durkheim is for Adorno 
the moment of “reification,” the moment in which the true basis — the individual 
moment — gets  lost. 
This mistake leads to an “identification with the collective,” which of course for 
Adorno is a real social tendency, as well as a unexamined ideology of Durkheim’s theory.
With this criticism, Adorno brings together Durkheim’s conception of the objectivity of 
society with his understanding of the Hegelian conception of Geist. Through this 
connection to Hegel,  Adorno proposes a dual critique: in terms of his collectivism or 
holism, and in terms of a sociological form of idealism. While these points are connected,
as the critique of Hegel showed, they also each have their own logic, which helps to 
demonstrate the difficulties of Adorno’s project. The difficulty here is that, on Adorno’s 
reading, the ideal and the collective in Durkheim’s thought are identical. Claiming that 
Hegel and Durkheim both have a “contempt for individuality” (ND 337/344), Adorno 
uses his conception of the object as both material and particular, to ground his analysis.
In his critique of Hegelian world spirit, Adorno emphasized that Hegel had 
misunderstood the fundamental nature of spirit “[t]he world spirit is, but is not, is not 
spirit, but precisely the negative, which Hegel shifted from it to those who must obey it” 
(ND 298/304; my translation). Hegel had in this way improperly “spiritualized” spirit, 
and had fundamentally misconstrued history, the history of human beings, as history of 
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another order.134 The result for Hegel, as for Durkheim, is a conception of society and 
spirit (world spirit or objective spirit) as necessity, as “fate”135 “In the concept of the 
world spirit, the principle of divine omnipotence was secularized into the principle that 
posits unity, and the world plan was secularized into the relentlesssness of what 
happens” (ND 300/305). The conception of society as Geist is basically problematic in 
this way, but as we’ll see that the potential is there for a more radical analysis; society is 
spirit in more than one way.
On this reading, the relationship between the individual and the whole, or the 
universal, determines and is determined by the degree of “collectivity” of society. When 
the collective realm has been “hypostatized” from the individuals who constitute it, it 
then faces them in domination. Durkheim’s social theory is, equally to Hegel’s 
philosophy, the defense of a “power from an allegedly higher order” [der Macht auf 
angeblich höherer Warte sich hergeben] (ND 302/307-8).136 The Zwang des 
134
 As we saw earlier, Adorno’s reading of Hegel involves the attribution of a conservative turn, 
after the Phenomenology, and represented most starkly in the philosophies of right and history. 
According to Adorno, Hegel lost touch with his analysis of philosophy as “the science of the 
experience of consciousness” that had grounded the earlier work, and as a result, the later Hegel 
was insensitive to the experience of the individual (See ND 302f./307f.).
135 In his critique of the Hegelian Weltgeist, Adorno likens the abstract nature of its concept to 
Durkheim’s own “doctrine of collective spirit” (ND 320/326), claiming that, in Durkheim’s 
conception, there is no room for either determinateness or dialectical negation. According to 
Adorno, Durkheim’s conception of collective objectivity is thus in a sense even more 
impoverished than Hegel’s. “In the sociology of primitive religions, Durkheim made the 
substantial discovery that qualities, the things the particular is boasting of, have been imposed 
upon it by the universal. He designated to the universal both the delusion of the particular, as a 
mere mimesis, and the power that makes a particular of it in the first place” (ND 320n/326n).
136
 In a related critique, in his discussion headed “Group Spirit and Domination,” Adorno offers a 
brief critique of the formal sociology of Simmel, asserting that the substance of Simmel’s 
discussions of the the power of the group over the individual 
does not lie in socialization pure and simple, in empty categories such as that of the group. 
Instead — which formal sociology dislikes reflecting upon, in line with its definition — they 
are impressions of a social content; their invariance is a pure memento of how little the 
power of the universal has changed in history, how very much it always remains prehistoric. 
The formal group spirit is a reflective movement on material dominance. Formal sociology 
gets its right to exist from the formalization of the social mechanisms, the equivalent of the 
dominance that progresses through the ratio . . . Compared with the class relationship, 
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Allgemeinen (coercive power of the universal) lives on unimpeded in Durkheim’s version
of sociology.137 For example, Adorno likens Hegel’s employment of the concept of the 
Volksgeist in his philosophy of history to Durkheim’s “collective norms,” complaining 
that neither one is truly a mediated, concrete universal, but rather only “an individuation
higher in grade, but independent as such [Individuation höheren Grades, doch als 
solche selbständig]” (ND 331/338). Here, it is the strict “independence” of these “higher”
categories that Adorno finds so problematic. As I’ve discussed above, Hegel’s attempt, in 
the Philosophy of History, to mediate the individual and the particular through the 
Volksgeist claims both an “independent” status for it, as well as one of the “concrete 
universal.” However, it is only through its “independence” that Hegel “legalizes” the 
“tyranny [Gewaltherrschaft]” over individuals. The “failure” of Hegel’s mediation of 
particular and universal, within his Realphilosophie, demonstrates the ultimate futility 
of his systematic philosophy.
Precisely the thesis of the autonomy of the Volksgeister legalizes [legalisiert] for Hegel 
tyranny [Gewaltherrschaft] over individual people, just like Durkheim’s collective norms 
and Spengler’s Kulturseelen would later. The more abundantly a universal is equipped 
with the insignia of the collective subject, the more completely the subjects disappear in 
it. However, that category of mediation — which incidentally is not explicitly called 
mediation, but only fulfills its function — stays back behind Hegel’s own concept of 
mediation. It does not prevail in the matter [Sache] itself, does not immanently 
formalization is not more neutral. It is reproduced by abstraction, by the logical hierarchy of 
the stages of universality — and that the more bluntly, the more conditions of rule are made 
to disguise themselves as democratic procedures (ND 303/308).
137
 Given this correspondence, Adorno’s refusal to acknowledge a version of speculative identity in
Hegel — which structures his thought about both the logical form and the social form of the 
relationship between universal and particular — prejudices his understanding of Durkheim. By 
relying on the strictly non-identical relationship of these two terms, in, as we’ve seen, a Kantian 
fashion, Adorno in effect merely imitates a speculative reading, while denying its cogency. In 
other words, Adorno’s work shifts back and forth seemingly so easily between the philosophical 
and the social realms, because it attempts to understand their relationship in a speculative way, 
and rejects for instance, any idea of social, or conversely mental, causality. Ultimately Adorno 
backs this up merely with references to the fact that “everything is mediated,” and a pointer to 
Hegel. But Hegelian mediation and Adornian mediation are very different species.
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determine its other, but serves as a bridging concept, a hypostatized intermediary 
between the world spirit and the individuals (ND 331-2/338).
Adorno discusses Hegel here as allowing his need for philosophical system to dictate his 
approach to historical reality. His category of the Volksgeist reaches back into empirical 
history, and remains there, beyond the point when it should have passed away; by 
remaining theoretically unmediated, the category of the Volksgeist, becomes stagnant, 
an “undialectical constant,” and, in Adorno’s opinion, “reactionary.” 
Another way to view this, through Adorno’s eyes, is that Durkheim has 
“spiritualized” the specifically social (EDu 247). In this critique Adorno typically 
neglects Durkheim’s analysis of the social, in for instance the Division of Labour, as 
being comprised by a form of solidarity; but even this would not help Durkheim’s cause, 
since Adorno is also interested in Durkheim’s neglect of the material and economic 
aspects of the collective spirit in his analysis of religion and knowledge. Durkheim’s 
central theory “shifts from the objectivity of the supporting, societal life processes to the 
objectivity of the conscience collective. If its spirit is raised to the substance of a society, 
something only derived from itself, so the distinction between true and false 
consciousness dissolves . . .” (EDu 247). Without undertaking any kind of analysis of the 
concept of the conscience collective, Adorno simply declares it to be a “spiritual” 
phenomenon, something which is not grounded enough in the process of social 
reproduction to adequately serve as the “substance of society.”
A part of this process of “spiritualization” is the refusal to reason historically and 
concretely. Adorno believes that Hegel’s category of the nation is not historically 
concrete; it is essentially an idealism, and he views the collective concepts of Durkheim 
along these lines as well. For Adorno, Durkheim’s “obsession” with primitive forms of 
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sociality constitutes an anachronism, and belies his mischaracterization of modernity 
(EDu 252).138 Durkheim’s reliance on primitive forms of sociality to understand the 
collective consciousness demonstrates to Adorno that he is operating ideally, rather than 
historical-materially. By employing Urphänomenen in this way, Durkheim understands 
collective phenomena not through their dialectical constitution, but rather through a 
collective-level morphology (EDu 252; see also Neilsen 1999, 68).
The “objectivity” of the social, which Adorno claims Durkheim has accurately 
perceived but mis-theorized, is then based on the sui generis nature of the social in 
Durkheim’s thought. Adorno’s complaint that Durkheim cannot theorize the mediation 
of the individual and the social forces Durkheim to reproduce reification by only partially
understanding the nature of society. 
The ostensible irreducibility of the specifically social suits him [Durkheim] exactly: it 
helps him to create ever more being-in-itself, to fully autonomize [it] not only with 
respect to the knower [Erkennenden], but also to the individuals, who are integrated into 
the collective. The impossibility of mediating the principium individuationis with that 
which seems social, according to his desire for the autonomy of the sciences of society and
their methods, compels him to the speculative act of violence [Gewaltsreich] of the 
hypostasis of the collective consciousness (EDu 250).139
Adorno points to the origins of Durkheim’s mistake here: his commitment to the 
scientific autonomy of the new field of sociology, which Adorno views as a form of 
Enlightenment or identity thought. 
138
 Although, as I’ve mentioned, Adorno significantly leaves out a discussion of Durkheim’s own 
theory of modernity.
139
 Along the same lines, Adorno reasons that 
[t]he principle of individualization, the law of particularity to which the universal reason in 
the individuals is tied, tends to insulate them from the encompassing contexts and thereby 
strengthens their flattering confidence in the subject’s autarky. Under the name of freedom, 
their totality is contrasted with the totality of whatever restricts individuality. Yet the 
principium individuationis is by no means the metaphysically ultimate and unalterable, and 
thus it is not freedom either. Freedom is a moment, rather, in a twofold sense: it is entwined,
not to be isolated; and for the time being it is never more than an instant of spontaneity, a 
historical node, the road to which is blocked under present conditions (ND 218/219).
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3.3.2 Knowledge of objectivity
The commitment to a “positive” scientific procedure and the appearance of the 
social as autonomous and irreducible go hand in hand. According to Adorno, Durkheim’s
attachment to a scientific method led necessarily to the “certification” of religion as a 
“godliness,” rather than being understood as  a “societal projection” (EDu 252). This 
understanding, which goes against many interpretations of Durkheim’s theory of religion
as precisely grounded in the social, accords with Adorno’s overall perspective. Religion 
becomes a “godliness,” in Adorno’s opinion, because it is coterminous with the social, 
which has been removed from connection with its mediated moments, and hence has 
become impenetrable to understanding and explanation. Durkheim has in this way 
“regressed behind the left-Hegelians,” who famously understood religion as a projection 
of society (EDu 252).140 This conception is the basis for his conception of society as an 
“objective” phenomenon, as well as his belief in the possibility of a scientific objective 
knowledge about it. Durkheim takes his mischaracterization of the totality of society and 
turns it into a “method.” Adorno argues that “Durkheim’s concept of faits sociaux is 
thoroughly aporetical. He transposes negativity, the opacity [Undurchsichtigkeit] and 
painful foreignness of the social for individuals, into the methodical maxim: you shall 
not understand” (NSO 240). The social fact, which is the so-called symbolic instantiation
of the social, is at the center of Durkheim’s method, but he has misunderstood its nature,
according to Adorno. For Durkheim, it is merely a postulate of his sociological 
methodology; but for Adorno it reflects a “central aspect of society as object” (NSO 240).
140 The question can be restated as the question of the priority of religion versus that of society, 
which has been an area of debate in Durkheim scholarship. See, e.g., Pickering (1984).
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According to Adorno, Durkheim understands society as “impenetrable (EP 308/27). 
Full recognition of this fact would force a further reflection on his conception of 
sociology as a science. Instead, Durkheim takes the social facts as immediate 
unproblematic reality. “Durkheim’s rule that one should treat social facts as things 
[renounces] in principle understanding them. He was convinced that society meets each 
individual primarily as that which is not identical, as ‘coercion’. To that extent reflection 
on society would begin where intelligibility [comprehensibility, Verstehbarkeit] ends. 
The method of natural science defended by Durkheim registers the . . . ‘second nature’ 
into which society congeals against its living members” (S 12/147). 141 Even more than 
this, Durkheim understands the social fact as a norm, as a “moral fact,” and thereby 
forfeits a critical conception of morality. For him, the “impenetrability of the norm and 
the inexorability of the sanction” are simply features deriving from their social status, 
whereas Adorno wants to locate them within the capitalist form of society. He instead 
equates societal alienation with sociation [Vergesellschaftung] itself. “The pre-given 
structure which does not merely stem from classification—Durkheim’s impenetrable—is 
essentially negative and is incompatible with its own goal, namely the preservation and 
satisfaction of mankind. Without such a goal the concept of society, seen in concrete 
terms, would indeed be what the Viennese positivists used to term devoid of meaning” 
(EP 308-9/27). Durkheim’s positive science cannot capture this negativity.
The following quote from Durkheim’s essay on the “Determination of Moral Facts,” 
cited by Adorno in his Introduction to Durkheim’s Sociology and Philosophy, shows an 
aspect of Durkheim’s understanding of the “appearance” of the facts:
141
 Translation by Rose  (1978, 82-83).
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But in order that moral facts may be beyond comparison it is necessary that the 
sentiments that determine their value should have the same character. It is necessary that
they also should be above comparison with other human desires. They must have a 
prestige and an energy that distinguishes them from among the other movements of our 
sensibility. The collective sentiments fulfill this condition. Precisely because they are the 
echo within us of the great voice of the collective, they speak in our consciences with a 
tone quite different from that of purely individual sentiments. They speak to us from a 
higher level and by reason of their origin they have a force and an ascendancy peculiarly 
their own. One can see how it is that the objects to which these sentiments attach 
themselves participate in the same prestige. They are set apart and elevated above other 
things by all the distance that separates the two different states of mind (DMF 58).
Adorno criticizes Durkheim here for a “sociological” conception of individual 
“sentiments” which is merely that of the collective. The social and moral facts that are 
present for sociological reason have a “prestige” and an “energy” according to their 
collective status. Durkheim’s “one-sidedness” consists in this. Durkheim allows the social
to be so severely imposed from the one side of the dialectical relationship, that he loses a 
perspective on the side of the individual, which would allow it to be seen precisely in its 
sociality. This is a “glorification” of the individual, as cut off from the collective, which 
directly contradicts Durkheim’s own understanding of the individual as a social category 
(EDu 255). The problematic implications of such an interpretation of the social are clear 
to Adorno, and parallel the problems with Hegel’s own (late) conception of the universal.
The collective consciousness, collective representations, cannot be subjected to a critique
in this scheme, because, without a conception of the dialectical relationship between the 
individual and society, Durkheim can posit no other role for the collective other than a 
positive one. The social is the immediate, and the socially sanctioned; the only visible 
problem with this is that some individuals will be “insufficiently integrated” (EDu 262).
It is in this context that Adorno refers to Durkheim as the “empirical descendant” of 
Hegel, in part because he discovered the contradictory, dialectical nature of society, but 
ultimately turned away from it (ED 275f.). Durkheim interprets critique of society as 
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immanent, and thereby “suspends critique in the spirit of such immanence . . . The 
Durkheimian version of the immanence of critique becomes a sabotage of judgment, in 
which a too willing state (condition; Zustand) differs from dubious being [seienden], 
although, that which moves in immanent critique is envisaged in the difference, urged by
Durkheim, between the reality of society and of that of consciousness, that it has of itself:
the difference between the object and its concept” (EDu 275-6). The main point here is of
course that Durkheim did not come to discover the negative dialectic, although according
to Adorno it was right there in front of him. The details are more interesting. Previously 
in this passage Adorno had isolated a point where Durkheim admitted to resorting to 
dialectical argument when scientific demonstration was impossible. Durkheim attempts 
a form of dialectical thought, which he misconceives, and ends up merely sabotaging the 
judgment which may differentiate between the object and its consciousness. This occurs 
despite Durkheim’s recognition of the gap which exists between society and 
consciousness of society.142 The understanding of holism that is central to the doctrine of 
the social fact is responsible in large part for what Adorno refers to as Durkheim’s 
“positivism.” With that holistic perspective, Durkheim took an enormous step forward, 
scientifically speaking, but in the end he could not situate this advancement properly. 
Durkheim’s commitment to science reproduces all of its problems in the social sphere. 
Science merely reproduces, it cannot find the “new.” It prioritizes method over content, 
142
 As mentioned earlier, Adorno’s critique of collective forms as forms of spirit blends various 
types of spirit together. Adorno criticizes the Volksgeist, the Weltgeist, and the Hegelian state 
together under one concept, just as he fails to differentiate between different forms of collectivism
in Durkheim’s work. The characterization of the collective consciousness, and all forms of totality 
in Durkheim, as Hegelian Geist implies, according to Adorno, their reactionary, undialectical 
status. They become independent entities, opposed to the social processes through which they are
supposedly constituted. And for Adorno, of course, this crucially leaves out the non-identical, 
leaving the constitution of history, or the state, or the collective consciousness merely a product of
a (false) formal rationality.
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for purposes of control. “Under the mechanisms of the conformity of scientific thought, 
the coercion of method may rank in the first position at the cost of the content” (EDu 
263). The criticism of Durkheim as a positivist, as a “victim” of the division of labour, 
suggests that a key for Adorno is the removal of the restriction between philosophy, or 
more specifically speculation, and sociology (EDu 267; PS Lecture 1). This is essentially 
an argument against the autonomy of sociology. Sociology is meaningless on its own; 
actually, more than this, it is ideological. As a form of science, it has to be combined with 
the self-reflection of philosophy (EDu 271). Science for Adorno represents the attempted 
“pacification” of uncertainty and insecurity (EDu 263). Adorno notes that Durkheim 
confessed to a form of rationalism, which Adorno excoriates him for, claiming that “his 
texts read like parodies of the Cartesian Discours de la methode” (EDu 265). He takes 
completeness and consistency as goals, without asking whether they are warranted in 
this instance. He thereby “defeats” the object, in “typical scientific fashion.”
In Adorno’s view, Durkheim’s commitment to the establishment of sociology as a 
science of society proved too detrimental to the retention of significant elements of 
Hegelian thought. “To attribute spirit or reason to some entity, which would not have 
been itself directly sensible, a kind of subject, he would have rejected as fantasy” (EDu 
253; see also 275-6). Reification here is represented by the undialectical relationship 
between the universal and the particular, a problem which is evident in the scientific 
understanding of society. It is crucial for the Durkheimian “positivist” conception of the 
social, that it become “registered . . . in the immediacy, in which it appears to the 
descriptive observer” (EDu 253). This is what it means for sociology to become 
autonomous as a science. 
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3.3.3 The experience of objectivity
However, the recognition of this gap or “block” between society and the individual 
was Durkheim’s primary insight, according to Adorno. He made some positive steps 
towards a critical theory of society through an emphasis on the coercive nature of the 
social. Adorno reads Durkheim’s collective “realism” precisely in terms of its conflict 
with the societal individual. The notion of constraint, of the individual experiencing the 
social only in what limits her, or in Adorno’s words, what causes pain, is the very 
definition of the “social fact” (EDu 250). Adorno postulates a link between the 
experience of society as “other,” and the subsequent understanding of it. The conflict 
between the individual and the collective structures both moments. In other words, the 
individual experiences society as “coercion,” and consequently views society as 
“impenetrable.” “The concept of the factual, in which an anti-subjective moment is in 
itself inherent . . . collides for Durkheim abruptly with any individuality” (EDu 250). The 
social is by definition that which constrains the individual externally. This 
“irreducibility” of the social allows Durkheim to make society into a being-in-itself, 
which is autonomous from both perceiving subjects and collectively-integrated 
individuals (EDu 250). But, secondly, the social as social constraint is also the social fact.
The dual character of objectivity gets to the heart of the matter: it constitutes the 
relationship between the individual and society. “The reason to read Durkheim is [the] 
entanglement of the provocatively speculative with positivism. His self-critique implicitly
announces itself therein . . . Durkheim’s concept of the social fact and its thing-like 
character can be traced back to his own experience of society” (EDu 248).
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Society, as spirit, is a complex reality; it is not a fact, but rather is “something 
extremely real” (ES 89/50). This is a paradox, as “precisely that which is non-factual, not
directly convertible into sense perceptions, has a higher, not a lower, degree of reality, in 
that it determines the lives of people more than the so-called ‘concreta’ which directly 
confront us” (ES 89/50). For Adorno this paradox between society as fact and society as 
experience is of paramount importance. Durkheim’s critical realization of the social in 
terms of resistance recognizes, on some level, this paradox. It is the recognition that 
society is in fact “real;” and we therefore cannot dismiss society as a metaphysical 
concept. “The phenomena I have mentioned to you, and a great many others which 
belong to the same category, can be described as experiential phenomena” (ES 89-
90/50). “Genuine experience,” Adorno continues here, is the “experience of something 
new which has not existed before.” This type of experience is prevented by both our 
world and by science. “I would not hesitate to define the idea of a dialectical theory of 
society as something like the restoration of, or — to put it more modestly — the effort to 
restore, the experience which is denied us both by the social system and by the rules of 
science.” The danger of science is that is will “conjure away this experience” of 
authenticity, of the new (ES 91/51). It is this combination of a commitment to the 
experience of the social, with the scientific understanding of it, that condemns Durkheim
to failure. Or rather, like Kant with his conception of the block, Durkheim’s theory has 
identified a central contradiction of modern life but without doing anything with it.
 But how can we understand the process through which scientific thought “conjures 
away” genuine experience? In the context of a social science, does Adorno’s critical, 
philosophical (negative dialectical) approach change character? The question gets to the 
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heart of Adorno’s conception of the relationship between philosophy and sociology; but 
it is difficult to answer without a full elaboration of his concepts of “configuration,” 
“constellation,” “mimesis,” “expression,” etc. In lieu of that here, and in preparation for 
the conclusion to the present chapter, I will briefly discuss the relationship between 
experience and the social, as it relates to Adorno’s critique of Durkheim.
Experience in Adorno is individual experience; in claiming that Durkheim has 
somehow not been true to his own experience of society, Adorno bemoans the situation 
of the individual in the totalized society, the “withering” of experience. But at the heart of
this critique is a social process of exchange and the way in which it has reconfigured  
(mentally, physically) the conscious individual subjects of society. “The experience of 
that which is prior to the individual and its consciousness, is that of the unity of the 
totally socialized society [total vergesellschafteten Gesellschaft]” (ND 309/314; my 
translation). Due to the fact that, in the society of exchange, everything is always already 
socially mediated, that which the individual experiences as immediate is therefore false. 
“That which is realized through the one and the many [durchs Einzelne und Viele] is the 
singular matter [eigene Sache] of the many, and it is also not [this]: they can do less and 
less about it. Their incarnation [epitome; Inbegriff] is at the same time their other; from 
this dialectic the Hegelian [one] deliberately looked away” (ND 309-10/315; my 
translation).
For Adorno, it is a false universality through which the individual is determined; the 
perception of society as a universal is based upon illusion, on a fetish. The priority of the 
universal forces the individual into submission to it; but it is not their universality, it is 
something essentially other. The individual experiences a form of self alienation (Tichy). 
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“When people are informed about the power [Vormacht] of the universal, it is nearly 
inevitable that that transfigure it into spirit as something higher that they must appease. 
Coercion becomes meaningful to them” (ND 310/316; my translation). Adorno describes 
experience here as a learning process, through which individuals may begin to 
understand the coercion to which they are subjected. They develop in essence a learned 
helplessness. Here Adorno relates this story to those thinkers and critics, like Hegel and 
Durkheim, who, having recognized the priority of the universal in social life, fall victim to
it by not recognizing the true contradiction inherent in the experience, the conflict 
between the individual and the universal. They attempt to describe what cannot be 
described.
“To experience the Weltgeist as a whole, however, means to experience its 
negativity (ND 300/305; my translation and emphasis). The totality remains negative 
(ND 305/311). The articulation of a “negative totality” is not possible within Durkheim’s 
(positive) thought, but he comes close. Durkheim recognizes the essential objectivity of 
society, but it is for him, in a sense, too objective. The sphere, the whole of society is 
alienated from the individual to such an extent, that recognition or reconciliation is no 
longer possible. And not only this, but the fact of reification has blinded Durkheim to its 
existence. Adorno understands Durkheim’s social objectivity as forcing an experience in 
the individual.
Adorno wants to believe in the fundamental experience of contradiction by the 
subjects of modern society. Yet he famously appears to waver on this. At times his 
writing reflects a belief that “the individual has no experience, nor any so-called 
empirical material, that the universal has not predigested and supplied” (ND 307/312-3).
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And at other times, the possibility of a radical critique is present. But my point here is 
that this ambiguity runs through his reading of Durkheim, and most likely all thinkers. 
Adorno finds value in Durkheim’s thought precisely because it reflects this ambiguity of 
modern society—the simultaneous reality and illusion of fetishism. Durkheim’s account 
of the dualism of human nature for instance, Adorno understands as both reflective of 
the state of alienation, and as a crucial foil to the experience of totalized (societalized) 
society. This “ideological” reading holds for Hegel just as much as for Durkheim.
4. Conclusion: the immanent critique of Durkheim
I have presented Durkheim’s work as engaging in an effort to reconceptualize 
philosophical problems from the standpoint of the new investigatory method of 
sociology. He attempted this in two primary ways: through the social grounding of the 
categories of thought, and through his understanding of morality as a fait social. In this 
way, he sought to stake sociology’s claim to some of the basic problems of theoretical and
practical philosophy. Through his critique of Durkheim’s work, Adorno effectively sought
to undermine the significance of these attempts, claiming that Durkhiem’s own 
commitment to a scientific procedure resulted not in enlightenment but merely in 
ideology. In Adorno’s analysis, the establishment of sociology as the science of the 
social/moral fact only served to translate the problems of philosophy into an intellectual 
idiom which simply hid their conservative character with other language. Although not 
addressing Durkheim’s relationship to philosophy directly, Adorno’s critique serves as a 
critique of the general method of subsuming philosophical reason to its social basis. 
But yet, Adorno is also fond of referring to the fait social as a signifier of the 
foundational experience of modernity. Durkheim’s chosisme is itself a result of the 
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objectified appearance of the social, of a social world in which subjects face an 
impenetrability, an Undurchdringlichkeit. The world is impenetrable, unintelligible. If 
Durkheim’s ongoing reliance on a chosisme is, on some level, a recognition of the “fallacy
of constitutive subjectivity” (ND 10/xx), Adorno’s complaint is that Durkheim has not 
fully committed to this fact. He has flagged the alienation of subject and object, but has 
not accounted for it. This means that he remains within the scope of the Kantian “block,”
while not recognizing that this position commits him to a thesis of unintelligibility. This 
essentially Kantian reading of Durkheim perhaps shows less insight into Durkheim’s 
work than it does Adorno’s own commitment to the interpretation of society as a Kantian
“block.” 
Adorno further points to a contradiction in Durkheim’s sociological account of 
knowledge: although the roots of our thinking are socially constituted, they are 
necessarily presupposed for any particular investigation.
The subject’s refection upon its own formalism is reflection upon society, with the 
paradox that, following the intention of the later Durkheim, on the one hand the 
formative constituents originate in society, while on the other hand, as current 
epistemology can boast, they are objectively valid; in Durkheim’s arguments they are 
already presupposed in every proposition that demonstrates their conditionedness. (SO 
757/257).
The result is a chicken-and-egg scenario in which each requires the other for its 
existence. Adorno’s attempt to go beyond first philosophy or foundationalism is inspired 
by Hegel; but here he expects it to function as it would within Hegel’s own philosophy. 
As we’ve seen for Hegel spirit was a means of getting beyond the causa sui; but it is only 
within his system of the absolute that spirit is a structure of self-reflection in which 
“producer and product are equated” (Hegel [1802] 1985; quoted in Hinchman 1984, 84). 
Adorno, however, is primarily interested in the contradiction between Durkheim’s own 
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experience, which, in his opinion, led to the theory of chosisme, and his subsequent 
attempts at scientifically grasping the social. Durkheim’s own insight into the 
impenetrability of the social implies its fundamental unintelligibility, and grounds his 
subsequent claims to social scientific success.
For Adorno, the key distinction between the versions of collectivism in Hegel and 
Durkheim was their understanding of its constitution. Roughly, Hegel retained a central 
notion of contradiction and mediation, while Durkheim could not “ground theoretically” 
the mediation between individual and collective (EP 76). Adorno implies that Durkheim 
could not stomach the Hegelian option — which in his opinion necessitated a 
commitment to a collective subjectivity — and was consequently driven to even “greater 
absurdities, the collective spirit as a social fact” (EDu 253). 
In his critical introduction to the essays collected in Sociology and Philosophy, 
Adorno attempted to simultaneously recuperate and dialectically transcend Durkheim’s 
social thought. The essay appears at times to be merely a notch in Adorno’s critical belt, 
the critical destruction of another of modern social theory’s “founders.” After noting that 
Durkheim’s thought retains a contemporary significance, due to its concern with 
questions of the “independence of societal tendencies vis-à-vis individual-psychological 
ones,” Adorno immediately reveals the contradictions inherent in it, leading to the 
“revenge of subjectivism in [his] spiritualization of objectivity” (EDu 246-7). Adorno 
praised Durkheim for conceptualizing the society as primarily social constraint, as a 
“moment of coercion [Zwangsmoment], in which society confronts us as something 
alien [fremd], objective, reified, over which we have no power” (PETG 151). This was in 
“express opposition to any idea of understanding societal motivations,” and hence to any 
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form of psychology. He simultaneously lambasted him for failing to recognize the 
contradictions that his theory required.
There is a distinct psychoanalytical moment of this critique. Reminiscent of the 
Freudian aspects of the Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno frames Durkheim’s 
attachment to a scientific theory in terms of a primal fear of uncertainty. Here the 
coercive impact of the totality obtains its weight from the “social disaster,” which has 
always already deformed the individual psyche, Durkheim’s included:
Under the mechanisms of conformity of scientific thought, the coercion [Zwang] of 
method may come first, at the cost of the content. The feeling of insecurity, in which real 
individual fear of existence and the nakedness of unregimented spiritual experience are 
connected with the preconscious knowledge of the sich schürzenden societal disaster, 
becomes in the whole pacified through the exaggerated and idolized unequivocal certainty
of Descartes. Because experience cannot destroy it, pure logical forms and methods in all 
their bleakness are affectively and exceedingly beset, without consideration of the fact 
that absolute certainty is thereby reduced to something vacuous [zum Nichtssagendes 
zusammenschrumpfen]’ (EDu 263-4).
The societal experience that is the starting point of Durkheim’s theory is “reduced” by 
the imposition of “method,” as a means of management. It loses the connection to its 
object, to the content. This framing is familiar; it poses the question of an alternative 
form of thought-behavior which will not reduce the negative social experience of the 
individual. Adorno reads this precisely as the move beyond the methodological dictum 
that sociology may be nothing else other than sociology. “Method, by becoming 
indifferent to societal experience . . . becomes merged with the spectre of the utter 
independence of the collective” (EDu 265). However, this reading only serves to 
highlight the attempted integration of epistemological and ethical-political concerns. For
Adorno, science, and identity thinking in general, are a refuge for those who cannot face 
the realities of the modern world. Instead, Adorno proposes what Rose calls a “morality 
of method.”  
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But is this reading too simplistic? Adorno’s critique of both Durkheim and Hegel 
conflates the realms of ethics and epistemology, and of philosophy and sociology; and, in
doing so, it fails (to use one of Adorno’s favorite tropes) to “follow through” with the 
critique. The critiques remain “suspended” by virtue of their inability to analytically 
separate the substance of the thought of both Durkheim and Hegel. 
To explain my critique here, let me review the findings of my analysis. Durkheim’s 
specifically sociological approach claims the ability to overcome the dilemmas of 
philosophy, most particularly of the debates about knowledge between the rationalists 
and the empiricists. Durkheim’s vision of philosophy has it serving a foundational role 
for other social science disciplines, such as law, economics, politics, etc. However, he also
believes, similarly to Comte, that the discipline of sociology was itself the future of 
philosophy. Addressing the philosophers, Durkheim claims that they have not 
sufficiently recognized the significance of the social, and hence remained locked in the 
polar binaries of empiricism and rationalism. Acknowledgement of the social basis of 
religion (and hence of philosophy) then allows Durkheim to, in a sense, invert Kant: 
“religion has not confined itself to enriching the human intellect, formed beforehand, 
with a certain number of ideas; it has contributed to forming the intellect itself” (EF 21). 
The collective representations which constitute “primitive” forms of religion, have arisen 
from the nature, and practice, of forms of society. He thus argues that the philosophical 
dilemma has been overcome through the grounding of the categories of thought in the 
sui generis realm of the social. 
Adorno argues that, due to his understanding of collectivity, and his commitment to 
scientific procedure, Durkheim’s work remains riven with contradiction and dualism, 
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and consequently cannot provide an understanding of contemporary society which 
exposes the phenomenon of reification for what it is: a human creation. Adorno’s 
critique of the non-dialectical, or “positivist” nature of Durkheim’s sociological work 
parallels his critique of Kant, but in a different register. The dialectical operation which 
needs to exist between the subject and the object, between the constituens and the 
constitutum, shifts explicitly to a relationship between the individual and society. For 
Durkheim, the autonomy of sociology is predicated on the sui generis status of social 
facts. While both study modes of behaviour and thought, social facts have a “different 
substratum” from “individual,” psychological facts. Each deals with a different order of 
representations. In this way, Adorno seemingly employs a version of Hegel’s critique of 
Kantian epistemology for his critique of Durkheim. The classical sociologist is seen to 
have remained caught in the antinomies of his own thought, much like Kant did. Looking
at it in this way, however, places Adorno’s own relationship to Hegel in question. That is,
in using a Hegelian critique here, Adorno seems to imply something like a Hegelian 
solution as well. Adorno wants to move to a foundationless stance, one of “mediation,” 
but he is not moving toward the absolute here, but rather towards the priority, in some 
sense, of society.
Adorno relies upon a conception of “objective spirit” which his own negative 
perspective cannot support. Although he is consistent in arguing about the negativity of 
the totality, in reality his discussions make no room for the kinds of contradictions that 
arise in Hegel’s own account. This is part of the danger of abstracting from the Hegelian 
system. While Adorno explicitly does not want to give credence to the idea of objective 
spirit as a “given,” and he criticizes the way that this leads to a problematic positivity in 
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Durkheim’s work, his alternative is to rely on a Marxian conception of value/fetish, in 
which the given is both what it appears to be, and what it is in essence. How does this 
change things? It is a question of determinateness. Within Hegel’s speculative and 
systematic perspective, we explicitly see the contradiction within a “shape of spirit.” For 
example, Redding comments on Hegel’s account of recognition and the development of 
self-consciousness in the “master-slave dialectic:”
The contradictoriness and self-transcendence of this specific form of recognition that 
emerges in the discussion of “self-consciousness” in Chapter 4 of the Phenomenology of 
Spirit is typical of the way that Hegel treats all finite “shapes” of consciousness, self-
consciousness and spirit in that work, and such a gap between the overt form of a 
recognitive relation and its underlying character must be problematic for any 
Diltheian . . . conception of “objective spirit” which accepts particular forms of life as 
“givens” and as intelligible in their own terms (Redding 2011, 216). 
This account of normative roles here relies upon a notion of recognition and self-
consciousness, in which what it means to be a “master” or a “slave” stems from being 
recognized as such, and adopting this recognition for oneself. In Adorno’s own 
discussions of the domination of the individual though social integration (a theme which 
he argues runs through Durkheim’s entire oeuvre, and which Durkheim’s work actively 
and ideologically reinforces), he has to fall back on a notion of the individual experience 
of such a social location as painful, an account of suffering. But his account of the 
experience of objectivity cannot substitute for a Hegelian speculative version, because it 
cannot generate its own internal contradiction. Its negation comes only through the 
bodily experience of the suffering individual, and the recognition of the 
theorist/observer. If my interpretation here is correct, then Adorno’s criticism of the 
ideal collectivism of Hegel and Durkheim, in favor of a nonidentical materialism, falls 
flat. Or rather, it fails to differentiate the very different accounts given by Durkheim and 
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Hegel on this issue, and, in doing so, it neglects its own Durkheimian account of social 
integration and domination. 
In seeking to resolve the antinomies of philosophy sociologically, Durkheim has, 
according to Adorno, merely reproduced them in the social realm. What is needed in 
sociology is self-reflection, which the scientific path eschews, in favor of clarity of 
definition, stability of its objects, and mitigation of uncertainty. “Such lack of reflection 
terminates in a prohibition of thought” (EDu 271). To avoid this prohibition, 
consciousness must obtain a different relationship to experience. I will return to the 
theme of “experience” in the following concluding chapter, and just note here Adorno’s 
characterization of it as a shield against the arrogance of enlightenment reason:
Elitest arrogance would be the last thing to become philosophical experience. It must 
account for how much it is, according to its contingency in that which exists [ihrer 
Möglichkeit im Bestehenden], contaminated by that existent and ultimately by the class 
relationship. In it, the chances [Chancen] that the universal grants individuals turn 
against the universal that sabotages the universality of such experience. Were this 
universality established, the experience of all individuals would thereby change, and 
would discard much of the contingency, which until then irredeemably distorts it, even as 
it still moves. Hegel’s doctrine, that the object reflects itself in itself, outlasts its idealist 
version, because, in a changed dialectic, the subject, divested of its sovereignty, becomes 
even more the reflection-form [Reflexionsform] of objectivity (ND 52/42). 
If the duty of experience is to recognize that it is always already contaminated, this is a 
high bar for the practicing sociologist. The recognition that universality has been 
compromised, sabotaged, appears to imply its reestablishment in a changed form. The 
new subject, as the Reflexionsform of objectivity, cannot, however, reestablish this 
universality. 
Paradoxically, the reason that Durkheim could not properly express his experience 
of objective society was that he misunderstood the subjective component. Following his 
penchant for a scientific analysis, Durkheim made the mistake of believing he could 
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remove the subject from consideration. But Adorno’s well-known claim that objectivity is
achieved by the exertion of the subject, rather than through its elimination by 
abstraction, applies easily to Durkheim here. The subject is responsible for going beyond 
the object as immediately apparent, as given, and revealing its history, its “become-
ness.” Tichy calls this the object’s “immanent universality.” Durkheim’s own 
reconceptualization of the Kantian transcendental subject certainly could not arrive at 
this point, because it remains an abstract subject; it is not the subject which experiences, 
which reflects, and theorizes. The necessity of turning to experience and its “expression” 
stems from this account of objectivity. 
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Chapter 6 From Adorno to Hegel: the sociological and the 
philosophical
In a living relation, insofar as it is free, the indeterminate
is nothing but the possible, it is neither something actual
made dominant, nor a concept which commands (D 
145).
Hegel’s philosophy has no social import if the absolute 
cannot be thought (HCS 204).
I have posited an account here in which the turn away from philosophy, towards a form 
of social science that was either more materialist, in the case of Marx, or more 
collectivist, in the case of Durkheim, should be seen neither as an overcoming of 
philosophy, nor as its realization. Both of these directions can be understood, in part 
through Adorno, as a response to Hegel; and doing so allows us to see some of the 
limitations that persist. While it is quite possible to look at the German idealist origins in
Marx and Durkheim more directly (as others have done), I have tried to give a broader 
perspective here, one that incorporates Adorno’s own struggles to make sense of (and to 
practice) both philosophy and sociology. My claim that Adorno’s own understanding of 
sociology and social theory cannot be understood without grasping his relationship to 
Kant and Hegel is straightforward. The further claims — that Adorno helps us to see the 
“translation” difficulties involved in the development of sociology out of the critique of 
philosophy, and that Adorno remains mired to some extent in a position he was trying to 
overcome — are perhaps less clear. Here I will summarize my argument, and give some 
pointers to potential problems.
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1. The Hegelian heritage
As opposed to interpretations of Hegel that claim that his value lies solely within his 
social theory, and against those who would separate his “method” from its systematic, 
idealist “context,” I have in the foregoing explored some of the deeper connections 
between his “speculative” form of philosophizing and the thought of some 
representatives of classical social theory. The topic has been neglected in large part due 
to the relative inaccessibility of the relevant philosophical texts, as well as the continuing 
stringency of disciplinary borders. However, the relevance of epistemological and 
philosophical concerns to social theory, combined with the enormously broad influence 
of the work of Kant and Hegel within philosophy, as well as “continental thought” in 
general, signals the importance and timeliness of such an investigation.
The heritage of German idealism is most significant for its complex understanding 
of subjectivity and its “objects.” The Copernican revolution instituted by Kant soon came 
under criticism for its reliance on a transcendental ground, and Hegel sought to solve 
this problem with his turn to the absolute. His complicated account, which in some sense
merges ontology, logic, and history, has been vastly influential, yet remains deeply 
contested in philosophical circles. Although the rejection of the formal Kantian subject in
favor of a “conceptual” Geist involves both intersubjective and social-historical aspects, 
attempts to appropriate this content for social theory have — from Marx forward — been 
fraught with difficulty.
I have argued here that Adorno’s understanding of the nature and tasks of 
philosophy was deeply influenced by his engagement with the philosophy of Kant and 
Hegel. In particular, his understanding of “nonidentity” derives from his negation of the 
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concept of “identity” developed among some post-Kantian philosophers. The nonidentity
of subject and object, or alternatively the priority of the object, is Adorno’s attempt to 
reorient philosophy in a materialist and critical direction, in response to the catastrophe 
of capitalist modernity. Although he took his cue largely from his view of the – mostly 
unrealized – critical potential of Hegel’s work, his commitment to the “Kantian block” 
prescribed limits to thought that clashed fundamentally with Hegel’s perspective. The 
result is contradiction; but more importantly it helps us to identify some of the problems 
of and limits to canonical forms of “classical” social theory. Here I have discussed just 
two examples: Durkheim’s commitment to social science and the requirements it sets for
thinking subject and object, and Marx’s own attempt to forge a mode of social scientific 
investigation through an “inversion” of Hegel.143 
2. From Geist to society
The significance of the issue of the philosophical origins of sociology can be grasped by 
asking what may have been lost in translation. I’ve argued that Hegel’s concept of Geist 
served as a model of sorts for thinking about society, and brought along some attendant 
problems. For Adorno, one of the appeals of sociology is its seemingly direct engagement
with the primary structuring force of contemporary society. The priority of “mediation” 
for Adorno stems less from the fundamental nature of diremption and dualism, and 
more from the structure of exchange society. Simply by virtue of the fact that “there is 
‘nothing between heaven and earth that is not “vermittelt” [mediated], nothing, 
143 My discussion has, in multiple ways, led to a position articulated and investigated most 
thoroughly by Rose (1981): that Hegel’s philosophical efforts have yet to be sufficiently 
appreciated by sociology, in either its traditional or Marxist varieties. The result is a continued 
repetition of collective self-misunderstanding, through the refusal, or inability, to think the 
absolute. 
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therefore, that does not contain, merely by being defined as something that exists, the 
reflection of its mere existence, a spiritual moment” (H 298/57) sociology becomes a 
fundamental part of the task of understanding and critiquing society. “[T]he concept of 
the mediated . . . is constitutive of sociology” (ES 184/109). However, this should not be 
taken too far; the “spiritual” moment of society is not constitutive of society. Just as 
immediacy is always already mediated, the mediated is also always immediate. “That 
social phenomena are mediated by the spirit, by the consciousness of human beings, 
should not mislead us into always deriving these phenomena themselves from a spiritual 
principle” (AS 122-123).
In this way, Adorno appeals to the concept of spirit, but he does so abstractly. His 
own work reproduces the dualisms that he believes stem from the contradictory nature 
of the exchange society. And though his negative version of dialectics draws on Hegel’s 
conception of speculation, in terms of promoting a form of consciousness which reflects 
upon its experience and thus undermines illusion and immediacy, his commitment to 
the priority of the nonidentical closes off access to the level of spirit and of the (Hegelian)
concept. Adorno is thus confined to an understanding of “society” as a constellation in 
which spirit plays an indeterminate role, and which cannot reconcile subjective and 
objective spirit. He refuses “to comprehend the antinomy which he enunciates” (Rose 
1993, 62). 
Adorno holds on tightly to the idea of the Kantian “block,” the Durkheimian 
“chosisme”. There must remain something fundamentally impenetrable by human 
reason; and, in this sense, he is clearly opposed to Hegel’s claim that the absolute can be 
known. But what if Adorno is making a conflation here? What if, by conflating the 
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subject-object dynamic of conscious knowing with the individual-collective dynamic of 
society, Adorno has lost the ability to to properly explain society? Of course, we must 
acknowledge that explanation was never Adorno’s goal; but his entire philosophy is 
based upon an interpretation of social reality, which in turn is based upon an individual 
experience, but also presumably analysis. Adorno wants us to remain aware of the 
experience of contradiction, or coercion; to remain conscious of the limits of our own 
knowledge. However, he is also committed to a kind of reconciliation, to a form of 
geistig experience and a mode of expression which can (re)connect us to our own 
universality. This is clearly the kind of reflective capacity whose lack Adorno noted with 
alarm in Durkheim. By not providing an engaged critique of Hegel and Durkheim, 
Adorno has shut down the possibility of a fuller account of the relationship between the 
individual and the spiritual whole.
3 From philosophy to sociology?
Adorno was fond of giving an account of the historical relationship between philosophy 
and science. From his early account of the “liquidation” of philosophy at the hands of 
science, and the danger of it being turned into merely art (AP 29), to his broad critique of
instrumental reason and positivism, Adorno’s work sought to recuperate a mode of 
thought that went beyond mere repetition. But he also characterizes philosophical work 
as operating on the results of the sciences (AP 32).  “Philosophy is nothing other than the
self-consciousness of facticity, or the consistent reflection on what [one] meets in [one’s] 
wissenschaftliche experience” (PS 57).  Science eliminates quality, and subjects the 
empirical world to ultimately subjective reason, and philosophy attempts a correction 
with a devoted attention to the “object,” the “nuance,” the “infinitessimal” (ND 
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53ff./43ff.). It does so by providing a renewed access to “experience,” to the “mimetic 
element of knowledge” (ND 55/45). 
Sociology, by virtue of its Doppelcharakter, occupies a unique position. Its mission 
is to directly handle the source of our experience and our world. The reification of the 
world simply cannot be avoided (ES 214f./128f.). “Sociology is no unified Wissenschaft 
but rather an agglomerate of different disciplines. It comes to philosophy, on the one 
hand — like any Einzelwissenschaft — through the reflection on the distinctive [eigene] 
object and the distinctive method, on the other hand, through the fact that it grasps 
philosophies in their dependence on societal moments and [also grasps] that the 
distinctive content of philosophy has to do essentially with society” (PS 388, n200). As a 
result, Adorno calls on sociology to incorporate elements from both the empirical 
sciences and critical philosophy; for sociology to renounce the “anti-philosophical 
impulse” which lies at its origins (PS 25). In this regard, Adorno’s conception of 
sociology clearly places it in a privileged position, where it seemingly has a duty to 
simultaneously perform both empirical research and reflective critique. In this sense, 
Adorno draws on Hegel’s own critique of empiricism; however, while Hegel’s critique of 
empiricism was intended to educate consciousness, to help it progress along the path to 
absolute knowledge, Adorno’s version has a different aim. An examination of the 
differences here will help set up some final reflections on Adorno’s concept of 
experience, and its relationship to philosophy and sociology.
3.1 The empirical
It is easy to discount the attention to empirical reality that both Hegel and Adorno 
demonstrated. While both were obviously concerned with articulating a notion of reason 
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which is situated within the social-historical world, the complexity of their philosophical 
thought, their attention to dialectical concerns, and their critiques of other forms of 
science and philosophy often lead to an understatement on the role that empirical 
content play in their work. Here I do not wish to provide a detailed discussion of this 
issue, but rather merely to signal that the idea of sociology as simply providing more 
emphasis on empirical data than previous philosophy simplifies the matter. The further 
issue is the relationship of the empirical to thought and experience. Adorno’s own 
characterization of sociology presents it as a hybrid or combination of two modes; but 
there seems to be more to be said here.
For Hegel, the empiricist philosophers rely upon sense perception as a “firm 
ground” for knowledge; they seek truth in experience rather than merely in thought (EL 
§37); however, it does so in a naive, unreflective manner. So, while it is admirably 
concerned with “what is,” over what merely “ought to be,” empiricism does so by falsely 
“elevating” perceptual content into concepts (see also EL §12). By trying to isolate the 
particular, this form of thought imports abstractions through the back door, creating an 
illusion of concreteness. Scientific empiricism “is unaware that it itself contains and 
engages in metaphysics and makes use of those categories and their combinations in an 
utterly uncritical and unconscious manner” (EL §38). 
Hegel claims famously that this type of knowledge leads dialectically beyond itself; 
by reflecting upon its own procedure it takes on a Kantian perspective, in which it 
examines its own concepts for validity. The effort is still rooted in the attempt to find a 
solid ground on which true knowledge can stand, but it seeks such ground in the 
transcendental rather than the empirical sphere. As we’ve seen above, Hegel’s critique of 
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Kant’s solution here formed the basis of his attempt to recoup a perspective which can 
understand the whole. The goal here for Hegel is not to dismiss these forms of 
rationality, but to progressively find their truth. In doing so, he acknowledges the 
necessary advancements of each stage. 
Is this, then, where philosophy and science part ways? Science wants to work with 
its concepts unimpeded, while philosophy insists that we cannot find universality and 
necessity “out there.” In order to truly understand what is happening when we are 
knowing, we must take into account the work of the “I,” but we must also pay attention 
to empirical content. In the Phenomenology, Hegel’s discusses what happens when 
“observation” turns its eye on itself (PG §298-308).144 What it finds, first and foremost, is
the “Laws of Thought,” which present themselves as given. In its analysis, observation is 
“led towards” the truth, which is that the “actuality” of these laws is “active 
consciousness.” Hegel refers to this stage as psychology, in which spirit both “conform[s]
to the habits, customs, and way of thinking already to hand,” and “knows itself as 
spontaneously active in face of them” (PG §302). In these two modes, spirit begins to see 
the contradiction, in that it observes a collection of “heterogeneous beings” which are 
merely collected haphazardly together in the mind, “like things in a bag” (PG §303). It 
finds its own law, because it brings to it the form of universality. Hegel then clarifies the 
moments which constitute this law: on the one hand, individuality, and on the other, 
“universal inorganic nature, viz. the given circumstances, situation, habits, customs 
religion, and so on” (PG §305). Observation is seen to be a false “shape of spirit,” because
it it based upon an internal-external differentiation which cannot be sustained. In the 
144
 My discussion here owes much to Hinchman’s account (1984, 88-92).
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case of psychology and sociology, the external is composed of laws, mores, customs, etc., 
while the internal is the thought processes of consciousness. 
Empirical science prepares the ground for philosophical speculation; it contains the 
“invitation for thinking, to advance to . . . concrete determinations” (EL §12R). But here 
is where Hegel specifies the complex nature of this emergence of philosophy, its “coming 
into being.” The process isn’t simply one of taking up content, but it also constitutes the 
process of giving this content a new “shape” as freedom and necessity. Philosophy gives 
its content the “validation of necessity” which transforms the scientific fact into “the 
presentation and imitation of the activity of thinking that is original and completely 
independent” (EL §12R). While such language of Hegel’s is often read as expressing his 
fundamental conservatism and preservation of what is, the point is rather that 
philosophy comes on the scene in this way that goes fundamentally beyond the 
“understanding.” To move with Hegel to this level is to leave science behind, in the sense 
that we are now beyond all notions of causality, and beyond Adorno’s “problems of 
constitution.” Consciousness gives its content a new shape of freedom; it takes the 
contingency of the given and discovers its necessity. It is the “activity of thinking” that 
becomes primary, original. The “I” becomes the causa sui in which “producer and 
product are equated (Hegel [1802] 1985; quoted in Hinchman 1984, 84). 
The self-reflective structure of the concept, and of the “I,” in Hegel’s thought has no 
correlate in Adorno’s work, nor in sociology. The crude sociologisms that Adorno 
criticized in the work of Durkheim, Mannheim, and others attempt to view knowledge 
through the lens of empirical science. This route is obviously closed to Adorno; instead 
he wants to move through philosophy to social categories, to out the social mediation 
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which lies hidden within consciousness itself. But the commitment to the priority of the 
object entails for Adorno a valuation of the immediate, non-conceptual character of 
experience. He is committed to opposing a form immediate experience to thought, which
is always already mediate. 
3.2 The universal and the objective
If empirical and reflective thought are both forms of merely subjective reason, and if 
Hegel’s version of a path to the concrete universality of the absolute is ruled out, what is 
the alternative? While Hegel’s own move to spirit involves a turn towards the 
intersubjective process of recognition, Adorno’s lack of attention to intersubjective 
relationships means an overemphasis on that between the individual and the object, 
whether particular object or abstract totality. Adorno understands the universal as that 
which dominates the particular. The universality that characterizes social relations in 
contemporary exchange society does not stem from concepts or from the Hegelian 
Concept; rather, it has its origins in the universality of exchange itself, which structures 
all social relations. It will then not be obtained through empirical research, which only 
ever tries to subsume the particular under a concept. The totality of society cannot be 
represented in such a fashion, for even more reasons than we’ve encountered with the 
priority of the object (AS 118-9). Adorno views this situation as the imperative for 
sociology to go beyond empirical research towards a theory of society. This is what 
Adorno often characterizes as the role of “speculation” or philosophy within sociology 
itself (AS 119). If everything is always already socially mediated, but this reality is hidden 
from perception through reification, then theory is the tool for its recognition (ES 104/59
EDi 138; Benzer 2011b, 92f.).
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But in what way exactly does this correct the inversion of science, its prioritization of
the universal concept over the particular object (EDi 138)? If we are fooled into believing 
that we see the particular, missing its hidden universality through social mediation, then 
a theory or society will help us see it. But this is a very different program for seeing 
through the illusion of immediacy than that proposed by Hegel. While Hegel relies upon 
contradiction to lead consciousness toward the next step in its education, the nature of 
the contradiction in this case stems from the dissatisfaction that consciousness 
experiences as it tries to articulate what it knows. Knowing that he has dismissed the 
dialectical progressiveness of the Hegelian dialectic, Adorno is forced to rely on a concept
of experience which seems to be more primal, and which bears an uncertain relationship 
to knowledge. Adorno’s individual suffers in its existence within the network of social 
roles and relations which constitute its world, it experiences the pain of domination by 
an abstract objectivity, but he cannot convincingly connect this experience to the drive to
speculatively re-cognize its situation. Above, in my discussion of Adorno’s 
“anthropological-materialist” reading of Kant’ transcendental subject, I emphasized his 
claim that Kantian universality ultimately reduces to social universality, or, essentially, 
commonality. While Adorno resists the conclusion that the Kantian transcendental 
subject actually is society, he emphasizes what they have in common: the “character of 
universality, of all-encompassing totality” (KK 261/172). There is a tension here in 
Adorno’s understanding of universality, which he seems to see both as the common or 
communal, and as a characteristic feature of the exchange relationship; but in either 
case, universality can be reduced to domination, to the attempted elimination of the 
particular (VGF 19/13). 
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It is therefore difficult for Adorno to make a case for a form of universality that goes 
beyond this. He can identify it negatively, as in the statement that “in its present form, 
the universal is no true universal,” but has difficulty with anything more (VGF 33/21). 
The universal, as social universal, is that from which the individual is abstracted, 
alienated; the individual sees and experiences it only as a form of oppression, coercion. 
Adorno’s claim that individual experience is “more than merely individual” entails that it
can “reach the universal,” but he also clarifies that the only way to grasp the universal is 
“through the movement of individual experience” (ND 6/46). Through the concept of 
philosophical or geistig experience, we can glimpse Adorno’s version of reconciliation, 
for the individual reaching a “true” universal (ND 50f./40f.).
If our “most immediate experience is that we are all harnessed to an objective trend”
(VGF 28/17), how is it that we can approach a true universal? It begins with the 
experience itself, and the reflection on it. “For Adorno the universality of the knowing 
subject can never be posited as an absolute over against the individual subjects 
themselves. The possibility of moving from individual experience to universal cognition, 
therefore, lies not in subsuming experience under universal laws of thought, but in 
discovering a universal moment within individual experience itself” (Tichy 1977). A final 
discussion of the concept of experience in Adorno’s work will help to clarify its own 
contradictions.
 4. From speculation to experience
Although he uses the term freely, Adorno has no place for Hegelian “speculation” in his 
work. The key to the negative dialectic is rather the concept of “experience.” As with his 
other key concepts, it is not a question of providing a definition, but of attempting to get 
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a handle on its meaning via constellation. I’ve discussed this constellation to some extent
above, emphasizing Adorno’s idea of the withering of experience within contemporary 
society, the loss of the experience of contradiction or diremption. Adorno conceives of a 
philosophical, or geistige experience as something which cannot be adequately 
described, and he emphasizes, especially in his reading of Hegel, the ways in which 
experience is encoded within texts. Adorno’s interpretive project of reading involves 
uncovering this hidden experience. In other words, it is not the concept of experience in 
a particular philosopher, or sociologist, that Adorno is concerned with, but the way in 
which their writing expresses a contradiction between the attempted description and the 
experience which lies at its origin. “Dialectical cognition must not . . . construct 
contradictions from above . . . Instead, it is up to it to pursue the inadequacy of thought 
and thing, to experience it in the thing” (ND 156/153; my translation). 
An adequate account of experience in Adorno would require an analysis of his 
notion of constellation and the way that it structures his writing. That is beyond my 
scope here; but I do want to bring up a few of the complexities. For Hegel, that which 
presents itself immediately to consciousness represents only the starting point for true 
knowledge. For Adorno, this is true as well, but in a very different sense. While Hegel 
shows how consciousness comes to see the illusory concreteness of these objects, 
Adorno, presupposing the universal mediation of exchange society, seeks to show how 
any attempt to grasp the object must fail, because of two factors: the essence of the object
as socially mediated is theoretically complex, and the subjective, individual experience 
which underlies our engagement with the object cannot be simply subsumed under 
universal concepts. But in this way, Adorno shows that he still relies upon a conception 
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of knowledge which should be adequate to its object. Hegel’s version of complete 
knowledge is offensive to Adorno because of the fundamental irrationality and evil of the 
world. The contemporary social world can only be understood in fragments now. 
Concrete objects are not false in Hegel’s sense, but in the sense that reason itself has 
been humbled. While the improper (and unethical) move from philosophical reflection 
to science can actually forestall experience, Adorno’s suggestion of an articulation 
between sociological and philosophical thought remains just that — a suggestion. 
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